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The Purge in Occupied Japan

A Study in the Use of Civilian Agencies
Under Military Government

by
John D. Montgomery

Received: 3 July 1953

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MEMORANDUM
OROT-48(TEC)

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Chevy Chase, Maryland**

ORO abstract

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THE PURGE IN OCCUPIED JAPAN A Study in the Use of Civilian Agencies Under Military Government

by

John D. Montgomery

One of the immediate problems confronting a military unit in an occupation is the removal of incriminated and politically undesirable elements from the native government. In Japan this was achieved by a categorical purge, carried out rapidly so that the Army could make continued use of existing governmental and economic machinery. The purge categories set up by SCAP included Army and Navy career officers, influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies, and officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion. People in these categories were to be removed from public office and forbidden to hold such office in the future. The Japanese themselves were to administer the program. ORO has studied the purge intensively, to draw lessons for the guidance of authorities in any future occupation. Some of the more important findings and recommendations follow:

- Make removals from public office decisive and swift, to take advantage of public reaction against those who "lost the war" and to minimize their influence under the military government.
- Remove no more local leaders than necessary to implement local government reforms. Bar family members, protégés, and other persons dominated by purgees from important policy-making positions.
- When the occupation lasts long enough, undertake a systematic program of "de-purging"—to avoid setting purgees apart for special public sympathy when the occupation is ended.

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Technical Memorandum ORO-T-48(FEC)



ORO

The Purge in

Occupied Japan

**A Study in the Use of Civilian
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by

John D. Montgomery

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Maryland

**Project
LEGATE**

Received:
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PREFACE

A recent study of the Japanese Occupation called it "the greatest single administrative enterprise ever undertaken by the United States outside its own borders." Whether the Occupation is considered in terms of the size of the population under the Supreme Commander's authority, or the dimensions of the staff he required, or the logistics and economic planning involved in the operation, or its broad political objectives, it was a task of monumental proportions.

In some respects this Occupation was a unique experience, although it is safe to assume that similar tasks, perhaps of even greater dimensions, may confront the US Army in some future postwar reconstruction period. It is unlikely that the future will bring about another set of conditions like this sudden and orderly surrender, or that the governing agencies in a defeated nation will remain intact for the convenience of the occupying powers; it is also improbable that a similar environment, with such a high degree of social uniformity, will be found among other occupied peoples, or that this singular lack of subversive activity against the security forces can be anticipated elsewhere. But in spite of all the unusual features of this Occupation, it was basically parallel to the other great military government activities of the past decade. In Japan, as elsewhere, enormous devastation and destruction and social disintegration confronted the armies in occupation. Following Allied policy throughout the conquered area(s) after World War II, the forces in Japan were compelled to take immediate steps to reinstate a stable government and economy. The Japanese Occupation, in a word, resembled other occupations in more important respects than it differed from them.

One of the immediate problems confronting a military unit in an occupation is the removal of incriminated and politically undesirable elements from the indigenous government. In Japan this was achieved by a categorical "purge," carried out rapidly in order to create political conditions which would enable the army in occupation to make continued use of existing governmental and economic machinery. This operation in itself represents one of the largest wholesale changes in "elite personnel" ever deliberately undertaken.

The present study was designed to provide exhaustive data on how this change in leadership was brought about, and what incidental effects accompanied it. The purge operation afforded an opportunity to study the mechanics of dealing with an occupied people on every plane of organized society—at the national level and in local governments, in politics, industry, and in the indefinable elements of community morale. The information gathered from this study may be useful both for military planning for future occupations and for training military government officers whose duties will require them to deal with various governmental units in an occupied nation.

The study was intended to be exhaustive as to the purge in Japan; but it can achieve its fullest usefulness only after further research in similar problems encountered in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. It describes what appear to be the basic elements of one occupation, but only further field research will reveal whether these are recurrent or probable in the predictable future. Accordingly, this study has not attempted to "improve" a past performance or "correct" its "mistakes." Its intent is to show operationally what the program actually achieved in Japan, and, where the evidence warrants it, to develop basic principles which may be applicable to other situations. Changing environments in future administrative situations will certainly require variations in these principles; what those variations may be can be predicted only after further research in other areas. At present, not enough is known about what really happens in an occupied country beneath a surface of conformity and acquiescence to permit planning on a systematic basis. Facts of this kind may help to prevent policy errors that might endanger the security of some future occupation or the success of its assigned mission.

Editorial Note: The English names or a transliteration of the Japanese names of organizations, political parties, newspapers, etc. will be used throughout. See "Glossary" for abbreviations of US terms and English translations of Japanese terms.

The superior numbers refer to a numbered reference section which is placed at the end of the report.

Where percentages appear they have been rounded off to the nearest 100th, and in many cases the columns do not add to 100.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The amount of material presented in this report could not have been gathered by one man in four months. Much of the arduous labor involved in obtaining data was done by Japanese government officials, scholars, journalists, businessmen, and translators. They cooperated wholeheartedly in the work, and accepted with good nature the harsh deadlines which were necessary.

Dr. Milton J. Esman, Department of State, was granted leave from his duties in Washington to join me in these studies. His knowledge of the Japanese government and his keen grasp of politics contributed substantially to the development of a perspective for the problem. Needless to say, neither he nor the Department of State can accept responsibility for the form which this analysis has taken nor for the conclusions presented here.

Through the courtesy of Mitsusada Yoshikawa, then Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau, and Masumi Takahashi, Chief of its Observation Division, a great deal of material from the official records of the government was made available to me, and Mr. Tsugunao Kubo and Mr. Haruo Hasegawa helped greatly by gathering and summarizing case records relating to the purge violations.

Mr. Masao Kobayashi, of the Supervision Section, Prime Minister's Office, provided information and records regarding the organization and statistical incidence of the purge. He and his staff gave many hours of their time to answer in great detail the troublesome questions I raised. Supporting materials were gathered by Mr. Katsuhiko Onogi, Chief of the Administrative Management Agency of the Prime Minister's Office, and by his staff.

Public opinion studies relating to the purge were carried on especially for this project by the National Public Opinion Research Institute, also of the Prime Minister's Office. Mr. Tadanobu Asano, its technical chief, and his associate Mr. Kazumi Kitahara performed the study of Tokyo public opinion, assisted by 28 interviewers.

Office space for conducting interviews and seminars was provided by the Tokyo Institute of Municipal Research, Mr. Tamon Maeda, President. Members of that Institute, including its Executive Director, Mr. Sadayoshi Tanabe and Directors Kuraji Ogura and Reikichi Kojima cooperated in many ways with the research. I was especially grateful, also, for Mr. Ogura's tact and wisdom in securing assistance and cooperation in local government circles throughout Japan. Mr. Teruyasu Hirahata of the Institute assisted in more ways than he realized, not only in tabulating and translating data but also in rendering advice that proved helpful in securing assistance from many Japanese friends.

Professor Nobushige Ukai, Director of the Social Science Research Institute of Tokyo University, proved himself a most versatile and able scholar and an esteemed friend. He and Professor Shigeru Hayashi provided a staff of eight

scholars who investigated the effects of the purge in three prefectures. This study, jointly conducted by the Institute of Municipal Research and Tokyo University, provided all of the materials used in Chapter 6. Professor Masamichi Royama, dean of Japanese political scientists, contributed generously of his time and wisdom to the project.

Professor Hanji Kinoshita of the Tokyo University of Education prepared a special study of the right-wing movements in Japan for this research. Professor Nobuo Noda of the Economics Department of Seikei University provided a valuable pilot study on the effect of the purge on the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu. Mr. Shigeyoshi Aikawa of the Yomiuri Press wrote an article dealing with political parties and the purge which was also of great interest and value. Many other journalists and editorialists contributed from their wisdom and experience to an understanding of the purge as a political problem. Mr. Nishijima of the Asahi Press in particular set up a series of seminars dealing with this subject.

Mr. Shuzo Watano, Editor of the Oriental Economist, and his associate Mr. Kiyomi Maeda made careful studies of the purge as an influence on the credit structure of Japanese industry. Yoichi Uyeno, president of the Industrial Efficiency College, prepared an analysis of the technological effects of the leadership changes following the purge. Mr. Y. Satoh, managing editor of the Osaka Branch of the Nihon Keizai, performed yeoman service in arranging for interviews in Osaka. Professor Saburo Morisawa of the Osaka College of Foreign Studies assisted throughout the Osaka phases of these studies, and Professors Ukai and Ogura came from Tokyo to assist in arranging for economic and other studies to be made in the Kansai District. Many officials in the city and prefectural governments in Osaka also aided in the Osaka research under the direction of Mr. Shohei Nakao.

Captain William J. Gerard of G-2, FEC, arranged for the temporary assignment of translators to the task of handling documents relative to this study. Without them this work would have been impossible. I wish also to acknowledge with thanks the administrative support and suggestions supplied by Nelson I. Fooks, Colonel, GSC, G-3, FEC.

In his last days in Tokyo, Frank Rizzo, retiring Chief of the Government Section, spent many hours with me when he should have been packing and attending farewell parties. His guidance and help were invaluable. Mr. Charles L. Kades, also formerly Chief of the Government Section, devoted the best part of an afternoon to discussing the basic administrative objectives and policies of the purge and other political reforms. His views were valuable particularly in establishing a perspective for evaluating the early phases of occupation planning. Macon Fry and Peter Ogloblin of ORO, FEC made special staff studies which provided useful background material for this report. A history of the intelligence phases of the purge operation by Mr. Ogloblin has been published as a separate appendix (CONFIDENTIAL) to this report. Professor Edwin O. Keischauer has read and commented on the entire manuscript, and James E. King and Henry Kissinger have read sections of it and made a number of helpful suggestions which have contributed to the final product.

Mr. Minoru Kawamoto served throughout the entire study as research assistant and interpreter. His unerring bilingual skill and his professional ability as a political scientist made some of the usually onerous tasks of the research almost pleasant. To him special thanks are due.

In spite of all this assistance, the final responsibility for errors and inadequacies rests with me. Since this represents a working paper and is a prelim-

inary report on this study, there is yet time for correcting errors and misconceptions which may appear in the following pages. I sincerely hope that if any reader encounters errors which deserve correction, or opinions which demand reconsideration, he will refer them directly to the Operations Research Office.

J.D.M.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

What effects did the purge of politically undesirable persons from public office have upon the achievement of the Army's mission in the occupation of Japan? How can these experiences provide guidance for future occupation administration?

FACTS

Experience in military government emphasizes the necessity of making extensive use of civil governmental and economic agencies during the occupation. In each case, this use has required the selection of certain key individuals for, and the exclusion of others from, positions of responsibility in these agencies.

The most systematic efforts used in applying this principle occurred in the German denazification program and in the Japanese purge.

The significant characteristics of the Japanese purge program are first, the absence of ground combat in Japan preceding the Occupation left most civil agencies intact and ready for immediate use by the military government, pending the removal of undesirable elements; second, the purge program was carried out in Japan by an administrative process involving no judicial findings as in Germany. This involved designation of individuals according to categories, screening by Japanese agencies, and the immediate removal or barring of such persons from all public office; and third, a single set of categories was applied in Japan to all governmental positions on both national and local levels, and to Japanese industry. There was no distinction between public office and other positions of public importance.

DISCUSSION

The sudden Japanese surrender imposed upon the Army the responsibility for implementing two basic US occupation objectives; that of restoring the Japanese economy to a minimum subsistence level, while at the same time introducing important reforms into Japanese government and industry. These objectives were to be carried out by the Japanese government itself, under military supervision. Accordingly it was decided categorically to remove and exclude from public office all incriminated and politically undesirable elements. Those removed included army and navy career officers, influential members

of ultranationalistic and terroristic societies and organizations, and officers of financial and development organizations involved in the Japanese overseas expansion. Their replacements were carefully screened to insure that occupation policies would not be implemented by persons whose past record would be embarrassing to the Allied Powers.

Field research in Japan for this study took place over a period of four and one-half months in 1952. The first phase was the examination of official SCAP (Supreme Command of the Allied Powers) and Japanese governmental records and selecting and briefing a staff to perform the necessary field work. The second phase involved the actual field studies. These included political analyses by Japanese political scientists, journalists, and public officials; three public opinion studies by the National Public Opinion Research Institute; economic analyses by the research staff of the Oriental Economist and the College of Industrial Efficiency; and community surveys in widely separated areas of Japan by a special staff assembled from the Social Science Research Institute of Tokyo University and the Tokyo Institute of Municipal Research. The third phase was the translation of thousands of pages of documents and reports. Thereafter nearly a year was spent in sifting, collating, and appraising the studies, resolving conflicts and inconsistencies, arranging for further supporting research, and interpreting the final results.

This research necessarily made use of Japanese records and scholarship. Although highly competent scholars were employed, in some cases the experience of Japanese social scientists in empirical field research was not as varied and extensive as that of American scholars. To minimize this disadvantage seminars and conferences dealing with research methodology were used throughout for the separate programs, particularly where young or inexperienced assistants were involved. In some areas, of course, the accepted methods in use in Japan were already satisfactory; the economic studies and appraisals compare in quality roughly to similar studies made in this country. Similarly, the public opinion techniques used were patterned after advanced methods in use in the United States, with the reservation that the vagueness and inexactness of the Japanese language adds special hazards in achieving a literal and exact translation of the opinions expressed. The variety of approaches used to substantiate the results was designed to minimize the possibility of methodological error.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Of the 2,308,863 cases screened, 210,287 were purged. Actually, however, only 13,835 of these were office-holders, the others receiving a "provisional designation" prohibiting them from holding office in the future. Although a handful—not over 20—of the Occupational personnel were concerned with the purge, there was an enormous staff of Japanese engaged in its administration. This included a score of members of the national screening and review commissions, a national secretariat of hundreds, over a thousand agents in the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB) of the Attorney General's Office, 784 local screening "commissioners," and many more performing secretarial work at local offices.

2. Japanese political life was instantly transformed by the purge: only three cabinet ministers survived the first purge; 95 percent of the candidates for the Diet were novices in the first postwar elections; nearly half the House

of Peers was purged; 375 of the 466 seats in the lower house were held by "freshmen" in 1946. The conservative parties underwent leadership changes almost in direct proportion to their distance to the right of center, the Socialist and Communist parties emerging in unprecedented strength as their political enemies were neutralized by the purge. Soon certain of these left-wing leaders began so closely to resemble the pre-Occupation rightist fanatics in their politics that they, too, were purged. This whole process had been designed to encourage a moderate group of political leaders by removing extremes of both right and left. As the Occupation progressed, however, the domestic balance of power was further disturbed by the emergence of the bureaucracy as an increasingly strong political factor in postwar Japan. This group had been closely related to the prewar imperialistic program, and Japanese politics soon became a struggle between inexperienced political leaders holding moderate views and an irresponsible bureaucracy with strong rightist traditions.

3. The public viewed the purge as a convenience to the occupying powers rather than as a reform. For the most part, they did not consider that the purgees had been responsible for either Japan's totalitarianism or for the war. This was partly because of the lack of public information on the purposes and scope of the purge. Greatest support for the purge was among less-privileged and less-educated elements of society, but this support was relatively small. Only a minority thought the purge had benefited Japan, or that the new leaders were superior to or "more democratic" than the old. There was indirect evidence that the Japanese believed the replacements for purgees were less "militaristic" than their predecessors, but even this opinion had not been mobilized to support the purge.

4. There were 1410 businessmen and industrialists purged, of whom 486 were actually removed from their positions. The purge screening included every major industry and 1807 separate factories. In large, well-structured industries, the removal of top management simply speeded up the promotion of intermediate and junior executives; but in smaller corporations, in those depending upon the enterprise and imagination of a few executives, and in companies possessing a less efficient organization, the effects were sometimes serious. Unfortunately, in this way the purge had its least effects upon the largest corporations of a monopolistic type, contrary to the basic economic objective of decartelization and encouragement of small entrepreneurs. The managerial changes tended specifically to affect those elements of executive decision resting upon personal relationships, particularly in credit status and labor relations. Removal of the former management, where it had any discernable effects, had three tendencies: to encourage irregular means of financing; to place greater power in the hands of banks which sought to protect their investments by providing managerial controls over companies in which they held stock; and to encourage the sudden rise of labor unions. There are evidences that a strong continuity of influence was retained by some purgees over their successors.

5. The removal of mayors, village headmen, and local officers of national totalitarian societies encouraged the rise of new elements of local leadership. Usually this did not bring about any important change in community attitudes or local politics and administration. Very few of the purgees at local levels had had any prominence in their communities, and often, particularly in rural areas, they seem to have had little connection with the war effort except through such formal duties as allocating crop quotas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For the formulation of military government policy relating to politically undesirable persons it is recommended that:

1. Removals from public office should be decisive and swift to take advantage of public reaction against those who "lost the war" and to minimize their influence under the military government. This requires early announcement of a complete, phased program that bears a clear relation to basic occupational objectives.

2. Removals and other disabilities accompanying the purge should be limited to those who carried major leadership responsibilities under the former government, and to those whose positions under the military government require the assumption of such responsibility whether it existed previously or not. Removal of minor functionaries whose activity has no political significance may have no value in accomplishing political reforms and may bring about unnecessary losses in public response to the program.

3. The extent of removals from various elements of political strength in a governmental organization should be calculated so that any displacement of domestic power will work to further the political objectives of the occupation. Removals should be lightest in agencies which the military government wishes to strengthen.

4. Removals of local leaders should remain at the minimum level required to implement local government reforms. Extensive removals of persons not publicly committed to the previous order may bring about a reversal of public sentiment.

5. Removals of industrial leaders should be part of a broad economic reform program. Important figures in large, well-organized industries may be removed without serious loss to company operations, as a rule, whereas the removal of entrepreneurial managers of smaller companies may place them at a competitive disadvantage. Such facts may be of decisive importance in a program of economic reform and reconstruction.

6. The training of civil affairs military government officers should include the study of relations with occupied governments and other civilian agencies, with some attention given to the preparation of text materials dealing with such experiences in past occupations.

For the conduct of future occupations it is recommended that:

1. Plans for the administration of the purge should begin as soon as such a policy is announced to the military command.

2. Initial plans should include a team of qualified specialists to conduct field studies (analysis of actual patterns of leadership, as potential targets of the purge program) when the military occupation begins.

3. A systematic and continuing analysis of the purgees' replacements should be made to determine whether the general changes in leadership personnel are consistent with occupational objectives.

4. Continuous studies should be carried out under the direction of competent specialists to determine the effects of the purge upon the institutions involved and to make recommendations for changes in the basic program wherever these effects threaten to become inconsistent with occupational objectives.

5. Where possible, if an "administrative" purge designation is used, it should be accompanied from the first by a quasi-judicial review process for the prompt correction of errors and injustices.

6. Where formal purge categories are used, a systematic means should be used for extending the purge to persons who may escape formal designation but who are otherwise unacceptable.

7. In the removal of elected office-holders, special care should be taken to provide for their replacement by an elective or other political process. (Constant study may also be necessary to insure that the purge is actually working to redistribute political power in conformity with basic political reform objectives.)

8. Agencies should be established in the civilian government, preferably under military intelligence supervision, for the surveillance of purgee activity and for the collection of evidence necessary for the prosecution of violators.

9. Where a purge is undertaken for purposes of political reform, a program of public information should be undertaken. Segments of the public which are sympathetic to these political objectives should be considered areas of potential support for the purge, and treated as special targets in the public relations program.

10. Improper continuity of influence by purgees over their successors should be prevented wherever possible by barring persons under their domination (family members, protégés, etc.) from important policy-making positions involving responsibility to the public.

11. Wherever the duration of the occupation permits it, a systematic and categorical program of "de-purging" should be undertaken. This will enable purgees to re-enter society in an orderly fashion and avoid setting them apart for special public sympathy and support when the occupation is concluded.

For further research in military government it is recommended that:

1. Parallel studies should be made in Germany and elsewhere in order to identify contrasts and resemblances in the two major occupations where a purge took place and determine how changed conditions may affect military government policy and administration.

2. A synthetic study should be considered for the purpose of applying the operational principles of the Japanese and German experience to a hypothetical occupation in the future.

3. Other studies should be formulated to deal with the problems of using civilian agencies for occupational purposes under military government. These should place primary emphasis on the use of such agencies for obtaining services for the occupying forces on both national and local levels.

Chapter 1

THE JAPANESE PURGE AS A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

One of the essential problems of occupation administration is selecting the most efficient means of providing for the government of civilians in a theater of war or in war-ravaged areas. For such purposes direct military rule is generally regarded as undesirable for two reasons: it is a wasteful use of military manpower, and it tends to involve the military government in troublesome and irrelevant issues of domestic politics. Most occupations in modern times accordingly have been conducted through civil agencies of the indigenous government, acting under military supervision.

UTILIZATION OF INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENTS UNDER OCCUPATION

There are two basic means of using civil agencies for military government purposes. One involves the organization and emplacement of a ready-made "puppet government," created according to the design of the victorious nation; the other permits the existing government to remain in power after removing ("purging") its former personnel and encouraging the rise of a new leadership. Neither form has been extensively employed to the exclusion of the other, because both devices if used in their "pure" form would entail serious consequences. In the former case, the creation of an entire mechanism of political administration would be an undertaking almost as inefficient as direct military rule; and the second form, involving a wholesale purge, might be equally impractical, since the removal of the entire operating personnel of the civil government would leave it handicapped by an inexperienced or untrained staff during a period of great emergency.

For practical reasons, therefore, the military governor of a nation usually seeks to discover the means for working out arrangements lying somewhere between these extremes and designed in accordance with his immediate needs. These arrangements have varied widely in the recent occupations. Totalitarian nations of all ideologies—Germany, Japan, and the USSR—have tended to make greater use of puppet forms than have democratic countries. In general, puppet governments can be established wherever the occupied country provides strongly organized native factions willing to accept without question a complete political dogma made to order by the occupying power. Through such devices, totalitarian occupations seek to create an illusion of extensive popular autonomy, designed to conceal the limited nature of civil sovereignty. Modern practice has demonstrated, however, that there is a risk that these puppets may develop a political life of their own, which in some cases has proven an embarrassment to the occupying nation. For this reason a drastic form of purge has frequently been used as a means of curbing "deviations." There have been

few puppet governments which have escaped the indignities of an involuntary purge after a short interval of tantalizing pseudo-autonomy.

In contrast to this totalitarian pattern, US experiences in occupation administration following World War II have tended to make greater use of a moderate purge system in establishing the relations between the military authority and the civil government. This method has avoided any political commitments to support the civil government under occupation, and has had the positive advantage of encouraging a degree of popular participation in self-rule. Generally, the American military governments have used purge devices to remove from office many persons who for political, economic, or administrative reasons were unacceptable to the occupational authority. Yet the Americans have also made some use of puppet devices in order to create an element of continuity with the previous government in the surviving personnel and institutions. This has provided civil government agencies with constitutional or traditional claims to power, even under occupation, and has avoided the appearance of a civil government resting solely upon the threat of force applied by the American armies.

The Japanese Occupation represents an outstanding example of the use of an established national government after a thoroughgoing purge. The Emperor and his household provided elements of stability which minimized the problem of security to the armed forces and enabled the Supreme Commander (SCAP) to make extensive use of existing Japanese agencies for performing tasks directly related to his program. This was followed shortly by an elaborate and systematic purge of extremists, starting with the right wing, and proceeding, as events made it necessary, to the militant left. The success of this method is attested by the efficiency with which a small number of military-government officers performed their functions in a nation of 80,000,000 people.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE JAPANESE PURGE

The Japanese purge occurred within the framework of a stable and largely undamaged national government. It was designed to bring about changes both in personnel and in the system previously used for selecting political leaders. Its objectives can be summarized briefly in spite of the complexity and magnitude of the operation:

Security. This is always a primary military consideration, but questions of security for the occupation forces in Japan were of special concern for two reasons.* In the first place, agencies which had provided the core of the Japanese Government's wartime despotism were to retain vast powers under the Occupation. The Army and Navy, for example, were reorganized into short-lived demobilization boards where they controlled large sums of money and stores of war materiel; and the infamous Japanese police were charged with the maintenance of public order among the civil population. It was, therefore, deemed essential at the outset to remove from these agencies the elements which had been responsible for Japan's military adventures and her domestic despotism. A special feature of the Japanese Occupation was the existence of

*Contrary to expectations, there was in fact no important threat to public order in Japan, as the early months of the Occupation demonstrated. This does not, however, detract from the security aspects of the purge program in its early phases.

many "secret" terroristic societies which, even in prewar times, had been responsible for numerous assassinations and concealed manipulations in order to achieve fanatical and irresponsible ends. These organizations represented a constant veiled threat against public safety and political stability until they were dissolved and their leaders purged from public office or barred from political activity.

Political Reform. The purge of Japan's wartime leadership did not necessarily in itself bring about reform, although it was a central feature of the program formulated at Potsdam and of the US initial postsurrender policy for Japan.* But the removal of all personnel associated with Japanese militarism and aggressive nationalism was considered essential to the development of a responsible democratic leadership, and thus it paved the way to reforms. The purge was in this sense, as the Japanese press called it, a "bloodless revolution."

Economic Reform. Japan's industrial war lords were to be dispossessed of their military assets, and, in some cases, of all other sources of economic power as well. The extensive program of reforms designed for Japanese business and industry was, therefore, accompanied by an equally sweeping change in her business and industrial leadership.

Administrative Necessity. SCAP was empowered to remove from office any persons who proved uncooperative with the Occupation program, regardless of their political loyalties or previous activities. These removals were extremely rare, however (See SCAPIN 1231, App A, for an example.).

ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING FOR THE PURGE

Whatever the objectives of a military-government purge may be, certain basic administrative decisions must be made before the program can be inaugurated. They, too, can be stated in brief summary, although their resolution requires a considerable amount of intelligence research and staff planning. In Japan, as elsewhere, these decisions included the following areas:

The Extent of the Purge. The directives calling for a purge of Japanese leadership provided no standards for determining the number of persons to be removed, the types of position from which they were to be barred, or the nature of the activities for which individuals were to be purged. The question of how many persons should be removed in order to accomplish the objectives of the Occupation had also to be tempered with other questions, sometimes in conflict with the program. The stability of the Japanese government, for example, might have been endangered if the purge were carried too far, and there was also the danger that economic rehabilitation might be retarded if valuable industrial or managerial skills were lost through the purge.

The Administration of the Purge. There were many available means for removing known persons from office in Japan, but as is usually the case in an occupation, most of the victims of the purge were unknown in advance; in Japan, the responsible leaders of the nation were possessed of a singular passion for anonymity even among their own people. The removals had, therefore, to be preceded by a detailed investigation; this called for a consistent, systematic procedure to be applied rapidly, effectively, and justly. Since more than two million cases were involved, elaborate machinery might be necessary for this

*These were communicated to SCAP through JCS Directive 1380/15¹ and other documents in September, 1945.

purpose. The process also required careful timing in order that the personnel changes in critical fields could take place without excessive losses in efficient and orderly performance.*

The Emplacement of New Leaders. The purge itself was a negative process, but its objectives entailed the rise of a new leadership to replace the old. Furthermore, the purge exercised a strong indirect influence upon the struggle for power following the removals, for it remained as a constant threat to any leader who might prove unacceptable to SCAP. Through the purge SCAP became a silent partner in the choice of new leaders: he could, if necessary, prevent appointments which might otherwise have been made in conformity with Japanese traditions, seniority, or other claims to office. Thus, he did not himself select Japan's new leaders and was under no moral obligation to support them, but the continued operation of the purge during the early years of the Occupation served notice that if the Occupation's program were involved he would not ignore domestic affairs which had been delegated to Japanese officials. Leaders who retained power did so at his pleasure.

The Enforcement of the Purge. Even after purgees were removed from office, they still represented a possible threat to the security of the Occupation and the accomplishment of its objectives. Means had, therefore, to be devised to minimize purgees' influence over their successors and to maintain adequate surveillance over their activities while purged from office. In addition to formal surveillance, this required an extensive program of public education† and an effort at reorientation of the new leaders who rose to replace the purgees.

The Appeal and De-Purge Process. In the 200,000 removals which occurred over a period of months, errors were unavoidable. This was especially true where the purgees had strong domestic political support and in cases where political controversies were involved. Such errors represented a potential danger to the success of the entire program, particularly where a popular leader was involved. An orderly review of alleged injustices became an essential part of the program. The de-purge occurred at a later time, when it became possible to arrange for a gradual reabsorption of the displaced leaders into Japanese society. As the Occupation entered later phases, the purge restrictions were successively removed in most categories, and purgees were permitted to re-enter active life beside Japan's new postwar leadership.

Relation to Other Reforms. The contemplated change in personnel would do no more than bring about a temporary shift in politics unless the governmental and economic systems themselves were changed. The system which had produced the original leadership was still intact, and it could still exert a strong influence over

*Administrative convenience was a factor only in the sense that personnel was removed by beginning with those at the highest levels in the national government and then proceeding to the highest levels in the prefectural and municipal areas, and then proceeding into the lower levels of government, national and local, on down as far as seemed proper in the light of the purpose of providing a new leadership. . . After all, the purge was, I suppose, in reality, the political as distinguished from the military side of disarmament, and should have been completed in the initial phase of the Occupation . . . "2

†Information regarding the purpose and administration of the purge was circulated to the public as widely as possible in order to enlist popular support for the restrictions on purgees' activities. There were some reports of purge violations forwarded to official channels as a result of this program, but in general the public approved the purge but sympathized with purgees. (Chap. 2 and 4.)

the purgees' replacements. The purge had therefore to be planned in conjunction with more basic structural reforms. The institutional reforms that followed were in a sense designed to make the purge of militarism and totalitarianism effective even after the Occupation was ended.

PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF THE PURGE PROGRAM

In spite of unpleasant predictions that the Japanese would seek to undermine the security of the Occupation Forces by subtle cunning and fanatical tenacity, there was remarkably little danger to public safety or that of the Occupation.* Accordingly, the primary focus of the purge turned quickly to the basic political and economic program of the Occupation. For this reason, the purge aroused criticism and controversy almost immediately. These began even in the planning stage, and they became all the sharper as the size of the program was revealed. By May 1948, well over 200,000 persons had been designated as purgees, including 54 war criminals, 160,000 army and navy career officers, and 42,000 other persons whose wartime activities or positions were deemed sufficiently undesirable to bar them from important public office.† More than 1000 national political leaders and public servants were removed from their positions, and 7000 prefectural, city, and village leaders were removed. Top executive positions in the leading financial, commercial, and industrial enterprises were defined as "important public offices," so that the purge could be applied to the business population; even newspapers, schools, and public information media were required to screen those holding responsible positions so that the purge could be applied in all phases of public and semipublic life.‡

In some ways, the dimensions of the purge created a strong source of support for the removals. The program had been orderly and systematic, as even its critics had been forced to admit: in little more than two years the purge was officially "completed,"§ and the Japanese nation was healthy and prosperous under its new leadership. National elections had been held twice, and in the government and in major industries a new leadership had risen to power. Although these were not hand-picked by the Occupation, many of the new leaders were basically sympathetic to the reform program, which after all had been responsible for their current positions of authority. Others, who had no reason to be grateful to the Occupation, or who were wavering in their own position on reform policies, found that the continued operation of the purge provided special stimulus to conformity and even cooperation. In addition to those who had benefited personally from the purge, there was also much support from prewar liberals and left-wingers, whose voices were rusty with disuse. To them the purge appeared a symbol of a new order of peace and democracy.

Although the purge generated support for the Occupation among these groups, it also aroused an intense and bitter hostility. From extremists on all sides, the attack concentrated on this target: some charged that it represented selfish

*A discussion of the few cases that developed during the early years of the Occupation, and of the role played by the purge in dealing with them appears in Chap. 3.

†If a similar operation were transplanted to the United States, about twice these numbers would have been affected, on the basis of population.

‡The "public information media" phase of the purge, an entirely separate program, has not been discussed extensively in this paper. For a brief discussion of the problem, see Ref 3.

§Ref 4, p 21.

American business interests seeking to destroy Japanese competition; others that it was dictated by pro-Communist elements in SCAP who wanted to undermine the capitalistic order. The only point of agreement among these criticisms was that the economic phase of the purge, at least, was a catastrophe for Japan.

Critics of the political aspects of the purge could also be divided into two camps: those who contended that the purge had gone too far, because it had struck down many figureheads and minor officials who had not been responsible for Japan's militarism; and those who believed that it had not been carried far enough to remove the most dangerous elements in Japan. The former group argued that the return of purgees to positions of influence, toward the end of the Occupation, proved that they were necessary to Japan's reconstruction; the latter contended that this return of old-time leaders to seats of responsibility proved only that they had never really had to surrender their influence at all, but had used their successors as marionettes, which they manipulated backstage. The former represented the business interests, the higher brackets of permanent government employees, and right-wingers; the latter group included academics, newspapermen, and "liberals" tending toward the left. For years after the purge was completed these camps could be clearly distinguished in their views toward the purge (see Chap. 4).

The criticisms levelled against the purge attacked its basic theory as well as its detailed operation. Many of them were insubstantial and irrelevant, but they represented strong sources of pressure during critical periods of policy formulation.* The criticisms started with the theoretical proposition that the generation of a new type of leadership could not be brought about by removal of the older elements if they were replaced with men who had been trained by the purgees and held similar points of view or remained subject to their influence. In all respects, this argument ran, the replacements were exactly like the purgees except that they lacked their experience and training.†

A second theoretical objection to the purge was even more general, for it attacked the basis of the Occupation itself; it was also used in political campaigns against the après-guerre leadership as late as the election of October 1952. According to this argument, the Occupation officials were hypocritical in speaking of "Japanese leadership" because under the conditions of the Occupation the only "leaders" were wearing American uniforms.‡ Replacements

*High SCAP officials indicated to the author that these pressures were exerted not only upon staff officers, but also upon officials in Washington.

†Subsequent studies (Chap. 4) showed that the differences in outlook between purgees and their replacements may not have been very great, so far as most Japanese could feel. This whole argument, however, ignores the fact that the Occupation itself created a different environment in which these new leaders assumed office, and that the purge furnished them with a dramatic illustration of the failure of the traditional ways. It should also be remembered that the postwar period, even apart from Occupation policy, raised problems which were different from those the purgees had been accustomed to facing: repair of war damage, a rising and virile labor movement, lost overseas markets, inflation, and an altered credit structure. New techniques of dealing with these problems had to be devised, and the value of prewar and wartime experiences was therefore correspondingly reduced. In some areas it is possible that the experience and training of the purgees may have disqualified them from dealing effectively with unprecedented problems (the labor movement, for example).

‡Japanese Communists claimed they could see no difference between the Japanese use of Emperor Henry Pu-Yi in Manchoukuo after 1932 and the American use of Hirohito.

for the purgees were frequently called "robots," because they were supposedly kept subservient to the whims of SCAP personnel by the threat of purge. Those who held this view argued that the Allies were defeating their own purpose because they were depriving the Japanese leaders of any initiative. This would leave the country without a leadership capable of assuming any political responsibility for their acts, and lacking popular support because their only sanctions had come from SCAP rather than the Japanese people. According to this line of reasoning, Japanese leaders would be repudiated as soon as the Occupation was lifted, with serious consequences for the security of Japan and her power and influence in the postwar world.*

In addition to these basic theoretical objections, Occupation officials were constantly bombarded with complaints that the purge was too often unjust—a complaint for which evidence is not lacking. In contrast to the German experience, the Japanese purgees were designated by an administrative process. Most of them were removed because of formal affiliations with objectionable militaristic organizations or because of the positions they had occupied during or after the "China Incident." Many of them, like the prefectural governors and other local officials, had occupied merely titular positions in regional chapters of national wartime societies; their subordinates, on the other hand, many of whom may have been far more active and influential in sponsoring militarism, were seldom disturbed by the purge. In other cases, the purge was applied to field representatives of private companies which had done business in occupied China, but not to Japanese governmental officials in the field who had supervised and directed their activities. These are the formal paradoxes of the purge, which have provided endless amusement to Japanese newspapermen and political commentators; they were, however, relatively infrequent in terms of the scale of the operation and, in most cases, could have been avoided entirely through the prompt introduction of an appeals system.†

Other criticisms of the purge centered about the proposition that the removal of Japan's "best brains" would handicap her recovery or would work other great injuries to the nation. Since it is the purpose of this paper to examine closely the effects of the change of leadership brought about by the purge, a discussion of these arguments will be deferred until the evidence can be presented in full.

Many of these criticisms found expression not only among the Japanese public, but within SCAP headquarters as well. General and special staff sections occasionally took opposing views on the purge and, in the years that followed, both Japanese and American accounts reflected elements of partisanship on these controversial issues. Most of these controversies can be resolved in the light of subsequent experience and may help resolve similar issues that may arise in the future.

*Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the outcome of the 1952 elections (which occurred months after the Occupation had been terminated). Although most Japanese and American newspapers interpreted the results as a victory for purgees, there was, in fact, a surprising tendency on the part of Japanese voters to ignore the purge as a factor in the campaign. Purgees did not have any important advantage over nonpurgees at the polls.

†Chapter 2 and Appendix D contain a description of the appeals system and the documents submitted in a famous appeals case.

SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH ON THE JAPANESE PURGE

The following pages trace the course of the purge program from its inception to the end of the Occupation.* Where possible, the material is presented in such a way as to place result beside intent, and value received beside effort expended, so that a measure of the efficacy of the program can be roughly taken. In addition to this analysis, there has also been some attention devoted to the employment of Japanese governmental agencies to carry out the purge, for the Japanese government was paradoxically required to serve as its own "cleansing agent."† This procedure has accordingly provided an unusual case study, involving both administrative problems arising from the use of indigenous governmental agencies for a special Occupation program and substantive data showing the general effects of an extensive purge of national and local leaders.

The basic planning and administration of the purge became the first subject for the study. The organization for screening and surveillance of purgees required a complex apparatus both in the Japanese government and at SCAP. The entire program operated upon a series of basic administrative assumptions which can now be reappraised in terms of subsequent events.‡

The impact of the purge on Japanese political life produced some entirely unexpected results. These ranged from the organization and financing of political parties to the relative position of minority factions in Japan's postwar struggles for political positions. The various branches of the Japanese government were affected in entirely different ways, some of which altered slightly the equilibrium which the Occupation was seeking to achieve. Since many of these had a direct bearing on the objectives of Occupation reforms, these effects were studied in considerable detail (Chap. 3). Supporting studies of public opinion toward the purge were also made (Chap. 4) to bring out evidences of other respects in which the program affected the larger mission of SCAP.§

The economic purge, perhaps the most controversial area of all, received special attention (Chap. 5). As in government circles, there were widely differing effects on various segments of Japanese industry and upon the manage-

*There has already been some historical treatment of the purge (see Refs 5, 6); the primary purpose of which was to present the successive administrative stages of the purge. Little data were then available on its impact upon Japanese life or its effects upon Japanese politics and economics.

†At first, the term "cleansing" was used in official discussions of the proposed purge, to avoid confusing the program with events simultaneously going on in Germany.

‡The administrative aspects of the purge are discussed at length in Chap. 2. These assumptions became the basis for the evolution of a group of general purge categories which were applied by the Japanese government to over 2,300,000 cases.

§The research upon which this report is based was conducted from early April until after the October 1952 election. During this period the Japanese peace treaty took effect (28 April 1952), and SCAP's special military government staff agencies were dissolved. Japanese newspapers were publishing the first unrestricted accounts of the Occupation to a sensation-loving public, and the luridness of these articles combined with the violent political struggles at the polls tended to overcome the traditional Japanese reticence and indirectness regarding political affairs.

ment of individual companies. These effects appeared in a consistent pattern, which made it possible to relate the changes of leadership to other known factors in the industries and enterprises of the occupied nation. This may provide a basis for predictions of future occupations.

The effects of the purge on selected local communities were also studied (Chap. 6). Here again the purpose was to determine whether the different effects could become the basis for predicting the nature of the changes which may occur in different types of localities when community leaders are removed according to a national plan. Because in Japan most local matters were largely left to the civil government with some supervision by military government teams, special conditions were encountered in the cities and towns which produced results that were often without any relation to the purpose and intent of the program. Conclusions based on purge results in such areas may be of special relevance to future occupations where a substantial element of discretion is to be left to local governmental agencies.

In any occupation the problem of effectively using the governmental and economic resources, whether under conditions of combat or in a peaceful occupation, will rise early in the planning stage. The experiences in Japan have demonstrated the extent to which a national purge may be carried, and what its characteristic results may be under given circumstances. After these results have been compared with those obtained in other occupations, it is hoped that this important phase of military government can be reduced to highly probable laws and principles.

Chapter 2

THE CONDUCT AND OPERATION OF THE PURGE

BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE ASSUMPTIONS

An extensive administrative apparatus was designed by SCAP to implement the policies of the occupying powers as they related to various minute phases of Japanese national life.* Underlying the structural details of this machine is a framework of unspoken assumptions, of which three are of particular significance. These provide a key to understanding the entire purge operation, for although they were never formulated officially, they underlay the planning by which it was to be administered.

The first and major assumption of the purge in Japan was that an alternative leadership would rise automatically after wartime officials had been purged, which would be free from the antidemocratic elements of Japan's past, yet which would be experienced enough to continue essential government and private operations without a serious decrease in efficiency. This assumption led SCAP to conduct the purge officially as a negative operation, concerned only with designating persons deemed unfit to hold responsible positions. No organized effort was made to select replacements or, for the most part, to suggest how they should be selected. In practice this theory had the advantage of not committing the occupying forces to the political support of any particular group which happened to come to the fore, and it also encouraged a high degree of initiative on the part of the Japanese in selecting and developing their own leaders. But it had the corresponding disadvantage that some of the new leaders chosen through this process were only pale images of the purgees themselves, possessing the same outlook but less experience. As subsequent chapters will show, there were both public and commercial companies in where the purge was not widespread enough to effect a change in the ideology of the organization as a whole, or where the replacements often had many of the same convictions held by the purgees. In the main, however, examination of the subsequent conduct of the Occupation justifies this basic assumption, although it should be noted that the occupying power retained full responsibility for the subsequent behavior of leaders who had been "cleared" for their positions. No disastrous drop in the efficiency of public or private organizations

*See Ref 68 for an adequate account of the formal organization of the SCAP sections. Since the GS, the ESS, and G-2 were the agencies primarily concerned with the purge, publications and histories of these organizations will also be of special interest. For a discussion of informal relationships involved in the local administration of military government in Japan, see Ref 7.

through the loss of administrative or technical personnel resulted from the purge; and a new political leadership was able to rise in Japan which was instrumental in achieving democratic reforms without appearing to be so subservient to SCAP as to lose popular support.

The second assumption was that the purge could be conducted as an administrative rather than a judicial operation. Fresh experiences in the German occupation suggested that trials might be slow and ineffective and would still run the risk of working injustices in individual cases. Since it was an administrative device, the purge was viewed as a preventive (i.e., administrative) rather than a punitive (i.e., judicial) process; it was conducted as a political reform and for the security of the Occupation rather than as a means of judging and punishing the guilty. The latter aim was to be accomplished through the war crimes trials, whose results may be easily distinguished from those of the purge. The device used in the purge, on the other hand, was a series of mechanical "categories," to be applied automatically to all persons who were occupying "public office." No taint of guilt or finding of intent was involved.

Here again the subsequent experience of the Occupation throws considerable light on the adequacy of the assumption. For the most part (as shown in Chap. 4), the Japanese people did not make any important distinction in their minds between purgees and war criminals, and in spite of the official announcements the purge was generally regarded as a device for getting rid of prominent enemies of the United States.* Public opinion studies showed that the purge was also regarded as punitive: though milder than the punishment meted out to major criminals, the dispossessing of large numbers of people from their means of livelihood wrought great hardships in some cases, and a basic change in the careers of many more.

The most serious operating weakness of this assumption, however, was reflected in the popular opinion that the categories were too mechanical, and that there was too much unevenness in the categories as they worked their way down to individual cases. Most Japanese believed that in many cases men nominally falling under the purge categories could have been allowed to remain in office without any loss to the objectives of the Occupation; and that in as many more the character of the wartime activities and the ideology of the apres-guerre leaders were undistinguishable from those of the purgees, except that the new men came from a lower social status. From these experiences it may be concluded that an administrative concept of the purge may result in charges that the program is mechanical and unjust. In any similar operation in the future, these facts suggest that some attention should be devoted to designing means of minimizing these criticisms.†

The critical attitude could probably have been considerably alleviated by the adoption of a thoroughgoing and effective process of appeal and review as part of the purge itself.

*The purge of men who were English-speaking friends of the US still remains an enigma to most Japanese.

†This does not assume that a defeated nation is necessarily entitled to due process of law, or other constitutional American rights. The only problem here under discussion is a simple administrative one: the public confusion and dismay that were aroused over cases of "injustice" posed a serious problem in securing Japanese acceptance of the occupational reforms. Failures to report flagrant cases of purge violations may have been caused by these attitudes.

The third basic assumption underlying the administration of the purge was that special agencies of the Japanese government could be used to apply the broad SCAP categories to individual cases. In implementing the purge, all persons occupying posts designated as "important public positions" (whether in public or private agencies) were required to secure a "certificate of eligibility" to hold office. In order to obtain this from Japanese authorities, each candidate had to submit a detailed statement describing his previous career, with particular emphasis on his participation in wartime agencies after 1931. Members or officers of certain designated societies were denied the certificate, as were others whose activities fell within the purge categories. The decisions were made by Japanese screening boards, subject to SCAP review in each case. This review resulted in the SCAP decision to purge a total of 97 so-called "memorandum cases," which had been originally cleared by Japanese authorities. There are no cases on record of SCAP releasing any persons considered by the Japanese to be subject to purge; the SCAP review power was used to stiffen the application of the purge in doubtful cases, not to ease it.*

Again, subsequent experience, on the whole, justifies this assumption. There is evidence that the Japanese government occasionally used the purge for political purposes, but various SCAP agencies themselves also used the purge for other than its stated purposes.† It is undoubtedly true that the administration of the purge program by government agencies resulted in the protection of many public servants who might otherwise have been removed from office,‡ but there is no evidence to support the charge that the Allies were victimized by the Japanese who administered the purge.

It is probable that assumptions similar to these, with the reservations suggested above, based on adequate insight into the social and political institutions of the occupied nation, could form a satisfactory basis for future military government planning and operations.

*There are some cases where a purgee was designated by memorandum through a simple error in fact. For example, Naotake Sato was purged from the Privy Council because he had once been an ambassador to Fascist Italy. Prime Minister Yoshida promptly submitted a statement showing that Sato had not been an ambassador in residence; he had merely been sent on a trade mission. Yoshida also submitted copies of Sato's Diet speeches discussing foreign policy and listed his other activities in connection with international affairs. Sato was subsequently cleared by another memorandum. No case of such a SCAP reversal of a Japanese decision to purge has appeared, however (App D).

†See "The Administration of the Categories" section; and, for an example, App A.

‡The administration of other SCAP reforms also resulted in inequities in the operation of the purge. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this was the use in the Japanese Demobilization Boards of 11,500 military personnel who were subject to purge. While these men were slowly bringing about a demobilization of the Japanese Army, they also took advantage of the opportunity to disburse pay, allowances, benefits, and medals to purged military personnel for services dating back to the China Incident. They were also illegally operating a number of communal farms, subsidized by the Japanese Government, for the benefit of military personnel and organized along lines of military authority. There were 12 of these farms in Chiba-ken alone. The budget for the Demobilization Boards in 1946-1947 was four times that allocated to the Ministry of Education.⁸

THE PURGE CATEGORIES

To apply the general purge program to individual cases through instruments of the Japanese government, it was first necessary to establish a series of general criteria to be used for screening all persons holding important public office. This device enabled Japanese agencies to handle a maximum number of cases with a minimum leeway for favoritism, political manipulation, or outright circumvention of the purge program.

Designing the purge categories was a field operation performed by SCAP sections. The original directives specified only that military and ultranationalistic officers were to be removed from office,* and not until 5 December 1945 was the first draft of a purge directive completed. This became the basis for SCAPIN 550 (App A), the authority under which the Japanese government carried out the purge program.

This directive provided for: (1) the removal of certain categories of militarists and nationalists from "public office," i.e., from any "position in the government service which is customarily filled by one with the civil service rank of Chokunin or above..."† "Public office" was further defined to include non-civil-service positions equivalent to Chokunin (such as chief executives of government corporations, etc.); (2) exclusion from government service of any person eligible for the purge who may seek any position of any sort in the national or local government or their agencies, or in any other organizations in which the government or its agencies have a controlling interest.

Thus purgees from high positions were barred from seeking further employment with the government, and other candidates for government service at all levels were required to submit to a screening to establish their exemption from the purge. Other government employees below the rank of Chokunin were not removed from office,‡ although after they retired they would presumably be subject to the same requirements as other candidates if they wanted to re-enter public life. This decision permitted all members of the bureaucracy

*The authority for the purge outlined the objectives broadly in basic policy statements: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."⁹ "... Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other positions of public or substantial private responsibility. . ."¹⁰ "In no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or important positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates, . . . or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation."¹¹ The Political Association of Great Japan and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society were mentioned by name, but SCAP was directed to "assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937 in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression."¹

†Chokunin rank and above includes only imperial appointments; ministers, privy councilors, governors-general, ambassadors, judges, prefectural governors, vice-ministers, bureau chiefs, etc.

‡In a few cases, however, clerical employees were removed in the automatic purge of officials of ultranationalistic organizations.

below a very high rank to remain in office regardless of their beliefs and sympathies; it had important implications for the balance of political power in Japan (Chap. 3).

The disqualification of purgees from holding public office was to continue until the democratic objectives of Potsdam had been fulfilled.*

The specific categories of militarists and ultranationalists to be purged from public office follow (slightly condensed):

(a) War criminals, including those under arrest for subsequent trial, until released or acquitted.

(b) Career military and naval personnel, special police, and officials of the War Ministry. Members of high military and naval councils, all commissioned officers in the Regular Army or Regular Navy or Special Volunteer Reserve. All personnel of secret military or naval policy, and higher officers in the Ministries of War and Navy, were included.

(c) Influential members of ultranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies. Founders and those holding important posts in any society listed in SCAPIN 548 (App A) or making substantial voluntary contributions thereto were included. Twenty-seven such societies were specified by name with the proviso that this list did not include all of the organizations subject to the purge.

(d) Persons influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan. Founders, national or prefectural leaders, and editors of the publications of these societies were purged.

(e) Officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansion. Occupants of specified posts between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 of the South Manchurian Railway Co., Manchuria Development Co., Bank of Manchoukuo, and 17 other companies listed by name, as well as others "whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory," were subject to purge.

(f) Governors of occupied territories, including others occupying specified positions in ten areas occupied by Japan as well as "responsible Japanese officers controlling collaborationist native governments" in Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Asia.

"(g) Additional militarists and ultranationalists: (1) Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime; (2) Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime; and (3) Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."†

*"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan. . . ."† Thus, if interpreted literally, the purge was to continue until those purged had lost their authority and influence for all time. The purgees (including convicted war criminals) who subsequently returned to political and economic leadership in Japan for the most part were de-purged officially prior to the end of the Occupation.

†Quoted in entirety.

The actual assignment under these categories* was through a detailed questionnaire prescribed to the Japanese as an appendix to the SCAP memorandum. This form was to be filled out in both Japanese and English, with criminal penalties for omissions or false statements, by all incumbents of public offices and future applicants for government positions. The questionnaire included, in addition to personal information, a chronological record of employment and military service since 1931, organizational memberships, a list of writings and speeches, and corporate directorships and executive positions. Abstracts of pertinent information were to be maintained for SCAP inspection at all times. In exceptional cases, the purge of essential personnel required for demobilization could be temporarily suspended upon written application to SCAP. Temporary reinstatement was also possible in cases of individuals indispensable to the performance of essential governmental activities, where no suitable replacement could be obtained.†

SCAP placed upon the Japanese government the initial responsibility for interpreting the purge directives to Japanese nationals and organizations, subject to final review by occupation authorities.¹⁶ Accordingly, the Japanese government, after preliminary conferences with GS and the chiefs of the intelligence agencies, issued a series of Imperial Ordinances defining in greater detail the operation of the categories. The original 27 organizations listed under Category C were expanded on 9 February 1946 to 119, and the positions to be purged in IRAA and affiliated organizations were enumerated in detail. On 27 February 1946, an Imperial Ordinance and a Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance appeared, furnishing the legal basis for the inauguration of the purge, and reproducing almost verbatim the provisions of SCAPIN 550 with the 9 February additions. The 20 organizations listed under Category E were expanded to 33, and a brief preliminary interpretation of Category G was offered. Subsequent Japanese government interpretations continued to offer greater detail in the application of Category G and other doubtful or ambiguous phases of the program.

*Soon after the purge was announced, but before the machinery for removals had been placed in operation, the Japanese conducted a voluntary self-purge. Thus most of the incumbent Diet members were discouraged from seeking re-election in the April 1946 elections: "In the light of the substance of the SCAP memorandum as well as in view of the importance of the coming general election for the members of the House of Representatives in the construction of a new Japan, it is clear that all militarists and ultranationalists as defined in Paragraph G of Appendix A must be strictly excluded from government service. The Government, in keeping with the wishes of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (sic) to conduct a general election that is clean and fair, therefore wishes that all those who stood as government-recommended candidates in the 1942 general election abstain from running in the coming general election for the reason that it is highly probable that such persons may come under the category of Par. G."¹⁵

†The Shidehara Cabinet requested the temporary retention in office of such men as Finance Minister Keizo Shibusawa, Justice Minister Chuzo Iwata, Commerce and Industry Minister Sankuro Ogasawara, and Minister without Portfolio Joji Matsumoto. This request (dated 9 March 1946) was approved on the ground that an election was coming up shortly and the purging of these cabinet ministers would unnecessarily disrupt government functions. Lesser temporary exemptions were granted in other special cases^{11,12} but refused where it was evident to SCAP that they were undesirable or unnecessary.^{13,14} No reasons were given publicly for these approvals or rejections of government requests for exemptions.

These additional interpretations offered increasingly detailed directions for the administration of the purge categories. For example, in developing the meaning of Category G, it was determined that "additional militarists and ultranationalists" would include all government officers, members of parliament, men of letters, and publishers or businessmen who had participated in certain proscribed activities. This opened the door to the removal of publicists, propagandists, and businessmen as well as high governmental officials not previously included. "Businessmen" were defined on 10 March and 16 May 1946, to include "persons who had occupied policy-making positions in enterprises which had produced more than 10 percent of the nation's total production of certain specified armaments."*

One year later the purge was extended to include public officers in prefectural and local governments. For this purpose, Categories C and D were simply applied to assembly members and responsible administrators in villages, towns, cities, and prefectures, who were screened by a process similar to that employed at the national governmental level.[†] At the same time, the purge was systematically applied to the public information media and to economic fields not previously included.[‡] The 1947 interpretation expanded the definition of public service to include not only the national and local governments, but special posts in certain companies and mass communications media as well. Public service was then divided into "principal public offices" (from which all falling under the purge categories had to be removed in 30 days) and "ordinary public offices" (whose holders could retain their present posts but could not be transferred to other public offices). In order to prevent continuity of purgees' influence, the new law also forbade "any relative of a purgee within within the third degree by blood, marriage, or adoption [to succeed] to the appointive office from which the purgee had been removed."[§] No one employed in the public service was to accept advice or compensation from a purgee in connection with official duties; purgees were barred not only from their former offices, but from the office building itself. No purgee could enter the office of any company from which he had been removed, or otherwise use its premises. These injunctions were intended to apply primarily in the field of economics, but were so worded that no distinction was made between public and private employment in their operation.

Statistically the most important extension of the purge (see Tables 1 and 2) occurred after May 1947. At this time a new classification of "provisional designees" was devised to cover militarists and ultranationalists who did not hold public offices, but who might otherwise exert secret influence upon those who did. This device applied the purge restrictions to former leaders no longer actively engaged in public life, and to all who fell within the categories.

As the purge program developed, of course, it was necessary to modify the interpretations of many of the categories, particularly in the economic field. Different positions in various Japanese companies, for example, were sometimes given the same titles in Japanese, and in a few cases different Japanese titles had been translated into the same English. In such cases, the purge was

*Ref 5, p 28.

[†]Plans were announced 8 Nov 46, with the legal basis furnished by Imperial Ordinances,^{17,18,19,20} and a Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance.²¹

[‡]A historical statement of the application of the purge in economic fields will be found in Ref 6, Chap. 5.

[§]Ref 5, p 28.

applied only after an investigation to determine which positions carried the actual responsibility. Again, although "stockholders holding 10 percent of capital stock" of certain companies were subject to purge, it was found that many such holdings were of an investment nature only and were not used as a means of exercising influence or control. Banks, insurance companies, and such organizations were exempted from the purge in these cases, and only holders of controlling interest were subjected to the purge.*

TABLE 1
GENERAL SUMMARY OF PURGE INCIDENCE BY CATEGORY

Category	Purged cases							Total
	Screening of incumbents			"Provisional Designation"			SIB (SCAPIN 548)	
	Central	Local	Total	Central	Local	Total		
A. War criminals	145	5	150	3,272		3,272		3,422
B. Career military personnel	7,219	1,604	8,823	113,412		113,412		122,235
C. Influential members of secret ultra-nationalistic societies	65	8	73	2,991		2,991	317	3,381
D. Influential members of IRAA and affiliates	225	598	823	1,261	32,312	33,573		34,396
E. Officers of financial or development organizations	88	9	97	391		391		488
F. Governors of occupied territories	46		46	43		43		89
G. Additional militarists and ultra-nationalists	1,027	2,479	3,506	3,526	39,244	42,770		46,276
Total	8,815	4,703	13,518	124,896	71,556	196,452	317	210,287

The categories were not self-administering, then, by any means. They required the establishment of elaborate and well-integrated agencies at all levels of government.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CATEGORIES

The decision to use mechanical purge categories was, as we have seen, an administrative necessity, given the assumptions of the program as a whole. The objective was to remove as quickly as possible potentially dangerous persons from positions in which they might jeopardize the Occupation's basic missions. If a judicial process had been employed, and each case examined

*These and other instances of modification are mentioned in Ref 5, pp 52 ff.

TABLE 2
GENERAL SUMMARY OF PURGE RELEASES AND ANNULMENTS

Category	Releases and annulments							Still purged 28 Apr 1952
	1st appeal	Appli- cation for release	2nd appeal	Annulment of military officers	Annulment	3rd appeal	Total	
A. War criminals			5		26	981	1,012	2,410
B. Career military personnel, total	14	1,486	3,072	3,250	101,216	7,715	116,753	5,482
Army officers	(5)	(1,087)	(1,413)	(1,761)	(44,238)	(3,436)	(51,940)	(1,914)
Civilians attached to Army			(5)		(47)	(9)	(61)	(1)
Navy officers	(2)	(354)	(534)	(1,489)	(23,756)	(1,822)	(27,357)	(334)
Civilians attached to Navy			(10)		(95)		(105)	(4)
Gendarmerie	(5)	(45)	(1,095)		(32,267)	(2,943)	(36,355)	(3,039)
Army intelligence			(10)		(806)	(58)	(874)	(181)
Navy intelligence	(2)		(5)		(7)	(47)	(61)	(9)
C. Influential members of secret ultranationalistic societies, total	8	1	113		2,547	191	2,860	521
Members (SCAPIN 550)	(8)	(1)	(107)		(2,505)	(171)	(2,792)	(272)
Members of organization designated by Justice Minister			(6)		(42)	(20)	(68)	(249)
D. IRAA members	26	16	2,268		31,864	151	34,325	71
E. Officers of financial or development organizations	5	6	114		353	4	482	6
F. Governors of occupied territories			12		43	22	77	12
G. Others, total	95	13	4,512		41,212	236	46,068	208
Cabinet ministers and civil servants					(105)	(28)	(133)	(12)
Higher Thought Police			(8)		(304)	(7)	(319)	(0)
Thought prosecutor			(1)		(32)	(4)	(37)	(0)
Individual cases	(8)		(25)		(335)	(9)	(377)	(8)
Information media (press)	(36)		(221)		(519)	(19)	(795)	(36)
Economic	(19)	(1)	(534)		(796)	(54)	(1,404)	(6)
Organizational members similar to C					(44)	(7)	(51)	(6)
Recommended members of wartime Diet	(2)		(46)		(365)	(13)	(426)	(8)
Veterans association	(29)	(11)	(3,456)		(37,821)	(30)	(41,347)	(31)
Military arts association	(1)	(1)	(221)		(891)	(65)	(1,179)	(40)
Communists								(61)
Total	148	1,522	10,090	3,250	177,261	9,306	201,577	8,710

individually, there was some danger that the purge would have been applied on a piecemeal basis, which could have permitted some wartime leaders to remain in office during the period of adjudication. The continued influence of the old leaders might have delayed considerably the changes contemplated by the Occupation. Furthermore, such a process would have given the purge an aspect of retaliation rather than of reform. The "defendants" in each case would undoubtedly have sought to justify their wartime actions and to kindle public sympathy; questions of guilt and responsibility would have clouded the main issues involved in removing undesirables. For these reasons, it was intended from the first that the purge be conducted without penalties or findings of guilt. The basic rule adopted by GS was simple and direct: When in doubt, purge. Stated more positively, the principle was to encourage the rise of a new leadership wherever the old elements might reasonably be expected to hamper the introduction of democratic institutions.

Unfortunately, as might be expected, the system of mass purging also accidentally eliminated certain elements which had actually opposed Japan's Pacific war. An example of this is provided by the case of Daisaburo Tsugita, who was Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat under Prime Minister Shidehara, soon after the Occupation began. He was purged under Category D in mid-1946 as a Director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. Yet his own account, substantiated by records of the organization, denies that he ever served in that capacity.* Although he has been nominated to this post, he rejected it because of his opposition to the movement. He pointed also to his wartime record of opposition to the war in the House of Peers. Here he had given speeches opposing various aspects of the China adventure, and had been passed over when the Tojo government had nominated peers for imperial decorations. At this time only Tsugita and one other peer (Giichi Matsumura, also purged) had been refused the honor. Tsugita's purge lasted from May 1946 to October 1950, in spite of his numerous appeals based on his wartime record. His hardships during the purge period when he was deprived of his former livelihood were undistinguishable from those of professional soldiers and prewar terrorists.

These accidental victims of the purge represented an important source of public resentment to the system. In a sense they may be considered war casualties; but from the viewpoint of occupation administration they may take on a special importance, for they demonstrate that even such a uniform totalitarian society as Japan had its elements of nonconformity. These elements offered a potential source of support in the occupied country; men like Tsugita may not have been fundamentally democratic in their political orientation, but they were antimilitaristic, and they bitterly resented being classed with categories of leaders whom they had opposed. Wartime dissidents may often present a greater political potential for the accomplishment of reforms than certain classes of political leaders who survive the purge, especially those whose past records were so neutral or insignificant as to escape categorical definition. It would seem in retrospect that much might have been gained if immedi-

*It was of course common for purgees of insubstantial political principles to deny that they had participated in the war effort in any other than a nominal capacity. To judge by confessions of any real participation in Japan's war adventures, one would have to conclude that Tojo was the sole cause of the war. Such post-facto defenses are to be taken with skepticism, but in this case, as far as Japanese records reveal the facts the individual concerned had been a fairly active antimilitarist (see App D).

ate provisions had been made for appeals based on error in the application of the categories, after which purgees who were vindicated might be encouraged to seek supporting roles in various Occupation reform missions.

Perhaps a more serious problem in the application of categories arose when the purge was used to achieve objectives other than those publicly specified. An example of this is the purge of Yoshisuke Yasumi, an employee of the Pharmacy Section of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. In this case SCAP issued special instructions to the Japanese government (SCAPIN 1231, App A) requiring Yasumi's removal because he had falsely reported Japan's heroin production from 1931 to 1939 to the League of Nations. No purge category was given in the instructions for his removal. There are also some memorandum cases where a category classification was given as reason for the removal, but where the facts stated did not seem relevant to the announced objectives of the purge.

The use of the elaborate purge machinery for the removal of miscellaneous personae non gratae tended further to vitiate the desired effects of the purge and created an atmosphere unfriendly to its democratic purposes. It became popular among some sophisticated Japanese to speak of the entire operation as a kind of grudge campaign thinly disguised by hypocritical ideals of democracy. Rumors of alleged political uses of the purge began to develop, centering particularly about the Hirano case. In this case, after an "acrimonious factional dispute within the Cabinet," Agriculture and Forestry Minister Hirano was purged as "official publisher" of Kodo, an ultranationalistic journal. This followed so closely upon his criticisms of the coalition government and his dismissal from the cabinet, that heated controversy among Japanese observers accompanied his purge, particularly in view of the fact that at first the screening committee had offered him a clean bill of health. After his purge on 13 January 1948, he appealed for judicial protection to the Tokyo District Court, which issued an injunction. Shortly thereafter, however, higher courts held, on advice from SCAP, that Japanese courts could not accept jurisdiction in purge cases.* If this case was not in fact a result of political manipulation, it could easily be made by caustic observers to appear so.

Many well-circulated rumors began to appear among journalists regarding alleged political manipulations involved in the application of the purge categories. Members of major Japanese editorial staffs (Asahi, Yomiuri, Nihon Keizai, and Kyodo) have agreed in retrospect that the political implications of the purge were so serious that most informed Japanese believe SCAP or the Japanese government were often using it for frankly partisan purposes (App E).

In some cases these facts have appeared before the public in battered and almost unrecognizable form. They illustrate, however, the political hazards that may be encountered in purge administration even when such apparently neutral devices as the categories are used. Whether the purge is applied or withheld in given cases, these dangers are present.

Case Studies - Political Uses of the Purge †

Political Pressure to Withhold the Purge. According to the officially approved interpretation of SCAPIN 550 (App A), all Diet members who had the support of the Tojo government in the 1942 election were to be purged.‡ How-

*This account is taken from Ref 6, pp 51ff.

†Cf. also App E.

‡Ref 5, pp 23, 25.

ever, the only wartime Eta ("outcaste") member of the Diet, Jiichiro Matsumoto, was released from the purge restrictions just prior to the first postwar election even though he had been approved by the Tojo government in his 1942 candidacy. Both Japanese and SCAP sources have indicated that this exception was made by GS in order to encourage the political rise of the Eta Class. Matsumoto was later purged, however (25 January 1949), under a less serious category (a member of a prohibited nationalistic society under SCAPIN 548, App A). This subsequent purge was also given a political interpretation because it coincided with a stiffening of SCAP attitudes toward the Communist party, and Matsumoto's speeches were turning more and more toward the Party line. It was also believed that he had lost the support of the Prime Minister by his acceptance of the Communist position opposing the continuation of the Emperor system. The story was widely circulated that Matsumoto had pointedly turned his back upon the Emperor when he paid a formal visit to the Diet, and that it was this gesture which resulted in his loss of support from the Government and, later, from SCAP.

Political Pressure to Purge. The purging of Agriculture Minister Rikizo Hirano, mentioned above, was also generally considered by Japanese journalists to have been prompted by a request from the Prime Minister. Several political reporters agreed that Hirano would have been purged eventually even without this intercession, but added that the purge was speeded up in order to remove him before he broke finally with the Government and set up his own Agrarian party. He had been dismissed from his cabinet post a few days before his purge because of this dispute. Political reporters argued that SCAP wanted to stabilize the Katayama Cabinet, which was a precariously-balanced three-way coalition, and that the purge offered a simple expedient for accomplishing that end. A further example of political interpretations of the timing of the purge is provided by the cases of Wataru Narahashi and Ken Inukai. These political enemies of Prime Minister Yoshida were removed in March and April, 1947, just as the Progressive party was undergoing reorganization, and before either was given an opportunity to accept an important post which might have threatened the stability of the Liberal Party Cabinet.

These accounts, together with scores of others, reflect an important element of informed Japanese opinion. It is apparent that however rigid and precise the purge categories may be, political manipulation may be either present or rumored. The existence of these interpretations tended to discredit the Occupation's reform program: they emphasize the wisdom of interfering as little as possible with the detailed management of the purge except to redress wrongs. After a time the GS began to view with detachment if not skepticism any proposals of political leaders that might have led to the removal of their critics or rivals.

ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS—SCAP

In view of the scale and complexity of the purge program, SCAP machinery for its implementation was relatively small. Vast as it was, the program involved only two major functions which could not be delegated almost entirely to the Japanese government: policy formulation and intelligence operations.

The policy questions which SCAP retained revolved about such matters as the formulation of categories, basic procedural decisions, and the dimensions of the purge program as it affected various areas of Japanese life. Most questions of this type were considered by a small group of officers and civilians in GS, with special advice furnished by ESS, CIES, and the intelligence sections. Probably the size of the GS staff devoted to the consideration of purge policies

did not exceed 20 persons at the height of the program, including liaison personnel, interpreters, and clerical assistants.

Although in theory this staff was used for policy purposes only, it soon became evident that in furnishing guidance to the Japanese government the abstractions of policy formulation had to accommodate themselves to the practical requirements of daily operations. Periodic conferences with Japanese authorities were supplemented by frequent requests for guidance on their part, even in relatively trivial matters.* Undoubtedly it was this participation by GS which led to widespread current rumors that the screening process, though nominally a formal procedure, was actually subject to the whims of various SCAP personnel. It also enabled the Japanese governmental officials to place the onus for unpleasant decisions for which they were unwilling to take responsibility on Occupation authorities.†

The basic intelligence operations required by the program, included two functions: securing information which might lead to the purging of individuals or societies, and conducting surveillance on the activities of purgees following their removal from public office. These functions were never formally described or assigned to the intelligence sections, however, and the activities of these agencies were at first much broader, and later much narrower, than this description would suggest.‡

During the first year of the purge, intelligence reports covering candidates for the purge were prepared by CIS based on information derived from field investigations, intercepted mail, and native informants. These reports were forwarded to GS, which referred to them in its review of the activities of Japanese screening agencies.

*"Interpretations and opinions relating to the application [of the purge] will not be given to any Japanese national or organization [by SCAP. Any private inquiries about the purge were to be referred to the Japanese government which was given] the initial responsibility for making decisions"¹⁶ subject to SCAP review. However, the Japanese government sought to save itself the embarrassment and the confusion of putting forth decisions which would be later overruled by SCAP; it cleared them in advance with SCAP. While these preliminary discussions between the Japanese government and GS did not entirely eliminate subsequent SCAP reversals of Japanese decisions, they tended to involve GS more and more deeply in questions of daily operation.

†In the de-purging program, for example, Japanese officials sometimes attempted to place upon SCAP the responsibility for deleting names which had never in fact been submitted to SCAP. The removal of "political enemies" by the Japanese government through the purge was also accompanied by private rumors that Japanese politicians were "using" SCAP through the periodic conferences as a screen for their own actions. A number of post-Occupation now-it-can-be-told articles have charged that certain officers who administered the purge were amenable to bribery or other blandishments. Charges of this sort were also made during the Occupation by American officials who had opposed various aspects of the purge program.

‡The first purge as contemplated in presurrender plans was a security device to be conducted entirely as an intelligence operation.²² In the extension of the purge to local areas and to the Japanese economy (January 1947), there were no intelligence functions assigned to any SCAP agency.²³ G-2's views criticizing the policy of extending the purge appear in Ref 24. A separate appendix (CONFIDENTIAL) to this report, by Peter Ogloblin, gives the history of the intelligence planning, and the point of view of the SCAP intelligence sections.

The surveillance of purgee activities was initially carried on by the Compliance Branch, Operations Division, CIS (activated 13 February 1946). This branch received reports of purge violations (usually purgees' attempts illegally to exert continued influence over their former organizations) from CIC field teams and from CCD, and forwarded them to GS for action. The findings of the CIC teams in each prefecture, based on local informants and other Japanese sources, were reported periodically to its central office for summary and distribution to the staff sections involved. CCD derived its information from letters intercepted in the Japanese mail and other communications media, examined on a sampling basis except in the case of suspected persons.

The major source of information used by GS in applying the purge was the more than 2,300,000 questionnaires submitted by present and past incumbents of public office and from the candidates therefor. The general plan was that those subject to the screening would open themselves to purge if they revealed a militaristic past, and to perjury if they attempted to conceal it. There is little evidence to suggest that concealment of such previous activity was encountered in a significant number of cases.*

In the surveillance of purgees, neither SCAP agencies nor the Japanese government secured much legal evidence of actual violations, although there were many widespread public rumors of illegal activity. In a few cases CIC reports of purgee activities brought about unofficial warnings to the men involved, but no formal enforcement program was installed among the SCAP agencies.

It may be concluded that on the whole GS regarded the purge program as largely self-enforcing.†

ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS--THE JAPANESE SCREENING AGENCIES

The purge directive caught the Japanese government by surprise. Within a few days four cabinet ministers resigned, and the Government had prepared a memorandum asking in disbelief whether SCAPIN 550 (App A) was intended to apply to all persons in the categories specified "no matter how innocent they may be of the sinister actions defined." About 200,000 would be affected by this plan, the Japanese memorandum pointed out,‡ and the Government

*There were 97 Japanese purged by order of SCAP after they had been cleared by Japanese screening agencies on the basis of questionnaires. Most of these cases involved activities not clearly or directly falling under the categories, and therefore requiring an official interpretation, presumably to be applied to similar cases in the future.

†A discussion of the effects of this assumption appears in the following section; for evidences, see App B.

‡The Chief, GS, proposed to inform the Prime Minister that "The Japanese have misconstrued the magnitude of personnel affected. The figure of 200,000 used in Paragraph 4 of the Japanese paper must be based on the assumption that all ex-Army and -Navy officers are affected. However, the directive affects only career commissioned officers. Furthermore, even if all officials of Chokunin rank and above were removed, the grand total would be only 666.

*The exclusions [as distinguished from removals] must necessarily affect a much larger number. Otherwise, the new Diet will not be composed of persons beyond suspicion of taint. . . ."24 As events proved, the Japanese estimate was much closer than the GS one.

proposed as an alternative that an "Executive Board of Inquiry" be created to determine "upon prima-facie evidence" how the purge should apply to individual cases. This plan was immediately rejected as inconsistent with the administrative nature and "preventive" character of the purge.*

TABLE 3
INCIDENCE OF PURGE BY MINISTRY AND CIVIL SERVICE RANK

Position	Shinin, top grade civil service, equivalent GS 15	Chokunin, second grade, equivalent GS 13-14	Sonin, equivalent GS 12	Ilanin, equivalent GS 5-8	Acting Ilanin
Home Ministry special police, total 4986					
1. Minister	1				
2. Chief, Police Bureau		1			
3. Supt-General, Metropolitan Police		1			
4. Prefectural police chiefs			47		
5. Section chiefs, Thought Police			54		
6. Police inspectors				168	
7. Assistant inspectors				1000	
8. Police sergeants					1587
9. Policemen					2127
Justice Department Thought Prosecutor Officials			106		


Accordingly, on 30 January 1946 the Ministry of Home Affairs created a screening organ designed to certify "the eligibility of persons applying for candidacy for membership in the House of Representatives."²⁷ † This organization consisted of the Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat, ‡ his deputy, the Director-General of the Legislative Bureau, the Vice-Minister for Home Affairs, the Director of the Local Bureau of the Home Ministry, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of the Government Division of the Central Liaison Office. Its functions were to receive, examine, and process questionnaires from Diet candidates and to deliver or refuse certificates of eligibility. This body existed for one month only, and did not actually purge any officeholders, although it advised 268 former Diet members not to file their candidacies or to withdraw if they already had done so. §

*Even at this date the purge was described as "a necessary precaution against the resurgence of Japanese expansionist tendencies." Questions of individual "guilt" and of judicial findings were "irrelevant."²⁴

†The Home Ministry, as it was generally called, had already been stripped of its Special Higher Police (Thought Police).²⁸ Within 10 days, 4960 officials were dismissed. The total impact of SCAPIN 93 was the removal of the "thought control" personnel given in Table 3.

‡The Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat was later purged himself under Category G for his activities in connection with the China incident.

§These were among the 382 Diet members whom the Tojo-dominated Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society had recommended in the general election of 1942.



The temporary organization was superseded by the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance 109,²⁸ under which virtually the same personnel* formed the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee. This committee set up its General Affairs Branch (to receive questionnaires, report results, deliver certificates of eligibility, etc.), its Examination Branch (to prepare materials and records for the screening committee), and its Records Branch (to prepare card files). It was dissolved on 28 June 1946.

The third screening organization established by the Japanese government,²⁹ also called the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee, retained only three of its former members† and added the names of several distinguished private citizens to avoid the criticism that it was controlled by the bureaucracy. Its functions and internal organization were virtually unchanged.

The extension of the purge to local public officials and to the economic field required further reorganization of the screening machinery,^{17,18} and 164 new committees were established on local levels. All members of the central and local Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees were distinguished private citizens.‡ The functions of the committees were about the same as those of the previous national committee, and each was supplied with a secretariat organized as above. For the first time a formal appeals process was established,^{30,31} which received written appeals, made recommendations, and forwarded them to the Prime Minister for formal action. In its personnel and its operations, the Appeals Board was strongly flavored by the Japanese legalistic tradition.§ By early 1947 the Japanese machinery for the purge was organized as indicated on Fig. 1. Because of the complexity which the operation had now assumed, the Prime Minister's secretariat created a supervision section, to coordinate the various laws and orders concerning the purge and unify their interpretations, draw up standards and criteria for additional orders, and compile the results of the committee activities. It served to consolidate all Japanese government activities relative to the purge. Reports to

*The Vice-Ministers for Justice, Education, and Commerce and Industry were added to the original members, and the Director of the Local Bureau of the Home Ministry and the Chief of the Government Division, Central Liaison Office, were removed.

†Professor Tatsukichi Minobe was chairman, and a journalist, Tsunego Baba, and a banker, Takeo Irumano, were added to the group consisting of the Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, and Justice. The chiefs of the personnel sections of each ministry served as secretaries. Irumano was later purged.

‡The members of the national board were as follows: Shikao Matsushima, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who later resigned and was replaced by ex-Professor Eiichi Makino; Yasusaburo Hara, President of the Nippon Chemical Co., Tatsuo Iwabuchi, journalist; Masuo Kato, journalist; Professor Kazuo Okochi; and attorney Fukichi Unno. Other members were Senzo Higai and Kozaemon Kumura, Diet Members, and Riichi Shono, attorney, who later resigned and were replaced by Asanori Shirogane and Tadaichiro Tanimura, attorneys, and Torazo Kumamoto, labor's representative on the Central Labor Commission. The members of the 46 prefectural and 118 city screening boards were likewise distinguished citizens selected from various professions.

§The Chairman, Takejiro Sawada, was president of the former Court of Administrative Litigation. Upon his resignation he was replaced by Judge Minoru Miyagi. Other members were for the most part lawyers or law school graduates.

SCAP were made by this body, which also relayed SCAP interpretations to the appropriate agencies.

This machinery continued to operate at high speed for over a year, until 10 May 1948. By this date, the Cabinet announced, the screening process would be completed,* and the elaborate purge machinery was to be officially dismantled.

Acting on its own responsibility, however, the Cabinet set up a new organization, largely in order to continue the screening of new applicants and as a gesture to the purge reform.³² The screening process continued much as before on both national and local levels. During the seven months remaining in 1948, 1167 individuals were purged, 911 nationally and 256 locally. The major emphasis from this point, however, was shifting gradually to the release of those who had been erroneously purged.†

The burden of labor performed by these Japanese agencies was prodigious, as indicated by Table 4.

TABLE 4
SCALE OF PURGE OPERATIONS

Examining agency	Persons screened, no.	Persons barred or removed, no.	Persons purged by provisional ignition, no.	Total purged, no.
Central	735,031	8,815	124,896	133,711
Local	1,573,831	4,703	71,556	76,259
SIB ^a		317		317
Total	2,308,862	13,835	156,452	210,287
Persons reinstated, no. 201,577				
Persons remaining purged, no. 8,710				

^aSCAPIN 548, see App A.

The purge removals were timed to minimize losses in efficiency and at the same time accomplish the reform objectives. Thus in 1946 the purge affected first the Cabinet and Diet, then the screening committees and the national bureaucracy. As the program was extended during 1947, when the vast bulk of the purge was carried out, a more elaborate timetable became necessary (see Table 5).

The actual functioning of the local screening committee did not vary significantly from prefecture to prefecture. There were boards and committees functioning in each prefecture, in the cities over 50,000, and in the national

*This announcement may have arisen from an informal SCAP statement.

†The first appeal or re-examination board, established on his own authority by the Prime Minister, heard appeals from 24 June 1948 to 7 February 1949. Its membership was wholly made up of governmental employees. The second and third boards and special de-purging machinery are discussed later.

government.* In addition to these agencies, there were 47 prefectural teachers' screening committees established to apply the purge directive to the educational system.†

Meetings were held in the prefectural and teachers' screening committees on a weekly basis, but the municipal committees met only once a month.‡ From the average number of cases determined at each meeting, it is estimated that the municipal committees took five minutes for each case, the teachers' committees less than one and one-half minutes, and the prefectural committees less than a minute. Usually fewer than 1 percent of the total cases reviewed were purged, the prefectural committees having a slightly higher ratio than the municipal and teachers' committees.§ Only rarely were the persons in

*When the prefectural screening committees were first appointed, 37 percent of the members were lawyers, physicians, newspaper reporters, teachers, and others; and 27 percent were judges, public procurators, and other public servants. Among these two groups, all told, at least 40 percent were engaged directly in the practice or adjudication of the law. Twenty-two percent represented business and farming, and 6 percent labor unions. Among the municipal committees, 50 percent fell in the professional groups, and only 14.5 percent among the group of public servants. Only about 26 percent were engaged in the law. The ratio of business and farming groups to union representatives was 25 percent to 1.5 percent. The prefectural committees had an average of 5.6 full-time clerks each, while the municipal committees had to make use of an average of 3 part-time workers who were already on the city payroll. Each of the prefectural committees handled an average of about ten times as many cases as did the municipal committees.

†The composition of the Teachers' Screening Committees varied somewhat from the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees. Each had 13 members, 6 teachers and 7 civic representatives. After 1 May 1947 this number was reduced to 5: 2 teachers, 2 civic leaders, and 1 prefectural government official. Among the teachers' representatives, from the first, the principals were overwhelmingly more numerous (80 percent) than the teachers themselves, and the elementary schools had a larger representation than higher schools. This was gradually equalized as the purge progressed. At first, over one-third the civic representatives were drawn from industry, followed in order by clergymen, public officials, professional men, and labor union representatives. After 1 May 1947, however, 40 percent of the civic representatives were professional men. When first inaugurated, the screening committees were made up principally of members in their fifties, but the average age tended to decline as the purge program continued. Women representatives tended to be younger than the men. When compared with the composition of the Prefectural Public Office Screening Committees, there are no significant differences, except that here judges and procurators constituted the majority of professional men, followed by businessmen, lawyers, and professors. These groups represented 70 percent of the total membership. In the municipal committees, businessmen made up the majority among the leading groups, followed by teachers, lawyers, and judges. These groups made up 60 percent of the total membership. In almost no case were the members active in party politics.

‡Municipal committee findings were referred to the prefectural committee for final action. No purgees were removed locally except with the concurrence of the prefectural committees. Each committee had a secretariat, but in most cases these employees also held other jobs simultaneously.

§The number of persons disqualified by the teachers' committees increased sharply after November 1946, but started on a downward trend after May 1947. The upward swing corresponds to a period in which many committees were disbanded because of "incompetence." Fortunately there exists one objective study of the process of screening and purging. Early in 1948 a questionnaire

question or witnesses called before the committees.¶

During the Occupation, Japanese opinion regarding the procedures of these committees varied largely according to personal circumstances. Those who had been purged overwhelmingly thought the system was inadequate (i.e., did not accept their or others' classification as militarists or ultranationalists), while those whom the purge passed over overwhelmingly approved the process by which this was accomplished.** Purgees tended to think that the committees examined only the data presented to them (such as quotations from books, essays, speeches), without reference to their actions as a whole during the war period, and that the boards acted on a basis of favoritism or in response to public pressures.***

was circulated by Tokyo University's Social Science Research Institute to various categories of public office holders. Six hundred thirty-three of these were distributed through the prefectural teachers' screening committees, and 256 by the university itself. A total of 294 replies were received, including 135 public officers, 32 teachers, 5 purged public officials, and 122 purged teachers. They were designed to elicit opinions on the adequacy of the screening process, with reference to its structure, the competence of the personnel involved, and the thoroughness and fairness of the screening process as a whole. The results are summarized in Ref. 33, Chap. 6. Some of them are also available in Refs 34, 35, 36, 37. Respondents included those approached by 15 of the prefectural teachers' committees and 15 prefectural Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees, and 50 municipal screening committees. They may be taken to represent a fairly wide sample of the country, geographically (App F).

¶When both the person in question and one or more witnesses appeared before a commission, there was a better chance of a favorable verdict than when only one appeared. For 800 out of 901 teachers who appeared with witnesses (88.8 percent), this was the case, and for 80 out of 110 who appeared before the prefectural screening commissions (72.7 percent). When only the person in question was summoned, the chances were better than when only witnesses appeared. This was also true in the cases examined by municipal commissions. Personal appearances were permitted only in the more difficult cases. The percentages of total cases purged by prefectural screening commissions, municipal screening commissions, and prefectural screening boards were 0.8 percent, 0.6 percent, and 0.4 percent respectively.

**There was no significant difference in the responses of teachers and of public office holders screened by the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees (App F).

***These responses may also be taken as an index to the Japanese attitudes toward the purge as a whole: there was little appreciation of its fundamental rationale, and some tendency to view it as a form of reprisal by the victorious armies against their enemies. Over 80 percent of the respondents to the Tokyo University poll volunteered opinions in response to a general "free-answer" question, usually with reference to the operation of their own committees. Although these responses were not statistically tabulated, they pointed to a general agreement that the purge, where any leeway was given to local committees, was conducted in many instances on a rough-and-ready offhand basis, without much uniformity in its application and with few procedural safeguards. The mechanical nature of the purge was exaggerated somewhat, as evidenced by the common opinion that "the committees were compelled to produce a fixed number of purgees, and therefore purged first and looked for reasons later." There is no actual evidence for the view that the decisions of the commission were partially determined by political factors, although the percentage of cases purged rose sharply after the boards had been criticized by higher authority for inefficiency. (The figures rose from 0.4 percent before November 1946 to 1.3 percent after that date.)

The general skepticism among purgees toward the impartiality and objectivity of the local committees where discretionary powers were delegated tends to support the proposition that case-by-case decisions applying the purge to individuals by a quasi-judicial process would not have removed the bitter-

TABLE 5
"TIMING" OF THE JAPANESE PURGE DURING 1947

Date, 1947	Persons to be screened	Total no.	Average no./day
A. Screening schedule of Central Committee, 1947			
20 Jan	Local committees members including temporary members	820	45
10 Feb			
5 Feb	Holdera of principal public office in prefectures (to be screened by Central Committee)	5,000	500
15 Feb			
15 Feb	Candidatea for governor and for mayor of five principal cities.	500	100
20 Feb			
20 Feb	Candidatea for prefectural assemblymen	21,000	900
15 Mar			
15 Mar	Holders of principal public office in organizations under Paras 9 (public information media), 10 (political parties), 11 and 12 (industries) App 2 ²¹	6,000	200
15 Apr			
B. Screening schedule of Local Committees, 1947			
20 Feb	Election Administration	5,200	650
28 Feb	Committee members and holders of principal public office on the local level		
28 Feb	Candidatea for mayor and headmen of town and village, superintendents of the poll atation and superintendents of the vote	12,500	500
25 Mar			
25 Mar	Candidatea for city, town, and village assemblymen	15,000	500
15 Apr			

ness and resentment felt by those who were purged. The areas where discretionary judgment was left with Japanese authorities were as sharply criticized in this study as those where the purge was mechanically carried out according to category.

ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS—THE JAPANESE PURGE SURVEILLANCE AGENCIES

No effort was made by the Japanese government to set up an enforcement and surveillance agency until 15 February 1948, two years after the purge directives were issued. At that time the SIB of the Attorney General's Office was established with a staff of nearly 200 investigators.* An analysis of the cases handled by the police prior to that time (App B) shows that only minor violations were being reported: of the 54 cases referred during this period to the public procurators, for example, 38 involved making false statements in the purge questionnaires (these cases usually being brought to the police by rivals or political enemies of the accused). There were only 11 penalties meted out, ranging from a 300 yen fine (then 20 dollars) to six months' imprisonment. Gradually, however, rumors of continued influence being exerted illegally by purgees, and of other major violations, filtered to the top, and further surveillance activity was directed.

TABLE 6
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU REPORTS OF
PURGE VIOLATIONS

Year	Total cases			No. warnings
	Registered	Investigated	Indicted	
1948	142,044	74	31	17
1949	5,448	301	79	141
1950	21,642	395	104	231
1951	4,361	368	34	234
Total	173,495	1,138	248	623

The rapid growth of the purge surveillance activities of the Japanese government after February 1948 suggests how inadequate the efforts prior to that date had been (unless one assumes that those of the SIB became needlessly extensive).† The staff of the SIB grew to 10 times its original size before the

*The Attorney General's Office was itself established by Law 193, 17 December 1947, to "administer matters concerning criminal investigations and prosecutions, matters concerning the Public Procurator's Office, . . . and matters concerning the investigation of activities, etc., of persons affected by the [purge] memorandum. . . ." The SIB was to "handle . . . matters concerning the prohibition against forming certain organizations. . . , the investigation, etc., of persons who were Regular Army and Navy Officers. . . in accordance with the request of SCAP."

†See App B. Prior to the establishment of SIB, an investigation department had existed in the Home Ministry (from 26 September 1945). Its functions remained obscurely defined, until on 7 August 1946 it was elevated to the status of bureau. This organization was transferred on 31 December 1947 (after dissolution of the Home Ministry) to the Second Branch of the Internal Affairs Bureau, Prime Minister's Office. Here it remained until 15 February 1948. During this period its principal duties lay in special assigned investigations, which incidentally included the activities of former army and navy officers, looted property, etc. Not until 15 February 1948 with the establishment of SIB was the purge memorandum surveillance officially included. At this time, the other functions of the former investigation bureau were transferred to the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Occupation terminated.* Its investigations during this period may be summarized in tabular form (Table 6). It is worthy of note that the number of cases registered (based on complaints, informants, and other sources of information) was greatest during the first year of its operation; in some cases the violations reported took place prior to the organization of the SIB. This again suggests that the early reliance upon police agencies for enforcement of the purge resulted in inadequate surveillance.

From the first, the indictments brought about by the SIB dealt, in every case, with attempts by purgees to exert influence over their former connections or with their participation in political activity. Of the first 10 indictments (ranging from February to July, 1948), only one resulted in a fine or other punishment, although three other alleged purge violators had been found guilty in the lower courts. By this time, however, the purge was losing its impetus, and the gradual relaxation of the rightist purge (see App B) was already under way. The conclusion seems unavoidable that adequate administrative machinery to carry out surveillance over the purge compliance was established two years too late.†

One of the major functions of SIB was to register the names, purposes, and membership of political organizations to determine to what extent terroristic, militaristic, or ultranationalistic societies may have been actively at work. During 1948 alone, 2229 such organizations were registered, with a

*Personnel assigned to investigation work in cities, villages, and prefectures can be summarized as follows:

<u>Type of duty</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>
Investigation of suspected organizations	435	435	336	336
Surveillance of purgees	49	149	104	104
Surveillance of military officers	138	138	97	49

Personnel strength in the national office varied as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total Personnel</u>	<u>Increase</u>
15 Feb 1948	174	--
22 Jan 1949	250	76
31 May 1949	387	137
1 Jul 1950	537	150
18 Aug 1950	1145	608

After June 1950, the great increase occurred when surveillance of Communist party publications and of leftist antidemocratic organizations was added to the functions of SIB. Nearly all the remaining investigation work related to the purge (SCAPIN 548 and 550, App A).

†It is also impossible to document the generally accepted fact that many purgees continued to control their economic holdings or to exert political influence, because violations of the purge ordinance are still punishable by law (the purge ordinances not having been repealed retroactively with reference to prior violations). However, many such cases were reported or referred to during this investigation, and their existence is widely accepted among the well-informed Japanese public.

membership of 188,665. The volume of this activity increased during the later years of the Occupation:

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Political Organizations Registered</u>	<u>Total Membership</u>
1948	2,229	188,665
1949	2,221	210,472
1950	12,467	1,947,235
1951	16,836	10,388,553

This growth of registered political activity in recent years accounted for much of the increase in the staff of SIB, since the activities of political organizations of many kinds had to be investigated for illegal terroristic elements. According to SIB reports, however, many of the organizations subject to registration resorted to secret or underground activities, making surveillance more difficult and costly. All told, SIB dissolved 94 organizations, involving 323 purgees.* Another function of the SIB involved analyzing the publications of suspected subversive groups. In 1950, there were 1456 different publications banned, and five cases prosecuted.† This primarily concerned Communist propaganda, however, although no precise data are available on this point.

The most important function of SIB with reference to the purge, however, was the surveillance of the activities of purgees. The first step was to require their registration immediately upon receipt of notification of the purge and upon any succeeding changes in status.‡ These registrations usually were handled through city, ward, town, village, or other local government offices. As has already been indicated, a total of 1138 cases were investigated, with 623 warnings issued by SIB and 248 cases actually indicted.

Surveillance of purgees' activities showed that there were some very considerable changes in their economic and social status after they left office. While businessmen and others with large economic interests seemed to suffer little because of the purge (there were many businesses not subject to purge which flourished in the scarcity economy of the early Occupation), frequently government workers, professional ultrarightists, and career officers lived in severely straitened circumstances. Many of the younger men among this

*The most important cases involved the ultranationalistic Gyochisha (this case resulted in the purging of 14 leaders, 7 July 1948); the Sekine Gumi (5 purgees, 14 June 1949) and the League of Korean Residents in Japan (19 purgees, 8 September 1949); Keiaidojun Remmei, an ultranationalistic organization (6 purgees, 13 February 1950); Shoji Ippa (1 purgee, 26 December 1951); the Communist Party Committee of Tokyo, Shinjuku-ku, was dissolved 21 July 1950, and 12 leaders were purged under SCAPINs 548 and 550 (App A) as terrorists. Six of the SIB purgees were included in SCAPIN 550 statistics for other reasons.

†As of 29 February 1952 there were a total of 1812 banned, and 425 cases prosecuted.

‡Only 70 percent of the purgees were registered at first, but this gradually rose to 94 percent. These registrations totalled as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Registrations, No.</u>	<u>Changes in Status, No.</u>
1948	142,044	2,120
1949	5,448	4,837
1950	21,642	7,435
1951	4,361	4,432
1952 (29 Feb)	77	106

group became laborers or were unemployed. In some cases purgees banded together to form mutual-aid societies or occupied advisory posts in quasi-governmental societies financed out of the national budget but legally classified as unofficial. In a few cases these private societies (including purgees) were officially used by national ministries, which paid for their services out of public funds.* More frequently, prefectural government agencies were guilty of this practice in evading the spirit of the purge.† Soon after this was discovered, SIB recommended to the Prime Minister's Office on 28 December 1948—nearly 3 years after the outset of the purge—that the screening process be extended to these unofficial, auxiliary government societies. Pressure by the Prime Minister's Office and the SIB brought about resignations in many of these cases involving organizations which were affiliated with the state, but which could not officially be considered as public offices under the purge directive.‡ On 28 February 1950, SIB reported to SCAP that there were 105 such organizations attached to national ministries, and 58 to local or prefectural government offices, some of which may have had offices in most or all prefectures. A tabulation of such organizations to which the purge was applied appears in Table 7.

TABLE 7
NUMBER OF QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
TO WHICH THE PURGE WAS EXTENDED
ON 28 FEBRUARY 1950

Organization and Membership	Central	Local	Total
Organizations classified as auxiliary societies performing quasi-governmental functions	105	2,700	2,865
Number of staff members	1,575	27,600	29,175
Number of staff members occupying the equivalent of "important or ordinary public offices"	315	8,280	8,595
Number of staff members removed after extension of the purge	210	5,520	5,730

The use of Japanese enforcement agencies for surveillance of purgees was intended to supplement, not replace, intelligence operations of the Army itself. The record shows its effectiveness in this area, where its superior knowledge of local customs and governmental traditions could be brought to bear. It also emphasizes the gaps that occurred early in the enforcement program.

*For example, Shadarhojin Rodokaei Kenkyujo, Labor Scientific Management Research Society, advisory to the Economic Stabilization Board; Tabako Kosaku Kumiai Chuokai a tobacco council, advisory to the Monopoly Bureau.

†For example, Wakayama Ken Shobo Kyokai Wakayama Prefectural Fire Prevention Association; Aomori Ken Kaitaku Kyokai, Aomori Prefectural Land Development Commission; Iwate Ken Kochi Kyokai, Iwate Prefectural Arable Land Association.

‡An Attorney General's order³⁸ provided that organizations it listed in a separate appendix should be considered as "principal and ordinary public offices" under the terms of the Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance 1.²¹

There was some danger, of course, that such an agency might have employed totalitarian "secret police" methods which would undermine the political objectives of the Occupation; but a study of the personnel policies adopted by the SIB (App B) shows the care that was taken to avoid using personnel who were themselves "tainted with totalitarianism." Institutional safeguards against this possibility can be afforded through the subjection of the enforcement agency to processes of political control by responsible governmental elements. The legal protections which may be designed as limitations on the processes of investigation and prosecution will also tend to reduce this danger; but the final guarantee against the perversion of occupational objectives by indigenous enforcement and investigatory agencies lies, of course, in the intelligence activities and the supervisory controls exercised by the occupation forces themselves (App B).

THE PROCESS OF APPEAL AND DE-PURGE

Because the basic philosophy of the purge disclaimed any punitive or judicial objectives, it was not considered of primary importance to establish means for adjudicating cases erroneously purged. The Japanese government was told that victims of any such errors could apply to the Prime Minister for correction,* but few purgees, if any, actually secured any relief through this device.

There were, of course, substantial incidental hardships connected with the purge in certain cases. Purgees from public office lost all governmental pensions,[†] except for those who had been wise enough to resign before the purge was officially inaugurated. Businessmen were forbidden by the terms of the purge to participate in any operations of their former companies. Government employees and professional soldiers often had no skills which would enable them to earn an adequate livelihood, and the value of their savings was substantially reduced by the very serious postwar inflation. Former associates of purgees were often reluctant to assist them not only because of social pressure (particularly at first) but also because of the fear that such actions might be interpreted as evidence of continued illegal influence by purgees over their former organizations and their replacements. The tales of suffering and privation during the purge period made an impression upon public opinion in arousing sympathy for the purgees. As a result, few purgees, and of course few of their friends, had any patience with the argument that the purge was preventive rather than punitive.

During the early months of the purge, however, both SCAP and the responsible Japanese officials were devoting their efforts to the removal of elements of wartime militarism; the incidental sufferings of purgees seemed a minor affair when set beside the much greater hardships of war. The Japanese requests for appeal procedures received no official action until the first Appeal

*The conference, 25 January 1946, between Brig Gen Whitney and Prime Minister Shidehara. Ref 5, pp 18, 41. The possibility of such appeal was not a matter of public knowledge.

[†]A recognition of this factor occurred when Cabinet Orders 335 and 336,^{39,40} provided that pensions and annuities be restored as of the date of de-purge.

Board began its operation in March 1947.* When it was liquidated in May 1948, over a thousand appeals had been heard, of which 20 percent were granted by Japanese authorities, subject to SCAP approval.† This was considered too large a number by the Occupation authorities, and the work of the Appeal Board was referred again to Prime Minister Ashida for reconsideration.‡

Nearly a year passed before the second Appeal Board was created, during which interval a Prime Minister's special de-purge staff reviewed cases of error, particularly in the "provisional designations" (24 June 1948 to 4 April 1949).§ The second Appeal Board (8 February 1949 to 31 March 1951)⁴¹ considered some 30,000 cases, approximately a third of which were exempted from the purge.¶ Additional review procedures were set up to accomplish

*SCAP had already indicated approval of this Japanese request, but had left the initiative for action to the Japanese government.³⁰ The Political Reorientation of Japan states that "in some cases recommendations for reinstatement were made to SCAP," (Ref 5, p 42) but does not indicate what process for review was involved or what the final outcome of the cases had been. Present Japanese attacks on SCAP for failing to establish review procedures may overlook the inert response of the Japanese government itself to this problem, although it cannot be denied that SCAP itself was not very encouraging in the matter of review. The GS attitude, as indicated to the writer by two of its former chiefs, was that during the early phases of the Occupation, the Japanese government should devote its attention to removals rather than to appeals. As to the merits of this argument, little need be said, in view of the fact that appeals procedures could have been set up as an entirely separate process. There is no reason to suppose that there would have been any loss in the efficiency of the screening process if errors committed by accident could have been corrected promptly. Indeed, there is substantial agreement among Japanese who participated in the screening process that they would have been able to act more freely from the first if they had not been compelled to regard their actions in each case as final.

†The relatively small number of approved appeals in the original list may be attributed to the Board's recognition that SCAP was reluctant to engage in any large-scale retrenchment at this stage. The Board's original list of 250 had unfortunately included the name of purged Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi, an inflationist and critic of the Occupation's monetary policy whose purge by SCAP memorandum had aroused great public speculation and political interest only a few months before. A member of this first Appeal Board told the author that the SCAP officer in charge of the purge was so "indignant" at the inclusion of Ishibashi's name that he brought about the dissolution of the Appeal Board on the ground that their work had been "careless." The Political Reorientation of Japan⁵ states that the Japanese government issued Cabinet Order 62,³² abolishing the Appeal Board along with other purge machinery, effective 10 May 1948, because the purge program was "completed."

‡Several Japanese observers reported that the Prime Minister's recommendation of about half the originally approved cases took place largely on a political basis. Thus, according to these observers, some purgees whose appeals may have appeared doubtful to the Board were de-purged, while others who had been purged "by clear mechanical error" remained on the purge list. The original committee had approved about 250 cases; Dr. Ashida resubmitted to SCAP a list of 150, and SCAP approved 143 of these at once, and 5 more cases shortly thereafter.

§Three hundred and fifty-one individuals were cleared, 337 of them under Category E, for the most part reservists who had been erroneously classified as career officers.

¶Military men remained on the purge list, as did purged Prime Minister Hatoyama and Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi.

the de-purge by categories of certain military officers and for examining local cases purged under Category D.⁴² The reviews took place without the formality of an appeals process. These operations were completed on 6 November 1951. The third Appeal Board, from 29 November 1951 to 28 April 1952,* de-purged all but a handful of extremists who remained under the purge until the Peace Treaty. Most of these are said to have regarded the purge as a "badge of honor," and made no attempt to secure a review or de-purge.

TABLE 8
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF APPEALS AND DE-PURGES

Organization	Term of Office	No. Appeals	No. De-Purges
First Appeals Board	3 Mar 47 - 10 May 48	1,085	148
Prime Minister's special de-purge staff	24 Jun 48 - 4 Apr 49	2,363	1,522
Second Appeals Board	8 Feb 48 - 31 Mar 51	32,127	10,090
Automatic de-purge of young army and navy officers	30 Oct 50		3,250
Automatic de-purge by category review	18 Jun 51 - 6 Nov 51		177,261 ^a
Third Appeals Board	29 Nov 51 - 28 Apr 52	9,943	9,306 ^a
Total		45,518 ^b	201,577 ^a

^aIncludes some persons who may be listed several times because of their classification under more than one purge category.

^bIncludes some persons who appealed more than once.

These appeals were not conducted officially as a judicial process, the Japanese courts having already denied themselves jurisdiction over the purge. Evidence was submitted and interpreted at the discretion of the review boards, many of whom, however, were attorneys or government officials with legal training. Criticisms of the appeal process have centered less about the procedures followed than about the delay in creating it and its slowness to act.

There seems little doubt, in retrospect, that a formal process could have been inaugurated from the first to receive appeals based on error, subject to SCAP approval in each case. Such a program would not have altered the administrative character of the operation or interfered with the speedy removal of individuals falling under the Potsdam Declaration.

*Ref 43. Note that this is the first appeals organ established by law. It provided that opportunity for a hearing be given all purgees prior to a final negative decision.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF JAPANESE AGENCIES TO IMPLEMENT THE PURGE

It is a matter of basic military government policy that whenever possible indigenous agencies will be used to carry out the occupational programs. This not only conserves the available troop resources, but also develops a sense of participation among the occupied peoples. A special argument can be made for using such agencies when the introduction of political and economic reforms is contemplated as a means of encouraging democratic tendencies in the occupied country. Use of existing agencies may also encourage elements in the defeated country to remain sympathetic to the purposes and the techniques of occupation reforms after the sanctions of military government have been removed.

There are, nevertheless, certain limitations upon the degree to which indigenous agencies can be used by an occupying force. Proper recognition of these factors, together with adequate supervision of the agencies involved, may do much to minimize the obvious dangers involved.

In the first place, the experiences in Japan show that an occupying force cannot escape some practical responsibility for the political texture of the government it employs to carry out the program. It may be taken as axiomatic that when any one of several contending political forces in an occupied country gains ascendancy, it cannot survive without the tacit approval or passive acceptance of the occupying military authority. This approval was exploited to the fullest degree in Japan by political forces seeking to retain power. The retention of indigenous leaders becomes to some extent a mark of their acceptability to the occupying forces.

There is a second and closely related tendency of the occupied nation's government to use all available means to circumvent all political reforms or other programs of the occupation which for political reasons it opposes. In Japan this often resulted, for example, in a legalistic haggling and other delaying tactics on the part of agencies concerned with the purge reform. In extreme cases unpopular policies not directly and specifically ordered in detail by the Occupation were not carried out for some time; an excessive emphasis on exact and literal compliance with directives and orders of SCAP took its toll in the timing of occupational reforms; facts important to the fulfillment of the spirit of the reform programs sometimes did not appear until relatively late in the planning stage.

A third tendency of an occupied government is, wherever possible, to affix the responsibility for unpopular laws and programs upon the occupation authorities regardless of the facts involved. In extreme cases, when a necessary but unpleasant domestic policy must be implemented, the government may make a great display of public opposition to it in order to attract the sympathy and support of the people. Such tactics may compel the occupation itself to undertake firm measures which for the good of the country occupied should be carried out by its own government. The net effect of this is to draw the occupation closer into domestic affairs, and to leave to it the responsibility for making difficult or unpleasant decisions.

To these tendencies there must be added a further caution, relevant to the purge process in particular. If large numbers of political leaders must be removed to make room for democratic elements of leadership, the success of the reform will depend to some extent upon the character of the leadership which rises after the purge has taken place. Thus the occupation may find

itself compelled to assert its authority even in the selection of certain classes of domestic leaders. This may involve, at the most, direct measures for augmenting and supporting native democratic forces or other elements sympathetic to the occupation's objectives; as a minimum, a US occupation may be forced to achieve its ends by continuing the purge to remove undesirable elements which rise to power under the military government.

In carrying out leadership reforms like the purge, there exist ample opportunities for the political leaders of the defeated country to make use of the "removal" power for their own political purposes. "Enemies" can be eliminated through adroit manipulation of the purge categories, and "friends" likewise protected. Furthermore, the entrenched, permanent element of a government—its bureaucracy—will invariably claim for itself a political neutrality which enables it to repudiate responsibility for the acts it performed under wartime circumstances.

It cannot be overemphasized that these political and bureaucratic elements possess the advantage of thorough familiarity with the political and administrative details of the occupied country, and that they may attempt to use this knowledge and skill to entrench themselves more strongly in their positions at the cost of other, less favored political elements. Unless positive measures are taken to insure that the powerful elements of strength in the occupied government are made politically responsible, there is constant danger that democratic reforms may remain on the surface alone, only to be wiped away when the occupation is ended.

In order to determine the extent to which these factors were at work during the Japanese Occupation, and to assess their impact on the nation's political structure, special consideration must be devoted to the political effects of the purge program.

Chapter 3

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE PURGE

THE BASIC POLITICAL OBJECTIVE

The political neutralization of Japan's military leaders was among the first of the surrender-term requirements; but it also furnished the strongest sources of support for the Occupation program in postwar Japanese domestic politics. Defeat had brought to the Japanese people a revulsion against war which soon became the dominant element in their national politics. The national demobilization and the constitutional provision outlawing war were perhaps the most popular reforms of the entire Occupation, and the Allied plan to bar professional militarists from public office had an immediate popular success. This also contributed to the enthusiasm with which the Japanese press accepted the purge directives. Militarists and war heroes were repudiated by a people whose homes and cities had been destroyed: the lost war was an unpopular one.

This did not mean, however, that the Japanese people were ready to accept fully the political implications of this great renunciation of their own traditions. The Allied policy of demilitarization was aimed not only at rendering Japan incapable of continuing the war or of starting a new one; it was directed also at the elimination of totalitarian elements which might in the future contribute to fresh military or expansionist adventures. This end was to be achieved by a political formula: Japan was to be democratically reconstructed. Thus if the forms and institutions of government and society were to be repatterned in a democratic mold, the national leadership and political philosophy had to be reconditioned to new ways. The purge of professional military men and cabinet leaders was clearly not enough to insure the success of the institutional reforms; it was also necessary to remove the other responsible officials whose past participation in the goals of militarism would disqualify them for democratic leadership. A new, positive concept of leadership was to be developed; Japanese leaders were to realize that their predecessors of prewar days had abdicated their responsibilities to the public when they permitted terroristic groups and extreme nationalists to direct Japanese policy. This had been their contribution to the progressive degeneration of democracy in Japan: even though in many cases they may not have been themselves violent militarists, their opportunistic acceptance of militaristic philosophies made them ineligible as democratic leaders.

THE NATIONAL DIET

These revolutionary implications of Occupation policy did not occur to members of Japan's first postwar government. After the fall of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet (which had been responsible for signing the surrender), the Shidehara government was specifically organized to carry out whatever measures would be required by the Occupation in accordance with the stated objectives. But it was organized along prewar lines: in the entire cabinet, only three members were clearly exempt from the purge.* Five members resigned immediately after the directive was issued,[†] and on 10 March 1946 a second batch of five ministers had to be removed by the purge.[‡] In the House of Peers, 14 members resigned after the surrender, 22 were named suspected war criminals, and 39 retired soon after the purge categories were announced.[§] When in March the Government appointed 30 new members to the House of Peers, without first screening them as required in the purge directive, SCAP suspended all prerogatives of their appointments until this had been accomplished.[¶] All told, some 200 of the 471 members of the House of Peers subjected to screening had to be purged. A democratic leadership for Japan was not easily found.

It was in the lower house, however, that the purge had its greatest political repercussions. The House had been dissolved on 18 December 1945, pending new elections (which were not held, however, until 10 April 1946).^{**} In the meantime, all candidates for the new House of Representatives were to be screened prior to the election, and some 252 out of 3384 aspirants for the seats were disqualified in a preliminary screening even before the election took place.^{***}

This brought about the injection of some new blood into Japan's leadership; 95 percent of the 2782 active candidates for the election were running for the

*They were Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Hitoshi Ashida, and Shigeru Yoshida—each to be in turn a prime-minister of Japan. Ref 5, p 16.

[†]They guessed right. They were later purged in each case: Home Minister Zenjiro Horikiri (Category D), Transportation Minister Takeo Tanaka (Category F), Agriculture Minister Kenzo Matsumura (Category D), Education Minister Tamon Maeda (Category D), and Cabinet Secretary Daisaburo Tsugita (Category D, see also App D).

[‡]Four of these were granted temporary permission to remain in office, since the first postwar elections were to be held in April 1946. Ref 5, p 25.

[§]Ref 5, pp 24, 25.

[¶]Ref 5, p 25.

^{**}The elections had been expected 21-22 January, but SCAP delayed them once and the government twice thereafter, presumably to allow the voters and the parties to adjust to current conditions.

^{***}Three hundred and eighty-one members of the House were automatically ineligible for candidacy because they had been recommended by the Tojo government in the 1942 elections. Only 113 of these had applied for candidacy, and 268 voluntarily abandoned their candidacy. Jiichiro Matsumoto, the only Tojo candidate exempted from this purge, was not cleared in time to prepare a campaign and did not run. See "The Administration of the Categories," Chap. 1. This was a nominal purge, however, as evidenced by the case of Professor Masamichi Royama. Although he had been purged because he accepted Tojo's political support in his candidacy in 1942, he was nevertheless regarded as a liberal and was frequently consulted by GS. He was de-purged in the first formal appeal procedure. For a discussion of the Tojo recommendations and the 1942 election, see App H.

first time in their lives. After the elections, 375 of the 466 Diet members were freshmen. Of the remaining 91 experienced members, only 48 were carried over from the previous Diet, the rest having served in prewar times.* Indeed, not since the first Diet of the Meiji Constitution (1 July 1890) had the Japanese national assembly had to perform its functions with so few politically experienced members.




Fig. 2—Freshman Members of Japanese Diets (466 seats)

The long-term effects of this political inexperience have been frequently exaggerated in Japanese commentaries. The fact is that by 1952 the successors to purges had had about as much experience as did the purges themselves; and this experience had been gained during a period of growing, rather than receding, parliamentary power. Even the freshmen of 1949 had had three years of experience by the end of the Occupation, which is about equal in political content to that which most purges could have claimed immediately after the war. Few of the purges had been in the Diet before 1936, and the period 1940 to 1942 was one in which parties had been dissolved, while during the war years 1942 to 1945 parliamentary power itself was negligible. Thus by the end of the Occupation and the renewal of self-government, de-purged leaders from the wartime period had little advantage over their successors in terms of their parliamentary experience.

In the early phases of the Occupation, however, the purge was not without significance in terms of the inner struggles for power within the Japanese government. The confusions and ineptitudes of the inexperienced postwar Diet were widely reported in press and rumor whenever the parliamentary procedures appeared unorthodox. The supposed lack of knowledge of parliamentary techniques and of the details of government organization also placed the Diet at a disadvantage in comparison with the stable bureaucracy and the political bosses, both of which were little affected by the purge. In terms of age, as well as experience, the new Diet members were also handicapped—

*See App C for a comparison with previous Japanese Diets.

especially at first—in dealing with these other elements of political strength. The 22nd House of Representatives (10 April 1946) had over three times as many members under 40 as did the 21st House (3 April 1942), and only half as many over 70. This disparity was increased as the Occupation progressed and the average age continued to decline.* Japan's postwar parliamentarians were young as well as inexperienced—an especially serious weakness in Japanese public life.

Although their youth placed the new political leaders at some disadvantage, it could be argued that the lack of the Japanese brand of parliamentary experience was an asset in the construction of a democratic tradition, rather than the reverse. Modern Japan's emergence under the Meiji constitution had also taken place under a youthful and inexperienced Diet; political revolutions are frequently the work of young men. A more important problem for the future of Japanese democracy was the absence of a popular "revolutionary" sentiment in support of Diet supremacy or executive responsibility to it. Much of the legislative initiative during the postwar period came from GHQ working in cooperation with experts in various Japanese ministries,† which transferred the parliamentary responsibility to members of the bureaucracy. Sovereignty lay with SCAP, and detailed programs were worked out by a permanent core of public servants. This provided the most important elements in the shift of political power following the purge of the old guard.

But the purge was not done yet. After the first postwar election had taken place (10 April 1946), 32 of the victorious Diet members were still to be purged. Twenty of these had been previous members of the House: the "old-timers" were still the most vulnerable. But an additional phenomenon must be considered here. The rule applied by the Japanese law in these cases permitted the replacement of only 11 of the 32 purgees.‡ In these cases, the replacements were the "runners-up" in the election, who were automatically substituted for purgees. This meant that usually there was either no replacement at all, or a member of an opposing party was placed in office. Only three of the total number of purgees were replaced by members of the same party. Thus the purge affected the balance of party power even after the elections were over, by either leaving the seats vacant or by

*See App C, Table of Ages of House of Representatives Members. It is interesting to note that the average age of the Diet generally increased after the beginning of the Meiji period until the end of World War II. Thus the 1949 average age was only slightly younger than that of 1914.

†This was partly because of the Diet's inexperience in formulating and drafting laws.

‡The first postwar general election was held according to House of Representatives Election Law.⁴⁴ Article 79, Item 1 stipulated that by-elections could not be held unless the proportion of vacancies in membership reached one-fourth of the fixed number of members of a given electoral district. Item 2 stipulated that vacancies occurring within one year from the date of election should be filled automatically without by-elections by the respective runners-up in that electoral district.

The second postwar election was held according to the same Law; revised March 1947. Article 79, Item 1 stipulated that by-elections could not be held unless two or more vacancies occurred in one electoral district. Item 2 stipulated that vacancies occurring within ten days from the date "the elected received his notice of election" should be filled automatically without by-elections by the respective runners-up in that electoral district.

filling them with political opponents of the purgees. This occurred in only a few cases—29 seats out of 466—but it denied representation to these constituencies until the next national election. And it did not affect all parties equally.

The second postwar election occurred on 25 April 1947. There were 1567 approved candidates in the campaign, among whom 222 freshmen and 244 experienced legislators were elected.* After the election, 14 were removed by the purge, of whom 5 were replaced by by-elections. Three of these replacements came from the purgees' rival parties.† The third election (23 January 1949) brought forth 1364 candidates. It returned 274 experienced parliamentarians and elected 192 new members to the Diet.‡

TABLE 9
NUMBER OF BUREAUCRATS
IN POSTWAR JAPANESE DIETS

Year	No. of career bureaucrats		
	Elected	Elected for first time	Holding important party posts
1946	20	10	5
1947	27	18	10
1949	55	41	42 ^a

^aEight Cabinet posts were held by elected bureaucrats after the 1949 elections.

Paralleling these political shifts of power brought about by the successive impacts of the purge, internal changes within the Diet itself contributed to a tradition of political irresponsibility. As we have seen, political inexperience had become a prominent characteristic of the legislative body, and the successive inroads of the purge even resulted in the loss of important seats to rival parties. But a still greater source of political disturbance was the increase in civil servants who were encouraged to run for office by the

*Two hundred and thirty-seven of these had been in the previous Diet.

†Article 79 of the House of Representatives Election Law⁴⁴ (Shugiin Giin Senkyoho) provided that by-elections should take place only where two or more vacancies occurred in the electoral district.

‡A striking feature of this election is that 35 out of 115 Communist candidates won seats. This was a greater victory than even the Party had expected, an increase of 31 seats over its previous 4. None of the newspapers had predicted the election of more than 10, and the fact that the popular vote increased from 1,002,903 (3.7 percent of the total) to 2,984,583 (9.6 percent of the total) shows that the gains were strategically placed. For a discussion of the reasons for this shift, see Ref 45. After this election and the subsequent developments in the Communist program, SCAP issued its 6 June 1950 directive purging 13 of the victors. In the by-election held in 1952 only 1 of them was replaced, and he from a different party. See the following discussion on "Effects of the Purge on the Extreme Elements."

political inexperience of other available candidates.* These soon worked their way to responsible positions in the Diet, as Table 9 demonstrates.

Thus the Diet suffered not only from the political uncertainty created by the purge and from the rise of bureaucratic initiative, but it was gradually surrendering positions of leadership in its internal organization to former bureaucrats.†

In summary, it may be said that the purge was one of several factors contributing to a loss in the parliamentary competence and prestige of the national assembly.‡ For this reason, and because Occupation policy required the development of a strong democratic government with parliamentary supremacy, special assistance had to be offered to Diet members in order to strengthen their relative position in the Japanese government.§ This did not, however, alter the relative advantage enjoyed by civil servants over the newcomers at the polls. When members of the bureaucracy entered politics, their successes as vote-getters were enhanced by the disproportionate share of responsible positions which they received in the Diet when once elected.

More important to the Japanese public was the fact that after each election adequate representation had been denied to those areas of the country which lost their delegates through the purge. Where purgees were replaced with their runners-up from the previous election, the probability was strong that the seat would go to the opposing party. In a country possessing strong party discipline along lines of national principle, this might have been of greater political significance than it was in Japan. Even when by-elections were held to fill such vacancies (as was the case after the first election in

*Here "civil servants" includes primarily those who passed the Higher Civil Service Examination (Kotokan Shiken) entitling them to occupy positions of bureau chief (kyokucho) or higher. A few others who attained this rank in spite of not having taken the examination, and who have made a career in the central government, are also included among these figures.

†The professional background of Diet members changed in several other respects after the war as well. There were more businessmen among the representatives, and fewer industrialists (i.e., manufacturers). There were more educators, by a substantial number, and fewer lawyers (see App H).

‡The question of parliamentary competence cannot be categorically determined with reference to the postwar Diets, not only because it is in itself difficult to assess, but because in Japan the legislative initiative was often out of the hands of the representatives themselves. Occupational reform measures were frequently pushed through the Diet arbitrarily and without assumption of political responsibility by the Japanese themselves. Thus Hasegawa Shinichi, Associate Editor of the Nippon Times, could say in a special article,⁴⁶ "The thirteenth Diet session was epochal in that it witnessed the switch-over of Japan from Allied Occupation to a sovereign independence. The Diet however failed to show a sufficient ability to carry on the task of leading the political world of Japan without the advice of SCAP." This opinion was frequently expressed to the author by newspapermen and other informed observers of Japanese political activity.

§The SCAP advisor to the Japanese Diet received the support of GS in many minor but highly suggestive conflicts between the Diet members and the leaders of the government ministries. These usually involved apparently insignificant personal prerogatives reflecting the status or prestige of the parties concerned. The principle of responsibility of the Government ministries to Diet committees was not easily established; neither was that of the supremacy of the politically appointed Cabinet ministers over the permanent career officials of each ministry.

Japan), there was no adequate system of replacements because of the uneven incidence of the purge.* In effect, the delayed application of the purge actually served to penalize constituents who had unwittingly elected candidates subject to a retrospective purge.

Nevertheless, in spite of these political problems, there can be no doubt that the purge did succeed in its first objective: it eliminated the elements from the Diet whose leadership was in question because of their previous associations with the war program. It may have succeeded all too well, for it created new problems in the relations between the Diet and the civil service. And it created an even greater problem for the United States as the Occupation lifted.

The post-Occupation Diet was almost embarrassingly free from military ambitions, in view of the developing need for limited national rearmament. In this respect the purge was almost too successful in eliminating militaristic influences.† A further test of the purge was provided soon after the Occupation ended. The 1 October 1952 elections brought out a postwar record in voting response (76.5 percent of the eligible voters), although there were fewer candidates than in the three previous elections. Out of 1243 candidates, 329 were de-purgees, including 7 who had been members of the previous Diet‡ and 6 who had never been de-purged.§ Purgees were running in 110 of the 117 election districts.

The 1952 election results looked superficially like a great victory for the purged candidates. Of the 466 Diet seats, 139 were won by them, representing 78 constituencies; 99 of the victorious purgees had formerly been Diet members, in addition to 3 who were re-elected from the previous Diet. Only 37 of the total were elected for the first time, of whom 23 were former civil servants.¶ In one extreme case (the third district of Ibaraki Prefecture) all five seats were won by ex-purgees, although they were the only purgees running against 9 other candidates.

Closer examination, however, discredits this first impression.** Purgees did not have an advantage at the polls. It is true that 42 percent of them were successful, as compared with 35 percent among other candidates; but among nonpurgees with previous experience as Diet members, 53 percent were successful, as against 45 percent of the experienced purgee candidates (see

*The by-elections in Japan could be held only if two vacancies occurred in the same district. There were 117 districts, and the probability of the purge striking two of the 466 members from the same district was very small except in a wholesale purge.

†Japan's pacifism can be interpreted either as a sign of the unwillingness of Japan's people to accept the responsibilities of a free nation, or as a triumph of democratic and peace-loving forces.

‡Only 3 of these were re-elected.

§Of these, five were Communists, none of whom were elected. The sixth, an Independent, was a former member of the General Staff who had planned or participated in operations in Malaya, Guadalcanal, and Burma. He had been sought for war crimes by the British, but had hidden in Thailand, French Indo-China, and China until his name was removed from the active list. He was elected to a seat representing the first district of Ishikawa.

¶3 October 1952.

**Neither the Japanese nor American press seemed interested in this closer examination, however: an almost uniform interpretation of the election was that the purgees were being gradually reinstated.

Table 10). And prewar Diet membership was not nearly as great an asset as membership under the Occupation, which involved only those who had been de-purged under allied policy.*

TABLE 10
SUCCESS OF PURGEES IN THE 1952 DIET ELECTIONS

Candidates	Total no. candidates	Total no. elected	Percentage
De-purgees, 329		139	42
With previous experience as Diet members	228	102	45
In pre-occupation Diets	176	74	42
During the occupation	52	28	54
Without previous experience in the Diet	101	37	36
Others, ^a 914		327	35
With Diet experience	483	254	53
Without Diet experience	431	73	17
Total	1243	466	37.5

^aCandidates not purged.

An interesting phenomenon of the 1952 elections was that the chances for purgees to return from political exile were not improved by the withdrawal of their protégés. Many purgees had assigned their political spheres of influence on a temporary basis to sons, brothers, secretaries, and others who agreed to withdraw after the Occupation was over (see App C). This evasive device was not wholly successful, and very few of the purgees were able to regain their Diet seats from their own chosen replacements once these had tasted power on their own.†

An analysis of the Diet elected in 1952 shows that there were 217 members of the previous Diet returned to their seats. Only 3, or 1.4 percent, were purgees. There were 140 members of former Diets who were successful in the 1952 campaign, and 99, or 71 percent, had been purgees. Only 109 successful candidates had never had a Diet seat, of whom 37, or 34 percent, were purgees.

The implications of these figures clearly show that the Japanese electorate had made its choice without special reference to the candidates' former status as purgees. There was no implied rejection of American concepts of democratic leadership in the election campaigning, and in many cases the voters' preference for purgees can be best explained by the absence

*See Chap. 2. The presumption was that "nominal" purgees were de-purged before the more serious cases.

†In only seven cases of those listed in App C was it possible to identify the withdrawal of the substitute and the return of the purgee as a candidate. Ref 41, 25 September 1952, p 3.

of political color or local support by their opponents. There was a marked preference for candidates with previous Diet experience, but within this group purgees were at a disadvantage. Japan's electorate was at least beginning to repudiate purged former leaders.*

The election of 19 April 1953 brought further indications of the waning prestige of the purgees. The actual outcome of the election, in spite of the heavy vote (74.2 percent of the electorate) was politically indecisive. Premier Yoshida's Liberal party lost heavily, and the combined strength of all right-wing factions lost slightly to that of the left.† But from the point of view of the purgees' status, the outcome was clear and unequivocal. Probably the outstanding feature of the election was the defeat of outstanding candidates whose tenure had been taken for granted. This extended not only to purgees, but to other leaders of the old school as well.‡ Of the 139 ex-purgees who had been elected in 1952, only 88 were returned to their seats in 1953 (45 were defeated, and 6 retired). Although 32 purgees who had been defeated in 1952 were successful in 1953, 67 more were again defeated, and an additional 91 did not run.§ There were also four purgees who did not run

*Among the 17 members of Premier Yoshida's Fourth Cabinet, however (formed 29 October 1952), 8, or 49 percent, were former purgees, as contrasted with 30 percent of the Diet. Purgees were evidently given greater representation in the executive branch than in the legislative. Mr. Yoshida, a former career civil servant, was more disposed to favor wartime leaders after the end of the Occupation than were the Japanese voters.

†The Party strength was as follows:

Party	1953 Seats	1952 Seats
Right		
Yoshida Liberal	199	222
Progressive	76	88
Hatoyama Liberal	35	22
Left		
Right-Wing Socialist	66	60
Left-Wing Socialist	72	56
Labor-Farmer	5	4
Communist	1	0
Splinter Parties	1	3
Independent	11	11
	466	466

Another indication was the emergence of labor-union-sponsored candidates and the "sizable donations from organized labor" (Ref 69, 31 March 1953). This may be balanced by the increase in the number of extreme right-wing candidates, supported by the 750 rightist organizations said to be flourishing at election time (Ref 69, 29 March 1953).

‡Examples were Ichiro Kiyose, Secretary-General of the Progressive party; Hatoyama-Liberal Kozan Hirokawa, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Budaiyu Kogure, "chief policy-maker" of the Yoshida-Liberal party. The greatest surprise to Americans was the defeat of nonagenarian Yukio Ozaki, who had been in every Japanese Diet since the Meiji Constitution, had brought about the first national elections in Japan, and was also famous for his present of the Japanese cherry trees to the US government while serving as mayor of Tokyo (1903 to 1912).

§For simplification's sake, these figures may be stated as follows: there were 329 purgees running in the 1952 election. One hundred and thirty-nine of these were successful, but only 88 won again in 1953. Of the 190 who had failed in 1952, only 32 succeeded in 1953.

in 1952, but were successful in their 1953 campaigns. The total number of purgees in the 1953 House of Representatives was thus 124, as compared with 139 a year before. Not only did the 1953 House contain fewer purgees, but a smaller percentage of those who ran (38 percent) were successful than in 1952 (42 percent).

The results of the two national elections following the Occupation suggest that purgees had lost status during the six postwar years, and that, as time progressed, they sustained further losses in their political appeal. The purge first discredited Japan's political leaders, and then it kept them out of circulation long enough to develop a new leadership capable of outstripping the old at the polls.

THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Characteristically, Japanese political parties have derived their support not from strongly centralized political organization, but from shifting local affiliations organized about prominent names in each community. The allegiance of these provincial leaders had usually been a matter of compromise and expediency rather than political principle, which gives to the entire political apparatus an aspect of instability and opportunism. This has been strikingly evident in postwar Japan: with the exception of the Communist party, no national party followed an unbroken line of political continuity from 1945 to 1952 (see Fig 3).

An unexpected but important political effect of the defeat and the Occupation has been the loss of political revenue from secret Army funds and large zaibatsu combines. In prewar days the zaibatsu group made political contributions in exchange for indirect benefits offered by the government party (such as legislation to prevent social revolution or to protect the activities and profits of the large corporations). These annual gifts to any one party were sometimes as much as \$2,500,000,* given, usually, without specific conditions, for the very power exerted by the zaibatsu groups made it unnecessary for them to ask petty favors of the party they supported.†

After the Occupation, however, political contributions had to be solicited from relatively small companies, many of which had mushroomed unexpectedly in the postwar economic confusion. Thus, the parties could no longer plan on receiving stable annual gifts from zaibatsu corporations, made regularly rather than at strategic moments in political bargaining campaigns. Postwar contributions were given largely on an ad hoc basis. This com-

*Testimony of a high-ranking party leader to the author. Major zaibatsu families supported different party groups in this way.

†It would be an oversimplification to associate one party consistently with a single zaibatsu donor. Factionalism and economic rivalries provided some variations in the amount, source, and consistency of the contributions; but for the most part all major parties were heavily dependent on the large industrial combines for their funds and their political orientation. In general, the Mitsui combine tended to support the Seiyukai, Japan's GOP, and the Mitsubishi combine, the Minseito. The Yasuda combine turned to the military and secret societies for its political support.




Fig. 3—Major Japanese Postwar Political Parties, Leaders, and Date of Organization as of 28 April 1952

pelled the parties to seek their financial support through hidden gifts,* which were usually specifically linked with special favors. The resulting political scandals (culminating in the Showa Denko Case, involving a Prime Minister) have dominated the newspaper accounts of party activities in recent years. The public developed less respect for politics than had been the case even in the days of "government by assassination."[†]

Against this background of personal leadership, locally bargained for and traditionally subservient to zaibatsu controls, it is clear that a major effect of the political purge lay in the loss of dominant personalities and the concurrent dislocations in party control. There is no evidence that the national cohesiveness of the parties or their basic platforms or organizational structure were seriously affected, except in the case of the Japan Progressive party (Shinpo To).

During its first year, the political purge had particularly striking effects upon the Japan Progressive party. Most of its leaders were men who had been prominent during the war,⁴⁸ and as such were highly vulnerable to the purge at its outset. Most of its members had been carried over from the Yokusan Seiji Kai and the Dai Nippon Seiji Kai, and had originally gained their seats because of the support of the War Government (see App D). Its membership in the "Lame Duck" Diet[‡] was cut from 274 to 27, and it lost every member of its executive staff but one.[§] This was a crushing blow to the Party's right-wing leadership, and in finding replacements the Progressives were compelled to seek out more liberal elements in the surviving leadership. Because purgees were associated in the public mind with war criminals and militarists, it became necessary for the party to counter this reputation by making its public appeals from that date in terms of "liberalism" and "democracy."[¶] That it had partial success in this readjustment is indicated by the election of 10 April 1946, when it became the leading opposition party with 94 seats.^{**} In the postelection rescreening, the Progressives lost three more important staff members.

*It was popularly estimated that in 1952 a candidate had to spend 1 to 10 million yen (3,600 to 36,000 dollars) to secure a seat in the Diet, and a ministership is said to be worth 20,000 yen. There have been important exceptions to this rule, however, in the case of a few candidates running on independent reform platforms. Many of the gifts solicited from large donors remained concealed, although Articles 12-13 of the Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin Kisei Ho) required that all gifts in excess of 500 yen (about 1.4 dollars) be reported to the Jiichicho Bureau of Self-Government.

[†]See Chap. 4. Studies by professional political scientists did nothing to counteract these political impressions. Cf. Royama, Masamichi; Ukai, Nobushige, and others, Ref 47, "Analysis of Political Consciousness," field research in the General Election of 1949, Tokyo, 1949.

[‡]The Eighty-Ninth Diet Session, convoked 26 November 1945 and consisting of the wartime Diet members, lasted only 22 days.

[§]Chief Party Secretary Yusuke Tsurumi announced ten days after SCAPIN 550 (App A) was issued that only three of the Party's leaders would escape. Ref 5, pp 16, 25. See also Ref 6, Part F.

[¶]It had to withdraw a total of 260 of its 274 seated members in the pre-1946-election screening; 2 of the remaining 14 were purged after the election. Thereafter, of the 24 leaders appointed from party remnants, 7 were still to be purged.

^{**}By the time the Diet was convoked in its 90th Session, 16 May 1946, the Progressives had 98 seats because of the general political reshuffling. The party also benefited from the proportional representation system and from pre-war conservative roots.

The Liberal party, which had held only 45 seats in the Lame Duck Diet session, was much less vulnerable to the purge because its leaders had not been prominent in wartime political activities. It lost 28 members in the purge, but retained its leaders,* and went into the 10 April election campaigning on its antimilitaristic record. It emerged as the winning party with 140 seats; and its president, Ichiro Hatoyama, was about to assume the post of Prime Minister when a special SCAP memorandum was issued purging him by name.†




Fig. 4—Effect of First Purge on Party Strength, 1946

A, before election; B, after election;
 ■, purged; □, not purged.

The purge of Hatoyama was one of the most dramatic incidents of the entire Occupation. Its reverberations could be heard in Japanese political circles long after the Occupation was over,‡ for it struck down the first premier who had been selected by political processes following Japan's long-heralded "democratic" elections. The Liberal party also lost the Speaker-Elect of the House of Representatives, Bukichi Miki, and its Secretary-General, Ichiro Kono, and began to assume in the public mind a place beside the Progressives as a reactionary party. The resulting uncertainty within the party also increasingly forced Shigeru Yoshida (Foreign Minister who became President of the Party and Prime Minister after the removal of Hatoyama) to draw upon the politically neutral professional bureaucrats in

*The Party maintained at first that the Party leaders who did not hold Diet seats or other government posts were not occupying "public office," therefore were not included in the purge. This erroneous impression was corrected by the official Cabinet interpretation announced with SCAP approval 15 February 1946.

†SCAPIN 919, App A.

‡After the Peace Treaty, Hatoyama's followers sought to dislodge his successor, Prime Minister Yoshida, by asserting that the latter had accepted the premiership with the "promise" to relinquish it to Hatoyama when he became eligible for the office.

forming his cabinets. This was an important additional source of strength for the bureaucratic elements in Japan, which, as we have seen, had already been gaining in relative power.*

The Cooperative party, which had claimed 27 seats in the Lame Duck Diet, lost 25 of them to the purge and was relegated to the role of minor party. In the 1946 election, it won 14 seats.[†] Its president Sanehiko Yamamoto, following the 1947 reorganization, was purged 14 February 1947 after having protested his original designation in July, 1946.[‡] The Socialist party, which was least affected by the purge, lost three of its 26 party officials prior to the election,[§] and 3 of its 92 seats upon later rescreening. Only one of these purgees was a high-ranking Party official.

The extension of the purge in 1947 to include local wartime politicians made further inroads on the national parties, for many of the emerging party leaders had been recruited from prefectural and municipal assemblies. Prior to the 1947 elections, many Diet members became ineligible for re-election because of their wartime activities on local levels of the government.

TABLE 11
NUMBER OF DIET MEMBERS INELIGIBLE
FOR RE-ELECTION IN 1947

Party	Members, no.
Democratic (formerly Progressive)	42
Liberal	30
Socialist	10
People's Cooperative	11
Others	3
Total	96

In the weeks prior to the election, the newly organized Democratic (formerly Progressive) party lost two of its three highest-ranking leaders within a week of its organization,[†] followed by two secretaries-general in succession. Other Party members went into the campaign with serious doubts as to their purge status. The Liberal party also suffered serious losses, including two ministers of state and one other prominent leader, at a time when

*There was also some room for doubting Yoshida's democratic bona fides. As former ambassador to London and Rome, he had "publicly championed Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China Proper," and "had served as Vice-Foreign Minister under General Tanaka, an archexponent of Japanese military expansion." Ref 49, p 29. His record has been, on the whole, sound, however.

[†]Political reorganization after the election gave it 32 seats at the convocation of the 90th Diet session, 16 May 1946.

[‡]He resigned as President in December 1946, and was thus not actually removed from the Diet by the purge, although it was clear that this was the cause of his resignation even though his case had not yet been finally decided.

[§]According to Ref 5, p 27, the Socialists lost 10 of their 17 seats prior to the election. This did not injure the Party, however, as the election results indicated. Its more dynamic left-wing leadership was able to consolidate the Party more firmly and coherently than before, and the Party remained unified until 25 October 1951.

[†]Ken Inukai on 9 April and Wataru Narahashi on 4 April.

ten other leading members of the party bolted to the Democratic party.* The Socialist and Cooperative Democratic parties suffered no important losses in this period.

The elections of 25 April 1947 resulted, surprisingly, in victory for the Socialists. The distribution of seats is shown in Table 12. After the election the Yoshida Cabinet resigned, and a coalition cabinet under Socialist President Tetsu Katayama was installed.

TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SEATS AFTER 1947 ELECTION

Party	Members, no.
Socialist	143
Liberal	131
Democratic (Progressive)	124
People's Cooperative	31
Communist	4
Minor parties and Independents	33
Total	466

In the rescreening of Diet Members following the elections, there were further inroads. The Democratic party lost one cabinet minister, Heima Hayashi, but no important party officials. The Liberal party was most severely affected, with the purge of Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi and his associate Kinkichi Ishiyama, both of whom were important party leaders. This encouraged Party President Yoshida to place even greater reliance on civil servants, both in his party's councils and in the cabinets which he subsequently formed.† Even the Socialist party suffered the loss of such important party leaders as Rikizo Hirano,‡ Jiichiro Matsumoto, and Shogetsu Tanaka. The Cooperative party was not affected by the post-1947-election purge.

The incidence of the purge by parties§ is summarized in Table 13. As we have seen, the successive inroads of the purge on Japanese parties have

*Tsunejiro Hiratsuka (Minister of Transportation) and Tokudaro Kimuro (Minister of Justice, though not a Diet member), and Tomejiro Okubo.

†The purge after the election of 1947 removed four members of the Yoshida Cabinet, (3 of whom had served for 13 months as cabinet ministers) during the entire period of Yoshida's prime-ministership. The delay in applying the purge to these men is credited not only with leaving them in office during a vitally important period, but also with contributing to the strength of the bureaucracy as the main pillar of unpurged strength.

‡Hirano's purge was followed by a split between the Left and Right factions of the Socialist party. There was some tendency in the Japanese press to attribute the splintering of the party to Hirano's removal, but it seems more probable that his influence on the Right Wing of the party was insufficient to have kept them from bolting after the Leftists assumed party leadership. Suehiro Nishio and Kazuo Nagae, among the Rightist leaders of the party, had been previously compelled to resign because they were implicated in bribery scandals. This had led to the election of Leftist Mosaburo Suzuki as chairman, which was the immediate cause of the party split.

§For the convenience of those desiring to conduct further research, an official list of names and dates of purge designations, classified by political parties, will be found in App C.

had political effects extending beyond the mere removal of objectionable leaders. After the war the parties achieved an unprecedented reputation for opportunism, partly because of the loss of the zaibatsu combines as paternalistic sources of revenue. When this compelled the parties to seek their financial supports elsewhere, a number of scandals resulted as attempts to secure favors in exchange for political corruption became an increasingly

TABLE 13
TOTAL INCIDENCE OF THE PURGE BY PARTIES

Parties	Diet members and candidatea	Governors and candidates	Total
Liberal			44
1946 ^a	4		
1947	37(153) ^b	3	
1948			
1949			
Progressive			39
1946 ^a	5		
1947	31(167)	2	
1948	1		
1949			
Socialist			30
1946 ^a	3		
1947	20(4)	4	
1948	1		
1949	2		
Minor ^c			27
1946 ^a	0		
1947	22(24)	4	
1948			
1949	1		
Independenta			103
1946 ^a			
1947	90(102)	11	
1948	1		
1949			

^aRefers only to postelection purgees.

^bFigures in parentheses refer to purgees "provisionally designated," December 1947, that is, members not actually holding or seeking public office who were barred from political activity.

^cCommunist party not included.

important factor in postwar politics. The advantages of emancipating Japanese parties from control by a single group and the eventual development of multiple sources of party revenue were not recognized. There was a potential gain for democracy in this release from political domination by a single interest, but during the Occupation the subjection of political leaders to conflicting pressures and influences has brought only confusion. The former unified pattern of control was eliminated by the purge and other reforms, but this has made all the more difficult the tasks of the postwar national leadership.

Similar conclusions may be drawn regarding the loss of party leaders: senior politicians were sacrificed in the purge, and the scramble for power temporarily lowered the visible standards of public life. It was commonly said that "second-stringers" had been promoted to the places of Japan's leaders to preside over the various operations that had been left in the hands of the Japanese government. The fact is, however, that although these leaders started with relatively little experience, their task under the Occupation was to install a program of basic institutional reform. By the end of the Occupation they had had more experience with a responsible type of representative government than many of their predecessors had.

The interparty relationships and competition for votes were also affected by the purge. An important political argument used by the Socialist party in its campaigns was that the parties with the smallest number of purgees were the most democratic. The victory of this party in the election of 1947 is to some extent related to this claim, as well as to the survival of its original leadership. The reorganization of the Progressive party and its redesignation as the Democratic party may also be directly attributed to the purge, which had so thoroughly discredited its leadership.

The party leaders who rose to power after the purge can be divided into several groups. They include a few former politicians of recognized ability whose previous careers had been obscure because they were not acceptable to the prewar military clique; but there were many more who had had no previous political prominence but had had long careers in subordinate posts. There is some reason to believe that it was the former, smaller group which provided the most important leaders of postwar Japan. They had been relatively progressive even when it endangered their careers, while many of the others, who had played subordinate roles under the militarists, had been willing to assume the political complexion dictated by expediency.

There is yet a third group of leaders whose rise can be identified as a product of the purge: the "substitute candidates" put up for election after the purge of party regulars. An examination of these cases provides striking evidence of political efforts to undermine the influence of the purge upon the complexion of the Diet. Brothers, wives, and former secretaries or campaign managers of purgees would succeed to vacated Diet seats representing the same party. The list in App C includes most prominent members of this group, and shows their relationships to the men they replaced. Although their independence has frequently been impugned by commentators, there is no evidence to support the contention that they voted according to instructions from purgees.* Their strength as democratic leaders has not yet been tested.

*In most cases purgees, impoverished by the restrictions on their activities, were in no position to travel to Tokyo to give them detailed instructions. It may be added that much of the legislation before the Diet was prepared by the government ministries under the direction of SCAP staff sections, which minimized the possibility of an advance briefing by purgees. Since correspondence between purgees and Diet members was subject to spot check by CCD, orders were seldom transmitted by mail. Indirect influence there undoubtedly was, but the political environment of the Diet sessions devoted to the installation of reforms was considered a counterirritant. As to the reasons for the success of relatively unknown substitute candidates in winning votes, some attention must be given to the means used by Japanese parties in securing local support. For a discussion of the Minseito as the prewar progenitor of modern Japanese parties, see Ref 48, esp pp 948ff.

Other political manifestations of the purge may be found in the divisions within the major parties which occurred after the gradual lifting of restrictions on purgee activities. Within the Liberal party since 1948, for example, de-purgees who have returned to power have exhibited marked tendencies to stand together as a group against newer members who were elected to replace the Old Guard. For example, followers of the inflationary fiscal policies advocated by Tanzan Ishibashi also tended to oppose Premier Yoshida's après-guerre nominee to the party Secretary-Generalship, to urge rearmament and deficit financing, and to support the bid of de-purgee Hatoyama for party leadership. It remains to be seen whether the liberals who rose under the Occupation will unite against the Old Guard.

It is probable that the impact of the purge on Japanese political parties may have been its greatest direct influence. It made for instability, but the stability it destroyed was that of an authoritarian despotism. It brought inexperienced leaders to the fore, but removed those steeped in years of totalitarian government. It created new cliques and new sources of disunity, which is only another way of describing the disappearance of an enforced uniformity in Japanese society. Whether the final outcome will be the development of a responsible democracy must be determined by the positive efforts, essentially, of the Japanese themselves.

EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN JAPANESE POLITICS: MILITANT NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM

Extremist elements which had gradually seized control of the Japanese government and economy in the decades after the Meiji Restoration were primarily responsible for the military adventures resulting in Japan's Pacific War. The extremes included both ultraright and infrared elements, reactionaries, and revolutionists, for Japanese politics had been characterized by opportunistic alliances on the part of both. Marxist-minded younger sons of landholders and farmers were frequently sent into the army, where they joined their social misanthropy to militant nationalism. Imperialistic army officers joined hands with zaibatsu interests engaged in exploiting foreign sources of raw materials. This marriage of convenience gave the right wing the upper hand because of its financial and military power, and where communists and social revolutionaries refused to join hands they were quickly and thoroughly suppressed.*

During the war, in spite of several official attempts to consolidate the 350-odd rightist organizations of all types and sizes,[†] they retained at least a degree of independence in their theoretical orientation. For example, many organizations centered their activities about nationalistic or feudalistic ideas,

*For a discussion of the effectiveness with which the Japanese police agents performed this task, see Ref 50, esp Chaps. 4 and 5.

[†]The Taisei Yokusankei, Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA) founded by Prince Konoe in October, 1940, was intended to consolidate all political right-wing associations. Some retained their independence from it by changing their names and calling themselves "cultural" organizations, but these were later incorporated into the Dai Nippon Koa Domei (Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance), the wartime totalitarian Tojo Cabinet. Further details on the right-wing activities may be found in the many articles and volumes published in Japan by Professor Hanji Kinoshita.

devoting themselves to "protection of the national structure." These opposed fascism and nazism as revolutionary foreign products. Other organizations, like the famous Dark Ocean Society and the Black Dragon Society and their affiliates, advocated state socialism frankly patterned on German and Italian models. This gave some variety to the surface appearance of Japanese politics, the one attacking, the other defending, the Axis nations of Europe; but in terms of domestic and international program these groups were indistinguishable.

The defeat robbed all these organizations of an important basis of doctrinal appeal to their followers. The fiction of imperial divinity became unpopular, if not untenable, after the Emperor meekly accepted orders from General MacArthur; and the doctrine of military supremacy and the unlimited spiritual power of the warrior was even more shattered. A more serious blow than this loss of theoretical foundations was the removal of financial supports when the rightist cartels were ruined and broken up.

Yet the members of these secret patriotic societies retained hidden loyalties to their worn-out beliefs. The facts of an occupation aroused a variety of antagonistic responses from the extreme right wing. Direct action was rare, although there are a few cases reported. The most celebrated incident occurred when some thirty members of the Kokumin Tokkotai (People's Special Attack Corps) fired machine guns into the Prime Minister's official residence on 15 August 1945, and then destroyed the private homes of Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and Kiichiro Hiranuma.* There were also several other raids upon the homes of cabinet officers, and in Shimane prefecture a large government building was burned to the ground in protest against the surrender.†

Another form of protest was that of passive resistance in the famed Japanese tradition of ceremonial suicide. The three most important cases of mass suicide occurred during the last week in August.‡ Other efforts to achieve mass suicides were not signally successful, although there were an unknown number of individual suicides protesting the surrender.§

*The leader of these attacks, an engineer captain named Takeo Sasaki, was also head of the Aikoku Seiji Domei, Patriotic Political Alliance of Yokohama. He was never apprehended and was still at large when the writer left Tokyo in September 1952.

†Naval flight officers engaged in positive resistance to the surrender at Atsugi Airfield, as did the many Imperial Guard Division officers in Tokyo. There were also a few sporadic evidences of resistance by civilian rightist organizations.

‡On 22 August 1945, ten members of the Sonjo Doshikai (Loyalist Comrades Society) killed themselves with hand grenades and revolvers. On 23 August, twelve members of the Meiro Kai (Serenity Society) committed suicide on the Imperial Plaza with poison, daggers, and a pistol. Also on 23 August, thirteen members of the Daito Juku (Greater East Asia Academy) committed hara-kiri following the ancient rites.

§The annual number of suicides is as follows:

1941	13,286	1946	15,686
1942	12,196	1947	15,406
1943	11,132	1948	16,477
1944	-	1949	18,421
1945	11,362	1950	21,710

Ref 70, p 639. There is, of course, no way of determining the precise influence of military defeat in itself upon this rate, since there were a number of corollary causes, such as domestic problems, unemployment, and economic hardships, which were enhanced by defeat.

Many of the rightist organizations declined the invitation to self-destruction, and changed their purposes and their names, in most cases using democracy rather than nationalism for a platform. Thus, for example, the "Ultra-Nationalism party" became the "All-Japan Worker's Alliance."* Like many others of its type, it was ordered dissolved by GHQ in the purge of ultra-nationalistic organizations.

A more successful means of reorganization was that which ostensibly abandoned political activities and hid under a commercial cloak. This not only enabled the leaders to maintain their associations with former members, but also provided them with a means of livelihood. Thus the former Toa Remmei (East Asia League, one of the few dangerous nationalistic societies specified by name in the original draft of SCAPIN 548, App A) organized a movement to popularize the use of yeast as a fertilizer and a society engaged in developing a new method of cultivating mushrooms. Similarly the Daito Juku (Greater East Asia Academy) established the Yamato Society, published a poetry magazine (Fuji), and operated, among other enterprises, a restaurant, a bookstore, and a farm. Other business enterprises controlled by the prohibited organizations included hotels, trading and industrial companies, a loan association, and a civil engineering company engaged as a contractor for the Eighth US Army.†

Most of these organizations were actually eliminated by the purge (SCAPIN 548, App A), however, and although there was some surreptitious activity of the type described above, no powerful, well-knit underground could be said to exist. Several insignificant right-wing groups were openly organized after the war on an anticommunist or antiunion basis, but these achieved no stability of organization or significant political power during the Occupation.

A study of the leaders of the abandoned right-wing societies shows that while some of them endured serious economic hardships under the purge, a greater number successfully weathered the storm period. A few had actually achieved a degree of prosperity, so they could extend help to their less fortunate associates. While these careers are too numerous and involved to discuss in detail, a summary of typical cases might prove useful in evaluating the role of the purge and its significance for the growing right-wing movement in Japan. Undoubtedly some rightist leaders were relatively strengthened by the purge, while others became dependent upon their erstwhile subordinates. Sumai Okawa, President of the Jimmu Kai (Emperor Jimmu Society), was so impoverished that he had to sell his entire library (for 200,000 yen) and to

*The Zenroku Kenrosha Domei was the name of the new organization. It succeeded the Kokusui Taishuto and Kokusui Domei. Its nominal leaders were Yoshio Fuji and Masakatsu Yoshimatsu.

†The Jinchu Gumi, the similarity of whose name to the Japanese word for Army of Occupation was probably no accident. It was established by Seigen Tanaka, formerly a leader of the Japanese or "Armed" Communist party, and also of the terroristic society Himorogi Juku ("Solidarity" or "Fence" Academy). It was also related to the Ketsumeitai Dan (Blood Brotherhood Alliance), controlled by Nissho Inoue. The company failed after a short time, presumably because of bad management, but not before enormous profits were chalked up to its leaders. Tanaka then engaged in some municipal public works in Tokyo. He established the Sanko Construction Co., with Yoshio Kodama, formerly of the Koa Seinen Undo Hombu, Asian Development Youth Movement. He later organized a "protective society" which provided guards to protect plants and power stations against communist sabotage.

receive financial aid from former friends. The other officers of that organization faced similar hardships. Nissho Inoue, leader of the Ketsumeidan (Blood Brotherhood Alliance, a notorious terroristic society), had to depend upon the generosity of Goro Obata, a member of that society, a former lieutenant of his who was generally credited with the assassination of Takuma Dan (of the Mitsui combine). After the Occupation began, Inoue published an autobiography and gave a series of public speeches, but did not succeed in winning much political support. Other leaders of the Ketsumeidan (Blood Brotherhood Alliance) and its affiliated organizations included Tadashi Konuma (who became a moderately successful broker) and Goro Hishinuma (who also became dependent upon the Gōtō family, mentioned above). Seigen Tanaka, founder of the Jinchū Gumi Contracting Company and other postwar enterprises, achieved both financial success and public notoriety under the Occupation. Kozaburo Tachibana, chief of the former Aigo Juku ("Native-Place-Loving" Academy), founded the Nomin Kesshitai (Peasant Suicide Corps) and, after his purge, operated several farms. He also became an active leader of the Ibaraki Farmers' party. Taku Mikami, a leader of the Imperial Rule Assistance Youth League, was allegedly engaged in black market activities. He was involved also in the smuggling of drugs and medicines in the S.S. Hailieh case in 1949. He assisted and sponsored other rightist leaders such as Seisei Sakata, Shozo Yabuki, Kazuma Saindo, Takeshi Nakamura, Masaharu Kageyama, Hiroshi Yamagishi, and Kiyoshi Koga. Genyosha (Dark-Ocean-Society) consultant Koki Hirota was hanged as a war criminal, but his former colleague, Taketora Ogata, former vice-president of the Asahi Newspaper, continued to prosper because of his newspaper connections. He and others from the Toa Remmei (East Asia League) organized the Nishi Nippon Kensetsu Kokumin Domei (Western Japan Reconstruction National Alliance) in December 1951. He was active in sustaining former Toa Remmei (East Asia League) and Genyosha (Dark-Ocean-Society) leaders and in maintaining liaison between the small postwar right-wing movements and the leaders of the dissolved nationalistic societies. After the Occupation he became a member of the Liberal party and was frequently mentioned as potential prime-minister timber. He supported and aided a number of former terrorists and ultranationalists, and through them was instrumental in organizing new societies such as Dokuritsu Jiyu Renmei (Independence and Liberty League). Masaharu Kageyama, one of the surviving leaders of the Daitō Juku (Greater East Asia Academy) after the suicide wave had taken its toll, continued to serve the cause of regenerating emperor-worship, and was even admitted to see the Emperor. There is also a substantial list of new groups organized by former secret or terroristic society leaders, bearing such innocuous names as Suiyokai (Wednesday Society), Sainihonsha (New Japan Society), Aikoku Seinen Yushi Inkai (Ardent Patriotic Youth Committee) and even a Tojigaku Kenkyūjo (Institute for the Study of the Science of Government).

Of the prewar groups operating in Japan at the end of the Occupation, the most important was the Toa Remmei (East Asia League) and its fertilizer-and-mushroom movements. Its leaders, Kei Wada, Masanobu Tsuji, and Haruo Sugiura, were still active and influential in political life in 1952. Many of their economic activities have been extremely profitable, and they and their followers have devoted their energies to organizing and uniting the farmers.

The post-Occupation resurgence of these activities, such as it was, appears to have been based upon the ability of their purged leaders to find an economic basis for survival and, later, for resumption of their former

status. This appears to be essentially a product of their own leadership potential, rather than of the purge itself. All but the most minor of them were prohibited during the Occupation from continuing their activities: with the exception of the Toa Remmei's (East Asia League) activities among the farmers of Yamagata prefecture, rightist strength was largely dissipated during the purge period. Only those whose leaders were able to surmount these handicaps emerged as political forces in the immediate post-Occupation period.

The extreme left wing was also subjected, somewhat later, to the inconveniences and restrictions of the purge. In June 1950, a letter from SCAP to Japan's Prime Minister set forth the necessity of this action after the Communist party had adopted terroristic and militant programs similar to those of the prewar rightists.* A total of 62 Communists were purged from June 1950 to October 1951, including 15 Diet candidates and members, and 42 other high-ranking members of the Party. This, combined with the suspension of the Communist newspaper Akahata (Red Flag), had serious effects upon the capacity of the Party to appeal to the rising group of liberal-minded citizens. Some of these were at first sympathetic to the reform program of the Communists, but were disaffected when it became apparent that the extreme left wing was pursuing a policy as intransigent as that of Japan's right-wing imperialists. The degree of discrediting of the Communist party as a liberal movement may be measured by the decline of party strength: it had 35 seats in the House of Representatives after the 1947 election, and none after October 1952. No Communist was elected to any of the 198 mayoral or 46 gubernatorial vacancies in the election of 23 April 1951, although 6 of the 2616 prefectural assemblymen were Communists after the election of 30 April 1951.†

It is an ironic fact that some liberal support may have been unintentionally thrown to the Communist party as a by-product of the purge in its early years. During the first four and a half years of the purge, when other parties were struck by the "MacArthur Tornado," the Communist leaders were untouched and the party was actually growing in strength. Communists joined SCAP in condemning the militaristic leaders of prewar Japan as unworthy of a democratic nation, and could rightfully argue, because of their years of imprisonment, that they had been the earliest opponents of Japanese fascism. The rising labor unions, encouraged as part of the democratic reform program, found support and assistance from trained leaders supplied by the Communists. The ancient enemies of freedom (and of the Party) were being removed from public life, as the Communists had always argued they should be. Land and tax reforms, long part of the Communist propaganda platform, were at last being introduced under the banner of democracy. The purge was hailed by many Communists as the greatest reform of all; it became official Party policy to encourage and "direct" it. A series of Red rallies were held throughout Japan to discuss its objectives and its implementation and to build public support for its continuance. Indeed, it was made to appear that SCAP was merely following the "Party Line," and that somewhat belatedly.‡ The

*See the statement by Makiyo Takahashi, App B.

†There had been only four Communist prefectural assemblymen of the 2498 elected in April 1947. The party response to this failure on the local level was to become "a lovable party." See Ref 50, an exceptionally complete and well-documented appraisal of the left wing in Japan.

‡The Communists "derived considerable encouragement from the purge directive." Ref 51, p 156.

Communist organs began to publish long lists of suggested purgees, including war criminals and other rightist leaders many of whom were subsequently purged under the official categories.* Unfortunately, the Japanese administration of the categories, accompanied by uncertainties as to their meaning and occasional attempts to circumvent them, often made it appear that only the Communist party had a definite program, while the other reformers were experimenting. When a Communist enemy was exempted from the purge, the Party invariably argued that the purge was not being carried far enough, and that extreme rightists were being protected by the conservative elements of the governmental bureaucracy and the Diet.

The Japanese left wing thus affords an example of how a purge of undesirable elements in an occupied country may work for a time in a way not contemplated at the outset, to the advantage of other political forces which may themselves become dangerous elements. It also illustrates the importance of framing and announcing the basic policy from the first, and of holding the initiative in serving the basic objectives of the Occupation. Had this been done, the Communist party might have been robbed of some of the early political gains caused by the purge program. Even though it would have been politically impossible to include the Communist party under the purge directives in 1946 to 1949, a clear announcement of the purposes and scope of the program would have rendered more difficult the Communist effort to make it appear a product of their thinking.

In the purge of extreme elements of the left and right wing, the importance of political surveillance has been repeatedly demonstrated. Intelligence reports indicated that rightist organizations were generally inactive during the purge period, except for some apparently harmless activities by purged former leaders and their associates. Since almost none of these was illegal, the efforts of the intelligence agencies were gradually shifted to other areas of activity. At the same time, surveillance by Army and civilian agencies enabled SCAP to discover unexpected underground activity springing from the extreme left and to take effective countermeasures.

By and large, the purge succeeded in immobilizing dangerous political elements during a period when they might have stirred up public resentment against the reform program. If it inadvertently aided an extremist group which was later to compromise the acceptance of democratic institutions, it also provided a means of neutralizing this new group as well.

*Important Communist party people's rallies concerning war criminals was held as early as 8 December 1945 in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Nagoya, Fukuoka, and Sapporo (the first General Order dealing with war criminals was not issued until 19 January 1946, and proceedings did not commence until 3 May 1946). At the Tokyo rally a list of 1600-odd war criminals was made public. At this time the purge categories were just being drawn up, and the Communist party lists provided a useful source of probable purge victims. The list included members of the royal and noble families, 23 Imperial Household officers, 37 generals and admirals, 79 army and navy officers and others, 125 former cabinet members, 18 diplomats, 16 local administrators, 32 judicial officers, 32 police officers, 38 Privy Council members, 165 members of the House of Peers, and 357 Representatives. It also included 86 financial leaders, 171 rightist leaders, 73 journalists and publishers, and 42 men of letters and 50 scholars. There were 19 women, 114 members of the Sampo (an extreme right-wing labor movement organized to speed up war production), and 46 religious leaders on their lists.

THE NATIONAL BUREAUCRACY

An important source of stability in prewar Japan had been provided by the national bureaucracy. Its power and authority, which far outstripped that of the politically-responsible elements in the government,* had been consistently used in support of the militaristic expansionist policies of Japan's army and navy. It, together with the zaibatsu and the military factions, had provided the apex of the prewar totalitarianism.†

The Japanese bureaucracy traditionally attracted a disproportionate share of the ablest law school graduates, usually from Tokyo Imperial University. They sought positions in the public service, largely from mingled motives of patriotism and desire for prestige and power. The combination of ability, power, extreme loyalty, and prestige created a tightly knit group whose chief characteristics have been efficiency and arrogance.‡ They were traditionally underpaid for their responsibilities and the exhaustive nature of their work; they were usually retired at 45 if their careers had been successful, and much earlier if not. Unless they had a family background of wealth, they had to live modestly and in continual apprehension for the future.§ Perhaps only their esprit de corps and their loyalty to the emperor prevented the bureaucracy

*The Japanese government, based squarely on the supremacy of the Emperor, had placed in his personal servants, the bureaucracy, the responsibility for the actual functions of government (i.e., the discharging of his will). The Army and Navy Ministers, of course, were largely independent from even budgetary controls by the legislature, and the Home Ministry, with its special police powers and its arbitrary control over the local agencies of government, joined to provide the central corps of bureaucratic power. The Finance Ministry was also very powerful, influential, and able, in determining the national budget and in shaping Japan's fiscal and economic policies.

†Ref 52, pp 391-406; Ref 53, p 213. Imperial honors conferred upon the bureaucracy included court rank equivalent to that of a marquis, or of the President of the House of Peers, upon civil servants of Shinnin grade; Chokunin received court rank equal to that of vice president of the House of Peers; Sonin, or section chiefs, were equated with member of parliament. Sonin with 13 years' service were decorated with the 6th Order of Merit, and Chokunin after two years received the 4th Order, but no "civilian" could receive higher than the 6th Order for his first decoration regardless of the merit of his service.

‡It is not accidental that the Japanese language makes no distinction between civil employee and military employee in the public service. The language does distinguish between kankai or yakunin for official, and minkan for people or civilians. Bureaucrats and military officials have been lumped together in the concepts and even the language of the people. Wartime efforts by militarists to add the word gunkan (military bureaucrat) to the language had little success.

§Salaries of civil servants before the end of World War I were relatively handsome, and generous pensions permitted a comfortable retirement income at the end of a public career. After the first war, however, these circumstances seriously deteriorated. Up to World War II, special "Hidden Ball" allowances had to be issued to public servants in amounts sometimes equal to basic salaries. After World War II civil servants lost both their imperial privileges (see below) and these special allowances. Salaries were substantially inferior to those in comparable public employment. There is much reason to suppose that these factors may have contributed to bribery and corruption in the post-war public service.

from accepting monetary assistance in exchange for official favors;* even so, the need to secure a means of livelihood after retiring at 45 somewhat undermined the independence of the ministries from the economic enterprises which are their private counterparts. In the Finance Ministry, for example, many of the retired officials found employment that maintained close connections with the government (see Table 14).

TABLE 14
OCCUPATIONS OF RETIRED CAREER OFFICIALS
OF THE FINANCE MINISTRY (AUGUST 1952)

Occupation	Members, no.
Government service and quasi-public corporations	20
Officials in public fund commissions	9
Officials in banks, including government-controlled banks	13
Corporation officials	56
Diet members	8
Lawyers	7
Professors	3
In retirement	82
Total	198

The Occupation generally had a serious effect on the dynamics of the bureaucracy as an institution. Loyalty to the Emperor and to the state was attenuated by military defeat, occupation, and the introduction of democratic reforms; the constitutional emphasis on the primacy of the Diet removed the aura of mystery and professionalism which had shrouded governmental functions; inflation undermined still further the economic status of public servants. Outstanding graduates of the universities which had provided the core of the bureaucracy were entering private employment, and accompanying this phenomenon was the wider spread of sources from which young men entered the public service. Far more beginning bureaucrats came from private universities and from other employment in 1952 than had been the case in 1935. Indeed, the Tokyo Imperial University had a virtual monopoly on public employment in 1935: 89 percent of the 99 appointments made to the career civil

*The factor of loyalty to the emperor is an indication of the lack of a tradition of popularly responsible government in Japan. Japan's government has always been one dominated by the executive, even after the Meiji Restoration, which in some respects was more a *coup d'état* than a revolution. There was no legislative body at all from 1867 to 1890. As to the freedom of the bureaucracy from corruption, there is some difference of opinion. There is, however, considerable evidence that the 4000 bureaucrats serving in 1945 were a very superior group of men, in their intellectual and ethical capacity. There is no doubt that in spite of this the lack of a sense of public service or general welfare may have enabled the bureaucracy to accept favors from private citizens or corporations. Where public employment is not regarded as a public trust, private interests can the more easily be "mistaken" for public policy, without violating any ethical standards.

service in that year were its graduates.* In 1950, however, it contributed only 45 percent of the 429 comparable civil service appointees.† This was the result of deliberate effort on the part of the Occupation reformers to secure a wider representative group of public employees and to destroy certain of the "elite" characteristics. Reforms were adopted as an adjunct to the purge, which, as we have seen, made no serious inroads into the government service.‡

Reorganization of the bureaucratic system by the installation of American testing, classification, and organizational methods became a major task of the governmental reform program.§ Such reforms were regarded as a substitute for the purge, which might have impaired the usefulness of the bureaucracy at a critical moment. The effect of the purge on the bureaucratic system as a whole was negligible, as shown by its incidence in the central ministries (see Table 15).

The system by which purgees were replaced was simple promotion from the ranks. For this reason, the only distinguishing feature of the new appointees was, in most cases, their comparative youth at the time they assumed office.¶ In the Ministry of Finance, for example, the chokunin removed from

*The notorious Home Ministry appointed a higher number of graduates of other universities than did any other agency (only 22 of its 33 appointees in 1935 came from Tokyo University). Only 7 of the remaining 66 new appointees came from other universities. These figures were furnished by Professor Nobushige Ukai of the Tokyo University Institute of Social Science Research, and are based on records of those passing the Higher Civil Service Examination for Administrative Positions, 1934-35, and appointed in 1935.

†Includes those appointed from the roster of applicants passing the "Grade 6 Position Appointive Examination in Administrative, Legal and Economic Fields" (the closest equivalent to the Higher Civil Service Examination of 1935). Appointments in other special fields were also relatively scarce for Tokyo University graduates: only 26 percent of the 335 appointments. All told, only 283 of the 830 (34 percent) permanent in service appointments in 1950 were Tokyo University graduates.

‡This was done by changing the nature of the civil service examination so that it was no longer a Tokyo University product, closely tailored to fit its own courses. An added factor in the employment of graduates of other universities was the encouragement given to the establishment of national universities by SCAP staff sections. Many Japanese scholars believe that there are now too many governmental universities (97 as opposed to 21 in 1937). The available funds and faculties are inadequate for maintaining the high academic standards set by Tokyo Imperial University.

§An appraisal of the effectiveness of this reform was not undertaken as a part of this research, since it is a complex and important subject in itself. It seems safe to say, however, that the elements of esprit de corps and authority have not yet changed significantly from prewar days except in the respects noted above; thus perhaps the main effect of the Occupation period has been to lower the intellectual and moral standards of the public service without necessarily injecting elements of political responsibility. This is an opinion encountered among almost all the political scientists, businessmen, journalists, and old-line bureaucrats interviewed in this research. Indeed, this provides the main source of hope for the future in repressing the power of this closely-knit group, since public opinion seems aroused against it because of the very failure of the Occupation to alter its political attitudes.

¶Many of the purgees had held office somewhat longer than was customary, because of the war and postwar situation, so the disparity of ages was slightly exaggerated. In most cases the replacements were within a year or two of the age at which the purgees had taken the post in question.

office were slightly older than their replacements and, in some cases because of delayed promotions, the replacements were actually the older (see App C). In factors other than age, there is no measurable difference between purged bureaucrats and their successors in background, training, efficiency, or political outlook. Both groups were products of the same system.

TABLE 15

TOTAL INCIDENCE OF PURGE IN CENTRAL MINISTRIES

Cabinet and Ministries	Purged		Authorized Strength	
	All ranks	Chokunin and Shinin	All ranks	Chokunin and Shinin
Cabinet	7	3	5,217	211
Foreign	32	23	632	45
Finance	9	7	7,725	52
Justice	47	26	2,309	96
Education	84	39	11,242	1,234
Agriculture and Forestry	152	5	4,391	58
Commerce	42	4	3,136	74
Welfare	14	7	5,149	87
Communications	99	4	3,166	41
Transportation	587	7	6,500	97

TABLE 16

HOME MINISTRY PERSONNEL: BACKGROUND AND OCCUPATIONS FOLLOWING THE PURGE, AS OF 28 APRIL 1952

Year hired by Ministry	Total no. hired	No. grad. from govt. univ.	No. grad. from priv. univ.	Present occupation								Total no. purged
				Civil serv.	Diet mem.	Semi-pub. corpa.	Lawyers	Officials large co.	Officials small co.	Dead	Unknown	
1928	69	51	18	21	1	2	1	3	22	5	14	11
1929	59	44	15	21	4	7	2	1	10	7	7	8
1930	65	57	8	24	4	7	1	2	14	5	8	16
1931	51	40	11	23	0	2	2	2	9	6	7	12
1932	42	35	7	29	0	3	1	1	4	2	2	3
1933	60	51	9	41	0	1	3	1	2	7	5	5
Total	346	278	68	139	9	22	10	10	61	32	43	55
Percentage	100	80	20	46	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	18	9	12	16

Even where the purge was most thorough, in the Home Ministry, its effects were not serious. The positions held by former senior members of that organization at the end of the Occupation show that the purge had little effect on their future: they continued to occupy posts of importance in government and semipublic corporations (see Table 16). It is readily apparent that the largest group of former Home Ministry officials were still employed in the public service, presumably by other national ministries. In view of the fact that all these men had served at some time as officials of the Special Police (Thought

Police) Bureau as a matter of course, their exemption from the purge was one of the most widely criticized decisions of the Occupation.

The bureaucracy, ever jealous of its dwindling prerogatives, was able to take advantage of the inexperienced postwar Diet, particularly after the purge had taken its toll of political leaders. The dependence of the legislature upon the initiative of bureaucrats was illustrated in the session following the election of 1947, when in a record sitting of 204 days it began to look as if only 17 government-sponsored bills would be passed, most of which were routine in nature. Although 39 other bills were passed during the next six weeks as a result of SCAP pressure,* many important legislative acts had to proceed as Cabinet orders, drafted and promulgated without benefit of legislation by the same civil servants who had performed these functions in prewar days.†

Only one conclusion is possible upon examination of the purge of the national bureaucracy: most of the civil servants who had previously designed the instruments of Japan's prewar despotism were not dislocated by the purge. If the Japanese experience is a criterion, one may feel obliged to conclude with Max Weber that "even in case of revolution by force or of occupation by an enemy, the bureaucratic machinery will normally continue to function just as it has for the previous legal government."‡

CONCLUSION: THE BALANCE OF POWER IN JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS

It is generally agreed that the sources of prewar Japanese dictatorial power were centered in the military, economic, and bureaucratic cliques,§ who had become political heirs of the Meiji reforms and beneficiaries of the Prussian-model constitution of 1889. The destruction of these centers of power was one important objective of the purge and of the Occupation's political program, for these groups had been primarily responsible for domestic terrorism and repression and for expansionist militarism abroad. Under the Occupation's timetable, the generation of democratic elements of political power could not take place until these had been subjected to control by democratic agencies.

But democratic agencies were not easily found in the Japanese government, for it had been the leaders of the prewar democratic facade who had permitted the rise of these institutions of despotism. By failing to provide democratic leadership, they had by default encouraged, then meekly accepted, the schemes of the architects of the Japanese police-state. This failure, together with the ambitions of the militarists, had brought the world to war and Japan to defeat. Such was the basic theory of the Occupation; and it is understandable, from this point of view, that the impact of the purge was more severe against the political elements of the government than against the mere instruments of totalitarianism. Almost all of the wartime Diet members became ineligible for the postwar legislature, and important leaders of nearly every party were purged from office. But among the bureaucracy, few were affected unless they were actually members of the disbanded Thought Control

*Ref 49, p 78.

†As a result, SCAP "reprimanded" the government for this infringement of the legislative responsibility and power. Ref 49, p 79.

‡Ref 54, p 128.

§Ref 5, p xxiv.

Police of the Home Ministry, had been local officials of the IRAA or the Military Virtue Association, had been engaged in ideological prosecutions for the Ministry of Justice, or in various censorship activities, or had been sent overseas for the administration of Japanese-occupied territories or for development activities there. Since all these tasks had been largely an accident of assignment, there was some reluctance among SCAP officials to place even these civil servants on the purge lists, while sparing others whose ideology and activities had been equally sympathetic to Japanese totalitarianism.

The losses among the ranks of political leaders were so serious that inexperienced and in some cases less able men were catapulted into positions of leadership. But because public servants were not generally held responsible for actions they performed in the line of duty,* the vast majority of them remained at their posts. Political figures, in short, were more vulnerable than they on the theory that as responsible political leaders they should have acted with full consciousness of the political consequences involved.

In one sense, therefore, the general effect of the purge ran counter to other major objectives of the Occupation, for it rendered the Diet weak and, by the same token, strengthened the relative position of the bureaucracy.† There were three ways in which the bureaucracy appeared to benefit from the purge:

First, the civil-servant group remained largely intact in spite of some removals because their services were necessary to operate the civil government.

Second, they worked more closely with SCAP officials than Diet representatives did. They interpreted this as a vindication of their position and their usefulness, and often were in a position of "interpreting" democracy to Diet members because of their closeness to the Occupation reform plans.

Third, they were successful in their political campaigns when they ran for the Diet. Many important rivals had been removed by the purge, and the bureaucrats' experience in government affairs, coupled with their immunity from the purge, made them attractive to the voters. Once elected, this experience in government administration insured them prominent positions in Diet committees, in the Cabinet, and in party conferences.

To counteract this result, other devices had to be adopted for the encouragement of increased legislative power and for the remodeling of the bureaucratic system. The Japanese experience only confirmed the general proposition that the civil service of a country will tend to remain relatively constant regardless of other political changes that may occur: even a purge cannot

*The question of personal responsibility is not to be confused with findings of guilt for violations of international law or customs. The significance of the problem of personal responsibility lies in the fact that whole categories of civil servants were removed from individual positions through the purge because they occupied positions considered incompatible with a democratic order, while other civil servants were retained on the ground that although they may have contributed to war planning or to acts of domestic despotism, their role was that of "the expert." Experts were thus considered exempt from responsibility for the political or moral effects of acts which they had blueprinted or carried out.

†This was a source of complaint from many journalists and political analysts who told the author that the bureaucracy had been the keystone of the police state because of its elite character, its political irresponsibility, and its share in the planning and execution of despotic laws and orders. This question, of course, lies somewhat outside the realm of the present study.

alter that, especially when it is conducted by the bureaucratic elements, or when the occupying authority is dependent upon them for much of its administrative program. The problem of reorganizing a bureaucracy on democratic lines is one of institutional reform, primarily, rather than of outright removal and replacement of masses of personnel.

The purge of political parties was consistently more severe in the right wing than the left. The losses of each party were roughly in proportion to its rightist proclivities, so far as these could be ascertained. Even in local politics this tendency was evident. While this served the purpose of removing ultranationalists and other extremists, it encouraged the parties of the left, in inverse ratio to their distance from center. Thus the purge virtually removed the basis of right-wing activity, but temporarily stimulated the left, for the simple reason that the latter had not been involved in war planning or in previous acts of despotism.

The Japanese experience demonstrates what may be a general political purge tendency: a purge may remove one undemocratic element, while temporarily strengthening another. The positive encouragement of democratic or friendly elements in such cases may require supplementary measures synchronized with the purge itself and designed to maintain a desired political balance*.

The final evidences of the rejection of militant nationalism and affirmation of democratic rights must be evaluated in the years ahead. They will appear in the new sources of financial and political strength that are discovered by the parties who replace the objectionable elements; in the acceptance of the responsibilities of leadership by the national Diet; in the degree to which the career public service is subjected to responsible popular control; in the gradual failure of extremist elements in Japanese politics; and, in the last analysis, in the continuing public attitudes toward the Occupation and its objectives.

*The purge of elements of one party also tended to strengthen opposing parties even if these were not necessarily more "liberal." This often took place at the expense of the popular will, for when replacements had to be selected for men who were purged from the Diet after the election, no steps were taken to insure representation of the same party which had been elected. In a two-party system, or where strong party discipline is to be found, such an effect may weaken or undermine popular acceptance of the fiction of representative government. For evidences of this in Japan see Chap. 4.

Chapter 4

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PURGE

THE RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion has never been an important factor in Japan's politics, except in those rare cases in her feudal history when it has been reflected in mass protests and peasant riots. The inertness of Japanese citizens has been remarked by local politicians as well as foreign observers; studies of political behavior in Japan are strongly shaped by the assumption that the public is a passive victim, rather than a source, of political strength.* The purge of politically unreliable leaders in Japan assumed, however, not only that democratic leaders would rise in their place, but that they would be able to generate enough public support to secure the future of a peaceful democratic state. The acceptance of this thesis by the Japanese press at the beginning of the Occupation provided grounds for considerable optimism that the outcome would be successful.

The present public opinion analysis was undertaken to evaluate the actual success of the purge in achieving popular support. After a series of pilot studies of the purge,⁵⁶ a survey of public opinion in the Tokyo area was taken immediately after the termination of the Occupation. For this purpose, the author obtained the cooperation of 28 staff members of the National Public Opinion Research Institute, an official organization of the Japanese government created under the guidance of American technicians and generally considered among the best of the score of public opinion research organizations in Japan. A standardized interview was prepared for use in 600 interviews to be made on a geographical random sample, first in the Greater Tokyo area. The Tokyo survey included 480 men and 120 women,[†] interviewed between 27 June and 7 July 1952. It was followed by surveys in other areas, to be discussed later. Interviews usually took at least 30 minutes, partly because of the need for overcoming Japanese reticence, and partly because of the inherent quality of

*See the studies by Masamichi Royama and others cited elsewhere in this paper. Members of the staff of the National Public Opinion Research Institute, when approached for the purge study, uniformly stated that this would be a matter entirely too sophisticated for any satisfactory public opinion analysis. Fortunately for the future of democracy in Japan, the results of their work disproved this view.

†This number provides the most useful balance for statistical purposes. Actually, in any one question the number of significant responses was considerably less. Three hundred and forty-eight men and 96 women were finally interviewed (a total of 444), 139 persons not having been reached for the interview and 17 having refused point-blank to discuss the purge (see App F).

vagueness in the Japanese language. Standard questions were answered and tabulated according to standardized key responses. Although there was some doubt concerning the state of popular knowledge of public affairs, this proved to be no greater a problem than is often the case in US opinion polling.* More than half the men surveyed had friends or acquaintances who were removed from their positions by the purge, so that although the basic policies of the program had never been subjected to searching public analysis, most of the Japanese interviewed had some awareness of the problems they were discussing.

The general subjects tested in this poll may be grouped under three headings: general public attitudes toward the purge and its purposes; relationship of these attitudes to other relevant opinions; opinions regarding the effects of the purge. The results indicated that relatively few of the respondents took an emphatic stand on the justice of the purge, since the overwhelming majority regarded it as an inevitable consequence of defeat and conceded that Japan would have done much the same in the United States if she had won the war. Only 20 percent of the public regarded Occupation policies as a whole as instrumental to the democratization of Japan, and there were few who found such reforms a justification for the purge. Most Japanese evidently did not regard their leaders as primarily responsible for starting the Pacific War, although they believed they should assume—temporarily, at least—responsibility for having brought defeat upon the people. This resentment against the leaders may be one of the reasons why the purge encountered so little opposition in its initial years. Another factor affecting public attitudes toward the purge was the surprisingly common belief (56 percent of the men) that militarism and the extreme right still remained a threat to Japanese society; but among those who had no such fears (including most women) there was a general belief that the experiences and abilities of the purgees would be useful to Japan in the times ahead. This group generally believed that the purge was in force too long, and that the leaders should have been de-purged quickly so that they could have resumed their former positions.

GENERAL ATTITUDES

The public was aware that the purge had been intended to force the withdrawal of wartime leaders from public office, but opinion was about evenly divided concerning whether the major objective of this was to democratize Japan or to render the nation powerless (Table 17).

Of the men expressing an opinion, only the laboring group was significantly (39 percent) of the opinion that the purge was intended for democratic purposes rather than for demilitarization (15 percent), the other groups being more evenly divided in their opinions. The age group 25 to 29 and 30 to 39 seemed disposed to the former view, and all other groups tended either to believe the contrary or to offer no comment. During the course of the investigation, an effort was made to judge the living standards of each respondent, and there was a strong correlation between high living standards and the belief that the

*The Japanese public has ample opportunity to acquaint itself with current problems. The US Department of State in Japan lists over 900 magazines in the field of the humanities and social sciences which are published in Japan. The daily newspapers have a circulation of 28,000,000, or an average subscription rate of 1.63 copies per day per household.

purge was designed somehow to injure Japan.* The evidence suggests that the young men, those engaged in occupations requiring little skill, and those who lived modestly, tended to accept the proposition that the purge was intended for democratic or humanitarian purposes, while others were more skeptical.

The Japanese public associated the purge with wartime responsibility rather than postwar reform. The sophisticated view that the purge was preventive rather than punitive was not generally known or accepted among most

TABLE 17

PUBLIC OPINION ON THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE PURGE

Sample	To democratize Japan, %	To make Japan powerless, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	31	25	44
Women (N = 96)	16	22	62

TABLE 18

PUNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE PURGE

Sample	Punishment sole objective, %	Punishment one of several objectives, %	Punishment incidental, %	Punishment not intended, %	No Comment
Men (N = 348)	16	38	15	26	5
Women (N = 96)	19	24	13	16	28

respondents (Table 18). When the views toward the objectives of the program were compared with attitudes toward its punitive aspects (Table 19), it became apparent that the public viewed the purge as a device for rendering the country as a whole powerless rather than for the punishment of individuals. Those who regarded the purge as an instrument of democratization conceded the punitive elements in a program designed to eliminate undemocratic leaders; the group which thought of the purge as a plan to weaken Japan tended to regard the punishment of wartime leaders as an unimportant aspect of the program (Table 19).

The first reactions to the purge at the time of its announcement had to some extent faded into the context of other attitudes toward the early Occupation. Nevertheless, over 90 percent of the men recalled some initial reactions and expressed them in definite form. These initial opinions were expressed more strongly, as might be expected, by those with close friends or acquaintances affected by the purge than by the general public. Most of the respondents (74 percent of the men and 72 percent of the women) made no comment about their sympathies, but 16 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women—the largest

*The standardized answers included responses like "making Japan powerless" in the same category as "to serve American ends" and "to slow Japanese reconstruction." No fine distinction among these responses is possible.

single group of answers—felt sympathy for the purgees. A further question was asked to determine whether the public thought the purge was “proper” or not, and to explore these initial attitudes more fully. These results (Table 20) confirm the findings that the purge was not regarded as a genuine reform movement. Among those who expressed feelings that the purge was unavoidable, many volunteered comments, usually suggesting that they did not personally

TABLE 19
COMPARATIVE DATA

Punitive Aspects of the Purge as Related to its
Basic Objectives^a

Basic objectives	Punitive aspects considered to be				
	Sole objective, %	One objective, %	Incidental, %	Not intended, %	No comment, %
Democratization (N = 107)	9	46	16	26	3
Make Japan powerless (N = 88)	14	38	12	35	1
Other objectives (N = 153)	22	32	15	22	9

^aComparative tables include only the male respondents because of the large number of “No comment” responses from females.

TABLE 20
INITIAL OPINIONS ON PROPRIETY OF THE PURGE,
AS RECALLED

Sample	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	30	61	2	7
Women (N = 96)	25	43	2	30

approve of it. A 52-year-old bank employee: “I regret that the purge was instituted but it could not be helped because the Japanese had nothing to do with it. . . . The Communists were the only ones who supported it.” Some who considered the purge unavoidable expressed contrary views. A 53-year-old fortune teller: “Personally, I felt sorry for the purgees, since what they did was to serve the country. However, I thought the purge was necessary for the reinstitution of misguided Japan to her former status.” When these first impressions were checked later by the question “Have your opinions changed any since these first impressions?” there was little indication of any change (Table 21). The 25 to 29 age group provided the greatest number of those who were disappointed or dissatisfied with the purge as it progressed.

A further question asked whether wartime leaders would have obstructed Occupation policies or created friction had they remained in office. Results indicate that less than half the Japanese believe that the purge was necessary in order to facilitate the Occupation program (Table 22). When these opinions

TABLE 21

CHANGE OF OPINION FROM REPORTED FIRST IMPRESSION OF PURGE

Sample	Finally convinced, %	Became dissatisfied, %	No change, %	Don't know, %
Men (N = 348)	4	9	78	9
Women (N = 96)	2	5	65	28

TABLE 22

ATTITUDES ON NEED FOR REMOVING PURGEES

Sample	Occupation smooth anyway, %	Some friction, %	Much friction, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	47	12	27	14
Women (N = 96)	24	18	23	35

TABLE 23

COMPARATIVE DATA

"Initial Opinions on Propriety of Purge" as Related to
"Attitudes on Need for Removing Purgees"

Need	Propriety				Total	
	Proper	Unavoidable	Not proper	No comment	%	No.
Smooth anyway	29	66	1	4	100	164
Some friction	33	60	2	5	100	42
Much friction	31	58	2	9	100	92

are compared with attitudes concerning the propriety of the purge, there is little correlation (Table 23).^{*} Opinions of administrative convenience or necessity did not, apparently, greatly influence moral or political judgments. On the other hand, only one-third of the respondents, whether men or women, thought that the leaders would have resigned if no purge had occurred, although most thought they should have been willing to accept at least some responsibil-

^{*}Unless otherwise indicated, other tables represent reaction among male respondents, since many of the females interviewed were unwilling or unable to express an opinion.

ity for the war and defeat. When opinions on leaders' assumption of responsibility are compared with initial opinions regarding the propriety of the purge (Table 24), the results show that a strong correlation exists between these two "moral" sets of attitudes (Table 41). Thus those who thought the leaders should assume responsibility were also likely to think the purge was proper, while the groups which thought the leaders should assume little or no responsibility tended to consider the purge "unavoidable," and to avoid taking any position as to whether it was "proper" or not.

TABLE 24
COMPARATIVE DATA

"Initial Opinions on Propriety of Purge" as Related to
"Opinions on Whether Leaders Should Accept War Responsibility"

Responsibility	Propriety				Total	
	Proper	Unavoidable	Not proper	No comment	%	No.
Leaders should accept responsibility	42	52	2	4	100	176
Leaders should assume some responsibility	15	74	5	6	100	81
Leaders need not accept any responsibility	16	76	0	8	100	68

TABLE 25
FIRST REACTIONS TO DE-PURGE ANNOUNCEMENT

Sample	Grave concern, %	Some concern, %	High hopes, %	Relieved, %	It was natural, %*	Other, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	9	6	10	37	21	2	15
Women (N = 96)	3	9	4	45	6	3	30

*Most of these respondents thought the purge itself was a natural part of the Occupation, hence thought that the de-purge was also "natural." The response does not necessarily mean opposition to the purge, judging from their other attitudes.

Another index to general attitudes toward the purge is provided by responses to the question, "What did you think when it was announced that many of the wartime leaders would be de-purged?" (Table 25). A further question was asked regarding the timing of the de-purge. Only 11 percent of the men and 3 percent of the women thought it was being carried out too early, but these were not necessarily the same ones who had felt "grave concern" at the prospects of a de-purge (Table 26). Opinions on the timing of the de-purge were consistent with first impressions of the purge program, those most favorably disposed to the purge being those least likely to approve of an early de-purge (Table 27). As before, the older, wealthier, and better-educated respondents tended to favor the de-purge, just as they had expressed doubts of the democratic purposes of the purge itself.* There is an interesting exception to this rule in the first

*This is not as pronounced a tendency among the better educated in terms of their first impressions of the purge, for more of the better educated felt it was "proper" than did the less educated groups.

TABLE 26

COMPARATIVE DATA

Correlation between "First Reactions to De-Purge"
and "Opinions as to its Timing" (In Row Numbers)

Timing	First reactions							Total
	Grave concern	Some concern	High hopes	Relieved	Natural	Other*	No comment	
Too early	21	6	0	4	0	2	4	37
Don't know	3	3	2	4	2	1	4	19
Too late	0	1	17	53	28	0	6	105
Just right	6	6	12	42	30	3	11	110
No comment	2	5	3	27	12	2	26	77
Total	32	21	34	130	72	8	51	348

*Includes some who said "This does not mean that purgees are completely free," "The purge had given GHQ too much say," "The purge should never have taken place if they were going to be de-purged."

TABLE 27

COMPARATIVE DATA

"Opinions as to Timing of De-Purge" as Related to
"Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge"

Reactions	Timing					Total	
	Too early, %	Can't generalize, %	Too late, %	Just right, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Proper	24	10	18	37	11	100	102
Unavoidable	5	4	36	30	25	100	213
Not proper	0	13	37	37	13	100	8

TABLE 28

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of
Purge" and Living Standards of Respondents

Standards	Reactions				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
High	41	59	0	0	100	22
Medium	30	62	2	6	100	152
Medium-low	29	61	3	7	100	139
Low	19	59	3	19	100	32

reactions when the purge program was announced. Those with a high standard of living, as judged by the interviewer, tended more to consider the purge a proper procedure than did those living more modestly. Most of this differential is made up from the "no comment" group, which rose inversely to living standards (Table 28). It was this higher-standard group which complained that the de-purge had come too late: an indication that such enthusiasm as it had felt for the purge at the outset had worn off as the program progressed (Table 29). The same characteristic is evidenced in the reactions of the high-standard

TABLE 29

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions on Timing of De-Purge"
and "Living Standards"

Standards	Timing					Total	
	Too early, %	Can't generalize, %	Too late, %	Just right, %	No comment, %	%	No.
High	9	5	41	18	27	100	22
Med:	10	5	28	35	22	100	152
Medium-low	10	7	33	29	21	100	139
Low	16	3	19	34	28	100	32

TABLE 30

PUBLIC OPINIONS ON EXTENT OF THE PURGE

Sample	About right, %	Too severe, %	Not severe enough, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 346)	18	59	7	16
Women (N = 96)	17	41	1	41

group to the first announcement of the de-purge. This group had twice the number expressing high hopes for the de-purge as did the medium and medium-low groups, and three times the percentage of the lowest-living-standard group. The more prosperous elements of the community were more ready to favor a change in leaders, whether by purge or by de-purge, than were others.

On the scope and extent of the purge, public opinion showed a much greater uniformity. A very small percentage considered it too lenient or moderate, although very few of them were familiar with the categories or the incidence of the purge, except as it touched upon well-known public figures, local leaders, or their own acquaintances.* The attitude that the purge was too comprehensive was held by both men and women (Table 30), although the problem of the scope of the purge was not always clearly distinguished in the public mind from

*The number referring to the categories during the interview comprised only 5 percent of the 348 men and 7 percent of the 96 women. Of those who referred to them, the men opposed the categorical basis of the purge 4 to 1, and the women favored it 5 to 2.

its duration. Those who were least sympathetic to the purge policy were, of course, least likely to criticize it as not severe enough (Table 31). Similarly, those who thought the purge lasted too long also thought it too comprehensive in scope (Table 32). The best correlation of all is between those who thought most of the purgees were not the real war leaders of Japan and those who

TABLE 31

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions on Extent of Purge"
and "Initial Opinions as to its Propriety"

Propriety	Extent				Total	
	About right, %	Too severe, %	Not severe enough, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Proper	27	47	16	10	100	102
Unavoidable	15	67	3	15	100	213
Not proper	12	63	0	25	100	8

TABLE 32

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between Opinions on "Extent of Purge" and on Its
Duration as Measured by "Opinions as to Timing of De-Purge"

Duration	Extent				Total	
	About right, %	Too severe, %	Not severe enough, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Too early	32	30	30	8	100	37
Can't generalize	16	74	10	0	100	19
Too late	9	78	2	11	100	105
Just right	25	59	4	12	100	110

thought the purge was too severe (Table 33). It is clear that a large segment of the Japanese public believed that the purge removed many men who were not responsible for militarism or for the conduct of the war. As might be expected, those with close friends or acquaintances among purgees were more critical of the extent of the purge than those with none.

Another series of questions was designed to determine the extent to which Japanese believed their own government was influential in the purge enforcement and implementation, and how well it discharged its functions in connection with the program. The results show again the tendency of the Japanese public to regard the purge as part of the price of defeat, and as a penalty imposed by "the other side" (Table 34).

Only 15 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women thought the appeals system brought about any operational changes in the purge system. Among these, opinions are divided among those who consider that the appeals system speeded up the decision to de-purge the leaders, and a few who regard the

appeals as one of the reasons for the failure of the purge to penetrate far enough into the structure of Japanese leadership. It is significant that those among the more active age groups politically, together with the better-informed

TABLE 33
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between Opinions on "Extent of Purge"
and on "Leadership of Purgees"

Leadership	Extent				Total	
	About right, %	Too severe, %	Not severe enough, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Purgees were all leaders	44	26	26	4	100	23
Many were leaders	18	56	12	14	100	66
Half were leaders	19	65	7	9	100	43
A few were leaders	16	66	3	15	100	187
None were leaders	14	72	0	14	100	7

TABLE 34
PUBLIC OPINIONS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN THE PURGE PROGRAM

Sample	Japanese views not considered, %	The same: Japan should have insisted on some voice, %	Japanese authorities had some voice, %			No comment, %
			(a) But they abused it	(b) They did not abuse it	(c) No comment	
Men (N = 348)	57	4	13	16	3	7
Women (N = 96)	38	7	6	11	5	33

TABLE 35
PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE INFLUENCE OF THE PURGE
ON ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Sample	Favorable influence, %	Unfavorable influence, %	Can't generalize, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	20	10	62	8
Women (N = 96)	11	7	58	24

and better-educated respondents, recognized that the Japanese government had some influence in the purge operation, while others regarded it primarily as an Occupation program.

Surprisingly enough, in terms of its objectives and its effects upon Japanese leaders, the purge as such was not regarded as an important factor in forming general public attitudes toward the United States (Table 35). Those who had

opposed the purge or who had taken a definite moral stand about it were most inclined to view it as having had a favorable effect on the Japanese attitudes toward the United States, which may suggest that they regarded it as more satisfactory from the American point of view than the Japanese (Table 36). As

TABLE 36
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Public Opinion on Influence of Purge on
Attitudes toward US" and the "Initial Opinions as
to Propriety of the Purge"

Propriety	Influence				Total	
	Favorable, %	Unfavorable, %	Can't generalize, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Proper	30	8	57	5	100	102
Unavoidable	16	11	68	5	100	213
Not proper	38	25	25	12	100	8

TABLE 37
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR RESPONSIBILITY OF
JAPANESE LEADERS

	Leaders should accept responsibility, %	Leaders should assume some responsibility now, %	Leaders need not assume any responsibility, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	51	23	19	7
Women (N = 96)	36	18	17	29

might be expected, those who regarded the purge as a democratic instrument were more likely to consider its influence as favorable to the United States; while those who thought its objective was to render Japan powerless considered that it injured American prestige in Japanese eyes.

The divided public opinion regarding the purge is suggestive of widespread misunderstanding as to its purposes and manner of execution. This must be viewed in a serious light insofar as these purposes may have affected the quality of leadership in Japan and the prospects of creating fertile soil for the germination of democratic institutions.

THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER OPINIONS ON PURGE ATTITUDES

Attitudes toward Japanese Leadership

One of the most significant attitudes bearing upon the purge is that regarding the Japanese leadership and its responsibilities for the Pacific War. There is no universal disposition to hold purgees responsible for the war, but most of the respondents expressed approval of their assuming responsibility, at least

temporarily (Table 37). Few of the respondents believed, however, that the purgees tended actually to be leaders or that they should bear the responsibility for the war. The majority opinion was that most purgees had merely cooperated with the war effort, and that the war itself was beyond their control. Only 15 percent of the total believed that over half the purgees should bear responsibility and even when the category "Wish they [i.e., over half the purgees] would assume responsibility temporarily" is added to this, the total is not over

TABLE 38
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relationship between "Opinions Regarding Leadership of Purgees"
and "Public Attitudes toward War Responsibility
of Japanese Leaders" (Raw Numbers)

Responsibility	War Leadership					Total
	Purgees were all leaders	Many were leaders	Half were leaders	A few were leaders	No comment	
Leaders should accept responsibility	18 ^a	35 ^a	24	91	8	176
Leaders should assume some responsibility	4 ^b	16 ^b	10	44	7	81
Leaders need not assume any responsibility	1	8	4	44	4	61
Total	23	59	38	179	19	318

^aThese figures represent 15 percent of the total responses.

^bThese figures represent 6 percent of the total responses.

TABLE 39
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE "PACIFIC WAR" ^a

	Critical of Japan at war outset, %	Critical now, %	Not critical of Japan even now, %
Men (N = 348)	13	42	45
Women (N = 96)	4	32	64

^aThe question was worded to determine whether the respondent criticized Japan for her share in starting the war or whether it would have been unavoidable under the circumstances.

21 percent (see Table 38). The Japanese public does not agree with SCAP spokesmen that the purge was "a rapier, not a bludgeon." Even among those who believe that most purgees were leaders and should assume at least temporary responsibility, only about half approved of the purge.

An equally interesting set of reactions concerned the war itself. A large number of Japanese evidently did not feel critical toward Japan for her participation in the war, even in retrospect (Table 39). As might be expected, those who were more critical of Japan's role in World War II tended to believe also

that her leaders should assume responsibility and that there was some danger of a recurrent militarism today. There was, however, even among those who remained uncritical of the war effort, a strong tendency to demand that leaders assume responsibility. This leads to the interesting conclusion that the public was seeking to lay responsibility for the defeat rather than for the war itself (Table 40). This was paralleled by a large number of respondents who were

TABLE 40

COMBINED TABLE

Comparisons between "Public Attitudes toward the 'Pacific War,'" "War Responsibility of Japanese Leaders," and "Opinions Regarding Leadership of Purgees"

Opinion	Japan's role			Total	
	Critical of Japan at war outset, %	Critical now, %	Not critical even now, %	%	No.
Leaders should accept responsibility	18	46	36	100	176
Leaders should assume responsibility	6	47	47	100	81
Leaders need not assume responsibility	10	36	54	100	61
Purgees were all leaders	9	39	52	100	23
Many were leaders	12	44	44	100	66
Half were leaders	12	39	49	100	43
Few were leaders	14	42	44	100	186
None were leaders	14	29	57	100	7

TABLE 41

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge" and "Opinions Regarding Leadership of Purgees"

Leadership	Propriety				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Purgees were all leaders	74	22	0	4	100	23
Many were leaders	42	53	0	5	100	66
Half were leaders	30	49	7	14	100	143
Few were leaders	21	72	3	4	100	186
None were leaders	0	100	0	0	100	7

not critical of Japan's role in the war but who did not regard the purgees as the real leaders of Japan (Table 40). Public opinion regarding the number of purgees who were actually leaders of Japan's war effort had a definite relation to first reactions to the propriety of the purge program (Table 41). Those who were inclined to regard purgees as the real leaders of Japan strongly supported the purge, while those who considered the leaders largely unaffected by the purge thought it irrelevant to the problem of leadership. Public opinion as to

whether the purges had actually been Japan's top leaders or not was also relevant to attitudes on the timing of the de-purge. Those who believed that most of the purges had been leaders were somewhat less inclined to favor de-purging than the others (Table 42).

TABLE 42
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions on Timing of De-Purge" and
"Opinions Regarding Leadership of Purgees"

Leadership	Timing					Total	
	Too early	Can't generalize	Too late	Just right	No comment	%	No.
Purgees were all leaders	39	0	17	35	9	100	23
Many were leaders	14	4	24	32	26	100	66
Half were leaders	9	9	28	40	14	100	143
Few were leaders	7	6	35	32	20	100	186
None were leaders	0	0	72	14	14	100	7

TABLE 43
COMPARATIVE DATA

"Initial Opinions as to Propriety of the Purge" as related to
"Opinions as to Whether Leaders Should Accept War
Responsibility" (Raw Numbers)

Responsibility	Propriety				Total
	Proper	Unavoidable	Not proper	No comment	
Leaders should accept responsibility	67	83	3	7	160
Leaders should assume some responsibility	12	60	4	5	81
Leaders need not assume any responsibility	11	45	0	5	61
Total	90	188	7	17	302

The question of propriety of the purge raises a problem in the interpretation of the familiar Japanese attitude of inevitability. Even among those who thought leaders should accept war responsibility, only 42 percent thought the purge proper, and 51 percent considered it inevitable. Among the other groups, of course, the percentage was even higher: 74 percent of the respondents who wanted the leaders to assume some responsibility (at least temporarily, to satisfy the conqueror) considered the purge unavoidable,* as did 77 percent of those who thought it unnecessary for any leaders to assume the responsibility. Those who took a moral view of the purge, however, also took a moral attitude toward the responsibilities of leadership. Over two-thirds of those who thought

*This is considered a response devoid of moral conviction: the purge was "unavoidable" because SCAP wished it, and because the Japanese had lost the war.

the purge was proper thought the leaders should accept responsibility for the war (Table 43), while those who viewed the purge as inevitable were entirely unconcerned about the need for any assumption of responsibility. Those who were critical of Japan's role in starting the Pacific War were somewhat more likely to welcome the purge than were those who considered Japan's actions justifiable (Table 44). A somewhat different tenor of opinions is evidenced in

TABLE 44
COMPARATIVE DATA
Comparison of "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge"
and "Attitudes toward the Pacific War"

War attitudes	Propriety				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Critical of Japan at outset	34	55	2	9	100	44
Critical now	33	60	2	5	100	148
Not critical even now	24	64	3	9	100	156

TABLE 45
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Opinions on Timing of De-Purge"
and "Attitudes toward the Pacific War"

War attitudes	Timing					Total	
	Too early, %	Can't generalize, %	Too late, %	Just right, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Critical of Japan at war outset	7	7	34	38	14	100	44
Critical now	17	7	27	30	19	100	148
Not critical now	6	4	32	31	27	100	156

attitudes toward the timing of the de-purge, as related to the attitudes toward Japan's role in the Pacific War (Table 45). Those who were critical of Japan's role as a maker of war were also the group who were most reluctant to permit a return of purges; but this was not a decisive opinion, particularly in view of the fact that those who were critical at the outset of war took about the same views as those who did not even later criticize Japan's position. Attitudes toward Japan's role in starting the war were much more relevant to the question of assumption of responsibility on the part of the national leaders (Table 46). This evidence points strongly to the conclusion that attitudes toward the war were not closely related to the purge even though they did have some bearing on leadership responsibility. This supports the findings set forth earlier (Tables 24, 33, 38, 40, and 41) that a large number of Japanese did not think the purge primarily concerned the problem of war responsibility. Those who were critical of the war from the first believed that Japanese leaders should assume responsibility, but were not outstanding in their support of the propriety of the

purge and did not object to the de-purge program. This group, in short, which presumably includes liberal elements in Japanese foreign politics, took a stand not much different from the rest of the public with regard to the purge. This conclusion is supported further by comparison of opinions on punitive aspects of the purge with those concerning war responsibility of Japanese leaders (Table 47). Those who held that the leaders should take responsibility for their share

TABLE 46
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions as to Whether Leaders Should Accept War Responsibility" and "Attitudes toward the Pacific War"

War attitudes	War Responsibility				Total	
	Should accept, %	Should assume, %	Need not assume, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Critical of Japan at war outset	73	11	16	0	100	44
Critical now	55	26	16	3	100	148
Not critical now	40	24	24	12	100	156

TABLE 47
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions on Punitive Aspects of the Purge" and "Opinions as to Whether Leaders Should Accept War Responsibility"

War responsibility	Punitive aspects					Total	
	Sole objective, %	One objective, %	Incidental, %	Not incidental, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Leaders should accept responsibility	18	37	19	24	2	100	176
Leaders should assume responsibility	14	39	10	30	7	100	81
Leaders need not assume responsibility	10	36	13	33	8	100	61

in the war tended slightly to interpret the purge as a punitive measure, though their difference from other segments of the public was not great.

In addition to the question of leadership responsibility as a justification for the purge, attitudes toward the necessity for removing wartime leaders were revealed also by asking whether it was believed that they would have retired from public life voluntarily if there had been no purge. Only about a quarter of the men and a third of the women thought this would have taken place spontaneously.* Those in the most active age groups (25 to 55), those with some experience as public servants, and those who have friends among the purgees were most skeptical of the probability of a voluntary retirement. One might

*Fifty percent of the men and 34 percent of the women thought they would not have, the rest offering no comment or replying that it depended upon the person.

TABLE 48
COMBINED TABLE

Comparisons between "Opinions Regarding Voluntary Retirement of Purgees" and Age Groups, Experience in Public Office, and Friendship with Purgees

Characteristics of sample	Voluntary retirement			Total	
	Most would have retired, %	Few would have retired, %	Don't know, %	%	No.
Age groups:					
20-24	34	44	22	100	65
25-29	17	62	21	100	52
30-39	19	55	26	100	82
40-54	35	48	17	100	101
55-	33	36	29	100	48
Experience in public office:					
Held public office	38	46	16	100	80
Never held office	25	24	51	100	253
Friendship with purgees:					
Close friends purged	26	53	21	100	109
Casual friends purged	27	48	25	100	69
No friends purged	30	48	22	100	170

TABLE 49
COMBINED TABLE

Comparisons between "Opinions Regarding Voluntary Retirement of Purgees" and "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge," "War Responsibility of Japanese Leaders," and "Opinions on Danger of Returning Militarism"

Opinion	Voluntary retirement			Total	
	Most would have retired, %	Few would have retired, %	Don't know, %	%	No.
Proper	23	59	18	100	102
Unavoidable	32	46	22	100	213
Leaders should accept responsibility	28	54	18	100	176
Leaders should assume responsibility	31	49	20	100	81
Leaders need not assume responsibility	34	38	28	100	61
Possibility of return of militaristic leadership:					
Great danger	19	61	20	100	96
Some danger	28	47	25	100	103
Little danger	34	44	22	100	70
No danger	37	46	17	100	60

conclude that the groups best qualified by age and experience were least likely to think that Japan's leadership would have changed without some compulsory program (but not necessarily the purge) (Table 48). Those who felt the purge to be a proper measure were more dubious about voluntary retirement than those who simply regarded it as unavoidable and made no statement as to its moral or political significance. Similarly, those who felt that the leaders were morally obligated to assume responsibility for the war tended to believe that

TABLE 50
OPINIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE NECESSITY OF
PURGE TO AVOID FRICTION

	No friction anyway, %	Some friction would have occurred, %	Much friction would have occurred, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	47	12	27	14
Women (N = 96)	24	18	23	35

they would probably have refused to do so without the purge. There is also a relation between strong apprehension of a return of militarism to Japan and doubts that the leaders would have been willing to leave public office if they had not been compelled to do so. Political and moral beliefs were closely related to opinions regarding the spontaneous acceptance of responsibility on the part of Japanese leaders through resignation from public life (Table 49). Those who thought the purge proper doubted that the leaders would have retired without it; those who thought the leaders should accept responsibility for their share in the war adventures of Japan were least likely to think they would retire voluntarily; those who believed there was likelihood of a return of militaristic leadership were also least inclined to think the former war leaders would have withdrawn from public life of their own choice.

When the purge was considered as an administrative convenience, without reference to its reform aspects, the respondents found somewhat more justification for it. In response to the question "Would the leaders have obstructed Occupation policies if they had remained in office?" about half the men and a quarter of the women thought not (Table 50). There was no significant difference in the response of those who had had some experience in the public service and those who had not. Those who regarded the general effect of the purge as good were somewhat more likely to feel that the purge was necessary to avoid friction than the others (Table 51). Those who considered that the purgees were replaced by an undesirable group of leaders were most pronounced in their belief that there would have been no serious friction in carrying out the Occupation policies even if there had been no purge (Table 52). The evidence also suggests that those who thought of wartime leadership as imposing certain obligations upon the purgees were most likely to consider the purge as administratively desirable in order to reduce obstructions to the introduction of Occupation policies (Table 52). Significantly, there was little difference in attitudes on the administrative necessity of the purge between those who thought the purgees would have resigned voluntarily and those who did not. Thus only about 22 percent of the respondents thought the purgees would have refused to resign

and that there would have been friction without the purge; in other words, that the purge was administratively necessary to get rid of undesirable leaders and conduct the Occupation smoothly. The majority of the others thought that either

TABLE 51
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Opinions Regarding Administrative
Necessity of Purge to Avoid Friction" and "Opinions
Concerning General Effects of the Purge"

Effects	Administration				Total	
	No friction anyway, %	Some friction without purge, %	Much friction without purge, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Generally good	45	14	31	10	100	96
Generally bad	61	8	25	6	100	65
Half and half	46	9	27	18	100	11
Can't generalize	47	18	23	12	100	60

TABLE 52
COMBINED TABLE
Comparisons between "Opinions Regarding Administrative
Necessity of Purge to Avoid Friction," "Public Attitudes
Comparing Purgees with their Replacements," and "Opinions
as to Whether Leaders Should Accept War Responsibility"

Opinion	Administration				Total	
	No friction anyway, %	Some friction without purge, %	Much friction without purge, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Replacements were less desirable	55	12	24	9	100	82
Replacements were more desirable or more democratic	26	20	42	12	100	50
Replacements were dif- ferent, but can't generalize	3	40	17	40	100	30
Replacements were about the same	13	54	10	23	100	142
Leaders should accept responsibility	44	13	34	9	100	176
Leaders should assume responsibility	57	10	18	15	100	81
Leaders need not assume responsibility	53	15	21	11	100	61

the purgees would have eliminated themselves voluntarily from office, or that even if they had remained there would have been no friction in the administration of the reform measures.

The attitudes of the Japanese public toward its leaders do not provide evidence of popular support of the purge, either in terms of opinions about the war or in terms of widespread belief that the removals were administratively necessary (Table 53).

TABLE 53
COMPARATIVE DATA

Summary of Public Opinions Regarding Administrative Justification for Purge ("Opinions Regarding Administrative Necessity of Purge to Avoid Friction" and "Opinions Regarding Voluntary Retirement of Purgees," Raw Numbers)

Retirement	Administration				Total, No.
	No friction anyway	Some friction without purge	Much friction without purge	No comment	
Most leaders would have retired anyway	40	16	28	14	98
Few would have retired	84	22	51	16	173
Can't generalize	40	4	13	20	77
Total	164	42	92	50	348

General Attitudes toward Occupation Policies

The absence of criticism of basic Occupation policies (only 22 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women ventured any comment, favorable or otherwise, on its reform aspects) suggests that public attitudes were more conditioned by considerations of power relationships between victor and vanquished than by thoughts of political reforms or social justice. These general attitudes toward the Occupation (Table 54) may also have resulted from the initial expectations of a harsh policy following the surrender; a majority of the responses to the question "Do you feel grateful to the Occupation as a whole, or do you think its policies were unjust?" did not touch on the problem of democratization at all. Neither a higher education nor good living standards inclined the Japanese public to favor the democratic reforms. Indeed, the more educated among them expressed the greater dissatisfaction, and the higher-living-standard group entertained almost no opinion at all regarding the Occupation's reforms. It would seem, not unnaturally, that the greatest failure of the Occupation to secure public support occurred among those who had secured the greatest advantages under the old system (Table 54).

The tendency of the Japanese public to regard the purge as a factor of power relationships alone is evidenced also by the response to the question "Would Japan have instituted a purge program in the United States if she had won?" And although the public had tended to regard it as neither a necessary administrative measure (Tables 52 and 53) nor as a political reform program (Tables 17 and 19), the opinion was general that Japan would have adopted a similar policy (Table 55). As we have already seen (Table 35), well over half the respondents thought that the purge did not affect the general attitude toward the

TABLE 54
COMBINED TABLE
General Attitudes Toward Occupation Policies, as Affected
by Education and Living Standards

	Reforms too half-hearted, %	Reforms about right, %	Disliked reforms but grateful for generosity, %	Disliked democratization, %	Dissatisfied (misc.), %	No dissatisfaction or gratitude, %	Don't know, %	Total questioned, no.
Men	1	19	10	1	10	54	5	348
Women	0	17	11	4	3	49	16	96
Education:								
0-5	0	15	3	1	5	69	7	74
6-9	1	10	7	0	6	71	5	78
10-12	3	24	2	1	12	50	8	90
13-	1	22	24	2	13	36	2	105
Living Standards:								
High	5	27	9	0	23	36	0	22
Medium	0	15	17	1	11	51	5	152
Medium-Low	3	24	5	1	8	54	5	139
Low	0	6	0	0	3	81	10	32

TABLE 55
OPINIONS REGARDING JAPAN'S USE OF A "PURGE"
IF SHE HAD WON THE WAR

	Japan would have instituted harsher measures, %	Japan would have used a purge, %	Japan would not have used a purge, %	Japan would have used other measures, % ^a	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	23	51	11	1	14
Women (N = 96)	17	42	8	1	32

^aThis usually meant that measures would not have been so "scientific" or "systematic."

TABLE 56
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge"
and "Opinions on Basic Objectives of Purge"

Objectives	Propriety				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Democratization	36	52	2	10	100	107
Make Japan powerless	26	69	4	1	100	88
Other objectives	26	67	2	5	100	113

United States. These attitudes help to explain the general feeling that the purge was unavoidable, hence not to be considered as either good or bad. A corollary to this rule occurs among those who considered the purge proper, yet regarded its objective as the weakening of Japan; the weakening of Japan was evidently, for them, a just measure (Table 56).

This "power view" of the purge is also borne out by the number of respondents who believed that, although Japan might not have undertaken a purge if it had won the war, it was entirely proper or at least unavoidable (Table 57).

TABLE 57

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge"
and "Opinions Regarding Japan's Use of a Purge if
She had Won the War"

Japan's use	Propriety				Total	
	Proper	Unavoidable	Not proper	No comment	%	No.
Would have been harsher	44	49	2	5	100	80
Would not have used purge	27	66	2	5	100	178
Would have used other methods	19	73	0	8	100	37
Others	60	20	0	20	100	5

This evidence seems to bear out the general proposition that the Japanese regarded the purge as a psychological necessity of some sort arising out of the relations between victor and vanquished.

Attitudes toward Danger of Recurring Militarism

Opinions regarding the growth of right-wing militarism during the later years of the Occupation had an important influence upon attitudes toward the purge program. At least 70 percent of those who considered the de-purging too early also believed that purgees* will again be active in rightist activities aimed at reestablishing a dangerous militarism. As might be expected, the older men had less fear of militarism than the younger respondents (Table 58). When directly asked about whether or not de-purgees would exert influence in the future, the respondents were about evenly divided. The correlation between the reasons for their answers and their attitudes toward the de-purge (Table

*Those who estimated the influence of de-purgees highly tended to believe that the de-purge was too early. Those who thought the de-purge too late regarded the purgees as harmless. Among those who stated that the de-purgees are likely to have great influence in the future, opinions were about evenly divided between those who feared a return of militarism and those who did not. But among those who felt that de-purgees will not exert much influence in the future, over two-thirds believed that there was danger of militarism. This would suggest that many Japanese believe that if the purgees did exert any influence in the future, it would result in a restraint upon returning militarism.

59) shows that fear of returning rightism has some bearing upon attitudes toward the purge. This is made even clearer when attitudes toward the timing of the de-purge are compared with opinions about the danger of militarism in

TABLE 58
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Public Apprehensions about a Revival of Militarism" and Age Groups of Respondents

Age, yrs	Militarism					Total	
	Greatest danger, %	Some danger, %	Little danger, %	No danger, %	No comment, %	%	No.
20-24	28	32	26	9	5	100	65
25-29	29	35	19	13	4	100	52
30-39	33	32	18	15	2	100	82
40-54	28	28	22	19	3	100	101
55-	16	21	13	31	19	100	48

TABLE 59
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of Purge" and "Opinions Regarding Continued Influence of Purge in Public Life"

Future influence	Propriety				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Those holding opinion that de-purgees will exert no influence because:						162
society is already democratized	27	66	1	6	100	83
de-purgees have changed viewpoint	23	71	0	6	100	31
society has turned too far rightist	50	37	0	13	100	8
other reasons	18	77	0	5	100	42
Those holding opinion that de-purgees will exert influence in the future because:						161
they will return to former positions	55	42	0	3	100	66
they are of better calibre than their replacements	21	66	5	8	100	61
other reasons	29	56	9	6	100	34

present Japan (Table 60). It is apparent that the greater the fear of militarism, the greater the reluctance to see the de-purge carried out. The whole initial reactions toward the purge, even as recalled in retrospect, can be clearly correlated with attitudes toward the danger of recurring militarism (Table 61).

EFFECTS AND DEFECTS OF THE PURGE

Most Japanese were unwilling to deny that the purge had had some influence on their country, with only 9 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women taking the contrary position. Half the women and a quarter of the men made no

TABLE 60
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Opinions on Timing of De-Purge" and
"Apprehensions about a Revival of Militarism"

Militarism	Timing					Total	
	Too early, %	Can't generalize, %	Too late, %	Just right, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Great danger	25	6	25	27	17	100	96
Some danger	9	3	28	34	26	100	103
Little danger	4	6	36	37	17	100	70
No danger	2	6	35	27	30	100	60

TABLE 61
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Initial Opinions as to Propriety of
Purge" and "Apprehensions about a Revival of Militarism"

Militarism	Propriety				Total	
	Proper, %	Unavoidable, %	Not proper, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Great danger	45	48	2	5	100	76
Some danger	27	61	1	11	100	103
Little danger	22	70	4	4	100	70
No danger	18	78	2	2	100	60

TABLE 62
OPINIONS AS TO EFFECTS OF PURGE ON JAPAN

Opinion	Men, %	Women, %
Expedited democratization	25	18
Delayed rehabilitation of the country	14	6
Had both effects	3	1
Reformed Japan psychologically and spiritually	12	7
Affected private life of purgees only	1	2
Effects cannot be explained	12	10
Total	67	44

specific comment on this question, however. The rest (66 percent of the men and 44 percent of the women) believed that there was a definite influence in one direction or another. Among these, opinions can be tabulated by categories of

TABLE 63
COMBINED TABLE
Public Opinions Regarding the General Effects of the
Purge Tabulated into Education, Living Standard,
Age, and Professional Groups

Group	Effects						Total*	
	Good, %	Bad, %	Mostly good, %	Half and half, %	Mostly bad, %	No com- ment, %	%	No.
Education, yr								
0-5	27	9	0	1	0	14	51	74
6-9	26	21	0	4	0	15	66	78
10-12	24	21	0	0	1	17	63	90
13-	28	19	4	7	2	22	82	105
Living Standard								
High	27	18	5	14	0	9	73	22
Medium	23	22	1	3	2	18	69	152
Medium-low	31	12	1	2	0	19	65	139
Low	25	22	0	0	0	3	50	32
Age, yr								
20-24	22	12	0	2	0	23	59	65
25-29	35	12	4	4	0	9	64	52
30-39	33	11	2	9	2	18	75	82
40-54	27	28	0	0	0	11	66	101
55-	12	23	0	2	2	21	60	48
Profession								
Salaried men	27	21	3	6	0	21	78	112
Laborers	29	14	0	2	0	15	60	92
Business, industry	27	18	0	1	1	15	62	85
Other	20	19	2	2	3	17	63	59

*Total represents percentage giving above replies out of the total number in that class. Other replies were usually in the "Don't know" category. The "No comment" category used above represents opinions to the effect that the purge had some definite effect which the respondent declined to state.

TABLE 64
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Public Opinions Regarding
the General Effects of the Purge" and
"Opinions on Basic Objectives"

Objectives	Effects			Total	
	Generally good, %	Generally bad, %	Others, %	%	No.
Democratization	53	8	39	100	107
Make Japan powerless	16	34	50	100	88
Other objectives	21	20	59	100	113

response (Table 62). When asked whether the influence was good or bad, the majority response among these was favorable; but the opinion that the purge had predominantly good effects represents only a small minority among the respondents as a whole (26 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women). Education, age, and standard of living were highest among those whose reactions were most critical of the purge influence: again an evidence that those who gained most from the old system regarded the purge unfavorably. Predominantly the relatively underprivileged were most sympathetic to a change of leaders (Table 63).

A very significant correlation also can be drawn between opinions regarding the basic objectives of the purge and its general effect (Table 64). Those who regarded it as a political reform thought better of its effects than those who considered it a weapon used against a defeated nation.

TABLE 65
OPINIONS COMPARING PURGEES WITH THEIR SUCCESSORS

Sample	Don't know whether different or not, %	No difference, %	Character and ability declined, %	Other undesirable effects of purge, %	Leaders became more democratic, %	Other desirable changes, %	Some difference, %
Men (N = 348)	14	41	22	1	10	5	7
Women (N = 96)	31	35	14	1	7	6	6

Since the purge was designed to accomplish its mission through a change of leadership, public reactions as to the actual differences between purgees and their replacements may be revealing. Only about half the men and a third of the women recognized distinct differences (Table 65). A follow-up question was asked specifically to determine whether the respondent thought the replacements were inferior to the purgees or not, and whether the change had brought about a more democratic leadership. This brought a more definite response than the open-end question above: less than 1 percent actually thought the replacements were less democratic than the purgees had been (Table 66).^{*} Follow-up questions regarding differences in ability between purgees and replacements did not arouse such striking responses, although the interviewers reported that the question aroused considerable irritation among many respondents (Table 67). Only among those in the lowest standard-of-living group did more believe that the purge had resulted in raising rather than in lowering the quality of leadership. In general, as before, the higher educated and higher-living-standard groups saw the more unfavorable aspects of the leadership change (Table 68). In answer to the open-end question concerning the differences between purgees and successors, businessmen and industrial entrepreneurs stated, for the most part, that no change had occurred (Table 69);

^{*}Interviewers reported, however, that the public seemed to think it was wrong to deny that their new leaders were democratic. There were also many responses to the effect that the times were more democratic, so that the replacements were more or less compelled by the conditions to become democratic even though their own inclinations might have been the reverse. These answers were classified in Table 68 under the heading "No difference" since the purge itself was not thought to be the cause of any incidental democratizing of Japanese leaders which may have occurred under the Occupation.

TABLE 66
OPINIONS CONCERNING DEMOCRATIC CHANGES IN
LEADERSHIP BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PURGE

Sample	New leaders more dem- ocratic, %	They are slightly democratic, %	No differ- ence, %	They are less dem- ocratic, %	No com- ment, %
Men (N = 348)	26	11	46	1	16
Women (N = 96)	24	15	26	0	35

TABLE 67
OPINIONS CONCERNING CHANGES IN CHARACTER
OR ABILITY OF LEADERS BROUGHT ABOUT BY PURGE

Sample	Declined, %	Unchanged, %	Improved, %	No comment, %
Men (N = 348)	51	16	10	23
Women (N = 96)	24	12	8	56

TABLE 68
COMBINED TABLE

Opinions Concerning Changes in Character or Ability of
Leaders Brought by the Purge, Tabulated by Education,
Living Standards, and Occupational Groups

Characteristics of sample	Ability					Total	
	Reconstruction retarded be- cause of decline in leadership ability, %	Leadership quality de- clined but did not cause retardation, %	No dif- ference, %	Leadership quality has im- proved, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Education							
0-5 years	24	18	11	15	32	100	74
6-9 years	24	13	26	10	27	100	78
9-12 years	35	23	13	8	21	100	90
13- years	34	29	15	9	13	100	105
Living Standard							
High	50	18	14	4	14	100	22
Medium	35	22	14	11	18	100	152
Medium-low	25	22	20	10	23	100	139
Low	9	19	16	12	44	100	32
Occupation							
Salaried Man	37	20	17	8	17	100	112
Laborer	21	24	17	9	29	100	92
Business, Industry	34	14	15	10	27	100	85
Others	25	29	14	17	15	100	59

upon specific questioning, however, this group was among the most certain that the quality of the leaders had suffered when the wartime militarists were replaced (Table 68). More than three times the number who had observed a lowering in character in the original question affirmed its existence in the follow-up: over twice the increase found in other occupational groups (compare

TABLE 69
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Opinions Comparing Purgees with Their
Successors" and Occupation of Respondents

Occupation	Don't know whether different or not, %	No difference, %	Character and ability declined, %	Other undesirable effects of purge, %	Leaders became more democratic, %	Other desirable changes, %	Some difference, %
Salaried men	8	34	34	1	10	5	8
Laborers	10	41	19	1	11	5	13
Business, Ind.	9	48	13	1	7	2	20
Others	7	42	20	2	10	7	12

TABLE 70
COMBINED TABLE
Opinions Concerning Democratic Changes in Leadership
Brought About by the Purge, Tabulated by
Education and Living Standard Groups

Characteristics of sample	Changes					Total	
	Democratic, %	Slightly democratic, %	No difference, %	Less democratic, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Education, yr							
0-5	30	7	36	0	27	100	74
6-9	31	9	40	1	19	100	78
10-12	25	13	50	2	10	100	90
13-	21	14	55	0	10	100	105
Living Standard							
High	32	0	64	0	4	100	22
Medium	22	15	50	1	12	100	152
Medium-low	28	12	42	1	17	100	139
Low	31	3	31	0	35	100	32

Table 69, the original question, with Table 68, the follow-up question). This points to the eagerness of the more privileged groups, and especially those connected with business and industrial ventures, to express resentment at the outcome of the purge.

The same conclusion is borne out by comparing attitudes among the less educated and lower standard-of-living groups toward the democratization of Japanese leadership through the purge: again it is among these groups that the most favorable attitudes toward the purge were found (Table 70). Education also dimmed the vision of Japanese respondents when they were asked to

observe democratic tendencies in national leaders produced by the purge. Those who were enjoying the highest living standards found the least that was admirable in the change; those with experience as public servants were slightly more inclined to doubt that the leaders had changed much in their democratic orientation.* This was clearly not a "revolution" favored by the educated and privileged classes, or by those most closely connected with public life.

Another problem concerned with the effects of the purge is the duration of its influence on Japanese national life. Opinion was about equally divided as to whether the influence of the purge would linger on in society after the program

TABLE 71

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions Regarding the Continued Influence of Purgees in Public Life" and "Opinions Regarding the General Effects of the Purge"

Effects	Influence								Total	
	Will not continue, %				Will continue, %			No comment, %	%	No.
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)			
Generally good	27	8	1	4	32	15	12	1	100	96
Generally bad	17	9	3	13	11	35	6	6	100	65
Other	23	10	2	12	14	14	11	14	100	156

- (a) Because society is already democratized
- (b) Because de-purgees have changed their viewpoints
- (c) Because society has turned too far rightist
- (d) Other reasons
- (e) Because de-purgees will return to former positions
- (f) Because de-purgees had been of better calibre than their replacements
- (g) Other reasons

was discontinued and the Occupation terminated. There was no significant difference in this respect between those who regarded the purge's effects as being generally good and those who did not (Table 71). Indeed, in general the Japanese evidently attached little direct importance to the power of their leaders to change society, at least under an occupation. Thus, for example, those who thought that the calibre of leaders had dropped were about evenly divided between thinking the purge had generally good and generally bad effects. This would imply that even though the replacements may have been inferior to war-time leaders, such a fact would not seriously detract from the good effects of the purge in the public mind. Those, on the other hand, who considered that Japanese leadership did not deteriorate in quality as a result of the purge were also strongly inclined to regard the effects of the purge as predominantly good (Table 72). Apparently attitudes toward the purge as a whole were deeper than those involving the comparison of new and old Japanese leaders. There is, of course, a strong correlation between those who thought the leaders had been

*The difference was constant on all questions relevant to this conclusion: fewer of the former public servants thought that the replacements were democratic, and more thought the change of leadership had brought about a decline in ability which tended to retard national reconstruction.

democratized and those who thought the effects of the purge were generally good.* There was also a strong correlation between the belief that the new leaders were inferior in ability and the opinion that the de-purge had taken place too late.† This suggests that the purge has some association with demo-

TABLE 72

COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation of "Opinions Regarding the General Effects of the Purge" to "Opinions Concerning Changes in Character or Ability of Leaders Brought About by the Purge"

Calibre	Effects					Total	
	Generally good, %	Generally bad, %	Half-and-half, %	No change, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Declined	23	26	4	11	36	100	179
Unchanged	32	9	4	11	44	100	56
Improved	48	20	0	6	26	100	35

cratization even in the minds of those who did not approve of its effects as a whole. Democratization may come about, evidently, even if the leaders are not more democratic, by the institution of a system—however arbitrary and extrinsic—of rotation in office.

A further index to the effect of the purge on society is the attitude of the public toward purgees. About half those tested believed that the purge had made no change in the public's respect for its former leaders even after they had been replaced; most of the rest felt that they or the public accorded them less prestige and respect than before. Yet when they were asked how the purgees would fare at the first post-Occupation election, there were more who thought the purgees would be at a disadvantage than the reverse. Other factors than those of prestige and respect entered into this view, of course: recognition of the changes that had taken place in the governmental and economic organization, desire to support the younger and more recent leaders, and others. But the general public reaction seemed to indicate that the purge succeeded in injuring much of the purgees' status in society and in undermining their political support (for a discussion of the actual election returns, see preceding pages). Respondents in the lower-living-standard groups were more inclined to believe that purgees were uninjured in their prestige than were those from the upper economic classes, and also gave them slightly better odds in their election prospects.

*To summarize the responses briefly, of the 91 who thought the leaders after the purge were democratic, 36 percent said the general effect of the purge was good, 17 percent bad; of the 39 who thought the leaders were slightly more democratic after the purge, the figures were 49 percent and 8 percent respectively; of the 161 who could see no change the figures were 22 percent and 20 percent respectively.

†Of the 78 who thought the main effect of the purge was a decrease in the calibre of leadership, 40 percent thought the de-purge came too late, 23 percent about right, and 5 percent too soon; of the 33 who thought the purge primarily resulted in democratization, the figures were 15 percent, 46 percent, and 9 percent; opinions of others (240) on the main effect of the purge were 29 percent, 32 percent, and 13 percent respectively.

Another indication of the effects of the purge is the relation between apprehensions of a return of militarism and attitudes toward the return of purgees to positions of influence. A close correlation was observed between these opinions: 62 percent of those who thought there was great danger of returning militarism (196) stated that de-purgees would exercise great influence in the future of the country; but only 32 percent of those who thought there was no danger (160) did, with the other opinions ranging evenly between these poles. Conversely, 34 percent of those who thought militarism was a great danger thought the influence of returning purgees would be small, whereas 61 percent of those who thought there was no danger were of this opinion. Clearly those who feared

TABLE 73
COMPARATIVE DATA

Relation between "Opinions Regarding the Continued Influence of Purgees in Public Life" and "Apprehensions about a Revival of Militarism"

Militarism	Influence			Total	
	Influence will not continue, %	Influence will continue, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Great danger	34	62	4	11.3	96
Some danger	41	47	12	100	103
Little danger	54	40	6	100	70
No danger	61	32	7	100	60

militarism also anticipated that the future influence of de-purgees would be great, and vice versa (Table 73). Since this response provides a consistent pattern, it constitutes evidence that the Japanese in general consider the purgees, even though they may not have been all leaders in the public mind, more militaristic than their successors (Table 41). Supporters of the purge could interpret this to mean that although the public would not concede it directly, there is strong support in its attitudes for the conclusion that the purge indeed reached its intended victims.

A final set of evidence relative to the effects of the purge deals with its effects on the purgees as individuals. Since over half the men and a quarter of the women had acquaintances among the purgees,* their opinions regarding these effects of the purge were frequently based on actual observations.

Most of the respondents thought that the purge created no serious economic hardships for most of its victims. These opinions were not related to other attitudes regarding the purge, and may be taken as independent of them (Table 74). The sole exception to this, perhaps, is among those in lower economic circumstances, many of whom were reported as saying, "They are still very well off compared to us." However, relatively few of these persons had acquaintances among the purgees.

*Those among the better-educated group and those enjoying the higher standards of living had more friends and acquaintances among the purgees than did the rest. Those in the age group 30 to 39 also knew a larger number than other groups, presumably because of their military experience and acquaintance with purged officers.

As to the psychological effects of the purge, results of the survey were indecisive, since only about half the respondents thought the purge had exerted much influence on the purgees, and most of these were unable to say what it was. Some 54 percent of the men and 55 percent of the women expressed

TABLE 74
COMBINED TABLE

Opinions Regarding Economic Hardships Imposed by the Purge,
Tabulated by Sex, Categories of "Initial Opinions as
to Propriety of the Purge," Categories of "Attitudes
Toward War Responsibilities of Japanese Leaders,"
Living Standards and Friendships with Purgees

Category	Economic Hardships					Total	
	Many purgees in need, %	Some needy, %	Few needy, %	None needy, %	No comment, %	%	No.
Sex							
Men	28	8	16	42	6	100	348
Women	6	16	26	31	21	100	96
Propriety							
Proper	31	7	20	39	3	100	102
Unavoidable	26	8	16	45	5	100	213
Not proper	25	12.5	12.5	25	25	100	8
War responsibilities							
Purgees were leaders	9	13	9	65	4	100	23
Many were leaders	32	6	20	38	4	100	66
Half were leaders	30	12	16	37	5	100	43
Few were leaders	31	7	17	40	5	100	186
None were leaders	14	0	14	72	0	100	7
Living standard							
Upper	50	9	9	32	0	100	22
Middle	27	7	19	40	7	100	152
Medium-low	29	7	16	43	5	100	139
Low	19	9	6	57	9	100	32
Friendship							
I was purged	66	0	0	17	17	100	6
Many purged friends	42	0	30	26	2	100	43
One purged friend	37	8	17	35	3	100	60
Some acquaintances	25	12	14	45	4	100	69
No acquaintance	22	8	13	49	8	100	170

sympathy for the purgees, including 27 percent and 28 percent respectively who stated that the public as a whole was not sympathetic to them; 46 percent of the men and 45 percent of the women expressed no general sympathy for the purgees, but 7 percent and 11 percent respectively thought the public felt otherwise. The general conclusion on this aspect of the study is that sympathy for the purgees was not a very important factor in public attitudes toward the purge as a whole.

PUBLIC RESPONSES OUTSIDE TOKYO

The Tokyo studies, discussed above, were followed by parallel public opinion polls in Osaka (Japan's second city) and in Yamagata (a rural area).^{*} The samples were taken according to the stratified random sampling method, 300 selected in Osaka, and 237 in Yamagata. Of these, 236 and 139 respectively were interviewed.[†]

The results in Osaka were very similar to those in Tokyo. The differences that occurred seldom exceeded 2 or 3 percent, which is not significant in comparison with possible statistical or methodological errors. Moreover, these differences do not present a consistent attitude pattern reflecting important lines of public opinion. A few more people in Osaka thought the purge was justifiable, but, also, more considered it too rigid and too extensive, and fewer thought that the de-purge had been properly timed. On the other hand, fewer respondents in Osaka thought that the purge had had a favorable effect on society or that it had brought about any ideological changes, and more believed that the de-purgees would exert a great influence upon Japan in the future. In all cases, however, these differences were statistically slight. There is some reason to regard Osaka in general as less sympathetic to the Occupation than the Tokyo public, as evidenced by the slightly greater number who believed that the calibre of national leaders had dropped and the smaller number who assumed a critical attitude toward the Pacific War or who supported Occupational reforms.

The most important contrasts, however, appeared between urban Tokyo and Osaka and rural Yamagata (Table 75). In general, these differences may be summarized simply. There were fewer villagers than urban residents who: (a) were critical of the Pacific War; (b) believed that wartime leaders should take war responsibility; (c) feared the resurgence of militarism in Japan; or (d) believed that Japan would have conducted a purge against her enemies if she had won the war. A very much smaller number favored the purge or feared the de-purge. There is evidence that rural inhabitants tended to view the purge more in terms of the purgees known to them rather than in terms of its effects on society as a whole, although the degree of acquaintanceship with purgees was about the same in Tokyo as in the Yamagata villages.

The strongest support for the purge was found in Japan's cities; and even here the losses somewhat overweighed the gains in public sentiment.

^{*}Note that Osaka and Yamagata were also studied in the community leadership projects (Chap. 6). The Tokyo interviews took place two months before those in Osaka and Yamagata. During this period, preparations were being made for the general election of October 1952, and purgees were making serious efforts to gain public sympathy and support. This may to some extent have displaced public attitudes. In a few minor details the questions used in Osaka and Yamagata were altered to secure a more valid response: in place of the question as to whether the purge was punitive or preventive, which had produced little result in Tokyo, the question was reworded to determine whether the public thought the purge was carried out for the benefit of the US alone or for that of Japan and the US. The Osaka and Yamagata respondents were also asked whether they thought the purge was a good thing or a bad thing, but were not asked what they considered its effects had been on purgees' attitudes and beliefs.

[†]The rate of interview returns in all areas was above 75 percent. Causes for failure ranged from absence and sickness to refusal to answer questions. See App F.

TABLE 75
GENERAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN RURAL AND
URBAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PURGE

	De-purge will bring militar- ism, %	De-purge may bring militar- ism, %	Most purgees responsible for war, %	I was indif- ferent to purge from first, %
Tokyo	8	17	9 ^a	7.7
Osaka	10	13	8	8.4
Ueda ^b	2	12	4	23.1
Funagata ^b	0	6	3	22.3
	Purge was a good idea, %	There would have been serious friction w/o purge, %	New lead- ership more democras- tic, %	Purge delayed recov- ery, %
Tokyo	--	26.4	26.1	30.1
Osaka	36	24.9	22.8	27.9
Ueda	22.1	21.0	32.6	11.5
Funagata	10.6	25.5	27.6	14.3
	Public and I were unsym- pathetic to purgees, %	Purgees will be at disadvantage in coming election, %	Purge was an American trick, %	Purge brought friendly feel- ing toward US, %
Tokyo	33	38.2		20.1
Osaka	35.5	37.7	43.2	17.7
Ueda	19.9	25.2	30.5	14.7
Funagata	13.8	30.8	47.8	7.4
	Japan would not have con- ducted purge if she had won, %	Pacific war was unavoi- dable for Japan, %	There is still danger of militarism in Japan, %	
			Great	Some
Tokyo	12.0	32.4	27.5	29.5
Osaka	13.8	41.5	29.6	25.8
Ueda	9.4	38.9	15.7	33.6
Funagata	19.0	38.2	11.7	34.0

^aQuestions 13, 16, and 25. Implication is that they should assume responsibility.
^bYamagata villages.

TABLE 76
COMPARATIVE DATA
Relation between "Fear of Militarism" and
"War Responsibility of Japanese Leaders" (Raw Numbers)

Responsibility	Fear of Militarism			Total, no.
	Strongly fear revival	Some fear	No fear	
Leaders should accept respon- sibility	7	12	12	31
Should assume responsibility	5	6	11	22
Need not assume responsibility	15	41	239	295
Total	27	59	262	348

CONCLUSION: POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE PURGE

In view of the democratic objectives set forth for the purge, the degree of conscious public support revealed in the present survey is surprisingly small.

This lack of public support can be observed first in a series of attitudes toward the possibility of reviving militarism as a product of the de-purge program (see, however, Table 73 and the accompanying comment). Only 8 percent of the respondents felt strongly that the de-purge might bring about militaristic tendencies, although another 17 percent considered this a possible result.* The largest group of these, incidentally, came from the better-educated segments of the population, most of which had criticized the purge for having brought about a deterioration in the calibre of national leadership (Table 68). The group who took a stand against the de-purge because of the dangers of militarism also tended strongly to believe from the first, according to their own statements, that the purge was proper; they were the most indifferent to the plight of purgees; they tended to believe that the net effects of the purge were good. They were more than usually critical of Japan's role in the war, and were also much more critical of Occupation policies as being too mild than was the public at large. This means that those who took generally favorable attitudes toward the purge provided a consistently favorable core of responses to specific questions concerning the purge, while the rest of the public remained, by comparison, indifferent or hostile. Empirical evidence shows that strong doubts as to the outcome of the de-purge program were closely correlated with other attitudes favorable to the purge, but that only a very small part of the general public falls into this category.

There is a second indication of the thinness of public support for the purge. Only 9 percent of the population believed strongly that the majority of purgees were responsible for the war.† Curiously enough, most of these did not agree with the group discussed above that the de-purge would bring about a revival of nationalism and militarism (Table 76). A disproportionate number of those falling in this group had received higher education and were enjoying a higher standard of living. Although 55 percent of them believed that the purge was too wide in scope (extending beyond those leaders who were considered actually responsible for the war) as compared with 59 percent in the public at large, 26 percent believed it too narrow, as compared with 7 percent among members of the general public. About half this group believed that the prewar situation is likely to prevail again under the influence of returning de-purgees, as compared with 19 percent of the general public. Only 39 percent (as compared with 54 percent of the general public) expressed sympathy for the purgees. A far larger

*Those who are considered here as taking a strong stand (a) foresee a danger of militarism in the future; (b) feel that the de-purge was too early; and (c) fear that de-purgees will work to restore the old order. A weak stand on the same position, for statistical purposes, described those who stated (a) above and either (b) or (c). This kind of analysis presupposes a coherence and consistency of public opinion which was in general not found in this study and is, therefore, to be considered significant only insofar as the evidence shows little general acceptance of the official purge doctrine.

†Fifty-three persons stated that most purgees had been war leaders and should assume war responsibility. But 22 of them are not critical of Japan and her leaders for having started the war, even now. Only 9 claimed to have been critical at the outbreak of war, and 22 more were critical at the time of this study.

proportion of them (68 percent) believed that the purge was proper and justifiable than did the general public (30 percent). Some 32 percent believed that the de-purge had taken place too early, as compared with 11 percent of the general public who thought this way. Nearly three times as many (74 percent) regarded the effects of the purge generally good as among the general public (28 percent), and only one-sixth (3 percent) as many thought it bad as in the public at large (19 percent). This group provided strong support for the proposition that the purge had enabled Japan to expiate its responsibility for the war and had brought desirable political changes as well; many more supported Occupation reforms in general (39 percent) than among the public as a whole (19 percent). Many more were greatly disturbed about the possibility of a revival of militarism in the future (55 percent) than were other men (28 percent).

A third special group whose opinions provided a source of support for the purge is composed of those who believe that the purge definitely contributed toward the democratization of Japan. Again, this is a disappointingly small group (4 percent), although an additional 11 percent conceded that this may have been one result. On the other hand, those who believe that the purge was positively harmful to the reconstruction of Japan because of the loss of leaders were equally rare (5 percent), occasionally supported by 5 percent more who thought this may have been the case.* There are proportionately more young persons who believe in the democratic effects of the purge than in its net harm to Japan's leadership, but living standards and education groups did not follow a consistent pattern in these attitudes. These groups provide the sharpest contrasts in their other attitudes toward the purge: 77 percent of the first group believed that the purge was proper from the beginning, and only 11 percent of the second (the average among all men examined was 30 percent); 55 percent of the first group thought the de-purge had been timed about right, and only 16 percent of the second (public average was 32 percent). Other attitudes tended to range proportionally, with the first group taking positions relatively favorable to the purge in nearly every case. The opinions on whether the purge democratized Japan or not were also related to judgments on matters of politics. For example, 8 percent of the first group thought the de-purgees would have an advantage in the forthcoming election, while 28 percent of the latter thought so. A large middle group moderately inclined to the view that Japan had been democratized partly as a result of the purge also shared opinions favorable to other aspects of the purge. One disturbing factor is that among those who inclined toward a "democratic" interpretation of the purge's effects there is greater than average fear of revival of militarism, and a very pronounced belief that the de-purgees will once more militarize Japan. This indicates a democratic orientation, from the point of view of Occupation reformers, and an entirely appropriate fear of extreme rightism; but it also shows a lack of confidence in the permanent value of the purge as an instrument of democratic reform, for these groups tended even more to such doubts for the future than did those who thought the purge had done no more than remove Japan's most capable leaders from office. The former was a group which provided strong support for the Occupation policies as a whole (62 percent favored, 0 percent were dissatisfied) while the latter opposed it (6 percent favored,

*These groups are not entirely mutually exclusive. A few stated that the quality of leadership had been lowered but admitted that democratization may have taken place, and vice versa. These numbers are small enough to be disregarded here.

61 percent were dissatisfied); but the support came apparently without much confidence in the future.

A final group providing elements of support for the purge is that which regarded it as a program specifically designed to democratize Japan. The former group numbered only 10 percent, while 11 percent thought its major purpose was to weaken Japan, and most of the rest thought it punitive. The first group chiefly had received less education and possessed lower standards of living than the second. The attitudes of the former were more fearful of resurgent militarism than was the public at large; both groups which expressed strong views regarding the objective of the purge tended to take a stronger than average stand regarding the over-all effect of the purge. Thus, for example, 64 percent of the first group thought the effects of the purge were generally good, although only 13 percent of the second and 28 percent of the public at large thought so. Far more of the first group believed that there were democratic trends in Japanese leadership as a result of the purge than did either the second group or the public, in a consistent pattern of response. Thirty-six percent of the first group and 19 percent of the second group said they thought the purge was proper from the beginning, as compared with 30 percent of the public, and 39 percent of the first group; 19 percent of the second, and 32 percent of the public at large thought the purge was timed about right. Like the three other groups lending general support to the purge, this public was relatively consistent in its attitude and firm in other opinions unrelated to the purge. But, like the other groups, it was an extremely small segment of the public.

Insofar as it was revealed by popular attitudes tested, such public support of the purge as did exist was centered in small minorities who consistently expressed views conforming to the official statements of the purposes and effects of the purge. The evidence suggests that these were primarily the underprivileged and less educated members of Japanese society.

If the purge was designed to discredit the old elite of Japan and to enlist public support of new democratic leaders, it must be accounted a failure. There is evidence (Table 73) that the major potential sources of public support for the purge were largely untapped. Whatever its successes as a measure of political reform, military security, and administrative necessity, its inadequacy as a program of public relations is conspicuous and demonstrable.

Chapter 5

THE INDUSTRIAL ASPECTS OF THE PURGE

US ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE JAPANESE PURGE

In their turn, all three of Japan's wartime ruling groups (the military, the bureaucrats, and the zaibatsu, or industrial monopolists)* were to be visited by the purge. The army and the navy had been demobilized and their officers barred from public office; the political leadership of the nation had been thoroughly cleansed; hard decisions had been made regarding the bureaucracy. The economic warlords were next.

Japan's economic power had been united behind a war effort for a decade before the attack on Pearl Harbor.[†] A totalitarian mobilization of industrial and governmental strength had begun with the first attempts to modernize the Japanese economy: Japan's progress since Perry's black ships entered Tokyo Bay a century ago has been almost continuously toward a form of national mobilization.[‡] Voluntarily or otherwise, the zaibatsu corporations had cooperated in plans for imperial expansion, and they had been entrusted with much of the responsibility for the development of the growing overseas empire.[§] In spite

*In seeking to define "zaibatsu," it is not enough to refer to its roots, zai (wealth) and batsu (clique). Willard Price quotes a "zaibatsu expert" as advising SCAP that "a comparable business organization in the US might be achieved if, for example, US Steel, General Motors, Standard Oil of N. Y., Alcoa, Douglas Aircraft, E. I. DuPont de Nemours, Sun Ship Building, Westinghouse Electric, A.T.&T., RCA, IBM, U. S. Rubber, Sea Island Sugar, Dole Pineapple, U. S. Lines, Grace Lines, National City Bank, Metropolitan Life, the Woolworth Stores, and the Statler Hotels were to be combined into a single enterprise." Ref 74, pp 157, 158.

[†]Ref 56, Chap. 1.

[‡]Ref 57, especially pp 133-135. Ref 58, especially Chap. 5, pp 68-86.

[§]On 27 January 1947, General MacArthur, responding to a criticism of the purge of businessmen, said: "It was these very persons, born and bred as feudalistic overlords (sic), who held the lives and destiny of the majority of Japan's people in virtual slavery, and who, working in closest affiliation with the military, geared the country with both the tools and the will to wage aggressive war. This, to the end that a large part of the earth's surface and inhabitants might be brought under the same economic bondage they had so long maintained over a majority of the Japanese people—and that Japan might wield... a vast totalitarian economic empire, designed further to enrich them. Those are the persons who, under the purge, are to be removed from influencing the course of Japan's further economy." He added his belief that such a course was not opposed to the American ideal of a capitalistic economy, but that even if it were disruptive of Japan's future growth, the purge would nevertheless be necessary in the interest of peace. Ref 5, p 549.

of their stout denials, they were also among its chief beneficiaries.*

The Potsdam resolution⁹ to eliminate "for all time the power and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" was followed by the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,¹⁰ providing specifically that "the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life." The economic plans required that "the existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive."[†] The Supreme Commander was directed to promote "democratic forces" in Japan's economic system by prohibiting "the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends," and by encouraging a program "for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry." This was followed by JCS Directive 1380/15,¹ ordering the Supreme Commander to

prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, of those who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated . . . [i.e., IRAA, Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, etc.] and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends. (In the absence of evidence, satisfactory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression.)

*Japanese industrialists often assert that they were victims of military policy, not its creators, and that the army excluded them from Japan's overseas exploitation. This was true in the case of the development projects in Manchoukuo, but great profits were reaped in Korea, China, Karafuto, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. Indeed, according to Russell Brines, the major wartime disagreements between the military and industrial leaders of Japan concerned the division of the spoils. Ref 59, p 130 and Ref 56, pp 59 ff, p 85, pp 101 ff.

[†]The purge was not, of course, the sole means by which this was to be accomplished. Indeed, it represents probably the mildest aspect of the economic reform program of the Occupation. The zaibatsu family dissolution law, for example, provided that the holdings of Japan's leading industrial families had to be turned over to the Japanese government, in return for interest-bearing, nonnegotiable bonds, redeemable in ten years at an undetermined value (not to exceed liquidation value of assets). The stock of these families was to be resold publicly, under special safeguards against block purchase. In two years, the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC) had taken possession of 67 parent companies and 800 subsidiaries, together with zaibatsu stocks of the top ten families to the value of 20 billion yen. R. Brines, MacArthur's Japan, Philadelphia, 1948, p 128. J. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, Minneapolis, 1949, p 428. This discussion of the Japanese economy under occupation (Chap. 7) gives an excellent account of the gradual shift of the Occupation's economic policy in Japan's favor.

IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PURGE

The first purge directive had carried no reference to economic positions, except in enterprises controlled by the Japanese government and those involved in financing and developing of Japan's empire. As interpreted by the Japanese government,²⁸ this included 114 corporations in the first category, and 33 in the second; 139 and 78 persons were removed, respectively, by this phase of the purge.

On 4 January 1947,* a second basic set of ordinances was promulgated by the Japanese government defining the purge as it applied to the economic fields prescribed in basic Occupation policy. The definitions, achieved after a series of conferences between GS, ESS, and representatives of the Japanese government, divided the economic purgees into two classes: those occupying "principal public offices" in the economic field, whose removal was mandatory if they fell under any of the purge categories (Chap. 2); and those in "ordinary public offices," who could be barred from other public service but who might be permitted to remain in their current positions. In the first category were corporation chairmen, vice chairmen, presidents, vice-presidents, directors, standing auditors, and others exercising similar influence and authority; the second group included auditors, advisors, councilors, the heads of business or accounting departments, and others of similar responsibility. These were the offices which were to be involved in the economic purge.

Not all Japanese companies and industries were subjected to the purge, however. The number of factories actually affected is estimated at 1807.† They included a large number of categories based upon evidences of several types: (a) 26 special enterprises in which the government had a controlling interest; (b) a large number of companies specifically designated by a temporary supply and demand adjustment law as essential to the economy; (c) 78 enterprises established under government subsidy or law; and (d) 278 influential private companies and other economic institutions which were named specifically.‡

The application of the purge to Japanese industry raised problems in interpretation which required almost continuous clarification during the early phases of its implementation.§ Rough standards soon had to be devised for determining which companies were to be screened under the purge laws. These standards were little more than policy statements: (a) conspicuously influential companies which manufactured critical munitions; (b) monopolistic companies engaged in the production of basic materials or engaged in communications or transportation; (c) monopolistic companies engaged in domestic or foreign trade; (d) certain holding companies designated by name; (e) companies with authorized capitalization of 100 million yen; (f) any others "which have commanded excessive economic power."¶

*A Japanese government ordinance published 21 November 1946 had already indicated the probable scope of the extension.

†Like other incidence statistics, this is based on information gathered for this report by the Special Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office.

‡Among these, 246 which were still active and located in Japan were to be purged of personnel who between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 had held either a "principal" or "ordinary" post, as well as of holders of 10 percent or more capital stock.

§Ref 5, pp 50 ff.

¶Ref 21, Para 11, App 2. Ref 5, p 526.

Once announced, the economic purge was speedily carried out. In less than seven months, 3150 economic leaders had been screened (and reviewed by SCAP) and 292 removed or barred from office.* The economic purge under Category G eventually included 1410 purgees, of whom 486 were actually removed and 914 barred from public office.† Government Section announced in 1948 that this had taken place without injury to the Japanese economy,‡ a view which was not shared, however, by all Japanese economists.

The fact is that the extension of the purge to business and industry came as a surprise to the Japanese economic leaders. The President of the Nitto Chemical Company and former president of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry expressed this attitude in a post-Occupation article,⁶⁰ in which he described the psychological reaction to the first announcements as follows:

A great number of industrial leaders considered that they had not cooperated with the military, but had been forced into their service. Frankly, almost all of them had been opposed to war with the US from the beginning—not one was pleased with the outbreak of war. This sentiment revived immediately with the end of hostilities, and there was a feeling of relief that the Americans would work a severe penalty upon the military leaders and the police, so that industrial circles would be secure. This feeling continued even after the promulgation of the [first] purge ordinance.

He recited the jubilation expressed by industrial consultants to the Suzuki Cabinet at the meeting of 9 August 1945, when immediate plans for resuming economic relations with the United States were discussed:

Mr. [Ryozo] Asano and the others thought they would be put to constructive use when it was learned that the Occupying Power would be the US. They never imagined that they would be purged. . . . Many industrialists in Karuizawa uncorked their champagne bottles and toasted the coming of a new "industrialists' era". . . . They simply had not examined their own role [as makers of airplanes and gunpowder, cannons and battle-ships].

The effects of the industrial purge depended largely upon conditions within each company. Characteristically, the larger Japanese industries had systematically trained an extensive management staff in much the same fashion

*This figure includes an unstated number of purgees screened "not because of their positions in economic circles but because they were incumbents or candidates for other public office." Ref 5, p 53.

†See Chap. 2. It should be noted that in addition to the purge removals, a large number of business and industrial leaders "purged" themselves by resigning their positions prior to actual screening. These were later (2 July 1947) subjected to "provisional designation" as purgees, most of the actual designations taking place in September and October, 1947. This action was designed to subject the "self-designated purgees" to the restrictions against exerting influence over their former connections. Nine hundred and fourteen of the 1410 economic purgees under Category G were "provisionally" designated.

‡A SCAP study of 21 requests for retention of "indispensable" purgees, of which nine were approved, had showed that during the three months prior to and following the purge, there was no significant drop in productivity except in two cases which could be otherwise explained. These cases do not provide proof that "the effect of the (economic) purge . . . did not weaken the economy of Japan," although they were so interpreted by GS. Ref 5, Paras 3 and 4.

as was done among the government bureaucracies. Top management was selected by a process of promotion within the ranks, and junior and intermediate executives were trained by a series of transfers within each organization, so that they could gain a varied experience. In such industries, the purge effect was primarily one of speeding up the process of promotion. It meant, in effect, that retirement came a few years earlier to the senior men, and promotion for their successors at a slightly younger age.* In other cases, however, where no such systematic procedures were followed in selecting and training the managerial staff, the purge effects were much more serious.

Simultaneously with the purge of their top management, the large industrial combines were dissolved into smaller (though, in most cases, still substantial) companies. Since this made it necessary to divide up the management of the parent company into several parts, there was an increased demand

TABLE 77
AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES
COMPANY DIRECTORS AS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF
SUCCESSOR COMPANIES' DIRECTORS

Company	Date	Total no. of dir.	Av. age	Av. yrs. of exp. as dir.	Av. yrs. of seniority in co.
Mitsubishi Hv. Ind	Dec '46	12	60+	8-	38+
Ea. J. Hv. Ind	Jan '50	10	54+	1½	30½
Mid. J. Hv. Ind	Jan '50	10	55½	1+	30+
W.J. Hv. Ind	Jan '50	10	53+	1/3	28-

for managerial skills at the very moment when senior executives were being removed by the purge. In the case of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for example (which manufactures ships, planes, and rolling stock), three companies were formed in January 1950, several years after the purge had removed the top management. There were 12 directors in December 1946, with an average age of 60 years,† who had served an average of more than 7 years as directors, and who had been with the company some 38 years. When these figures are compared with those of the successor companies, it is immediately apparent that the new directors were younger and less experienced than the purgees (Table 77). A similar experience can be demonstrated in the case of the Mitsubishi Mining Company, which was split into the Mitsubishi Kogyo Coal Mining Company and the Taihei Metals Mining Company (Table 78).

*Even this effect was not as pronounced as might have been expected, for during the war many retirements had been delayed, so that the replacements for purgees had reached, in some cases, the age at which they would normally have been promoted anyway. The system was reported by several companies to require that employees retire from intermediate managerial positions at the age of about 55, if no promotion was in prospect. This made room for younger men to rise, and also provided a greater range of selection for top policy positions. Pensions were usually provided at retirement, and it was also common for these retired managers to accept responsible positions in smaller companies.

† This was an unusually advanced average age, doubtless because during and immediately after the war most companies decided not to make normal managerial retirements.

But even in the case of large industries which were not divided under the zaibatsu dissolution reforms, there was a distinct drop in age and experience after the purge. The Mitsubishi Electric Manufacturing Company was re-organized as an independent company under the same name, and the Mitsubishi Bank became Chiyoda Bank. Nevertheless, because this occurred at the same time as the purge, there was a substantial diminution in the age and experience of the management. (In Table 79, note increase in directorships

TABLE 78

AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF MITSUBISHI MINING COMPANY
DIRECTORS AS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF SUCCESSOR
COMPANIES' DIRECTORS

Company	Date	Total no. of dir.	Av. age	Av. yrs. of exp. as dir.	Av. yrs. of seniority in co.
Mitsubishi Mining	Oct '46	10	57	5+	31
Kogyo	Apr '50	11	52+	1/2	27½
Taihei	Apr '50	12	50½	0	25+

TABLE 79

AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF DIRECTORS OF MITSUBISHI BANK
AND MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC MFG. CO. AS COMPARED WITH
THOSE OF SUCCESSOR COMPANIES AFTER REORGANIZATION

Company	Date	Total no. of dir.	Av. age	Av. yrs. of exp. as dir.	Av. yrs. of seniority in co.
Mitsubishi Bank	Jan '47	13	59½	4½	33+
Chiyoda Bank	Feb '47	12	53+	1/3	29-
Mit.El.Mfg. Co.I	Dec '46	8	55	2-	29-
Mit.El.Mfg. Co.II	Apr '47	15	53½	1-	29-

in the second case.) In all cases, the average age and experience of directors were reduced after the purge. While this is not necessarily an indication of a decline in the actual potential of the company leadership, it may be expected that the combined effect may have reduced to some extent the judgment and managerial skills of the top management. Yet during the Occupation all of these companies except the East Japan Heavy Industries continued operations without loss. This suggests, of course, the advantages of "management-in-depth," which enabled large corporations to minimize the losses of efficiency that presumably accompanied the purge of top executives.

In the case of small organizations dependent upon the personal leadership of the founder or president, losses through the purge brought much more serious results. The peculiar losses sustained by such companies led to the widespread professional and popular opinion that Japanese business had sometimes fallen into the hands of incompetent opportunists as a result of the purge (see case studies following).

The most important areas in which this shift in management influenced company policy were perhaps those depending upon personal judgment and friendships. Company labor policies, for example, depended in many cases upon the judgment of top management. Wartime attitudes toward workers were undergoing change at the time that the labor movement was gaining strength in Japan and a new, "liberalized" management was installed. There had been no free labor movement in Japan since long before the war, and new managers were inexperienced in dealing with union demands.* There were also occasional difficulties encountered among lesser companies in securing adequate credit advances, since no established personal basis for confidence existed between bank managers and company executives.

Undoubtedly the effects of the purge itself were enhanced by the chaotic conditions of Japanese industry. A relatively inexperienced (though not necessarily inferior) management was simply confronting a whole series of unprecedented problems: the rebuilding of war-damaged plants; the reorganization of the dissolved zaibatsu enterprises; the liquidation of holding companies; negotiations with the strengthening of the labor offensive, which was demanding the improvement of standards of pay and working conditions; and the loss of former markets and sources of raw materials. In the face of such economic problems the purge was relatively unimportant, except as it deprived corporations of experience and judgment, but even this may have been relatively unimportant because they were facing problems for which there were no precedents.

Overshadowing all these considerations was the fact of the Occupation itself. To the Japanese industrialists the economic policies appeared unpredictable and sometimes arbitrary; paternalistic and sometimes stern. It was not the purge alone which accounted for the timorous and hesitant response of Japanese business to postwar reconstruction needs. It was a congeries of factors, of which the purge may have been among the least important.

CASE STUDIES OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY

The general conditions just described confronted all phases of Japanese business, although they varied in different industries. Significant variations also occurred among competing enterprises within the same industry, a fact which precludes any comprehensive statement of the effects of the purge upon industrial segments of the Japanese economy. For this reason, a series of case studies by industry† will present a more adequate summary of the economic effects of the purge than the general figures themselves could.‡

*It can be argued that this may have been an advantage to the company in those cases where the previous management had been arbitrary or unsympathetic.

†Ninety-four detailed case studies were made for this purpose, 75 of them by members of the research staff of the Oriental Economist, under the technical direction of Kiyomi Maeda. The other 19 studies were the work of a staff of assistants recruited and directed by Yoichi Uyeno.

‡See App G for a complete and classified tabulation of all companies affected by the purge, the positions involved, and an index to companies which were reorganized during the Occupation.

Trading Companies

The Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, Japan's two largest trading companies,* were subjected to three Occupation reforms occurring almost simultaneously: a purge of their top management (March 1947); their dissolution from zaibatsu affiliation (July 1947); and a rule specifying that no new company should be organized employing more than 100 former executives and workers from the parent company.

These companies had benefited considerably by Japan's expansion into East Asia, opening up new areas of trade in close cooperation with the military authorities in occupied areas. During the Pacific War, government controls of imports, exports, and domestic trade forced them still further to devote their activities to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thus, at the end of the war when these areas were liberated and Japan's assets forfeited, their sphere of trading activities was severely limited. Their extensive overseas staffs were repatriated to Japan, where they had to be absorbed into the operating overhead.† Domestic trade was accordingly developed during the early postwar months, and by July 1947, the Mitsui Bussan had established 16 different departments (such as Textile, Foods, Fuels, Hardware, Transportation, and a number of administrative divisions), 20 branch offices, 17 subbranches and 45 agencies. Mitsubishi Shoji, also responsive to the need for seeking domestic trade, had set up 14 departments, 16 branches, 19 subbranches, and 30 agencies. The total number of employees of these companies, respectively, was 7058 and 4130 in July 1947. The monthly volume of business of Mitsui Bussan from October 1945 to March 1946 had averaged only 72 million yen, and of Mitsubishi Shoji, 30 million yen; but, partly because of a rise in commodity prices, these figures had risen to 460 million yen and 290 million yen, respectively, by the first quarter of 1947. There was a gradual increase in optimism for the future, as new vistas of foreign trade began slowly to emerge under the cautious encouragement of ESS/SCAP.

The dissolution order of 3 July 1947 came suddenly and unexpectedly. As applied to these companies, the restrictions of the purge and dissolution meant that the former staff members‡ were not permitted to collaborate in forming new companies, nor could more than one staff member of either company be hired even to advise it; and in no case could more than 100 former staff members of either company be in any way engaged or employed by the new companies. The objective of this order was to decentralize industry, and there were no fewer than 170 new companies organized from Mitsui Bussan, and 120 from Mitsubishi Shoji, as a result of the dissolution.

As these orders went into effect, Mitsui Bussan had a book balance totaling 6,393,570,000 yen, and Mitsubishi Shoji 5,446,033,000 yen, in contracted sales and purchases: a sum sufficient to require special government action to minimize the possibility of a panic after the dissolution occurred. Accordingly, when the dissolution was announced, and the regular staff of the trading companies were engaged in reorganizing their assets into new enterprises, the HCLC§ made arrangements to provide for the fulfillment of existing contracts and to arrange for the extension of credit for such purposes.

*These companies had been among the largest trading companies in the world, representing in 1937-1943 a total of 28.6 percent of Japan's total aggregate export and import trade volume.

†It was proposed that these supernumeraries be dismissed en masse, but management rejected this proposal as incompatible with the paternalistic responsibilities of large corporations toward their employees in times of distress.

‡This included 66 officers and 120 department chiefs and branch managers of Mitsui Bussan and 46 officers and 90 branch managers and department chiefs of Mitsubishi Shoji.

§Mochikabu Kaisha Seiri Inkai, which in this case worked closely with the Finance Minister, the Bank of Japan, and local banks.

After the dissolution had taken place (by November 1947), most of the purged staff members of these companies were actively engaged in the 290 new enterprises soon created to absorb the operations of Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, and normal business operations almost ceased.* In August 1952, 16 enterprises formed out of the Mitsui Bussan had already amalgamated to form four larger companies, and the reorganization of Mitsubishi Shoji enterprises was also slowly taking place† with the former purged leaders again assuming positions of responsibility in the former trading combine.

The Motion Picture Industry

The most striking contrast in managerial responses to the purge occurred among competing companies engaged in the production and distribution of motion pictures.‡ Unlike the zaibatsu trading companies, in each case the role of a creative and imaginative management was crucial; there existed no industrial bureaucracy to absorb the functions of planning and coordination when a vacancy took place at the top levels. There was instead a scramble for power, and a tendency for the company to undergo violent changes with a shift in management.

Neither the Shochiku nor the Daiei Motion Picture Companies was seriously affected by the purge. Shochiku's joint founders and key figures, Matsujiro Shirai and Takejiro Otani, were not removed by the purge, presumably because of their positions of leadership in the entertainment world, and because the removal of their support from the Kabuki theater would have seriously affected this folk-drama form, which the Occupation authorities desired to encourage.§ Only a vice-president and two managing directors of Shochiku were purged, later in 1947. Although one of them, Shiro Kido, had been vice-president in charge of motion picture production, this did not have any measurable effect upon the total output of the company (see Table 80). His place was taken by his superior, Otani, who had previously devoted himself to the Kabuki theater in Tokyo.¶

The Daiei Motion Picture Company was only slightly harder hit by the purge. Late in 1947, five directors of the company were purged, and shortly thereafter its president, Masaichi Nagata, was removed. Less than six months later, however, the able and dynamic Nagata was released from the purge, presumably because of his argument that Shirai and Otani of the rival Shochiku Company had been exempted. Yet even during the short period of Nagata's purge, the company accountants experienced difficulty in collecting fees from theaters showing Daiei films. They interpreted this as evidence that the company was considered weakened by the loss of its president.**

*A table of the most important of these organizations appears in App G.

†When the use of former names was permitted, one small warehouse and building company (Nitto Soko Tatemono), a realtor with a capitalization of 90 million yen, assumed the name of Mitsui Bussan, of which it had taken over only a small branch. There are also other examples of small companies employing the name of a former giant corporation, which made it necessary for a few of the reorganized zaibatsu corporations to adopt new names.

‡For a discussion of the Public Information Media Phase of the purge, see Ref 5, Part III.

§This mild form of dramatic entertainment had been made a financial success largely through the efforts of Shirai and Otani. Otani had remained in the Tokyo office of Shochiku and was devoting his full efforts to Kabuki, while his twin brother, Shirai, supervised motion picture activities.

¶There is some irony in the fact that Otani, who was spared from the purge because of his importance in the Kabuki theater, was forced to terminate his activities in that field in order to take over the duties of a purged executive in his company.

**After Nagata's return, company policy began to favor the production of higher quality pictures than previously; the international prize-winning Rashomon and Genji Monogatari are outstanding examples.

In the Toho Motion Picture Company, however, the purge had much more striking effects. Its president, the chairman of its board, and four directors resigned on 10 March 1947 in anticipation of the purge, and other executive members of the management resigned en bloc.* Since Toho had been amalgamated from several companies as recently as 1942, its staff was still loosely integrated, and its activities were relatively diversified (including the operation of motion picture and stage theaters as well as production and distribution of movies).

TABLE 80
MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION IN OCCUPIED JAPAN

Year	Shochiku	Daiei	Shintohto	Toho	Toyoko	Oizumi
1937	90	297 ^a	52 ^b	52 ^b		
1945 ^c	5	6		1		
1946	24	25		18		
1947	33	33	12	14	3	
1948	42	37	20	6	10	
1949	44	39	34	6	12	3
1950	48	48	43	19	25	13
1951	53	49	37	27	18	6

^aDaiei was reorganized from three companies which produced a total of 297 pictures in 1937. These were Daito (111), Shinko (90), and Nikkatsu (96).

^bShintohto and Toho were a single company in 1937, producing in that year a total of 52 pictures.

^cAfter 15 August.

The personnel was divided into factions engaged in these different enterprises, and based upon loyalties to the previous companies; there were also policy disputes between those who wanted to concentrate on commercial films and the advocates of more artistic productions. These difficulties were enhanced by the violent and powerful unions† of the motion picture industry, which had their start in Toho. During the first prolonged negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement, the Toho Union split into two unions, one Communist, the other Socialist. Shortly thereafter, a third union was formed for workers in the business departments of the industry, which joined forces with the socialist wing of the original unions to form a National Screen and Stage Workers Union. This organization was short-lived, however, for in March 1947, the third union left Toho to form a new motion picture company, the Shintohto.

The confusion caused by these union maneuvers and the divided loyalties among management groups was undoubtedly increased in the subsequent months by the inexperienced executive staff which was appointed after 10 March 1947. The new staff was chosen from among the remaining management corps, including relatives of those who had withdrawn from their positions and a few others who had previously held minor positions. The newly-formed Shintohto, moreover,

*The management of Toho was separated from the capital ownership, unlike many other Japanese companies. This may have enhanced the effects of the purge, since operating personnel were affected who in other companies would have been in protected subordinate positions.

†The Toho Workers Union, which organized in February 1946, amalgamated its activities with Shochiku and Daiei workers to form the Nippon Eiga Engeki Rodokumiai, the Japan Screen and Stage Workers' Union. It later joined the Communist-led Sanbetsu (Congress of Industrial Unions) and engaged in the latter's October struggles.

attracted many of the more experienced members of the former management, including those who had previously been in charge of finances and film production. As Table 80 shows, the new company soon far outstripped the parent organization. Toho continued under the domination of left-wing elements, and its offspring Shintoho eventually merged with Nikkatsu. An indirect cause of this split was undoubtedly the removal of the top management of the original company.

The situation of Toho continued to deteriorate, as the union began to demand a voice in the planning and production of films and the management of the company. A new management was named in December 1947, following the temporary arrangement which had prevailed in the months immediately after the purge. One of its first moves was the dismissal of 1200 of Toho's 5500 employees, which immediately touched off a violent labor protest. Occupation troops had to be dispatched to the scene to check the ensuing riot. After this incident, the new management again split over the question of reuniting Toho with Shintoho, and those favoring the reunion were compelled to leave the company. One of the former directors, Ichizo Kobayashi, who had been purged, intervened at this point and was consequently charged with violation of the purge directive.

In September 1951, Kobayashi was de-purged, and began working to effect a reorganization of Toho. In anticipation of his return, his son Fusao Kobayashi had become the company's president, and through his father's influence was able to secure a substantial loan. By the end of the Occupation the company had resumed operations on a scale surpassing its prepurge level.

The purge had an important effect on the managerial stability of Toho, contributed toward a reduced credit rating,* and helped bring about the loss of its distribution channels to a new rival, the Shintoho, itself a by-product of the purge. The cumulative effect of the loose managerial organization and the rising labor movement emphasized the effects of the purge at a time when managerial stability was of special importance to the company in meeting postwar competition.

Mining Industries

The capacity of large, well-organized interlocking concerns to survive in spite of managerial changes was well demonstrated in the case of the mining companies. These constituted the basic enterprise of the zaibatsu combines, and as such received the full force of the Occupation's economic reform program. Their financial ownership and relations were disturbed by the zaibatsu family control reform, their management was purged, and the companies themselves were split up into competing subsidiaries.† The net effect of these re-

*During its period of distress, it was compelled to resort to irregular borrowing methods, and at one time borrowed 400 million yen at 70 percent interest per year. Within a few months of Kobayashi's return, most of these debts had been converted into bank loans and bonds, largely based, according to the Oriental Economist, on his personal reputation and ability. This irregular financing and the sharply reduced production rate had reflected seriously upon the reputation and credit standing of the company. The Oriental Economist estimated the total loss to the company following the purge at over one billion yen—three times the company's total capital. There was also a drastic re-trenchment in its employment totals: after the purge, 3500 of its 5500 employees had to be dismissed. The almost unique magnitude of these losses presents one of the most serious cases of managerial ineptitude resulting from the purge of top executives where no adequate replacements were available.

†The Mitsui Kozan, Mitsubishi Kogyo Coal Mining Company, and Seika Kogyo Coal Mining Company of Sumitomo were each divided into a coal mining and a metals mining company. The coal industry was regarded as a key to Japan's recovery, and therefore received state funds from the Fukko Kinyu Kinko (Reconstruction Finance Bank) in addition to the US counterpart aid fund and special priorities in materials and rations; but the metal industries were in an inferior position because an abundant stock of metals remaining from wartime supplies was already on hand.

forms was almost invisible, however, so rigid was the structural organization of the companies involved (Table 81). The only exception is Hokutan (Hokkaido Coal and Steamship Company) which suffered a drop in worker productivity in 1948 because of the coal strike. Although the strike affected other mines as well, it is generally considered among Japanese observers that the ineptitude of Hokutan's postpurge management in dealing with the labor uprising accentuated its effects on coal output.* The company had never separated its ownership from its management, and the chairman of the board of directors had actually served as executive head of the company.† Consequently, there had been no president or central executive staff between the board and the operating departments. His removal, and that of the managing director (February 1947), brought about a greater change in the forcefulness and coherence of the managerial staff than was generally the case.‡ The wage increases finally granted by the company in response to the strike also weakened its financial stability. The failure of the new management to provide adequate labor relations measures without jeopardizing the company was generally interpreted as a result of the selection of technical men for managerial positions.

In the other companies, which sometimes showed spectacular increases in productivity (Table 81), the executive group replacing the purgees was elected from the existing technical and managerial staff. In each case adequate replacements were able to insure that there would be no changes in basic leadership policies, and Sumitomo's Seika Kogyo Coal Mining Company simply promoted former department heads to the top positions. In such cases, the replacements had been selected according to a conventional pattern of succession.

These cases further illustrate the fact that the internal organization of a company, including its system for selecting its top management, was an important factor in determining the effects of the purge upon worker-productivity and industrial relations.§

*This is difficult to document, however. A trade union movement that was strongly communist in flavor flourished in Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, and it is by no means clear that the former management would have been able to devise more effective means of increasing worker productivity while the labor dispute was in progress. Yubetsu, which also operated in Hokkaido, suffered a similar drop in 1948. An additional factor in subsequent productivity may have been the unsuccessful one-year operation of the mines under state control following April 1948. For a discussion of the reasons for the failure of the government to regulate and operate the coal industry, see Ref 61, Chap. 5, pp 105 ff.

†Katsunosuke Shimada, chairman of the board, had served as a director since 1937. He was also a director of the Mitsui Gomei Kaisha (Mitsui Holding Company) and an active leader in Japanese financial circles. His direction of the Hokkaido Coal and Steamship Company was strong and inflexible, and his removal at the time of the greatest labor upheavals in the coal industry had a doubly weakening effect upon the managerial strength of the company.

‡According to the Oriental Economist, the Occupation's ESS was so concerned about the inadequate productivity rate of the Hokkaido Coal and Steamship Company that it informally recommended a strengthening of the executive direction of the company.

§The element of managerial solidarity was also a factor in its resistance to other occupational reforms. In the Mitsubishi Mining Company the officials refused to divulge any information regarding the names of purgees, their replacements, or the effects of the purge or other occupational reforms upon managerial policies; but the labor union representatives reported that disputes with management had increased in intensity in recent years, and that the workers' union was compelled to establish its offices in a suburb far from the plant, where it was denied even telephone communication with company offices or shops.

Other Industries

The effects of the purge upon the financial standing of a company were vividly illustrated in the petroleum refining industry. The Maruzen Sekiyu (Maruzen Oil Company), for example, lost its president (Kazuo Katayama) to the purge, and his successor (Hikotaro Yamamoto) when the Mitsui zaibatsu interests were withdrawn under the Occupation's zaibatsu dissolution reforms.

TABLE 81
PRODUCTIVITY OF JAPANESE COAL MINES (1946-51)

Company		Fiscal Year					
		1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951
Mitsui	Coal output ^a	3,770,806	4,832,605	5,478,328	6,011,020	5,965,903	6,708,400
	No. of miners ^b	59,894	60,657	64,207	63,557	54,245	46,165
	Worker productivity	63.0	79.7	85.3	94.3	110.0	145.3
Mitsubishi	Coal output	2,605,747	3,463,229	4,025,888	4,325,227	4,674,800	5,234,303
	No. of miners	41,916	45,910	50,556	50,112	43,033	38,199
	Worker productivity	62.2	75.4	79.6	86.1	108.6	137.0
Hokutan	Coal output	1,836,750	2,379,630	2,637,400	2,950,685	3,191,502	3,612,900
	No. of miners	24,501	26,467	31,454	29,980	27,647	25,301
	Worker productivity	75.0	89.9	83.8	98.6	115.4	142.8
Sumitomo	Coal output	999,747	1,225,748	1,466,140	1,583,311	1,654,590	2,108,300
	No. of miners	15,811	15,073	16,699	14,755	13,709	13,509
	Worker productivity	63.2	81.2	87.8	103.9	120.7	156.1
Furukawa	Coal output	757,819	908,109	1,068,141	1,069,624	1,167,970	1,328,112
	No. of miners	10,966	12,374	12,529	11,540	10,137	9,372
	Worker productivity	69.1	73.9	85.3	92.7	115.2	141.7
Meiji	Coal output	825,590	1,063,358	1,175,576	1,313,097	1,396,366	1,632,396
	No. of miners	13,515	14,469	15,427	14,967	13,594	13,057
	Worker productivity	61.1	72.9	76.2	85.7	102.7	125.0
Yubetsu	Coal output	451,820	562,900	641,000	844,400	972,300	1,097,000
	No. of miners	5,597	6,230	7,380	7,674	7,429	7,379
	Worker productivity	80.7	90.3	86.9	110.7	130.9	148.7

^aIn metric tons.

^bAverage number of workers employed at the end of each month.

A mechanical engineer succeeded to the post; he proved incapable of dealing with the financial problems involved in raising capital for reopening the refineries on Japan's Pacific coast, which had been closed during the War. He borrowed funds from local banks, which immediately began to exercise a strong influence upon the managerial policies of the company. The indebtedness of the company had increased by September 1951 to 3600 million yen, or over seven times its capital, and a former officer of the Bank of Japan was placed on the board of directors to serve as overseer to represent the banks. There were many disagreements between him and the president regarding company policy,

and the president was finally compelled to resign.* He was succeeded by Kaheita Okazaki, formerly with the Bank of Japan and the Hwa-Hsing Commercial Bank in Shanghai. He in turn brought with him three other bank executives, so that the board of directors was made up principally of financiers. The management of the Maruzen Oil Company became one of many bank-controlled enterprises which emerged in the postwar period, representing what many observers regard as a new era of financial control in the Japanese economy.†

In the textile industry, all the key figures were purged. Here, however, the effects of the purge were negligible. The industry's management has frequently been cited as the most stable in Japan, and neither its supply of raw materials, its credit, its marketing, or its labor relations were seriously disturbed by the postwar readjustments. Indeed, the capacity of the industry expanded from 1.6 million spindles at the end of the war to 6.5 million in May 1952—although at the Occupation's end about 20 percent of these were idle. There is strong evidence that the purgees continued to advise and direct activities in their companies even after their forcible retirement. After the de-purge, most of them were back at their former positions or performing other policy-level functions in the industry. In the Toyo Boseki, for example, the chairman of the board, the president, and all three vice-presidents were de-purgees (August 1952): a record which is duplicated in nearly every textile company in Japan.‡ It is clear that where strong controls can be maintained through indirect means, the effects of a managerial purge can be minimized to the vanishing point.

In seven of the companies in the chemical industry,§ the return of purgees to their former organizations was as spectacular as in the textile industry, and the effects of the purge in the meantime were negligible. In an eighth company, the Mitsui Chemical Company, the successor to the purged president was a technician with little managerial experience or ability, and a loss of 1.5 billion yen was sustained in the ensuing years, largely through uncollectible debts and overproduction of unsalable stock. These difficulties were complicated by an intensive labor offensive, an overvaluation of raw material assets, and a lack of discipline and *esprit de corps* among the junior management staff. The evidence suggests that this is a further result of the accident of replacement.

In the machine tools industries, analysis failed to show any results of the purge in the 17 manufacturers of electric machinery and communications equipment affected. Although the purge toll was heavy, the general inactivity of the industry after the loss of its military markets was of far greater sig-

*The specific issue resulting in the resignation of Takahashi, the president, was his failure to obtain the funds necessary for reopening the Matsuyama Plant—a failure which came about when the banks rejected his requests for credit. This in turn lost the company a contract with the Shell Oil Company, even though foreign currency had been allocated by the government for that purpose in the fall of 1951. This is an illustration of the "squeeze-play" method used by banks to gain control of a company; a device which has been used repeatedly in postwar Japan.

†In this case the de-purge of Katayama and his return to the company as chairman of the board of directors (May 1952) made possible the reopening of the Matsuyama Plant and the loan of 3.5 million yen from the Bank of America.

‡See App G for a list of purgees in the textile industry and their occupations in August 1952. The only important exception was Kengi Oita, former president of Toyo Boseki, whose de-purge was delayed, and who subsequently retired.

§The Nitto Kagaku, Mitsubishi Kasei, Shin-Nippon Chisso (Nitrogenous Fertilizer Co.), Showa Denko (Electro-Chemical Industry), Nippon Soda, Nissan Kagaku, and Nisshin Kagaku.

nificance.* There had been relatively little damage to the plant equipment of these industries, and the conversion to postwar activities was the major concern of the industry. Because of this change in the operations of these companies after the conversion to peacetime manufacture, the loss of the purged management was not serious, and in subsequent years many purgees from different industries were placed in top management positions.† A new market and changing production schedules called for a new management, and the wartime experience and military connections of the purgees were not assets in the postwar conversion of the industry.‡

The purge had little or no effect on the shipbuilding and shipping industries in general, although some of their leading figures were removed. They have for the most part progressed rapidly under their new leadership, with credit supplied by the Bank of Japan and by the Japanese government; profits have been good despite rising material and labor costs.

An exception was the Kawanami Kogyo Kaisha, a company which had developed under the strong personal direction of Toyosaku Kawanami. His removal by the purge precipitated an internal struggle for power in the management and a rivalry among the remaining executives. After the war, the company shifted its main efforts to fishing because of the temporary inactivity of shipbuilding operations. This was at first profitable, during the food shortage, but soon became a financial burden to the company. At an extraordinary meeting of stockholders 28 August 1950, a special report was presented by a commission of four representatives chosen to investigate the operations of the company. According to this report, "the cause of the internal trouble of the company is that in order to conceal their failure in shipbuilding, a group surrounding Managing Director Nishio conspired to take over the company's management by attempting to have men of their own choice elected to executive positions at the general meeting. . . . The group attempted to control the general meeting by illegal tactics in complete disregard of the stockholders' will." The stockholders replaced Nishio as a result of this report, and began to reduce the fishing enterprises and to sell company property to cover the accumulated deficit of the company. In August 1951, Kawanami was de-purged and returned to his post as president, with his own staff. The liquidation of debts through the sale of coal mines and other properties provided a good basis for further improvement in the company's position, and a rejuvenation of Japan's shipbuilding industries together with a return to managerial stability ended the company's lean years.

SELECTED PLANT STUDIES: THE RELATION OF THE PURGE TO MANAGEMENT POLICIES

From the above industrial analyses, it is apparent that the purge did not work uniform industry-wide effects in Japan. Its seriousness and even the manner of its consequences were clearly an effect of other factors, extraneous to the nature of the industry itself. The effects of the purge were sometimes unpredictable, but often depended upon specific managerial situations.

*Nearly all of the companies had been engaged exclusively or principally in the manufacture of munitions.

†See App G.

‡The outbreak of the Korean War and Japan's rearmament occurred after the reconversion had already been undertaken, and while it provided a source of prosperity, it did not require the return of purged leaders except in a few cases.

These can perhaps be best illustrated by a series of case studies showing different types of effects.*

Effects of Purge and Dissolution in a Highly-Structured Industry (The Oji Paper Company)

In large, stable organizations provided with "management in depth," the effects of changes in individual leaders were least discernible. This is especially true, as we have seen, of zaibatsu combines, where the management corps could be recruited from several interrelated concerns.

The Oji Paper Company, organized in 1873 with a capital of 150,000 yen, became a powerful member of the Mitsui zaibatsu, growing in strength until, through the gradual purchase of competitive mills, its capital increased to 666 million yen in 1933. Its greatest rivals at that time were the Fuji Paper Company and the Karafuto Industries, but through its access to Mitsui funds it was able to absorb both these companies. Through the acquisition of stock in other companies as well, it soon dominated the paper production field. On 4 December 1946, it was designated a holding company, and its paid-up capital was 310 million yen.† Its holding company operations were terminated when the HCLC took over its securities, under the Economic Reconstruction Law. At that time its assets included 15 plants, and it employed 11,400 workers and held stock in 140 companies. It ranked first in paper production and production capacity in Japan.

In January 1949, it was split into three companies, designated the Tomakomai (later renamed the Oji Paper Company), the Jujo, and the Honshu Paper Companies. Its total productive capacity in 1950 (1900 million pounds) was only 86 percent of the 1932 to 1936 average, and only 56 percent of its prewar peak in 1940. It maintained its position of leadership, however, for its combined productive capacity constituted 27.11 percent of the whole nation's capacity,‡ and it produced 36.76 percent of the entire nation's output in 1950.

Seven purgees were designated from the Tomakomai Company's rolls, of whom four had already retired from an active share in the management, and three (the president and two vice-presidents) were removed.§ They were re-

*The cases that follow were drawn from materials gathered by means of a detailed questionnaire and field trips to 19 companies, whereby analyses were made of conditions of production and the managerial situation, and where interviews were held with management, labor leaders, and stockholders. The field work was conducted by a team of economists and instructors in business administration at the Tokyo College of Industrial Efficiency, Musashi University, and research members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Office. The research was performed under the general supervision of Yoichi Uyeno, President of the Sangyo Noritsu Daigaku, and included Professors Tatsuo Ozawa, Shigeo Oka, and Yujo Kaneko, Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Commercial and Industrial Guidance Office, with a team of assistants.

†Its stock ownership was widely diversified. The largest stockholder, Okawa Gomei, owned only 3.4 percent of the stock. The Mitsui Company and family holdings together were only 3.7 percent.

‡Each of the companies was larger than the Mitsubishi Paper Manufacturing Company, which ranked next with 3.66 percent of the national capacity in 1950. The combined capacity of the top nine companies in Japan accounted for 43.47 percent of the national output.

§The four retired purgees held 6312 shares of the stock, however, and the three others held 2020 shares. Thus they participated in the company profits, although their actual holdings were much too small to constitute a voice in stockholders' decisions, since 29,782 persons owned 8 million shares of Tomakomai stock alone. Among the seven purgees in the period following the purge, one remained in retirement, two became officers in other companies in the same industry, two entered other types of industrial management, and one joined another company associated with the Oji mill.

placed by direct promotion: former managing directors filled the posts of president and vice-president, and directors were promoted to managing directorships. The vacancies created by these promotions were not immediately filled. All the purgees' replacements had been with the company for about thirty years,* and held a modest amount of stock in the company.†

It is impossible to discover any evidence of change in management policy resulting from the purge. A postwar paper shortage, diminished productive capacity, and the subsequent Korean war orders temporarily kept the operations of the company profitable and provided little incentive to seek new markets or improved production techniques. The Jujo Paper Company was slightly more progressive in this respect than Tomakomai, but this was primarily because its machinery sustained war damage and had to be replaced by new equipment. It also sent its president on a mission to the United States to study labor administration in the American paper industry, and began to adopt American systems of job classification and industrial management. There were slight organizational changes in the management, particularly in auditing and budgeting, and an effort at "rationalizing" managerial functions.

Credit relationships of the Oji mills were not disturbed by the purge,‡ and no significant labor disputes were encountered.§ Each of the three companies prospered after the purge and dissolution, improving production techniques in the handling of raw materials. Production rose steadily, and new stock issues increased tenfold in the years following the purge, with a slight improvement in their value.

The paper companies had come under the purge directive because of their size and capital structure rather than their wartime activities. In such cases, the purge did not usually disturb the management or effect any discernible changes in its policies.¶

*One exception, the auditor, had been transferred from the Toyo Seni Kabushiki, (Oriental Textile Company), a subsidiary of the Oji Paper Company, which held a controlling interest in it.

†Their holdings totalled 2522 shares of which 1110 were held by the three replacing the purged officers. It must be emphasized that stock holdings in the paper industry were not highly concentrated. The largest stockholder of Tomakomai was Chuo Mutual Life Insurance Company, which owned only 3.13 percent of the total; no stockholder owned as much as 10 percent of the total capital assets of the company. Similarly, the Jujo stockholders in December 1950 numbered 26,912 with 5.6 million shares. Its largest stockholder was Dai Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company, with 160,000 shares, or 2.86 percent of the total. All life insurance companies combined held slightly over 10 percent of the total stock.

‡The paid-up capital of the Oji and Jujo mills doubled between 1949 and 1951.

§The Oji union was also subdivided after the division of the company into three units, and did not always act together thereafter, although the management in the three units maintained close contact. Most of the officials with experience in labor-management relations at the section-chief level were assigned to the Jujo Paper Company at the time of the division, but this did not seriously handicap the other segments of the former Oji Paper Company in their industrial relations.

¶Here, the ability of company policy to withstand changes in personnel was a result of company organization and systematic promotional devices rather than of the industry itself. In the equally well-documented case of the Asahi Glass Company, a Mitsubishi concern, the dissolution and purge had little or no effect. This was also true of the Japan Cement Company, of the Asano zaibatsu, and of the Japan Steel Tube Company (Asano) which was operated by a council system of management. In the Sumitomo zaibatsu the Japan Electric Company (Nihon Denki Goshi Kaisha) illustrates the same result of managerial solidarity.

The Purge and a Managerial Scandal (The Showa Electric Industries Company)

The most dramatic episode of Japan's postwar economic reconstruction was undoubtedly the Showa Electric Industries Company corruption scandal. An unsuccessful effort to establish a new base of credit brought about the downfall of a cabinet and the indictment of a prime minister, two cabinet ministers, and a host of governmental officers, and implicated even members of the Occupation forces. It occurred largely because of defective judgment on the part of the management emplaced after the purge; it was a result of efforts to offset losses of credit caused by the purge.

The Showa Denko was organized in June 1939 by Nobuteru Mori, a pioneer in the Japanese electro-chemical field. Its initial capital of 110 million yen was subscribed through the Tokyo Electric Light Company (Tokyo Denko, K.K.) and the Suzuki Trading Company. (Suzuki Shoten) as part of a plan to create a Mori zaibatsu. Its plant facilities were provided by an amalgamation of the Japan Electric Industry Company (Nihon Denki Kogyo, K.K.) and the Showa Fertilizer Company (Showa Hiryo). Its 13 factories and 5 power-plants produced ammonium sulfate, calcium cyanamide, and other fertilizers,* as well as aluminum and other light metals, ferro-alloys, and industrial and agricultural chemicals, drugs, grinding and polishing materials, and various types of machinery. It was Japan's second largest producer of aluminum sulfate and aluminum, and stood first in the 1951 calcium cyanide and potassium chlorate production.

The purge removed the chairman of the board of directors, the president, and three managing directors. At first President Mori requested exemption from the purge from SCAP, offering a petition bearing the signatures of 20,000 company employees. Because he was a member of a zaibatsu family, and the leading figure of a company which had played an important war role, and which was engaged in an enormous postwar reconstruction plan (1,200 million yen) the petition was denied.[†] The Reconstruction Finance Bank, the largest creditor of the Company, after a number of conferences with Occupation authorities, decided to select a new president.[‡] It even recommended one, Setsuzo Hinohara,[§] president of the Japan Hydrogen Company. In the meantime, however, the directors of the Showa Electric Company itself had decided that because no immediate replacement was available from within the company ranks, it would be advisable to adopt a council system of management without filling the president's vacant chair. After a conference on the subject, the Reconstruction Finance Bank withdrew its recommendation temporarily. After a short time it returned with the statement that SCAP desired that a president be selected.[¶] President Mori and eight other executives then formally resigned in favor of Hinohara and his staff on 28 March 1948. On 3 April 1948, Hinohara visited several offices in ESS/SCAP with members of his staff, and returned with the statement that SCAP wanted them to dismiss all remaining executives who had supported the Mori faction. Four candidates for directorships and 25 other

*Over half its 6617 million yen sales during the first half of 1951 were fertilizers, but 40 percent of the total was aluminum and light metals. Only 6 percent were industrial chemicals.

[†]It is alleged that accounting irregularities in Showa Electric's wartime and postwar record contributed to the refusal to exempt Mori from the purge. Its wartime activities on no basis exempted it from the purge.

[‡]This account is based on information furnished by Chief Uemura of the Administrative Department of the HCLC, a public body set up under SCAP supervision. Many details of this case were under litigation throughout 1952, and have not yet been made public, especially where they concerned members of the Occupation Forces.

[§]Hinohara was said to have used extensive bribes among Japanese officials and Occupation personnel in his effort to secure this post.

[¶]The SCAP "desire" was expressed in an informal conference. There was no documentary evidence of the recommendation.

section chiefs and other executives subsequently resigned, resulting in a second wave of removals, the so-called "Hinohara purge."

An important part of the scandal that subsequently overtook the Showa Denko Company was the widespread suspicion that Hinohara and his clique used bribes to influence the Occupation officials who were quoted as favoring a change in the management. It was also alleged that large sums were distributed at the same time to the Reconstruction Finance Bank and the Japan Industrial Bank to secure the recommendation of Hinohara as the successor.*

Illegal use of company funds was further charged in the financing of a program of factory reconstruction. Plans had been made as early as August 1946 for the rehabilitation of the Kawasaki Ammonium Sulphate Plant, and for the conversion of the Toyama Aluminum plant and three other factories to electric furnace production of calcium cyanide. The cost of this operation, 799,999,999 yen was to be financed in 16 installments ending 23 June 1947. The completion of this ambitious program was impossible in the inflationary months that followed; rising costs limited progress on the rebuilding of the Kawasaki plant to about 50 percent and even the plants to be converted were only about 80 percent completed. It was during this reconstruction period that the Hinohara group was installed. Hinohara's efforts at fulfilling the plan were directed primarily toward securing a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Bank, and by June 1948, a total of 2358 million yen had been advanced. The sums allegedly spent on bribery and entertainment in securing these funds are as yet unknown.

With the funds obtained through these loans, the reconstruction work progressed rapidly, and by March 1949 the plan was fully completed and ready for operation. The managerial operations of Showa Denko were largely the work of Hinohara himself and of his subordinates, and according to subsequent revelations the Board of Directors was not informed as to the details of his program. During the war the separate plants had operated almost independently under the supervision of the Munitions Ministry, and the central office of Showa Denko was enlarged from a staff of 140 to 400 under Hinohara's presidency.

On 25 May 1950, acting on persistent rumors, the Metropolitan Police authorities raided the head office of Showa Denko during business hours and removed two truckloads of "evidence." This brought the business operations of the company to a standstill, and the amount of losses in uncollected bills was substantial. Before the records were released, many of the company's claims had expired under the statute of limitations.

The name of the company became notorious as a result of the bribery revelations and the public charges of illegally procured government funds: employees making deliveries reported being followed by hordes of shouting children as they drove company trucks through the streets, and when Mori interests again took over the company, there was even some consideration given to the possibility of changing the firm's name.

Thus an accidental effect of the purge† was the fall of the Ashida cabinet when high governmental circles were implicated in the briberies. It was an unpredictable and indirect result of the simultaneous change of economic leadership and an unprecedented need for expansion capital.

*These matters are in litigation as this report goes to press, and no definitive statement as to the exact nature and extent of the alleged bribes can be made.

†The Showa Denko scandal was of course a product of managerial circumstances rather than of the nature of the industry itself. The Oriental High-Pressure Industry, a Mitsui affiliate also engaged in the manufacture of ammonium sulfate and other chemical fertilizers (Japan's largest producer of this fertilizer, with a capitalization of 450 million yen; also led in the production of urea, methanol, formalin, and other fertilizers and industrial chemicals) suffered a purge of 21 of its officers. There were no changes in managerial policy, in labor relations, or in credit structure.

The Purge as a Modernizer of Management (Japan Iron and Steel Company)

In a few cases, an unexpected result of the purge was the removal of outmoded concepts of management along with the wartime executives. This occurred predominantly in industries which had previously been controlled by military personnel or by an agency of the central government.*

The Japan Iron and Steel Company furnishes an excellent example of this. It was founded in 1897 as the Yawata Iron Works, and managed and protected by the government as part of its national industrialization program. In 1933, it was redesignated by law as the Japan Iron and Steel Company, representing the amalgamation of five private companies† with the government plant, and constituting the largest steel combine in Japan.‡ In December 1949, it was split into four companies, Yawata Iron and Steel, Fuji Steel, Nittetsu Steamship, and Harima Brick Manufacturing Company. The purge affected 14 top executives, including the president and other members of the top managerial staff. Three of these were military men (including the president) who had been assigned to directorships during the war, and one other had been appointed from a civilian governmental position.

The purgees were replaced principally by promotion from the intermediate managerial level of Japan Iron and Steel and affiliated companies. This eliminated almost wholly the influence of military leaders from management policies, and the company's activities were oriented toward achieving financial independence without reference to government subsidies. A new system of accounting was introduced and management was "rationalized" into major functions and organized accordingly.§ In spite of these organizational changes, the company suffered no losses either in credit capacity or through technological or administrative alterations as a result of the purge.

*In some cases the previous management, though not military or governmental, had been otherwise wedded to traditional methods. The purge did not uniformly result in an improvement in such companies' status, however. Where a strong management had to be replaced by subordinates of less experience, the result sometimes brought about an automatic degeneration of the capacity for making decisions, and an appearance of "democratization," as decisions had to be made by committees, and in some cases by individual factory superintendents. An example is the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company, where Board Chairman Kisaburo Yamaguchi and four other members of the top management were replaced by less-experienced personnel. Many decisions, by default, were left to operating chiefs and department heads. Unlike the Hitachi Works Case, to be cited later, the company made no provision for the economic relief of the purgees, although it was criticized as heartless for complying with the purge directive in this respect. During the purge there was no contact between the new management and the old, and no sustaining influence of the old ways was felt. In this case, too, only one of the purgees returned to the company after the restriction was lifted, and that in name only. The company was unsuccessful in its postwar operations. This type of democratization of management, as many Japanese called it, is not here regarded as synonymous with modernization, needless to say. In this case, as in many other situations of management distress in postwar Japan, financial institutions holding an interest in the company dispatched representatives to participate in company policy decisions who were not themselves familiar with the operations of the industry.

†These were Wahihi Seitetsu, Kamaishi Kozan, Fuji Seiko, Kyushu Seiko, and Mitsubishi Seitetsu.

Illegal Influence as a Defense against the Purge (Hitachi Works)

In independently owned companies, where the management had no large zaibatsu-trained clique to draw from in securing replacements, one defense against the purge was to exercise continued control indirectly while junior executives nominally occupied policy positions.

The Hitachi Works (Hitachi Seisakujo, K.K.), a striking illustration of this, had made its modest beginning in 1909 as a repair shop attached to the Kuhara Mining Company. It became an independent company in 1920 with a capitalization of 10 million yen. It operated two plants manufacturing electric machinery. Its most spectacular expansion took place after the China Incident of 1937, after which it opened 15 new factories and increased its capitalization (1945) to 700 million yen. In March 1952, it employed 24,569 workers, and was Japan's largest manufacturer of locomotives and electric motors, and second largest maker of rolling stock.

In the purge it lost its president and vice-president, two executive directors and four managing directors, four directors, and its auditor. The company continued to extend economic assistance to these purgees even after they had been removed, although they were unable to accept any nominal responsibilities in exchange. On the day of their de-purge, the directors of the company invited all of them to return to the company. In order to make room for them, half of their successors were transferred to subsidiary companies, and the others were demoted to the position of "junior directors." During the purge, the former president, Namikei Kodaira, continued to exert great personal influence in company policy, especially in questions of financial policy.[†] The success of this maneuver is attested by the fact that after the purge no changes took place in the company's traditional policies regarding labor relations,^{**} financial policies, or other managerial functions. The management operated efficiently in spite of the fact that the replacements were predominantly engineers with little experience or training in business administration.

[†]In 1949 it produced 65.9 percent of Japan's iron and steel.

[‡]Company management at Yawata Iron and Steel offered the opinion that although there may have been temporary losses in the efficiency of company administration, the long-term effects of the change in management were advantageous. Labor union leaders who were interviewed at Yawata welcomed the purge because the new management was more adjustable in industrial relations. The management of Fuji Steel agreed to this conclusion, but emphasized the initial loss of its highly-skilled intermediate management which had been assigned during the war to offices in Manchuria, China, and the South Seas plants of the company, and thus had to be purged. The loss in intermediate managerial levels was in some cases more serious than the purge of top executives.

[¶]Perhaps because the purge was almost universally condemned among business circles in 1952, the existence of continued influence in managerial policy was freely reported in this survey. Those companies of the large zaibatsu type which preserved their managerial continuity through systematic promotions generally denied the existence of such continued influence in their own case (this would be a reproach to the managerial replacements) but stated that it was widespread in less centralized companies. Among such companies as Hitachi, evidences of the unlawful influence were encountered in interviews with the firm's executives and with union officials and outside observers.

^{**}The union at first greeted the purge of President Kodaira with roars of approval. The slogan "Down with Emperor Kodaira" was adopted by labor leaders in the plant, who protested against his "dictatorship" and "feudalistic autocracy." After the dismissal of 5500 "surplus" employees in 1950-51, the union leaders' attitude moderated somewhat.

CONCLUSION

The purge did not seriously affect Japanese industry as a whole. Other postwar economic dislocations were of far greater importance, and while there was considerable resentment of the purge among industrialists and businessmen, this was more for personal reasons and because of suspicion of American motives* than for its economic effects. Few business leaders recognized Japanese industries as part of her war effort, except as they were victimized by it; in the postwar years the management of companies which had benefited most from the military adventure denied that they had had any association with Japanese colonial expansion except the minimum required by patriotic duty.†

Although the purge had no profound effect on the Japanese economy, in certain corporations it brought about dramatic changes. Since the purge itself was applied equally to Japan's major industries, it may be inferred that the disproportionate changes that occurred in isolated cases were a function of peculiarities in the companies themselves.

In general, the purge effects may be classified in two categories:

Credit and Financial Operations. Here the effects of the purge were greatest in corporations whose credit structure and fiscal operations were most closely linked to the personal abilities or associations of the management. Companies possessing the largest cadres of experienced executives were best able to maintain their credit status and raise capital. Where the purge altered a company's fiscal structure, this took place in two characteristic ways:

First, banks providing credit demanded an increasing voice in the basic management policies of the companies. This was done sometimes through the placing of bank officers in executive positions of the companies, and sometimes by simply removing officials not acceptable to the banks. It is important to note that in this sense the general effect of the purge created conditions favorable to concentrated control of Japanese industry, in direct contrast to other economic policies of decentralization.‡

*See Chap. 4, "Public Opinion and the Purge."

†The judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East⁶² was based on a tentative acceptance of this view. The relations between military cliques and the zaibatsu were treated in terms of exploitation of the latter by the former. See the discussion of the development of the Manchurian economy following 1937 (Part B, Chap. 4, pp 161, 168, 196, et al.); and the use of devices of government control over the Japanese economy, such as the placing of each industry under a specific cabinet minister, which, of course, meant military domination in the immediate prewar politics of Japan (pp 239 ff). The judgment of the Tribunal conceded that "industrial and military preparations were interrelated" (p 356), and pointed out in several ways how the industrialists benefited from Japan's war preparations. There was no disposition, however, to include the industrialists in the "conspiracy against the West" of which army leaders were found guilty. There were only occasional references to the army's plan to see that "due regard would be paid to the danger of permitting the industrialist to sustain capital or operating losses" (p 177), and to outright subsidies (pp 237, 238, 240, 241, 354, 415, et al.). The International Tribunal, in short, did not overlook the fact that Japanese industrialists were partners in the expansion of the empire; but it apparently regarded them as junior partners, or perhaps as silent partners.

‡In 1952, 60 percent of Japan's capital came from banks and other financial institutions, in contrast to 40 percent in 1936.

Second, the corporations in some cases resorted to irregular and even unlawful means of raising capital when normal credit channels were closed to them because of the purge of top management. This again ran contrary to policies of economic reform which had been designed to separate Japan's economy from the public purse and from national politics.

Labor Relations. In this field the effects of the purge were greatest where corporations had established no traditions of collective bargaining, and where the removal of the former management became a symbol to the rising labor movement. This resulted in strikes and labor unrest in some industries, but for the most part the more radical elements of the labor movement simply disintegrated when SCAP policy turned against the Communist party and against the use of the strike as a political weapon. In spite of the purge, most Japanese industrialists soon acquired adequate skills in labor relations to prevent an excessive balance of power in favor of the unions.

If the purge had no important adverse effects on the Japanese economy as a whole, it must be added that it had correspondingly little influence upon the democratization of Japanese industry, except as the new management may have become more lenient toward the rising labor movement. The ability of large, well-structured companies to resist any losses arising from the purge also served them in protecting themselves against other reforms.* Large concentrations of economic power—the very objects of the purge and dissolution reforms—were least injured by them. A new source of economic concentration—the banks—actually benefited by the purge.

Among the purgees themselves the effects were neither serious nor lasting. Few of them were impoverished by their removals from office, and as the Occupation lifted many were returning to their former positions,† accepting responsible government posts,‡ or entering other companies at the

*The trading firms belonging to the former Mitsubishi zaibatsu, for example, began to regroup in the spring of 1951. In April 1952, these were grouped as follows:

1. Fuji Shoji (incorporating the former Miyako Shoji, Kyokuto Shoji, Marunouchi Shoji, and Meiko Shoji).
2. Tozai Koeki (incorporating the former Shin Nihon Tsusho, Zenrin Boeki, and Tokyo Shoji).
3. Tokyo Boeki (incorporating the former Santo Shoji, Seiwa Shoji, and Asahi Koeki). Progress in the Mitsui trading companies has been slower because of disagreements among the company leaders. For further details see Refs 63 and 64.

†Kazumi Kohayashi, Pres. Toho Motion Picture Co.; Keita Goto, Pres. Tokyo Kyuko Electric Ry. Co.; Giusuke Watanabe, Pres. Yawata Steel; Shinichi Kojima, Vice-Pres. Yawata Steel; Katsunosuke Shimada, Pres., Hokkaido Coal Mines; Keizo Seki, Pres. Toyo Spinning Co.; Taro Yamashita, Pres. Yamashita Steamship Co.; Kyosuke Tamai, Pres., Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Ind.; Muneki Shiraichi, Pres. Shin Nihon Nitrogen Co.; Teiji Wada, Pres. Nippon Soda; Chohei Asada, Pres. Kobe Steel Co.; Katsujiro Takagaki, Pres. Fuji Trading Co.; Kanzo Tanaka, Pres. Tozai Koeki Trading Co.; Ichiro Hattoyi, Pres. Tokyo Boeki Trading Co.

‡Especially Tadaharu Mukai, former Chairman, Mitsui Trading Co. who became Minister of Finance in the 4th (1952) Yoshida Cabinet; Takeo Kato, former Pres., Mitsubishi Bank, and Toshinosuke Furuta, former Chairman, Sumitomo Combine, who became members of the Supreme Economic Council (1952).

top levels.* Many of the zaibatsu corporations, having reorganized their scattered branches and salvaged their managerial class, have even begun operations once more under the old name.†

There is no evidence for the charge that the economic purge significantly retarded Japan's recovery. There is also little indication that in itself it

*Most famous examples are:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Former Position</u>	<u>Position, December, 1952</u>
Ryozo Asama	Pres., Nippon Kohan Steel Tube	Chairman, Kayaba Industries
Haruo Tashiro	Pres., Mitsui Mining Co.	Pres., Teikoku Oil Co.
Ryosei Kawai	Pres., unnamed company	Pres., Komatsu Mfg. Co.
Kota Tsukada	Pres., unnamed company	Pres., Kurashiki Spinning Co.
Gyo Mori	Pres., Showa Denko	Pres., Nippon Metallurgy
Tatsunosuke Tadaichi	Pres., Manchurian Hv. Ind.	Pres., El. Power Source Develop. Co.
Kiyoshi Goko	Pres., Mitsubishi Hv. Ind.	Chairman, Defense Production Comm.
Tadashi Ashidate	Pres., Oji Paper Co.	Vice-Pres., Japan Chamber of Comm. and Industry

For more details on the positions occupied by de-purgees, see Ref 71, "Economic Leaders Come Back" 13 January 1953, p 3. (In Japanese)

†Companies regrouping under the former zaibatsu names include the following (Ref 72, 23 December 1952, p 2): (Names within parentheses indicate former name).

Mitsui Affiliation

Mitsui Bussan (Nitto Soko) trading company
Mitsui Shintaku (Tokyo Shintaku) trust company
Mitsui Seimei (Chuo Seimei) life insurance
Mitsui Kinzoku Kogyo (Kamiooka Kogyo) metal mining
Mitsui Seiki Kogyo (Toho Seiki Kogyo) precision machine

Mitsubishi Affiliate

Mitsubishi Shoji (Kowa Jitsugyo) trade
Mitsubishi Shintaku (Asahi Shintaku) trust
Mitsubishi Kasei (Nihon Kasei) chemical
Mitsubishi Rayon (Shinko Rayon) rayon
Mitsubishi Nihon Juko (Higashi Nihon Juko) heavy industry
Shin Mitsubishi Juko (Naka Nihon Juko) heavy industry
Mitsubishi Zosen (Nishi Nihon Juko) heavy industry
Mitsubishi Kinzoku Kogyo (Taihei Kogyo) metal mining
Mitsubishi Kozai (Tokyo Kozai) steel production

Sumitomo Affiliate

Sumitomo Ginko (Osaka Ginko) banking
Sumitomo Shintaku (Fuji Shintaku) trust
Sumitomo Seimei (Kokumin Seimei) life insurance
Sumitomo Shoji (Nihon Kensetsu Sangyo) trade
Sumitomo Sekitan Kogyo (Ibana Kogyo) coal mining
Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo (Shin Fuso Kinzoku Kogyo) metal industry
Sumitomo Kinzoku Kozan (Besshi Kozan) metal mining
Sumitomo Kagaku (Nisshin Kagaku) chemical
Sumitomo Kakoza Kogyo (Nihon Kakoza Kogyo) chemical materials

Yasuda Affiliate

Yasuda Shintaku (Chuo Shintaku) trust
Yasuda Seimei (Hikari Seimei) life insurance

Okura Affiliate

Okura Shoji (Naigai Tsusho) trade

Oji Affiliate

Oji Seishi (Tomakomai Seishi) paper making

brought about any permanent improvements in the organization or managerial policies of Japanese industry.

The basic failures of the economic purge arose from its compromised origins. It attempted to remove men from business and industrial positions because of their political deficiencies. It failed to bring about extensive changes in their political influence, however, because it left untouched the hidden connections between industry and government; but it aroused antagonisms in the business world because it removed many industrialists whose political activities were tenuous or even nonexistent. Most of these difficulties could have been avoided if the management of Japanese industry could have been withdrawn from political life on a far more extensive scale, and from economic activity on a far smaller one.

Chapter 6

LOCAL EFFECTS OF THE PURGE

THE BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

The Japanese Occupation was conceived and executed primarily in national terms, both as to objectives and administration. Local reforms came, on the whole, as an afterthought. The new Japanese constitution, it is true, included a chapter on local self-government, and the famous land reforms were designed to benefit the rural areas; but all of these reforms were promulgated and administered through the central government.* Furthermore, all local reforms tended to rigidly follow a uniform national pattern.†

Like other reforms, the purge was extended locally only after the central government had paved the way, and had adjusted itself to the enforced changes of personnel. The original purge directive to the Japanese government (SCAPIN 550, App A) had accompanied a memorandum which stated that "in order fully to comply with the existing policy directives, it would be necessary to extend the purge to prefectural levels."[‡] This was specifically not to take

*The local government reform was secured through the Local Autonomy Law of 1947. Ref 5, pp 260-290. Its main features were the separation of executive (mayor or headman) and legislative (assembly) functions. This separation made mandatory a provision already in existence permitting assemblies to elect their chairmen instead of requiring the mayor (headman) to serve in that capacity. The functions of the legislative body were also enhanced, and the village headman was given a greater degree of independence from the prefectural governor than he had previously enjoyed. The land reform, an equally far-reaching program, required the transfer of about one-third the cultivated areas of Japan, primarily to small farmers who had been tenants working the same land.

†This had the unfortunate result of overlooking possible local variations in tradition and circumstance, and also of disregarding the local attitudes toward the field agencies of totalitarian Japan. Thus, the buraku, a local unit reorganized in Meiji times but possessing roots many centuries older, was dissolved by SCAP order because it had become a wartime organization used for control purposes. The dissolution of the buraku offices as well as their control functions actually created a hardship on the villagers in the rare instances where the reform was carried out. In most cases the buraku functions were continued informally and under other names.⁶⁵

‡Ref 5, p 29.

place until the national removals had been "absorbed." The purge categories themselves had been designed on a national basis.*

The task of extending the principles of the purge to community leaders was assigned to the Japanese government in the summer of 1946.† The Japanese government submitted a plan on 21 October, and after some revisions,‡ it was placed in operation early in 1947. Local screening committees were established at each of the 118 cities of 50,000 or more population, and in each of the 46 prefectures (see Chap. 2). These included municipal committees (which were to screen all municipal officers except candidates for mayor and city assemblyman) and prefectural committees (which considered mayoral and assembly candidates and had the power to overrule other municipal decisions). Following the procedures used successfully in the national purge, questionnaires to be completed by those holding or seeking public office supplied the basis of the screening action. Those designated as purgees were to be removed from office within twenty days after the notification had gone out, with a possible ten-day extension where needed. In addition to the outright purge of officeholders, a special provision against continuity of influence barred any relative of a purgee "within the third degree by blood, marriage, or adoption" from succeeding to the same office from which he

*"Unfortunately under the currently outstanding 'purge directive,' SCAPIN 550, officials below the prefectural government level are not, except for candidates for major positions running for a new term of office, subject to SCAPIN 550. Yet, from the point of view of the common people of Japan, the militarists and warmongers in public offices were these minor officials who in their daily contacts with the people actually moved them to war by speech and deed. To remedy this hiatus in sweeping the 'old line militarists' out of local governmental offices of cities, towns, and villages, a new purge directive designed with special criteria to remedy the foregoing situation is needed. Such a directive is also necessary to prevent the drifting of former personages of national importance into these local offices . . ." Ref 5, check sheet, GS/CIS to GS, 22 June 1946, p 30.

†The SCAP instructions simply directed the Japanese government to submit a plan which would be uniform and which would apply the purge screening to candidates for prefectural and local assemblies and for appointive offices in prefectural and local governmental subdivisions. At the same time, the plan was to be presented to the public to secure popular criticism and support. At this time the Chief, GS, took the occasion to inform SCAP that "the Japanese government has shown an increasing tendency not only to ignore the spirit and intent of the basic directive, but to evade and circumvent the literal provisions of the purge directive by extremely legalistic and literal interpretations which in many instances are specious to the point of obvious political dishonesty . . . There has also been a steady stream of rumors not corrected by the Government to the effect that [purgees] . . . may become candidates at the next election . . . Shifts from public office to influential industrial posts having substantially the same functions make a mockery of the purgees. . . ." The plan was to allow the "sanction of publicity" to restrain the Japanese government and compel it to assume a more responsible attitude. Ref 64, pp 30 f.

‡The GS objected to certain omissions in the Japanese plan, and added certain requirements designed to tighten the program: local purgees would also be barred from holding national government posts; mayors and headmen in office prior to 2 September 1945 could not succeed themselves; influential IRRA members would be purged from public office; important policy-making positions at all governmental levels should be subjected to the screening process.⁵

had been purged.* Local removals were followed by a provision 3 May 1947 prohibiting the heads and assistant heads of the buraku subdivisions† from continuing in office or performing similar functions‡ for four years.

The basic organization was simply a duplication in each major city and each prefecture of the process established in Tokyo. In its operation, however, many local variations occurred. As a preliminary to evaluating its operations at village levels, the writer submitted a detailed questionnaire relating to the administration of the program to the governors of the 46 prefectures. There were 44 responses, all of which gave the desired tabulated information, and 32 of these volunteered additional comments regarding the administration of the purge and its effects.§

The returns as a whole gave a favorable picture of the quality of the personnel serving on the local commissions. There were 784 "commissioners" in all who served on the prefectural and municipal committees. Of these, the highest number were lawyers, educators, and businessmen.¶ In some places, there was a heavy preponderance of government workers on the committees, for whom the purge duties were a portion of their professional responsibilities. This made for greater convenience in calling meetings, but created some community resentment. The greatest frequency of meetings

*Legal machinery for the local purge extension was provided in Imperial Ordinance Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, Refs 17-21. The extension of purge restrictions to families of purgees was a peculiar necessity because of the nature of family relationships in Japan. It had precedent in Japanese laws relating to standards of conduct which may be prescribed for families which have a strong community of interests that sets them apart from others in society. See General MacArthur's reply to the Prime Minister on this point, Ref 5, Vol II, App B, 5h.

†This referred to those who held the post between 1 September 1945 and 1 September 1946. Cabinet Order No. 15, re Tonari Gumi. This provision was based on the assumption that the buraku were the rural equivalents to the notorious block organizations in the cities, which were used for wartime control purposes. Subsequent studies by Japanese scholars indicate that there was a change of 10 to 40 percent in the personnel performing buraku functions in 1950. Ref 66, p 166.

‡The buraku themselves were officially dissolved, but in most cases their functions were continued.

§The largest number of comments on a single point (16) referred to the unexpected difficulty of administering the purge (one statement observed that it was one of the most difficult administrative undertakings of the entire postwar period), particularly in view of the limited funds made available by the national government; the difficulty of using independently elected local officials to carry out a national program like the purge; and the lack of an experienced administrative staff. Many (13) referred specifically to the importance of public support in the success of the program, particularly (11) in anonymous reports of purge violations. Other comments related to the success of the program, its extensiveness, and, in a few cases, its wisdom.

¶The exact numbers were as follows:

Law (including judges)	203	Clerical work	29
Education (all levels)	143	Journalism	23
Business and industry	147	Labor (including unions)	5
Medicine	53	Fishing	4
Religion (all faiths)	50	Fine arts	1
Government	46	No occupation, or none stated	46
Agriculture	32	TOTAL:	782

was almost invariably during the first six months of the program. This varied from prefecture to prefecture, ranging from nine per week in Kagawa to one every two weeks in Tochigi. The actual number of cases handled during the first six months had little relevance to the frequency of meetings: in Kagawa, 8694 cases were considered, and in Tochigi, 8594.



Fig. 5—Map Showing Location of Purge Surveys

In order to appraise the effects of this operation as accurately and systematically as possible, field studies were made in cities and towns widely distributed geographically, socially, economically, and politically. The results of these studies, while not necessarily typical, represent the approximate

extremes of circumstances surrounding the purge. They represent the only existing observations on the results of the purge in community life in Japan.*

The local pattern presents a view of the purge entirely different from that obtained at the national level. The most important characteristic of the purge from the local point of view is its general irrelevance to actual patterns of community leadership. Except for village headmen (mayors) who were purged because they held wartime propaganda posts ex officio, most purgees were comparatively obscure persons who had been appointed village "chapter heads" of national organizations (IRAA and IRA). In other cases, purgees had been ordinary citizens who filled local posts by a system of automatic rotation. There is little evidence that local purgees had been publicly identified with the war or with Japan's prewar policies.

There are exceptions to this, of course, especially in the more progressive villages of Nagano; but on the whole the community surveys revealed that the alterations in village life following the purge had little relevance to the desired ends.

THE COMMUNITY STUDIES

Nagano-ken

Nagano is located in central Honshu. Although it is noted for its superior educational facilities and progressive attitudes toward political change, it is not unusual in other respects. About 63 percent of its 2,060,000 people are engaged in agriculture, and another 15 percent in industry. The prefectural budget for 1951 was 6.62 billion yen, and it received an additional 2.5 billion from the national government.

Six Nagano villages were selected for this study. Goka-mura, in the north, was chosen largely because of its record of conflict between landlords and tenants, which contributed to the election of a Communist mayor following the purge. Its neighbor, Urasato, furnished an example of the opposite tendency: its tradition was that of a model community. Here the purge resulted in a loss of village esprit rather than in a political upheaval, for the removal of the "strong man" brought an ideological vacuum which remained unfilled.

*The field studies were carried out as a part of an ORO project by graduate students in social science at Tokyo University and elsewhere, and by professional research assistants who volunteered to join the survey. The field methodology was carefully outlined in a series of seminars held at Tokyo University and the Tokyo Municipal Research Institute. The results were compiled by "captains" appointed for each district, and submitted for review to Professor Nobushige Ukai, Director of the Social Science Research Institute, Tokyo University. The interviews followed a standardized pattern in each case. There were four parts to the interview which lasted approximately two hours. The first part dealt with the reasons for the removals and the nature of the replacements or substitutions made. This was followed with a discussion of the purge policy: details of administration, extent, the necessity for the purge, and its general success. The third group of questions probed more deeply into the changes brought about locally by the purge, both in village administration and social and political leadership. The replacements or substitutes for the purgees were also evaluated in terms of their political pedigrees, their success in their posts, and their sources of support. The fourth part of the interview discussed the de-purge and its effects on the community.

In the central section of Nagano, Nakasu and Kitayama were surveyed. Nakasu had also been known as a model village during and before the war; but here the purge was followed by the development of a moderate reform program which continued in power throughout the Occupation. Kitayama, an undistinguished tourist resort, was largely unaffected by the purge. The traditional succession of village headmen took place as it had for generations.

Matsuo, in southern Nagano, represented an extremely conservative and stable agricultural village. The purge of the headman resulted in the succession of a hand-picked "substitute," in spite of the fact that the latter did not receive either a majority or a plurality of support from the village assembly.* Kamiosato, located nearby in the same county, elected a Communist to succeed the purged headman, but this did not result in any important political or administrative changes in the village, which had always prided itself on its progressive municipal enterprises.

The interviews in Nagano gave a strong impression that, although individual headmen occasionally imparted a strong sense of village loyalty and dedication to the war effort, there had been little discretion allocated to local administrators. All governmental activities were strongly centralized, and decisions were almost invariably made at prefectural or national levels. There was, accordingly, much resentment because governmental officials who "established policy" were not purged, while the titular subordinates were: the purge of heads of local chapters of the various wartime associations was also regarded as unnecessary, once the organizations had been abolished. Most conceded, however, that in spite of these individual injustices, the purge had removed enough of the wartime framework to bring about a change of public sentiment and encourage the rise of new elements of leadership.

Yet among the communities studied in Nagano, the resulting changes did little to further the objectives of the Occupation. Purgees became politically inactive temporarily, and during the purge exerted little direct influence upon village administration. Yet, although they generally expressed the view that they had been convicted in the eyes of the public, they actually suffered little or no loss of prestige in their communities. Their economic positions, of course, were seldom affected by the purge: the older purgees accepted the purge as a premature (but frequently welcome) retirement, and the younger ones continued their former occupations and planned to resume political activities later. It is significant that even among "progressives" there was little criticism of this behavior, nor was there much visible reluctance over accepting their return to office after the occupation. In some cases, purgees banded together for political solidarity, as illustrated by the rightist association, Comrades of Constitutionalism, in Kitayama, and the National Spirit Society in Matsuo. And in Urasato the de-purge was officially celebrated in a banquet given by the village headman.

In short, there is little evidence that the purge discredited wartime or prewar leaders in the Nagano communities except immediately following the removals. Nor was there any apparent discrimination against the purgees or their politics. The evidence suggested that this was because the inclusion of a number of minor figures had blurred the objectives of eliminating wartime leaders.

*Of the 18 votes, 8 were for "A," 5 for "B," 3 for "C," and 2 for "D." A second ballot between "A" and "B" resulted in a tie vote, which was terminated when "A" "conceded" to "C," who thereafter secured a majority. "C," unfortunately, was the substitute for the purged headman.

Goka-mura, Hanishina-gun, Nagano-ken.* Goka is located in a dry riverbed in northern Nagano, composed of rich farmlands but endangered by the periodic floods of the region. Its 4531 people have a reputation for tenancy disputes stretching over the past quarter century: its nickname, Gota-mura (Trouble-village), is a result of the political struggles which have characterized it. After the war, "N", a Communist, became village chief, but he was recalled on 8 February 1951 after a strong opposition movement secured a petition by means of a strenuous house-to-house canvas for signatures. The incumbent at the time of the survey was "Y", a right-wing Socialist who had organized the anti-Communist Goka Farmers' Union and mobilized its resources for the recall. He was supported by the Young Men's Association under the leadership of a group of landlords' sons.†

There were 11 purgees in Goka. Apart from the headman, none were especially inconvenienced by the purge, since their official positions had vanished with Japan's defeat in any case, and they had simply returned to their land. Indeed, there were frequent--though not necessarily sincere--expressions of relief because the purge afforded them an excuse for evading onerous public duties. There was a somewhat inconsistent tendency on the part of purgees to regard themselves as martyrs "sacrificed for the sake of the people."

In spite of the unexpected victory of the Communist candidate after the purge, there is little evidence that Goka was much concerned about politics or partisan reforms. A former village headman (1926 to 1929) stated that "If the clerks of the village office are capable, it does not matter who the village chief is, because all that he does is affix his seal blindly to the documents." Although the Communist headman, "N," was recalled by popular vote, there was apparently no objection to his ideology,‡ but only to the harm the Communist head was doing to the village reputation because of unfavorable newspaper publicity. It was stated that this had made it difficult for the villagers to secure positions outside Goka-mura, or even to negotiate for wives!

The purgees themselves experienced no loss of status in the community, either in their own eyes or those of the others interviewed. A former IRA chief was serving as deputy-chief at the time of the interview; an IRAA official stated "It is an honor to be purged."

In Goka, as in other small farming villages, there was little public recognition of any political significance in the purge; other political events had overshadowed whatever political changes the purge had brought about.

*Field work was performed by Takeshi Ishida, assistant in the Law Department, Tokyo University, and author of the article, "Ideology of the Emperor System," Shisho, June 1952. There were 17 full interviews, including 8 purgees (3 IRAA heads, 4 IRA chiefs, and 1 career soldier) and 9 nonpurgees (2 former village heads, the incumbent head, 3 young association leaders, a Communist assemblyman, and others).

†The Young Men's Association of Goka is said to be more conservative than the middle-aged group because the more enterprising and politically active youths commute to Nagano City (one hour distant). Those who remain in Goka, by implication, are for the most part either landlords' sons, or are unable to secure employment in Nagano. Their lack of experience is thought to make them conservative.

‡One non-purgee stated that the Communist party had won only because of the land reforms and the "honeyed promises" of the candidate. Another non-purgee stated that this victory was made possible by the purge. "N" himself denied this, of course, maintaining instead that the Communist victory was the result of a growing democratic consciousness in the village, which had received a temporary setback because of "egoism and factionalism."

Urasato-mura, Ogata-gun, Nagano-ken.* During the war Urasato was regarded as an exemplary village for its contributions to the national mobilization. It is located inconveniently (one hour by bus from the Ueda station) in northern Nagano. About 82 percent of its population (4701) is engaged in farming. In 1950 it imported sheep from Australia, and its agricultural cooperative began to operate a homespun plant. It also raises dairy cattle, chickens, and a number of crops. During the war, its agricultural output and the efforts of its head, "M," gave it the status of "model village." It also manufactured drills and gauges for military purposes. Visits by Prince Takamatsu (1936), Prince Asaka (1940), and Prince Mikasa (1945) have kept the village loyalty and prestige high. "M's" purge removed an influential strong man of the old order from his position of leadership, and made possible the accession of younger and more progressive elements.

Unfortunately, however, the new administration lacked the purpose and drive of the old order. Nearly all villagers described Headman "K" as "of smaller caliber" than "M," although most of them believed that this made no particular difference in village administration. The former's views on the purge and on other political questions appeared to the villagers and to the interviewer about the same as "M's."

All told, there were 10 purgees in Urasato. Of these, only "M" had held an official peacetime post, the rest being IRAA, IRA, or military officers. Their removal from office did not directly affect village administration, nor did it bring about any financial inconvenience to those who had been farmers and landowners. As was usually the case in local areas, however, military men owning no land† encountered some difficulty in securing employment simply because public offices were barred to them and they had no particular qualifications for private positions.

All the villagers interviewed felt that the removal of "M" had brought about changes in the attitudes and sentiments of the community. The youth organizations were encouraged to play a role in politics, which had theretofore been impossible. The cleavage between the progressive youth associations and the rest of the community was observed throughout the study. With few exceptions, the older villagers deplored the lack of leadership of the present village administration; but the younger group, which had enjoyed a brief fling in politics, seemed to be receding slowly in political strength.

Urasato had lost its characteristic wartime aggressiveness when it lost its leaders. The new village leaders were neither reactionary nor progressive, but seemed instead colorless and uncertain. When the lifting of the purge restrictions was announced, Headman "K" held a celebration at which the purgees gave speeches justifying their wartime activities. Public attitudes toward them seemed unaffected by the purge: they had not lost status and had won sympathy for their enforced retirement even though this had not involved a financial loss. One respondent, attributing this to the fact that they "did not deserve purging," added that some of the purgees had actually gained status in the community because of the rise of popular sympathy.

As the Occupation lifted, Urasato had not significantly changed its prewar traditions. The monthly village and neighborhood meetings continued as they had in the past, following the same program, singing the same songs, and

* Also based on field work by Takeshi Ishida. There were 15 interviews, including 6 purgees (the wartime headman, who was a prefectural section chief of IRAA; 2 village heads of IRAA, and two of IRA; one secret police officer); the successor to the purged headman; and 8 neutrals (the chief of the village assembly, the chief of the agricultural cooperative, the Parent-Teachers Association president, two youth association leaders, and others).

† Often professional military leaders had gone into the army as younger and therefore landless sons of farmers and landowners.

hearing only slightly modified speeches. Even those who had regarded Miyashita as "the village Tojo" conceded that the village had lost by his withdrawal from public life. There were few reports and no evidence that Urasato had made any corresponding gains in its political or social structure or behavior as a result of the purge.

Nakasu-mura, Suwa-gun, Nagano-ken.* Nakasu was a "model village" both before and during the war. It is a small (population 2988) suburb of Suwa City, with which a merger was once proposed. It is a fruitful rice-producing area,[†] but it possesses unusually good hotels and shopping facilities for transients because of the ancient Suwa shrine, located within the village limits. Three-quarters of the population is engaged in farming (sericulture, fruits, vegetables, and rice), and another 10 percent in manufacturing. Seventy percent of the farmers own all their land, and another 26 percent own part. Only 4 percent are purely tenant farmers.

Prior to the war, Nakasu was designated the "model village" for southern Nagano, largely through the efforts of "I," purged headman who served for over 10 years. A small farmer from a middle-class family, he had succeeded to the office largely through his own ability, and, through the support of Shigeo Iwanami, a powerful Tokyo publisher who had been his boyhood friend, had achieved something of a national reputation. "I" had also participated in the war as chairman of the Prefectural Cooperative Council, a member of the National Service Political Council (Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogikai), and in various prefectural councils. The wartime record of his administration was outstanding for the high percentages of rice delivered, taxes paid, and metals reclaimed.

During the Occupation "I" was purged, and there was a resurgence of the popular movements which had been silenced under wartime restrictions. "T," assisted by "A" and "K", organized a farmer's association deriving its support from the suppressed prewar Labor-Farmer Mass party. The village conservatives, who desired to maintain the village status as a "model," selected as their candidate for headman "I's" assistant, "Y," while the reformers supported "T". Unexpectedly, "T" won, by a slender margin (100 votes), and village politics turned to the left. Within three months, however, "T" left Nakasu to become deputy-governor of Nagano,[‡] and a new election was held. "Y" had with-

*Shinichi Takayanagi, 31, carried out the research in the Suwa District (Nakasu and Kitayama). He is a graduate of the political science course, Tokyo University Law Department, and is employed in the Social Science Research Institute, Tokyo University. His article "An Introduction to the History of the Formation of a Modern Prussian State" was published in the Journal of State Science Society. In Nakasu he interviewed 12 persons, including 4 purgees. Two previous village headmen, and the incumbent, were interviewed, as well as an unsuccessful candidate for the post. The other included a member of the agriculture committee and the president of the Parent-Teachers Association. The respondents were indicated in Takayanagi's report by letter only.

[†]Productivity is nearly 5 koku per tan in the richest part, and the village average is over 4 koku. Nagano's average is 3.2 koku. (Yamagata has 2.6 and Japan as a whole, 2.1). In Yamagata the farms were too small to enable the farmers to enjoy the benefits of their productivity, but the Nagano farms are relatively large. In 1902-1903 an agricultural cooperative was founded by Iwanami, which enabled the farmers to consolidate their debts and mechanize their farming. Nakasu owned and operated 3 tractor-powered cultivators, 245 electric motors, and 7 kerosene engines at the time of this survey; 18 percent of the households used draft animals, 17 percent used powered machinery, and another 39 percent used both.

[‡]In 1951 he resigned, returned to Nakasu, and announced that he had joined the Communist party.

drawn from the race, and "A," who had served as "T's" assistant, was elected by default. In the 1951 elections he was re-elected.*

Purgees remained politically taboo during the "period of exile." Those who had been active in village politics found themselves silenced if they attempted to speak (one related that he was scornfully rebuked with the remark "What do we care what you think? You're only a purgee."), and all felt they had lost status ("I" complained that even children who did not understand the purge referred to its victims as criminals); in one case, negotiations for a marriage were reportedly broken off because a member of one of the families had been purged. There was, correspondingly, somewhat more bitterness expressed by purgees in Nakasu than elsewhere. All of them, for example, alleged that there had been favoritism (conscious or otherwise) in the application of the purge by the local committee; in each case, the purgees gave the names of men who had fallen under the categories as chapter heads of the IRA or IRAA, but who had been spared the purge by "errors" in the local records. This report was not encountered among the nonpurgees, but even among these respondents, all stated that many obscure figures had been included among the categories, particularly the village leaders of wartime organizations, while others had been omitted. The purge of men who had "reluctantly" assumed these offices was "ridiculous," stated "K" (a nonpurgee assemblyman); it was perfunctory and meaningless, according to "T." Others echoed this view, one even citing the case of "Z," who had lived in complete obscurity until the purge, which made him "boastful" because it placed him among Japan's "leaders." The attack on the purge for having included such minor officials was usually accompanied by the complaint that those who were most guilty had been spared: the prefectural bureaucracy, the administrators who had given orders to the wartime association heads. The specific attack on the bureaucracy was reported six times, and a communist respondent objected further because the war profiteers had been spared.

The village sentiment toward its wartime headman, "I," was surprising. Nearly all (10) of the respondents admitted that he had deserved the purge or stated that he was less "democratic" than "A," the incumbent. Even those who considered "I" a man of superior ability conceded that he was "undemocratic" or that he concerned himself too much with honors and titles, and too little with the welfare of the villagers.

It was generally agreed that Nakasu had undergone great changes as a result of the land reform and the purge. Farmers sometimes lost their tenancy in the old days merely for speaking too freely at a village meeting, according to a purged IRA head. Their feeling of participation had greatly increased through their independence from former landlords and the elimination of their former leaders from positions of authority. Even though there were reports of frequent meetings among purgees after the Occupation had ended, there was a general opinion that their return to office would not mean a resumption of the old order. "A" had secured the support of 11 of the 12 assemblymen during his first term, he stated, and 12 or 13 of the 16 during his second; village support of the politics of "A" and his party (Socialist) was manifest even among some of the purgees.

Kitayama-mura, Suwa-gun, Nagano-ken.[†] Kitayama is an undistinguished mountain village of 3494. Its large forest area and expanse of unused land give it a greater size than is customary in such a small village, and it is relatively inaccessible (45 minutes by bus from the nearest railroad station).

*The conservatives had wanted to run "I" in 1951, but he was not de-purged in time for the campaign. "I's" purge was an unusual case, having been made by the central screening committee rather than locally.

[†]Also studied by S. Takayanagi. Based on interviews of 11 persons, including 4 purgees. Three former village heads were interviewed as well as the incumbent.

Eighty-seven percent of its population is engaged in farming, and only 2.6 percent in manufacturing and 2.1 percent in hotels and restaurants (it is a small hot-spring resort, and the incumbent headman was trying to encourage the tourist trade, much to the disgust of many of the farmers). Landed farmers constitute 56.1 percent of the total, and tenants who also own some land another 31.9 percent.* No influential or powerful landlords existed in Kitayama, nor has the village administration been dominated by a strong political figure. The farmers have prided themselves on their hardiness, and villagers drafted into the army have had unusually good records of military advancement and honors, although no important military leaders have come from Kitayama.

Village office is considered a duty to be borne by all qualified citizens. Village headship is achieved through clearly-marked steps: service in the fire brigade during the twenties, accepting some administrative office in the hamlet (a subdivision of the village) during the thirties, then running for the village assembly, becoming assistant headman, and finally serving as headman at the age of about 40.† Almost all interviewees volunteered the statement that those who had been purged had been merely taking their turn in positions which were a matter of simple public duty. The purged headman felt some guilt because his political "banishment" under the purge had prevented him from fulfilling his obligations; a purged IRAA chapter head said "I intended to remain inactive as I had during the purge. But villagers won't allow me to remain so and... demanded that I work for the village because I was idle during my purge." The phrase "he took his turn as headman" appeared in many interviews. All respondents agreed that the purgees could not be viewed as the "bosses" of the village, but were merely those who happened to occupy the titular posts during the specified period, where they had little to do except carry out routine functions, following village tradition.

After the war, headman "S" was replaced, and was succeeded in turn by "Z" and "Q," whose "turn" had come, and not until the elections of 1951 was there a deviation from the normal succession to office. "F" was elected at an unusually early age and without the customary career behind him. He was of an old and influential family, however, and although there was some criticism of his inexperience, there were no evidences that his administration provided any contrast to those of his predecessors.

There was no evidence of political change in the village as a result of the purge: even the land reform had little influence in Kitayama. Politics, indeed, seemed almost entirely alien to this village, except in local rivalries ("S" had been a compromise candidate acceptable to two rival hamlets). There was no farmers' cooperative, and even a new organization for purgees (Rikken Yogo Docho Kai, Constitutional Protection Comrades Society, devoted to reinstatement of the Emperor) found little active support in Kitayama. The purgees

*Unlike Nakasu, there has been little mechanization here: there are 68 electric motors, 22 gasoline engines, and 55 power threshing machines in the village.

†The purged IRA head stated that "the feeling here is that any man who served as a hamlet head or assistant village head would also serve as the village head . . . All of us are required to assume village posts when our turn comes." The present head stated that none desired the office, but were forced to accept it "when their turn comes" as a result of social pressure. It is regarded, apparently, as a form of free labor like that all villagers must give to road repairing, fire fighting, and afforestation. One reason for the general unwillingness to accept the post of headman was hinted by a Buddhist priest: "As the saying goes in this village, one must sell a tan of his farm in order to serve as a village head because of the cost of entertaining, lavish drinking parties, etc." According to this informant, "Q" had refused to conform to this custom when he became head, and received a reputation for "stinginess" and "was unpopular among the villagers."

organized funeral services for the war dead, but did not consider themselves a political force.

In July 1952, the purge had become only a mildly unpleasant memory in Kitayama.

Matsuo-mura, Shimoina-gun, Nagano-ken.* Matsuo is a village of 7505 located along the Matsu and Kega rivers in Nagano. Of the 1330 families in the village, 663 were engaged in farming, 626 of whom owned all or part of their farms. Most of the farms occupied less than two and a half acres, and none were over seven acres. As a result of the land reform program, about twice as many of the farmers owned all or part of the land they worked as had been the case at the outset of the Occupation. The village revenue of 13 million yen was 60.2 percent supplied by village taxes averaging 5855 yen per household. Most of the remainder came from the central and prefectural governments in the form of "equalization grants" and subsidies. The largest village expenditures were for welfare and labor facilities (30.7 percent), the village assembly and office (27.3 percent), and education (22.4 percent). The living standards and cultural level of the community are said to be relatively high.

In 1911 Matsuo adopted the municipality system of government, which still provided the basic governmental organization in use at the end of the Occupation. In that time, only seven different headmen have held office, each representing a leading family in the community. A further element of stability was provided by the prefectural Shinto (Hachiman) shrine, which was traditionally very closely related to village politics. It and the prewar National Spirit Enhancement Association served as a barrier to the growth of a leftist movement in Matsuo.

"Y," successively county (gun), prefectural (ken), and village (mura) chapter head of the IRAA, was among the most prominent citizens of the community. During his long political career he had served in the national House of Representatives, as a prefectural assemblyman, and as village headman. He had been responsible for securing large sums of money from the prefecture for the construction of bridges and roads in the town. In the 1942 campaign for the House of Representatives he polled 16,283 votes in his district, placing him third among the seven candidates for the four seats.† The position of village headman, in which he had developed most of his political experience and strength, was customarily assigned to alternate members of a very few families, and was regarded as virtually hereditary.‡

After "Y" was purged, he "recommended" his protege, "S," to succeed him. The latter was subsequently appointed to the post by the village assembly in

*The investigator was Zenshiro Yasuda, 27, a political science graduate of Hosei University Law School, a former schoolteacher in Ibaragi-ken and formerly engaged in election surveys in Ibaragi in 1950 and 1951. He is now engaged in graduate studies at Hosei University. While in Matsuo in July 1952, he interviewed 12 residents, including 4 purgees. Four of his interviews were with headmen, including a purgee and his successor. The nonpurgees included several prominent rightists who had escaped formal designation as purgees in spite of their wartime activities.

†In Shimoina-gun, his home, he polled 13,226 of the 31,455 voters; in Kamiinagun, 485 out of 30,335; in all the other areas he won very few votes, totalling only 36 votes for four cities. His strength, as this clearly indicates, was greatest--nearly half the votes cast--in his own county but he was relatively weak outside this area. This is not an unusual circumstance in Japanese politics, and reflects the importance of its rice roots aspects.

‡The selection, made under the old system, took place in the village assemblies rather than at the polls.

spite of the fact that a rival candidate, "O,"* had received a greater number of votes than he. In 1951, "S" was himself defeated by a distant cousin. There was no loss in the continuity of the village headship in Matsuo: there was unanimous concurrence in the view that if "S" was not a puppet of "Y," at least their views could not be distinguished.

A further element of continuity was provided by the relations between the village leaders and the Shinto shrine. Although public support of the shrine was no longer lawful, the priest himself received a state subsidy, and religious associations formed by prominent local figures undertook to maintain the shrine.†

During the war there had been a flourishing crop of militaristic societies in Matsuo. Among these were the National Spirit Enhancement Association, the Women's National Defense Association, and the Women's Patriotic Society. None of these were included under the purge directive,‡ although in their local activities, reports indicated that they were as influential as the IRAA or the IRA. Indeed, the village head in June 1952 reported that IRAA members were often compelled to accept posts in the semi-official organization, while the leaders of the other societies had been entirely volunteer. Purgees and non-purgees alike agreed that the selection of IRAA and IRA for the purge was an arbitrary selection apparently based on a misconception of the role of these organizations.

After the war, a new society known as the Rising Sun Alliance (Hinomaru Domei Kai) was formed by the leaders of the wartime Asia Development League and Greater Asia Association. Its members were de-purgees and former rightists. Although local in character, its leaders were seeking, as the Occupation ended, to develop an alliance with a national organization.§

Few interviewees thought that the new village leaders were more "democratic" or different in outlook from the purgees. This was also supported by the fact that their attitudes toward the purge and other political subjects covered in the interview could not be clearly distinguished from those of the purgees interviewed.

Kamiosato-mura, Shimoina-gun, Nagano-ken.¶ Kamiosato is a mountain village of 8413 located near Matsuo. It is served by three prefectural roads

*Cousin of "S," who withdrew after purgee "Y's" recommendation of "S" was announced. Following the recommendation, a motion had been made calling for another vote in the assembly, and "O" withdrew at that time. He appeared as a candidate again in 1951, but withdrew for a second time, in favor of "M."

†Village authorities reasoned that postwar demoralization at Matsuo-mura under headman "S" was because of the conversion from traditional Shinto worship to utter disregard of the gods, according to a former headman named Yagi. The current headman, "M," agreed that the public seemed to demand that the shrines be maintained by some means.

‡"An oversight of the purge," according to one purgee.

§Information supplied by "R," who was himself engaged in this effort. Its strength and the sources of its support were not revealed. One additional comment by "R" was interesting: "I think both the United States and England are militaristic nations. Theirs is a militarism cloaked in silk. They tried to subdue Japan with American civilization and institutions. Branding Japan as a militaristic nation, they employed [various reforms] in this attempt. But Japan's mission today is to understand the philosophy of Nehru."

¶The investigator was Zenshiro Yasuda, who also did the field work on Matsuo. He interviewed 12 residents of Kamiosato, six of whom were purgees (one of whom was, however, immediately de-purged). These included the purged village headman and his two successors, local leaders of the IRAA and the IRA, a professional soldier, a school principal, the president of the women's association, and a city employee.

and the Iida Line of the National Railways. Mt. Nosoko, a village-owned forest, occupies four times the total arable land of the village and provides an important source of revenue for the community. The village also operates a lumber mill, most of the proceeds from which are used to maintain a public health clinic. Seven hundred fifty-seven of the 1553 families are engaged in agriculture, 58.4 percent of which own all their own lands, with an additional 38.2 percent owning part of the land they work. As in Matsuo, well over three-fourths the farms are 1 cho or smaller, and none are larger than 3 cho in area. There are 1847 cho of forest lands in the village; 1785 cho of these belong to the public. The village revenue is 26,141,816 yen, of which 30.8 percent comes from taxes, 22.4 percent from equalization grants and subsidies, and 20 percent from public enterprises. The largest item of expenditure is for public health (36 percent). Only 13.9 percent is spent for the village assembly and offices, 10.7 percent for education, and 8.5 percent for welfare and labor facilities. Police and fire prevention together constitute 1.3 percent of the budget, and public works 5.7 percent.

In Kamiosato one of Japan's few Communist headmen was elected after the purge of the wartime leader. Communist activity was producing results in Kamiosato even before the war, and "K," the local party boss, had served diligently as a village committeeman in eliminating village debt and in the establishment of the national health insurance program (1939). It is said that during the war only the fact that the secret police declared him unsatisfactory because of a previous criminal record* prevented him from becoming the local head of the IRAA, which he had vigorously supported in spite of his well-known Communist affiliations. Immediately after the war, he gathered the villagers for the first political rally, at which he accused the wartime leaders of responsibility for militarism and demanded their resignation.

"H," village headman from 21 February 1940 to 17 November 1946, had resigned prior to the extension of the purge to local government, and thus retained pension rights which purgees usually lost. As headman, he was named president of the village branch of the IRAA, and for this he received provisional designation as a purgee.† After his resignation in January 1946, no candidates for the headship emerged before the village assembly (which then selected village headmen), and it was decided that a village election should be called. A slight plurality of the voters re-elected "H," who served until he decided to resign again in November. Communist "K" was then elected.

"K," who accepted the Communist interpretation of the Occupation as a colonizing venture by the United States, and viewed the purgees as feudalistic relics, criticized only one aspect of the purge: the prohibition against permitting a purgee's relatives to succeed to his office. In his view, the purge should have been carried out as a popular act, in response to public opinion, rather than as an occupation policy.‡

*Information supplied by "H," the purged village headman whom he replaced. Another view (suggested by "A," a purged soldier) is that his sickness prevented the appointment. No suggestion that his ideological activities were responsible was encountered in this investigation.

†Provisional designation referred to individuals who were not holding office at the time the purge category was applied (Chap. 2). "H" was unable to see why he was provisionally designated as a purgee while those "who had been active behind the scenes were not included in the purge list," including a Shinto priest who served the propaganda machine and others who had actively participated in IRAA planning.

‡"W," a Communist member of the farmland commission, departed from the Party line far enough to complain that the purge had been too severe, extending to persons who merely acceded to wartime necessity, instead of being confined to those who were engaged in actual war planning. He specifically referred to junior officers, and to IRAA and IRA chiefs. He then stated the conventional Communist party position that those really responsible for militarism had escaped the purge, and that the Americans had used the de-purge for their own ends, permitting all purgees to return regardless of their degree of guilt.

"A" succeeded "K" as headman in 1951. According to him, "K's" administration was noteworthy chiefly for the thoroughness with which he expanded the Communist party membership. Many members were employed as village officials, and many incumbents joined to protect their jobs. In the 1951 election campaign, "K's" petition for candidacy was filed one minute after the deadline, and "A" was elected without competition.

Other purgees in Kamiosato complained of the mechanical nature of the purge, arguing that those who held formal positions in the IRAA and the IRA had sometimes been given the titles without their consent or were ordered to participate in the wartime activities as part of their duties.* Some also argued that the purge of former IRAA and IRA chiefs who had no other public office was "foolish," since the purge in effect merely prevented them from remaining leaders or continuing to use the offices of organizations which had already been dissolved.†

The view was frequently encountered that the rise of the Communist party in Kamiosato was an indirect result of the purge, since it temporarily removed the only political rivals of the Communists. Although the purgees allegedly continued to meet twice a year to "talk over old times," and for "mutual aid," there was no evidence of any attempt to engage in political activity. Neither were there any indications that purgees sought to influence their successors or other community leaders while the purge was in force.

Yamagata-ken

Yamagata Prefecture was chosen because of its remoteness from the Tokyo center in economics, politics, and geography. It is in northeast Honshu, in one of the poorest districts of Japan. It has traditionally supplied many extreme right-wing military officers, who were usually the younger sons of peasants for whom no farmland was available and who lacked other means of livelihood. It was also the home of the Greater East Asia Society, a racist organization reported running during the immediate post-Occupation period as a strong support for Nehru's "Third Force" theory of neutrality in the Soviet-American controversies.

Yamagata's population in 1951 was 1,351,204, and it had a budget of 4.2 billion yen. Its living standards were only 55 percent that of the Japanese average. An investigator's report described it as "astonishingly poor."

The traditional conservatism of the agricultural areas of Japan was particularly evident in Yamagata, for it had enjoyed little industrial development,

*An extremist, "Y," purged as chief of the Kamiosato Chapter of IRA, remarked that "this situation becomes clear when one reflects on whether or not he could have refused the position." This view, however, is a relic of Japan's feudal past, for he continued by stating that everybody in Japan was under orders except Tojo. "Individuals in the military system were powerless.... They should not have been purged as individuals. To punish Tojo alone was sufficient." The president of the village women's association, "T," said that the only reason leaders of the Patriotic Women's Association and the National Defense Women's Association were not purged was that "no importance was attached to the position of women."

†There had been some confusion in Kamiosato regarding the nature of the intended limitation on the activities of purgees' families. One IRA chief's son was, through a misunderstanding, denied permission to apply for a teaching position. The purge restriction was intended to deny relatives of purgees any access to the office held by the purgee, but not to deny them any participation in public life. Eventually the situation was corrected. Surprisingly enough, the father, who had had occasion to reflect considerably on this point, expressed the unorthodox view that the extension of the purge ban to family members was a reasonable precaution against continued influence of extreme rightists.

and had attracted very few visitors from other sections of the country. Habits of obedience to authority had made the government slack and careless. Tax delinquency was high, and the Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Prefectural Office stated that "even an unsuccessful governor from another prefecture would be an instant success in Yamagata, before the war."

The areas studied were Funagata, an agricultural area supporting about a quarter of its population by lignite (a low-grade coal) mining; Ueda, a productive rice area lying in the Sakata River basin;* most of the land had been held by one very powerful and influential family.† The third area studied was Takahata, a comparatively diversified agricultural district producing rice, butter, and fruits. The capital, Yamagata City, was studied by all researchers before they left for the rural areas.‡

The results in Yamagata-ken show a general unawareness of the objectives of the purge, especially in the rural areas. The villagers were unable, for the most part, to find any difference between the purgees and their successors, even in cases where there was vigorous political controversy between these two elements. The extreme poverty of the area discouraged most villagers from taking an interest in local affairs. Even the land reform had not substantially improved the lot of the farmers, for while in some areas these were rising to the fore, in others they were finding discriminatory taxes too heavy a burden, and their farms too small for economic cultivation.§

Yamagata provided almost the least fertile soil in Japan for political reforms. Yet even here, there were areas where a vigorous leadership had risen to challenge the old, and to stimulate greater popular participation in government. This was especially true in relatively prosperous areas, where some diversification existed in the economic activity of the community.

As in Nagano, the community studies revealed a significant range of local variations in response to the purge.

*It produced 2.6 koku of rice per tan of land, which is above the Japanese average of 2.1 koku per tan.

†The "H" family, whose representatives told Mark Gayn that the clan owned a total of 4100 acres, cultivated by 5150 sharecropper families, who earned an average of 117 dollars per year. The "H's" then collected 47 dollars of this in rent. Ref 73, pp 63 f.

‡Their procedure was to select 10 to 15 persons in each village according to a predetermined plan, to include purgees and their successors, purged IRAA leaders, military officers, and prominent citizens. The appointments were usually made by city or prefectural officers.

§In addition to the tax discrimination, the new farmer-owners were unable to find supporting work with the landlords, as they previously had. The added financial gain from these part-time occupations had often made a crucial difference in their living standards. A Yamagata citizen, whose duties required him to move about the prefecture frequently, stated that this denial of part-time work was in part a deliberate device of the old-time landlords to encourage the farmers to sell their property back and accept once more the traditional paternalistic protection.

Funagata-mura, Mogami-gun, Yamagata-ken.* Funagata is a mining and farming village of 9531, located north of Tokyo on Japan's main island, Honshu. It is served by two railroads and two buslines. According to village records, the 1563 households in the village were engaged in the following professions at the time of the survey:

Agriculture	827
Lignite mining	307
Public Service, liberal professions	149
Commerce	32
Industry	30
Transportation	22
Other	139
No occupation	57

As in most Japanese communities, the major industry was agriculture, although here the average size of farms was smaller than that of the prefecture. Before the land reform program, 25 percent of the land was owned by absentee landlords, with two or three families predominating. When these holdings were eliminated under the Occupation, the effects in Funagata were great. This reform did not include timberlands, however, which occupied a much larger area than the farmlands; most of these remained in the hands of absentee owners.

The limited farmland acreage did not normally absorb the full labor supply of the village, which thus became available for mining, charcoal-making, and lumbering. About one-fourth the available workers were employed in the lignite mines, which, at the time of this survey, were operating near capacity. Of the 11 mines in the vicinity, all but three were owned by absentees. Because employment conditions in the village had been so uncertain, the Prefecture established a public works project to absorb excess labor. The project was primarily designed to recover useless riparian lands and convert them to farms, which would permanently alleviate the uncertain employment conditions.

The village's political record has been traditionally conservative.† Except for a flurry of excitement in the 1920's (two rival headmen were claimants to the post in 1928, and sought to oust the other), the tenure of office has been long and politically uneventful. "H" was headman from 1935 until his purge in 1948, when "N"‡ succeeded him. There was little doubt that in this case the purgee

*Seiichi Imai, 28, was the interviewer at Funagata. He graduated in the Political Science course of the Law Department, Tokyo University, in 1945, and became a lecturer at Hosei University and assistant professor at Yokohama University. He has written "Political Position of the Emperor," Shiso (1952), with Professor Shigeru Hayashi as co-author; "Roles of Senior Statesmen during the Period of Japanese Fascism," Hogaku-Shirin (1952); and participated in research on local administration in Shimamura, Sawa-gun, Gumma-ken, prior to undertaking this project. His interviews in Funagata included six purgees and four nonpurgees: the purged village headman and his successors, two village assemblymen, two educators, three farmers, and two leaders of social organizations were included in the interviews.

†In contrast, even the IRAA was relatively "progressive," especially under the leadership of "I." The IRA had little political power, and usually supported the IRAA. The purged leaders of both organizations were interviewed in this study.

‡"N" was a distant relative of "H." "H's" main source of influence over "N" was that the latter had served as village treasurer for 13 years during the former's administration. It was an example of the famous "oyabun-kobun" (boss-follower) relationship in traditional Japanese politics. "N" stated that he visited the purgee about once a month to play Chinese checkers, adding, "Since I served as treasurer under him for thirteen years..., we understand each other quite well. But that does not mean that I received orders from him."

had hand-picked his successor, although apparently he exerted little political influence over him thereafter, according to the villagers. All respondents were aware of these facts, and the statements of both "H" and "N" made no secret of the relationships between the two men. Yet most of the subjects stated that the new administration was much more "democratic" than the old, particularly in its responsiveness to public opinion, and in its willingness to open local government posts to "outsiders" of the former ruling cliques.

There were also other evidences of change in village politics as a result of the Occupation. The lignite interests were seeking to increase their political influence in Funagata at the expense of the traditional leaders, some of whom were purged. Three village assemblymen, including its president, were described as officials of the mining companies. To balance this development, a labor movement among the miners had flourished since 1948, and 400 votes were cast for a Communist candidate for the assembly in January 1949. One assemblyman was a Communist sympathizer, but not an active Party member.

Local views of the purge emerged in a consistent pattern. While there was some difference of opinion as to whether the purge had had much influence upon the leadership of the village, all agreed that it had been too wide in scope at local levels. For example, the former IRA Chief (who had had little political influence in the community) regarded his purge as an honor because, as he said, it placed him among the responsible leaders of the community.* The phrase "it couldn't be avoided" was frequently repeated here, as elsewhere throughout Japan, whenever the purge was mentioned; unfortunately, this sentiment had usually precluded any previous consideration of the merits or wisdom of the program.

Social relations between purgees and the new village leadership remained unchanged during the purge, and candidates for new posts sometimes visited the homes of purgees.† Both elements stated that official business was never discussed at these meetings, and purgees complained that they had been separated from political life as a result of the restrictions upon their activities.‡ They volunteered no specific statements regarding their future political plans, but all except the purged headman (a physician) were active leaders of the village agricultural association, and he expected to become president of the prefectural chapter of the Progressive party.

Funagata is one of the many villages in which all the purge records were burned in May 1952, ostensibly on the basis of orders from the central government which had been misunderstood. When these orders were questioned in Funagata by the interviewer, the original instructions were brought out, and it subsequently appeared that a request that the records be preserved for an additional three to five years had been "misinterpreted."

*His only claim to political prominence in the community lay in his disagreement with the village headman prior to the surrender. He argued at that time that since all males would be castrated by the Americans, they should resist the invaders to the last man.

†"I" and "O" both denied this, but the interviewer reported that the denials "seemed suspicious."

‡Purged Headman "K" stated, "I was inconvenienced in that I was not authorized to express my opinion in public speeches during campaigns. However, since the candidates were allowed to call on me, they often came.... The present (prefectural) governor also visited me. When I was purged, I felt as though I had been expelled from the world but the villagers sympathized with me."

Ueda-mura, Akumi-gun, Yamagata-ken.* Ueda is a conservative farm village of 2645. All but 56 of the 360 households were farming at the time of this survey.

Ueda has been insulated against serious political strife or even political rivalry; there was a strong sense of loyalty to the village and its people, and whenever a political criticism was heard during the survey it was given apologetically, and, apparently, regretfully. Ueda lacked any industrial development either in or near the village; the nearest city, Sakata, was an old castle town which has changed little since the Meiji Restoration. Even the agriculture of the region followed traditional lines: there was no truck gardening of vegetables and no timbering. Ueda was a rice-producing village, and its entire population was absorbed in the raising of its one crop a year. Prior to the Occupation's land reforms, half the arable land of the village belonged to absentee owners, and no important landlords were to be found in the village. The few historical disputes involving the local population had consisted of a united struggle by all the villagers against the landlords. Since 1911 an active land improvement movement had worked for cooperative reclamation efforts and for adjustment of property boundaries.

After the land reform (probably the most important postwar change in Ueda), almost the entire farming area was converted to local ownership, all except 10.4 cho being actually worked by owner-farmers. Since that time there had been an increased interest in improved farming techniques. Village productivity has risen, although most of the farms are still too small for the most efficient use.†

There were five purgees in Ueda:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Reason for Purge</u>	<u>Date of De-purge</u>	<u>Present Occupation</u>
"K"	D	Chapter head, IRAA	30 June 1951	Chairman, Agric Comm
"S"	D	Chapter head, IRAA	30 June 1951	Member, Agric Comm and Land Improvement Comm
"X"	C	Chapter head, East Asia League	13 October 1950	Chairman, village assembly
"Y"	D	Chapter head, IRAA Men's Association	30 June 1951	Business firm exec (no longer in Ueda)
"I"	G	Chapter head, IRA	30 June 1951	Farmer

Where any opinion was encountered regarding the purge (other than "it couldn't be helped, since Japan lost the war"), it was usually one of surprise

*Studied in July 1952, by Mokuichi Matsushita, 22, Tokyo University graduate and assistant in the Law Department of Hosei University. There were twelve interviewees, including two purgees and one "self-purgee," who, though not officially purged, chose to consider himself as being as important as the purgees and who consequently resigned from all public activity until the purge was lifted. He stated that this self-denial meant a serious economic loss to him. The purged village headman and his successor were included in this survey, as well as two village clerks, two assemblymen, the chairman and a member of the agricultural committee, two members of the land improvement committee, and the head of the young men's association.

†According to 1950 figures, the cost of production for farmers working one cho of land was 6200 yen per koku of rice, while that for two cho was 4900. In 1950, the average arable land per farmer in Ueda was 0.8 to 1 cho.

that it had included the village leaders.* The IRAA head was said to have assumed his post only very reluctantly, and that because of village dissatisfaction with the "high-handedness" of his predecessor.† The villagers did not hesitate to refer to purgees for advice, however, and according to accounts of purgees and others it was evidently given freely.

Under the circumstances it is clear that the effects of the purge were relatively slight. The interviews showed little awareness of the nature and purposes of the program; in fact both the purgees interviewed stated that they doubted if the majority of the villagers even knew they had been purged.

Political leadership in the community had always rested with the privileged few who owned more than the bare subsistence minimum of land (2 cho), and when the purge removed certain of these from office, the transition simply involved a process of substitution. National politics had little meaning to Ueda villagers, and none were able to state whether the purgees had been "militarists" or not. Although some personal prejudices against one or the other of the purgees were encountered, these had no identifiable relation to the causes of their removal.

After the Occupation, the purgees were again freely achieving political leadership.‡ Their relatively greater leisure, combined with their experience in public life had given most villagers the impression that they were "men of character" and "influential leaders."

The land reform, on the other hand, succeeded in creating a new sense of independence on the part of most villagers.§ Many former tenants who were not previously connected with politics were seeking office in the 1951 elections. This may be interpreted as a change in potential leadership brought about through the encouragement of the dispossessed many, rather than the purge of the privileged few.

Takahata-machi, Higashi Oikushi-gun, Yamagata-ken.¶ Takahata is a conservative farming and dairy community of 10,000, relatively inaccessible and

*One 21-year-old clerk said he supposed that those who deserved to be purged were purged, but was unable to state whether purgees from Ueda deserved the purge or not. He added that the purge had created a new view of political responsibility of local leaders, and that village leaders would accept a different attitude toward their responsibilities in the future than they had before.

†Source: "E," village headman.

‡The posts of chairman of the village assembly and chairman of the agriculture commission, described by a clerk as the "two most important offices in the community," were held by purgees.

§Social conditions of the village were largely unchanged, however, especially in family relations. Second and third sons were seriously handicapped by social and economic customs, and "free" marriages were still strictly prohibited.

¶The local pronunciation of the city's name is Takabatake-machi. The shorter version, Takahata, is used here for convenience. The county also has an alternative reading (Higashi Oitama), which is apparently not used locally. The investigator was Hirotatsu Fujiwara, 30, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics, Meiji University, and lecturer at Chiba University. He has published two works, "Introduction to a History of Political Ideology of Modern Japan," and "Outline of Lectures in Social Ideology." His articles include "Mental Pathology of Postwar Rightists" (Ushio), "On Figgis' Theory of Jus Divinum" (Shiso), "Nature of State Ethics Manifested in Political Activities of Modern Japan" (Seiji-Ronso), "Postwar Form of Japanese Nationalism" (Nippon Jinbun Gakkai), "Postwar Rightists' Ideology" (Seikei-Ronso). His field of special research during the previous year was nationalism and rightist politics, especially in the Kyushu district. For this project he interviewed 13 villagers in Takahata during July, including six purgees.

prosperous. Although the land reform program made a temporary change in the role of the large landowners in community life, a strong tendency to return to the tenancy system was reported by three assemblymen. This has been the result of a reported squeeze-play, involving a heavy tax burden on small farmers, combined with the universally uneconomical results of trying to work small subsistence farms.

The incumbent headman, "E," was elected in 1951, with the strong support of "M," the purged wartime headman. He had previously served under the latter as village treasurer and assistant headman, both during and immediately after the war. His rival candidate in 1951 had been "S," who had succeeded "M" after the purge, and although "S" had been a powerful and influential businessman in his own right, he had been unable to retain the office against "M's" political opposition.*

Although Headman "E" stated that the purge had had a great influence in the community ("it brought only confusion," however) no other respondent shared this view. Two purgees admitted that they had continued to give advice frequently, even though they feared they might be punished for it.† The same influential families of brewers and landowners continued to dominate local politics, and were rewarded for their civic interests by a tax system designed to favor the wealthy classes.‡

Although Takahata was a prosperous community, its economic activities were not greatly diversified. Fruit growing, timbering, and dairy farming furnished practically the sole livelihood of the village. The political climate is made the more uniform by its inaccessibility, although there are some occasional political rumblings (the town had 16 young Communists at the time of the survey, according to one villager, but these had no political power, and lacked even a spokesman). A dairy cooperative owning 600 milch cows was prospering, and, according to reports, operated smoothly and democratically. The purge did not entirely remove the influence of wartime leaders, who continued to offer political advice. The removal of the IRA Chief was considered by the villagers "absurd and incredible" because of his political obscurity. Of all purgees in the village, the only ones who had been personally inconvenienced by the purge were junior officers, who found themselves unable to find employment upon their return from military service, especially since all public positions were closed to them.

In 1951 the purgees formed the Uzan Society, under the leadership of purged headman "M," which held memorial services "to console the spirits of the war dead." All purgees stated that the only public response to their purge had been one of sympathy, and it was apparent to the researcher that they intended to take advantage of that fact in the future.

Yamagata-shi, capital of Yamagata-ken.§ Yamagata is a city of 102,537 located near the interior of the prefecture near the Miyagi border. Its indus-

*"S's" administration was attacked as extravagant and financially unsound, largely because he had succeeded in securing large sums of money from the prefecture for local public works on the strength of his own financial standing.

†"T," son of the purged headman, and himself a purgee, stated that the opposition party once criticized him publicly for giving advice to a prefectural assemblyman, but added that nothing had come of it.

‡This statement reflects the only criticism of the old order encountered at Takahata-machi. It was made by two village assemblymen, the assembly chairman, and a local dry goods dealer.

§The three researchers listed above who had been assigned to Yamagata-ken combined their efforts in Yamagata-shi before leaving for the rural villages. They interviewed 20 residents at length, not including minor city officials. Eleven of these were purgees; the mayor and three city assemblymen were included, as well as three prefectural committeemen.

tries are diversified but small, and, like the rest of the prefecture, it is far from prosperous.

The conservative center of the city had been vitally affected by the purge. Mayor "O" had retired 10 months before the purge (thus retaining his pension rights), and was succeeded by the incumbent, "S." Of the 36 municipal assemblymen, 33 were either purged or defeated in the first elections thereafter (1947). Purgees played no active role in city government during the early years of their political banishment. During the 1951 elections, however, de-purgees formed a strong opposition movement,* and while they lost the mayoralty campaign, 12 of the de-purgees returned to the municipal assembly. A purged schoolteacher (formerly an IRAA official) even stated that the purge had given progressive elements the opportunity to expose the corruption of the municipal administration under the old order. It was apparent that some of the former political bosses had been discredited and deprived of their power; oligarchic control of the city assembly became virtually impossible because of the sheer diversity of elements which were elected.† Factionalism was developing, and while it would destroy the traditional village unity, it would also weaken the traditional boss-rule system by which that unity had been obtained.

There were many indications, however, that the old order was not destroyed. Its decline was more apparent than real. Its members still controlled the banks and the local press; the village assembly, though freed from boss-rule, seemed indecisive, and its president, a former IRAA vice-president, had eleven de-purged colleagues to help him restore "order" when the time was ripe. Four of the respondents in this study‡ stated that they believed that the (prefectural) bureaucracy had been relatively strengthened by the purge, and that the purge had thereby missed one of its major targets. "There must have been a marked difference between the US plan and its actual results," observed one respondent. "It seems that the United States placed too much emphasis on community leaders and overlooked elements like the old Thought Control Police in the prefectural government." Another view: since former prefectural officers had become mayor and deputy-mayor, this was merely substituting one oligarchy for another.§ The Vice-President of the federation of young men's associations, not himself a purgee, stated that "since the bureaucracy had been used for the implementation of the democratization policy of the United States," there had been "no contact whatsoever between the military government and the civil population. Accordingly, the bureaucratic structure became very powerful, and popular democratic groups did not develop. Thus today there is no force which can serve as a bulwark against the emergence of both right and left. The bureaucracy who had been the cat's paw in the democratization policy of the United States suddenly changed their attitude to ingratiate themselves with the rightists. The democratic elements are now on the left, attempting to establish themselves not by supporting, but by criticizing, US policies."¶

*Deputy-mayor "K" was its leader. Ex-mayor "O," ex-Assembly-Chairman "I," and publisher "H" of the Yamagata Shimbun, all purgees, were the other important opposition figures. A striking hostility between purgees and their replacements was encountered in political circles in Yamagata-shi.

†The People's Friend Society had 14 seats; Municipal Administration Research Society, 16; and the Independents, 5.

‡Including an unpurged left-wing bookseller, an IRAA purgee who was former president of the village assembly, a purged schoolteacher, and the unpurged vice-president of the prefectural federation of young men's associations.

§The fear and distrust of bureaucrats expressed by these four members of the "intelligentsia" is characteristic of this group's attitude toward them. See Chap. 3 for a more realistic discussion of the problem.

¶The purgees in Yamagata were also conspicuously criticizing US policies, and several of them refused to be interviewed in this study because they believed it was likely to be some kind of propaganda for the United States.

Members of municipal and prefectural screening committees who were interviewed stated that the purge scope had been much too broad, and had included many titular leaders but not some of the "real bosses" of the old order. Municipal and prefectural committee members stated that they had sought to apply the purge as lightly as the criteria permitted, since they considered the categories too mechanical to have any valid application to the real situation in Yamagata. They cited cases of subordinates in IRAA ("merely a political party") and of junior officers to prove their point.*

Few of the respondents believed that there had been any major changes in the political structure of the community in spite of the new leaders that came to the fore. The reasons for this view varied: some thought that the purge as an imposed reform lacked popular support; others that the purgees would return to power because their real sources of strength remained untouched. None felt that there had been a real democratization in the community except the mayor (who nevertheless feared the return of the purgees) and one assemblyman who was considered the boss of the street vendors. His statement of the meaning of democracy was not, however, likely to offer much solace to Japanese liberals: "We street vendors are basically democratic. We distinguish right from wrong. We all listen to the boss; after all, some differences among people are natural. The street vendors are not dependent upon others; they carry on by uniting themselves. This is democracy." He deplored the "tendency of the subordinates to insult their seniors...In our circle, the boss looks after all his followers, who in turn listen to all that he says. If they disobey or betray him, they will suffer punishment...We do not care which party is in; we just want to distinguish right from wrong."

Fukuoka-ken†

Fukuoka-ken, located on the southernmost island of Japan proper, has a population of 3,529,000. Its principal industries center about its extensive coal fields, which are operated according to methods in use because of their antiquity rather than their efficiency.

Two mining cities have been studied in this survey: Iizuka and Omuta. In both cases the effects of the purge proved negligible because the coal-mining interests, which dominate the communities, provided such strong links with the past. In Iizuka, where new elements of leadership were rising, the coal interests were apparently willing to accept them, and the shed-boss tradition was gradually passing away. In Omuta, where a large zaibatsu firm held most of the industrial wealth, old forms of local paternalism (somewhat more enlightened than that of the Iizuka shed boss) seemed largely unchanged and unchallenged even by the rising labor movement.

*The most pathetic case encountered in Yamagata was probably that of a major general, who owned no property, had lost his pension, and was apparently in severely straitened circumstances. He eventually found a job as a book-keeper in a noodle shop for the summer. He complained that applying the purge to ex-soldiers who, like himself, had retired before the war, "was a little too stiff." He admitted his responsibilities as "a high-ranking officer who had encouraged the youth to fight for Japan's victory."

†Based on field work performed by Itsuo Emori, 23; Hironari Oyama, 27; and Taro Oshima, 23, of the Institute of Social Science Research, Tokyo University.

Iizuka-shi, Fukuoka-ken* Iizuka is located near the center of Fukuoka at the point where the Tooga River meets the Honami and Yoshima Rivers. In feudal times it was an important rice bowl known as the Chikuho Plain,[†] but after the commercial revolution its liberal endowment of coal became the basis of its prosperity. Its population grew from 28,876 in 1920 to 53,653 in 1950. Half the working population is engaged in coalmining, with manufacturing and commerce together absorbing another quarter; but indirectly every industry in the city is dependent upon mining. Fluctuations in coal prices and other changes in the coal industry have a profound effect upon the economy of the region, and the fact that one out of every three eligible voters mines coal is not without its political implications.

Until recent times all labor for the mines was produced through a group of shedbosses (Nayagashira). Under this system, the mining company would enter into a contract with the boss for the services of a work force. Workers were housed in "sheds," where they lived with the boss under a system of feudal obligation. The bosses acted as foremen as well as suppliers of the work force, and the mine owners surrendered all supervisory responsibilities to them. Each boss would absorb new workers into the force by simply offering to pay their debts and travel expenses to the shed. He in turn received all the workers' compensation directly from the mine operators, and paid his men by means of tickets which could be redeemed for goods in the retail store attached to the shed. The prices in these shops were 20 to 50 percent higher than the prevailing prices in the city. If a worker became dissatisfied and fled, his possessions were confiscated; when, occasionally, another shed took in such a refugee, gang-wars sometimes resulted. The survival of these rigid loyalties into modern times is known as "kawasuji-katagi," or Riverside men's spirit. A worker who betrayed his shedboss was taken into a prison in his shed, where, in serious cases, he was lynched. The shedboss, of course, assumed the obligation of caring for his men.

During the 1920's and 1930's, this primitive feudalism was gradually replaced by the lodginghouse (Hanba) system.[‡] Here the companies began to employ the workers directly, but made all wage payments to the chief of the lodging-houses where they lived. The chief would deduct his rent from the wages, and pay the rest in cash to the workers. In some cases, the lodginghouse also served as an employment office, for which they charged the workers a daily brokerage fee when they worked.

*In Iizuka, there were 25 full interviews including 6 purgees, 7 successors, and 12 neutrals. Included were the mayor and ex-mayor, vice-mayor, and four past and present assemblymen, a former judge, a women's club representative, two former purge administrators, and a number of businessmen.

[†]Archeologists believe that the area emerged from the Stone Age to the Stone-and-Metal Age during the first century. Already it was practicing paddy-field rice-cropping and had developed a clearly-marked class system. Its importance as a commercial center and a post-road town grew during the feudal and early modern periods, when the Dutch and other foreign traders joined the feudal lords on their spectacular trip to Yedo (Tokyo). Coal was discovered in 1478, and a primitive mining operation was flourishing during the Genroku Period (1688 to 1703). It was hoisted by means of buckets made of wisteria vines, according to a contemporary account, and transported on horse-back to Fukuoka-shi where it was sold as a domestic fuel. Its first industrial use occurred in 1764, when it was in great demand for the Wakamatsu salt manufacturing industry. Shortly thereafter its use for steamer fuel became predominant, and soon the rivers surrounding Iizuka became important commercial arteries for transporting coal to Wakamatsu.

[‡]The Hanba as a secondary aspect of the oyabun-kokun system is discussed in Ref 75, pp 21-41.

A few of the larger companies did not adopt the lodginghouse system, but established their own dormitories and paid their workers directly.

The Asoh family provided the patriarchal element in Iizuka politics before the war. For 300 years it had provided many of the great squires of the area, and after 1892 Takichi Asoh began to expand his career by exploiting several coal mines, founding the Koho Bank and accepting political posts, until finally he was rewarded with a seat in the House of Peers. His grandson, "T," still derives a considerable income from these enterprises, which include a cement company in Tagawa and a gold mine as well as the coal industry. He is himself above the domestic political disputes of Iizuka, spending much of his time out of the city: but both major political factions of the city (the "O" group and the Civic Reform League) acknowledge his authority. His political power derives partly from his position as a member of parliament; his local status was further enhanced by his marriage to Prime Minister Yoshida's daughter (he was able to present "O" with a tablet written by Mr. Yoshida, which is said to be one of Mr. "O's" most cherished prizes, although he is unable to read the cursive style of its calligraphy). His economic power is also said to be used judiciously for political purposes: according to ex-Assemblyman "Y" and other informants, "T" has sometimes given small lots of coal fields (workable by 20 to 30 laborers without machinery) to his proteges, and especially those in the "O" group. These favors are not only guarantees of his continuing political influence in Iizuka, but also serve to maintain his political support in his own campaigns for the National Diet. Even the Civic Reform League, which is nominally opposed to the old-style corruption of the "O" group, supports "T" because of the importance of his holdings to the city's welfare (four-fifths of the mine-lots in Iizuka belong to "T's" companies). There are several indications that the old-line "O" group is gradually losing its political power to the Civic Reform League, with "T's" tacit consent and approval.*

As has already been indicated, the municipal assembly is divided into two factions. After the first postwar elections (30 April 1947), 22 of the 30 assemblymen were freshmen, and the remaining former members were defeated. Only one of these ("K") had been a purgee, but public discontent with the old order and general postwar interest in democracy were said to have been decisive factors in the election. Even among the assemblymen who had been re-elected, some (including current Mayor "H") ran on a reform platform; conversely, however, some of the newly elected assemblymen joined the party representing the conservatives. The split reached its highest point in 1949, when communist "I"† of the Civic Reform League succeeded in exposing the tax irregularities of "O" and members of his group. "O" succeeded in securing a motion of censure against Yoshibashi through his majority in the city assembly, but the Civic Reform League began a movement to recall "O," which proved successful.‡ In the elections of 1951, the "O" group received 16 seats, the Civic Reform League 14; the mayor, however, was a member of the minority group.

"O" himself was a former shedboss. He had served three terms in the assembly when this study was made, but was chief of the prefectural branch of the Liberal party. This was sufficient to account for his leadership of the conservative faction (Aishi "Love of City" League, usually referred to as the "O")

*The mines in Iizuka are gradually becoming exhausted, and only one major mine (Yoshikuma, in a suburb of the city) is being considered for conversion to the more economical vertical mining methods. Asoh's interest in the city is therefore said to be waning, although the main office of the Asoh Mining Company has remained in Iizuka.

†Later purged in the Red Purge of October 1950.

‡Through a legal action, however, "O" did not actually surrender his seat until the elections of 1951, wherein he was returned to power by an increased majority.

group) in spite of his lack of seniority in the city assembly. In 195, he became chairman of the assembly. Through his relations with the survivors of the shedboss system and his control of prefectural public works projects, he has maintained powerful sources of patronage.*

The Civic Reform League has no common platform, but is united only in opposition to the "O" group. It is made up of the Shinren-gumi (a new party), the Progressive party, and neutrals, and it derives support also from the Socialist party and the trade unions.

This factious political scene was not exclusively a postwar phenomenon. The two prewar mayors ("S," a former bureaucrat who served 12 years, and "W," of the Asoh Mining Company), though themselves non-political, were unable to subdue the contending political forces sufficiently to carry out a consistent program. During the war, emergency needs were served by the local chapter of the IRAA, which created a standing committee for city administration to expedite local government matters.† In addition to this, the various men's and women's clubs united to form the Yokuso for carrying out social work, collecting scrap metal, and otherwise supporting the war effort. Its leadership was nonpolitical in that none of the city officials succeeded in capturing its presidency.‡

The functions of the president were primarily to create local unity and to secure the cooperation of various agencies in support of war programs. The president therefore had to be a politically neutral figure enjoying universal respect and prestige. The occupants of the post were successively "M," a lawyer; "S," an elementary school principal; and "N," physician and volunteer social worker.

The purge affected all branch directors, office managers, and presidents of the IRAA and the Yokuso. The IRAA branch director was also mayor of Iizuka, but none of the other purgees held political office in the city. Only one member of the wartime assembly was purged ("K"), together with the three presidents of Yokuso, who were essentially politically neutral, though popular in the community.

In the 1947 elections, "Z," former deputy mayor, was unopposed for mayor. Although 12 assemblymen ran for re-election, only 7 were re-elected, while 23 of the 39 new candidates were successful.§

In Iizuka the voters were ready for a new leadership. As we have seen, however, many of the new members joined the old clique, where patronage opportunities were greater. Several left-wing assemblymen joined former

*The investigators encountered persistent rumors of great expenditures in the Iizuka elections. The slogan "Yon-to; San-ka-ku" "Four-successes; Three-failures" referred to the victory of those who spent 400,000 "atom bombs" (or yen) over those who spent 300,000 "ball cartridges," on the election. This reputation was not confined to the "O" group: "N," a member of the opposite camp, was said to have spent 500,000 yen.

†According to the testimony of "R," a prominent businessman, the Yokuso Imperial Rule Assistance Adults' Association (not to be confused with IRAA) actually performed many functions of the city assembly, as being more "representative" of the people. On other occasions the "city meetings" of the IRAA performed the work of the city assembly.

‡The first president was a national government bureaucrat detailed to the task. Thereafter local figures were elected, but no city assemblyman was able to secure the post, partly because of the stubborn opposition of their fellow assemblymen, and partly because of the unpopularity of local politicians in the Yokuso itself (some of the clubs and associations which were united in the Yokuso had been organized as a protest against local politics).

§In the 1940 election, 17 of the 30 elected assemblymen were former members.

Yokuso staff members to form an uncertain opposition to the old order, which culminated in the recall of "O." The wide diversity of their opposition proved self-defeating in the 1951 elections, since its strength* was divided among too many candidates to secure a majority, while the old order remained a small but unbroken group which actually achieved—by default—a plurality. The purge did not disturb this political balance of power except in removing certain nonpolitical figures whose leadership might have created a stronger opposition to the old order.

Sixteen of Iizuka's reservist leaders were purged, including 3 directors of the city chapter and 13 regional directors.† One of these had been a former mayor, and several others, though not themselves politically active, have been influential as behind-the-scenes campaign supporters in local elections. Their power was not decisive, however, nor was it exerted according to any consistent pattern. There were in all, 77 purgees‡ in Iizuka, exclusive of the Thought Police agents.§

It is clear that in spite of the scale of the purge in Iizuka, its effects were indecisive, primarily because it left unchallenged many of the political bosses representing the old feudal order, who survived because the economic basis of the coal-dominated town remained unchanged. The major sources of reform were provided by the former right-wing staff members of wartime agencies who were junior to the purgees. These groups, though united in their opposition to the corrupt "bossism" of the rejuvenated old order, were themselves not oriented to democratic thinking, and derived their principal sources of support from the latent elements of the wartime right wing.

Omuta-shi, Fukuoka-ken.¶ Over half the Omuta population (195,000) is engaged in mining or industrial activities heavily dependent on coal. The economic oligarchy of the city was consequently that of the Mitsui Mining Company, and even companies which were nominally independent after the Occupation's antimonopoly laws remained closely related to it. Nearly every family

*The labor movement was divided between extreme left-wingers who were removed under the Occupation's Red purge, and other leaders who were so conservative that they were indistinguishable from the old-line shed bosses. One of the respondents, Mr. "X," of the executive committee of the official Asoh Miner's Union, said, "A family who had served the Asoh industry for three generations pays so much homage to their boss that they never sleep with their feet toward his mansion," adding, "I myself make it a rule to take off my hat and bow whenever I pass in front of Mr. Asoh's house." The workers clearly have a strong sense of personal loyalty toward the mine-owner, which extends even to a sense of obligation to vote according to his wishes. Unions are also divided between mine workers and white-collar workers, according to regions and by company.

†The younger ones, in their forties at the time of the survey, had been called from civilian life as the war progressed, usually to noncommissioned officer ranks. They were replaced by older men who, though also former soldiers under Japan's compulsory system, were then too old for active duty.

‡Including two war criminals, 52 career military officers, 3 rightist leaders, 4 Yokuso members, and 16 others purged under Category G.

§Records of these purgees were burned in Iizuka, as in many other parts of Japan. It is perhaps significant that all the records of local purgees were retained except those referring to members of the national bureaucracy in local assignments. From the community point of view these purgees were the least significant, but the conclusion seems inescapable that the mysterious "orders" to destroy certain records were a reflex action of self-protection on the part of bureaucracy.

¶There were 16 interviews in Omuta, including 7 purgees, 4 successors, 4 neutrals, and 1 official serving the purge committee.

secures its living directly or indirectly from the highly organized, highly monopolistic coal industry of the area.

Reports from Muromachi Era (1334-1467) relate how a farmer named Tsutau Jizaemon discovered "a burning stone" (presumably coal) near the city; during the 17th century the mines were operating at a depth of 20 to 30 feet underground.* The modernization of the Japanese economy brought prosperity to the city, which profited greatly by the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. During World War I, the Mitsui Mining Company organized itself into five sections (which still exist): mining, port operations, refining, dyestuffs, and manufacturing.

The industrial growth of the city introduced new political leaders to challenge the conservative families who dominated local affairs, and political structures gradually crystallized into party competition. Dominant political factions in prewar Omuta were economic, however, rather than partisan. There appeared no important political differences among the contending parties and factions.

There were 391 purgees in Omuta,† few of whom, however, occupied important positions in municipal affairs. The leadership changes that occurred in the city and prefectural assemblies after the war were the result of a swing in public sentiment rather than the purge itself. Socialist candidates received overwhelming support in the local (though not the national Diet) elections; out of 40 seats only 4 members of the wartime assembly were returned in 1947. Locally, most of this is attributed to the newly-found strength of organized labor, which was the dominant element in the 36 new members of the assembly.‡

The Wartime Yokuso was a formal organization of rightists, only 2 of whose leaders were on the municipal assembly. It had little or no influence on local politics or government. The IRA was organized according to street or district, with an honorary head elected in each. None of these were important figures in the city, however. As was the case throughout wartime Japan, the central government provided most of the impetus to local actions. Thus the rightist groups were influential in mobilizing local support and in wartime activities by default of the municipal authorities and because of their association with the national organizations rather than because of the strength of their local leaders. Once the organizations themselves were disbanded, most of the rightist leaders returned to local obscurity.

The purge also affected a few Mitsui executives, only one of whom, however, was still living in Omuta. Other Mitsui managers,§ such as the section chiefs

*It is to be hoped that the traditional appraisals of depths are more credible than those of heights. Local histories also tell of a tree 9700 feet high for which the region was originally named ("Miki-no-kuni," country of the tree, later shortened to "Miike," the name of the coal-bearing district in which Omuta is located).

†By categories; class A-1, B-320, C-1, D-56, G-13.

‡In 1951 the strength of the labor-supported "renovationists" was reduced by half, leaving them some 18 of the 40 seats. In the prefectural assembly, the 1951 election was an overwhelming labor victory, however.

§It is possible that the desired political reforms could have been achieved in Omuta by denying public office to Mitsui executives while permitting them to retain their industrial connections. In cities like Omuta, where economic interests controlled local politics, the confusion created by the SCAP decision to include private employment in the category of public office had its worst effects. It confronted the Occupation with the alternative of slowing down production by removing key managerial figures, or keeping a relatively experienced management at the risk of endangering the political reform program. This dilemma might have been solved by a redefinition of terms, so that economic purgees in intermediate levels were barred from governmental positions but not from managerial posts. (See Chap. 5.)

who were also serving on the city assembly, were not affected by the purge. To this extent the local leadership of the city remained untouched by the purge.

Although there are many evidences that there has been a change in leadership since the wartime days, this seems largely unrelated to the incidence or effects of the purge. Assemblyman "E," the founder of the Socialist party in Omuta, stated this conviction in its most extreme form: "[In prewar days] the [Mitsui] company and the Thought Control police were the same thing.... Of course, the Mitsuis changed their attitude after the war ended, and sent nine representatives of their own into the city assembly instead of two or three as before. Thus they came to have a direct connection with city administration, and the police remained much as before...." * The "undemocratic atmosphere" of which he complained may have contributed to former IRA President "K's" statement to his children, "Having a purged father is a great honor." The evidence was strong that the candidates for city office stood little chance of winning unless they had financial support from Mitsui or strong numerical support from a well-organized union. This made for fiercely contending factions† in Omuta, with no apparent middle group capable of bridging the gap between the two groups. The conclusion seems inescapable that in Omuta, as in Iizuka, the persistence of the wartime economic oligarchy provided a stronger source of political influence than the changes in personnel introduced by the purge.

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps the most important finding of the community studies is that national politics seemed to have had little relationship to rural leadership. Most of the purgees in the villages studied had little local prominence in spite of their positions in local chapters of national political organizations. Their removal had no results except to create some local doubts as to the purpose and value of the program, particularly because it had been designed primarily on a national level and applied locally.

Even among village headmen, who frequently assumed leadership on a simple rotating basis, the removals did not bring about important changes in rural life. The purge of extremists also failed in many cases to change local customs or political attitudes (such as the switch to Communism following the purge in Kamiosato and Goka in Nagano). The dramatic destruction of important centers of wartime support (such as occurred in Urasato and Nakasu, Nagano) proved more likely to leave a political vacuum than a newly-dedicated citizenry.

In rare cases where a local popular movement had been suppressed by the old order, the purge gave it a prompt and important advantage. In Kamiosato this introduced the Communists to power, but in Nakasu the rise of a new leadership was more nearly in keeping with Occupation objectives. Opportunities for such new leadership arose, apparently, only in the cities (e.g., Yamagata) and among progressive and politically active rural villages.

It was more usual for the replacements of purgees to follow traditional lines of succession, without an accompanying change in the political con-

*He had been himself convicted of bribery on a police charge which he claimed was trumped up, and was awaiting the outcome of his appeal to a higher court at the time of the interview.

†The fierceness of the struggle can be estimated from the statement by a Mitsui executive that 50 union leaders were ousted by the Red purge sponsored by the Occupation.

sciousness of the village (e.g., Matsuo, Nagano, and Funagata, Ueda, and Takahata in Yamagata).

In areas dominated by a single industry, whether locally owned or not, the shifts in leadership tended to depend upon the ability of the progressive postwar elements to force changes, rather than the removal of wartime rightist leaders. In the Fukuoka cities, the purge seemed to have had little influence in an essentially economic struggle between the labor movement and the owners of the coal industry.

There were, however, areas even in the poorest sections of Japan where the purge brought about changes of leadership that were to benefit the population. The trouble was only that too many were removed whose disappearance was of little consequence except as a disturbing factor. Locally, the purge was not entirely useless; it was simply too extensive. Its potential value in dramatizing the need for political consciousness in community life was not exploited by the Japanese program.

Chapter 7

CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CRITIQUE

As the Occupation lifted, the purge was still one of its most controversial aspects. Left-wing reformers argued that it had ignored some of the main elements of nationalistic strength, and conservatives attacked it as an arbitrary and thoughtless act of an impetuous conqueror. Each side mobilized an abundance of evidence which could be used, with a few minor adjustments, to support either view. The only general agreement among them was that the purge was "inevitable" because it was an administrative necessity.

Given this premise of administrative necessity, there still remain questions of the utmost importance in determining basic policies: how a purge should be carried out to minimize resentments, and how extensive it must be to achieve its purposes. The fact that in Japan it soon lost its initial popularity as a reform indicates that the decisions to be made in these areas may be difficult and highly controversial, even though the basic program itself may be generally accepted. The Japanese experience, indeed, provides a useful index to some of the implications of these decisions: it may be tentatively assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that similar decisions made under future occupations of this type (see Chap. 1) may produce similar successes and failures. Fortunately, from the point of view of military government administration, the major decisions of the Japanese purge can be simply stated and evaluated on the basis of the results described in the foregoing chapters. Implications for the future can also be drawn with some assurance from each of these decisions.

1. The decision to employ categories in the application of the purge proved to be self-justifying in achieving uniformity and speed. There are certain dangers implicit in this method, which appeared as the program developed, but fortunately means of minimizing them also became apparent. These dangers were twofold: First, important cases might be overlooked including individuals who were deeply implicated in Japan's totalitarian web but who escaped categorical designation because they did not actually hold formal positions of responsibility; and second, a single series of categories might be applied too rigorously and in fields where they were not appropriate. The one may be considered an error of omission, the other of excess.

The evidence suggests that both types of error were made in Japan. Many important behind-the-scenes plotters and the routine planners were not included in the purge because they could not be located in terms of titular positions in the wartime hierarchy. The errors of excess, on the other hand,

removed a large number of obscure and inoffensive individuals when national categories were extended to local communities and to many industries without reference to their actual power or the patterns of leadership.

Repetitions of this type of error may be easily prevented, for they occur primarily because of inadequate information. Analytical studies can always be made, if necessary, to document the pattern of wartime totalitarian controls in the occupied country. From these patterns, groups of purgees can be identified which might otherwise escape unnoticed, as they did in Japan. It would be entirely possible to initiate such studies at the outset of an occupation, making use of native scholars under the direction of competent personnel provided by the military government. As the purge formally progresses, special native commissions can be assigned to investigate other suspicious cases not included in the purge categories. In Japan, the SIB of the Attorney General's Office could have performed this mission had it been activated earlier.

A second series of studies of this same nature may also be initiated on local levels to determine appropriate purge categories for village and other local officials and other leaders. In Japan, the application of the purge to local levels was not undertaken for one year following the national purge, leaving ample time for thoroughgoing field investigations in several communities.

Similar studies should also be made in detail before undertaking reforms at the level of the national government, as well as in making any administrative arrangements with its subordinate agencies.

Adequate studies of this type cannot always be conducted in advance of actual occupation. There are few direct sources except for occasional interrogation of prisoners of war, which might not provide a sufficient sample for systematic analysis. It is safe to state, however, that a team of trained social scientists could probably prepare a working description of political responsibilities and social status within a matter of weeks after the first troops had landed, and that a precise and accurate list of categories of politically incriminated persons could be prepared soon thereafter. (See Chaps. 5 and 6.)

2. The decision to apply the purge categories through Japanese agencies provided a speedy and generally impartial administrative program for the purge. It resulted in many charges of political favoritism, but these were directed primarily against the civil agencies rather than the occupying power. There was, of course, some SCAP involvement in such political controversies, but the Japanese experiences (see Chaps. 2 and 3) suggest certain precautions that may be taken in indoctrinating military government officers against assuming an excessive responsibility in the details of an operation assigned to civil agencies.

This decision resulted in a certain legalistic haggling on the part of the Japanese screening committees, which occasionally declined to apply the purge against powerful political figures claiming exemption. The remedy here was firmness on the part of the Occupation authorities and the application of pressure upon the Japanese screening committees. In nearly all cases the outcome of such episodes was satisfactory.

A further danger in using the existing civil agencies is that the operating members of the bureaucracy in the occupied country may find purge exemption restrictions. In order to make use of the Japanese national ministries, for example, the Occupation authorities tacitly assumed that public employees below the high policy levels had been politically neutral; that they had merely carried out wartime orders, and that therefore they could be used effectively

for reform purposes, just as they had previously been used in mobilizing Japan for her imperial expansion. This view was consistently advanced by the bureaucracy itself in justifying its wartime actions. In fact, however, this view fell far short of describing the actual role of the Japanese civil servants, whose power had extended even to the throne itself. Their immunity to purge served only to confirm their position of impregnability and to bolster their claims to unquestioning obedience from the general public.

The exemption of subordinate members of the bureaucracy from the purge restrictions also made it possible for former employees of liquidated totalitarian agencies simply to transfer to other government positions. Many ex-Thought Control officials, for example, were transferred from the abolished Home Ministry to ordinary police posts on local levels, or found their way into other national ministries (see Chap. 3). Others entered public life, some with conspicuous successes in the Diet and in high appointive offices; and those who remained at their wartime assignments often succeeded in building elements of strength and stability during the postwar period of political disorganization. The political implications of this alteration in the domestic balance of power may have been an important obstacle to the development of a popularly responsible government.

This basic decision also involved the risk of allowing the Japanese agencies to apply the purge in such a way as to favor certain political elements in the government. In order to minimize this risk, GS decided from the outset to apply the purge to all doubtful cases. This established a pattern in which the verdict of the Japanese screening agencies was final only if it had been unfavorable. Other cases were subject to review by SCAP, and favorable decisions were occasionally reversed where it appeared that the Japanese had been too timid in applying the purge.

This subordinate decision had the unfortunate effect of allowing only the unfavorable decisions of the Japanese government to stand, even though in some cases it may have appeared that the purge had been unfairly applied for political reasons. It also permitted political use of the purge to get rid of Japanese officials who were not formally subject to the purge categories except under the vague category of "other militarists and ultranationalists." It did, however, greatly reduce the possibility that certain favorites would escape the purge; and its errors of excess could easily have been corrected by the adoption of an adequate appeals system (see Chap. 2).

3. The decision to use an administrative process to the exclusion of judicial review in considering individual cases brought about an unfortunate reversal of public opinion. Resentment against the militarists who were responsible for the war and the defeat slowly turned to sympathy for the numerous purgees, who could protest their own "innocence" and point to the arbitrary categorical nature of the purge as an explanation of the "error" in their own cases. The lack of a means for examining individual cases upon appeal was one of the most unfortunate aspects of the program: probably more than any other phase of the Occupation, this created an impression that the Americans were not really interested in democratic processes.

An efficient review process could have eliminated the basis for complaints against the categorical removal of arbitrary classes of purgees. The appeals could have been subject to approval by an Occupation agency, upon presentation of proof of error, injustice, or unusual hardship, and would have afforded a means of giving token indications that the purge was not a punitive device, but a preventive one.

4. The decision to rely upon public opinion, to the exclusion of special devices, as a means of enforcing compliance with the purge restrictions was generally successful in the case of national political purgees, but frequently did not succeed in restraining economic purgees from continued participation in their business or in mobilizing community opinion against local purgees. In short, notorious militarists and nationalistic leaders received considerable attention from the Japanese press and interested citizens; but other purgees whose part in the growth of totalitarianism was more obscure were frequently ignored by the public. Public opinion was, in general, a powerful restraining force in the more obvious areas of the purge, but was of little value where popular resentments had not been previously aroused against the purgees. In spite of the numerous press releases prepared by SCAP sections, public attitudes regarding the wartime leaders seemed little affected by the purge, and the public's information on the program was sparse and often erroneous. An effective publicity program is essential if public support is to serve occupational objectives.

The successful work of the SIB after May 1948, suggests that an extensive program of surveillance might have had a beneficial effect upon the purge enforcement from the outset, two years earlier (Chaps. 4 and 6).

5. The decision to prohibit political purgees from holding any public office undoubtedly served as a restraint upon the custom of merely transferring a *persona non grata* to other agencies. There was still the possibility of evasion, of course, even though the purge restrictions prevented any form of political activity or public responsibility; some purgees, for example, entered "private" life to establish companies or societies which entered into contracts to perform functions similar to those from which purgees were banned. These practices were eventually eliminated after a report by the SIB but not until 5730 such violations occurred.

There were many cases of hardship arising from the denial of a means of livelihood to professional public servants, politicians, or military men, which occasionally aroused public sympathy when the purgees remained in their former neighborhoods. Such losses will probably always be considered casualties of war (see Chaps. 3 and 6).

6. The decision to prohibit the purgee's family (within the third degree of relationship) from occupying his former position was at best only a partial solution to the problem of continuity of influence. The traditions of succession in Japan did not uniformly depend upon a blood relationship; other relationships, such as those between a master and his protege (the *oyabun* and *kobun* pattern in Japan) were of equal or greater importance, following feudal patterns of apprenticeship. The continuity of influence in such cases depended upon *shinyo*,* a form of loyalty as binding as that of the family. This form of succession was especially important in the case of economic purgees. The program had been designed for managers rather than owners. Here the family restrictions served little purpose, for only ownership tended to follow the family line, other positions being filled by traditional systems of selection. In many cases these were undisturbed by the purge.

For these reasons, the restrictions upon family succession to the purge, based upon a fragmentary conception of the Japanese system, created only public bewilderment and resentment. It did little to prevent purgees from

*For a description of shinyo cf. Ref. 67, pp. 15-33.

exerting continued influence over their successors when these were not members of the same family (see Chaps. 5 and 6, App C).

7. The decision to conduct an orderly and systematic de-purge by category permitted successive ranks of purgees to re-enter public life while Japan was still occupied. This did not create any changes in public opinion (those who favored the purge usually opposed the de-purge, and vice versa), but it may have prevented a sudden large-scale offensive by the Old Guard after the Occupation controls were lifted. The de-purgees were not set apart in the society and enjoyed no special public sympathy or support when sovereignty was restored (Chaps. 2 and 6).

8. The decision to purge the legislators who had been involved in Japan's imperialistic expansion was a means of dramatizing the democratic concept of legislative leadership. Although the Tojo-sponsored Diet members had actually exerted little influence in the shaping of Japan's prewar totalitarianism, their unwillingness to accept a constitutional role of law-making supremacy had paved the way to a despotic coup d'état. Their political opportunism had disqualified them from a leading role in the building of democratic traditions.

As a result, the first postwar legislature was young and inexperienced, and it lost a measure of its authority to other elements of the government. This provided a possible source of weakness in the operation of the new constitution, particularly in its principle of legislative supremacy. Nevertheless, the purge of these legislators proved an important means of communicating a new public view of democratic leadership. The miscellaneous losses sustained by the constitutional checks-and-balances system were minimized by an elaborate series of institutional reform measures (Chap. 3).

9. The decision to limit the purge of public employees to high policy-making positions resulted in a displacement of power favoring the permanent bureaucracy. Whether this will prove an insurmountable obstacle to the prospects for a constitutional democracy cannot now be predicted.

The context of the Occupation, involving the use of indigenous governmental agencies, made it especially important that these agencies be free from elements of the outmoded wartime ideology. Yet Occupation planners confronted equally important considerations of efficiency, which demanded a continuity of key personnel in the national government.

This dilemma cannot be solved by a formula. Undoubtedly in Japan the bureaucracy could have been more thoroughly "cleansed" without serious loss of efficiency, but there is no means for determining how much of a purge could have been safely permitted. It is possible that a special screening process could have been devised for the public service, which could have determined fitness of individuals to hold offices of public trust. The bureaucracy may become the key to the future of a democratic order, even though it must remain also a link to specific plans and operations of the old. Care must be taken that its continuity with the past represents a preservation of elements compatible with the aims of the Occupation.

Special attention should also be devoted to the problem of institutional reforms (civil service system, extension of the social base of public employment, elimination of special privileges, etc.) which may serve to convert an entrenched bureaucracy into public servants responsible to the political institutions of government.

The strengthening of the bureaucratic cliques in Japan may yet prove to have been one of the most important failures of the Occupation (Chap. 3).

10. The decision to purge officials of extremist political societies was particularly appropriate in Japan. Not only had these semipublic associations been an important means of integrating individual citizens into totalitarian patterns, but the leaders of these organizations had also provided a source of important political pressures in the formulation of Japanese aggressive policies.

The removal of these extremists also enabled Occupation authorities, with perfect consistency, to purge Communist extremists who rose to public favor after the war had ended.

11. The decision to include economic leaders in the purge of public offices was dictated by expediency rather than design. It was an uneasy compromise between the opponents of any economic purge at all and those who desired a special program for the business world. Since the original program had made no provision for economic leaders and no special economic purge would have been acceptable to all SCAP sections after the first year of the Occupation, the purge of industrialists took place only when, a year after the original directive, the GS simply redefined "public office" to include positions of responsibility in Japan's leading industries (Chap. 5).

This decision served its immediate purpose, but it aroused hitherto unexpressed antagonisms to the Occupation. The inclusion of positions in private industry among the "public offices" of Japan was puzzling to many Japanese and foreign observers, and did much to discredit both the purge and the economic reform programs.

More basically, it also produced excesses of literalism in its application (Chap. 5). Its formal definitions invited evasions already long familiar to a people who had traditionally used figureheads to protect responsible officials who might otherwise be involved in scandals, law suits, and shady financial operations. The successes of the purge were therefore spotty and haphazard; often the greatest hardships were created in companies of a type which the Occupation was seeking to encourage (Chap. 5).

12. The decision to extend the national purge categories to local communities had unexpected and sometimes far-reaching effects on village life and traditions. Its targets were frequently only obscurely related to the objectives of the program, particularly in cases involving the operations of local chapters of wartime national organizations.

The local purge, based on the assumption that communities were uniform models of the national pattern, removed at the same moment fanatics and liberals, political bosses and obscure old men, village elders and youth leaders. It included offices which had been assigned by a traditional system of rotation, together with others whose functions were nominal and perfunctory.

There is no doubt that many local tyrants were removed from office, but the vast majority of local purgees appear to have been of no particular importance in the community, and to have possessed no special associations with the war or with totalitarian policies.

It is probable that errors of this sort could be avoided by limiting the number of titular purgees to be removed in villages and cities, once the field studies described above have been made. Other removals may, of course, become necessary where local "bosses" have avoided holding public office; but it seems doubtful if cases of this type can be identified through the machinery of a national purge. Where the results of a limited purge appear too protective of these elements of community "leadership," it may be necessary to delegate responsibility for special purges to local military government teams, with adequate safeguards against abuse.

The conclusion seems clear that application of a purge program in special areas of national life (whether in the political parties, the bureaucracy, local communities, or industry) should be undertaken separately, based on an intensive field analysis of each.

13. The decision to announce the purge in a context of reform rather than revenge was not successfully carried out. There was little public understanding of the relation between the purge and the elimination of totalitarian and militaristic elements in Japan: the program appeared more a matter of military necessity or administrative convenience than of political rehabilitation. The vast majority of the Japanese people were ignorant of the objectives and scope of the purge, which they viewed with suspicion or indifference. This attitude was especially harmful to the objective of discrediting Japan's war-time leadership (Chap. 4).

A more thorough program of public information, relating each phase of the purge to its basic objectives and directed to different levels of popular response, might eliminate simple public misconceptions, although a certain amount of public resentment may be anticipated in any case.

The major decisions of the purge were sound, as evidenced by the changed character of Japan's political leadership following the war and Occupation. Even the smooth and efficient operation of the civil agencies of the occupied government were related to decisions of restraint and balance in the purge program as much as to changes in the structure of government itself; but the purge is also related to the survivals of the old order that have remained to struggle against the new. There is an important element of gratitude in the public opinion polls relating to the United States and the Occupation; but there are also scarcely veiled attitudes of resentment and disappointment in the "bloodless revolution" promised by the Potsdam Declaration and the purge directive.

As a working arrangement, the purge was a success. As a political reform it partially achieved its purposes.

Its course through Japanese national life must be accounted one of the most important influences of the Occupation, both in what it destroyed of the past and in what it encouraged for the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Important lessons may be drawn from successes and failures in Japan. These do not necessarily provide definitive arguments for other decisions and other places, but they can provide precedents that should not be overlooked. Their implications clearly transcend Japan and the years 1945 to 1952.

It is now axiomatic that the conditions of war and defeat tend to produce a class of politically undesirable persons, who are potentially capable of obstructing the course of a military occupation. Most obvious among these are the creators and the spokesmen of a political order which the war was fought to destroy. They and their patrons and their subordinates are the first targets of an enforced "revolution from above" following defeat. But the Japanese experience shows that other groups, equally dangerous, may seek to take advantage of the postwar confusion and to advance programs inconsistent with the purposes of the military government. These may appear first in the guise of a friend of the Occupation, as did the Communist party in Japan, where they made temporary gains by associating themselves with the attack on the old

order. This more subtle problem requires great insight and flexibility in its solution, which did not appear in Japan until the passage of many months had brought about a national crisis. The Occupation authorities could deal with the first group of purgees directly because the original policy so directed; but indecision in the early administration of the purge enabled the Communists to seize the propaganda initiative in the destruction of the old order, until they were themselves visited with the purge.

Future policy should dictate, therefore, that purge removals should be announced decisively and carried out swiftly, so that the public reactions against the defeated regime may be mobilized to the support of the military government reforms. The objectives should be stated broadly enough to include politically undesirable groups which may arise later in the Occupation.

The scale of the projected removals provides a highly controversial area of decision-making. It seems clear that removals should begin with well-known leaders whose names are publicly associated with the elements of the old order which are to be discredited; they should also, if possible, include others occupying positions which the Occupation is seeking to make politically responsible, if for no other reason than to dramatize the need for accepting responsibility in such positions.

There is, however, the danger of a "boomerang effect" in public sentiment if the number of removals vastly exceeds public expectations after the policy is announced. This occurred in Japan especially in the rural areas, when the categories were found to include obscure and apparently harmless figures. "You have been bitten by a mad dog," was a phrase used to console purgees who saw themselves as victims of an arbitrary persecution. To avoid such reactions, the scale of the projected removals should be measured against anticipated public responses, so that popular resistance to the new leadership will be minimized.

Unavoidably the balance of power in domestic politics will be disturbed by the removal of certain elements and the survival of others. This may bring about important losses to the reform objectives if undesirable elements emerge in comparatively greater strength as a result of the purge of their rivals. Alterations in policy should be made wherever necessary to create a desired equilibrium among domestic political forces, either through the extension of the purge to these elements, or through institutional reforms favoring the desired groups. The original policy statements should therefore be broad enough to include such contingencies, so that no appearance of a public reversal becomes necessary.

In other respects, also, the purge program should be carefully integrated with the broad objectives of the Occupation. This applies in economic fields as well as political, where the removals may inadvertently bolster the economic positions of the very organizations which had prospered most under the old order. Similarly, in the purge of local leaders on the basis of an inappropriate system of categories, the injuries to the reform program may outweigh the advantages of discrediting former leaders. It is extremely important that military government officers be trained to recognize the consequences of such actions and to avoid performance of their duties in such a way as to nullify their own work.

The actual administration of the removal policies may minimize defects in basic policy, particularly if accurate information becomes available where only informed guesses had existed before. Administrative plans for the specific application of the program to the occupied nation should be undertaken as

soon as the policies are announced to the military command (and even, in some cases, before official statements have appeared). These plans should include the appointment of a team of area specialists and social scientists to collect data on the operations of the enemy government and the patterns of leadership in the enemy's social structure. Early in the Occupation, these data should be checked by a series of field studies covering each major source of domestic leadership (e.g., the national politics, the civil service, economic agencies, etc.). Similar studies should be repeated as the Occupation progresses, so that the effects of the removals and other reforms may be appraised in terms of their objectives.

Many of the errors of excess arising from an overzealous purge program can be avoided. Review agencies should be established as soon as the removals go into effect to eliminate injustices arising from simple errors of fact. In the same manner, errors of omission should be corrected through the extension of the purge restrictions to flagrant cases occurring outside the original purge categories.

Public indignation against the removal program tends to become particularly acrimonious when political manipulation is suspected. In Japan, for example, there were persistent rumors that the purge was being used by the government party to neutralize its rivals; but even more objectionable was the fact that elected officials were sometimes purged and replaced by their political enemies. Military government officials should carry on scrupulous and constant surveillance over the operations of the indigenous agencies engaged in administering the removals.

Much of the success of a change of leadership may depend upon public opinion. There are many devices that can be used to secure public support, but these lose much of their effectiveness if the objectives and scope of the program as a whole are not given wide currency. Flagrant violations (continued office-holding in secret or continued exercise of influence over vacated offices) will tend to arouse resentment against the program and sympathy for other purgees who act more honorably. Adequate surveillance should be maintained over the activities of purgees, using both civilian and military intelligence agencies.

In Japan the length of the Occupation was sufficient to permit a smooth transition to restored national sovereignty. It is impossible to predict the length of an occupation in advance, but the Japanese experience emphasized the fact that, if possible, purge restrictions should be systematically lifted so that lesser offenders may be released first, and those who are willing to cooperate with the reform program can secure some advantages over other survivors of the old order. In this way, the purge becomes the sharper weapon against those who provide the greater danger to the success of the occupational mission. Even if the occupation does not last long enough to introduce a de-purge program, a public announcement of such plans may serve the same objective.

The present research was designed to explore the feasibility of gathering empirical data relating to military government operations. The Japanese experience had already illustrated the enormous complexity of occupation administration: that the basic functions of government and society continue in much the same fashion under an occupation as in other conditions of stress; that the interactions between occupier and vanquished provide further variables in the already complex conditions following a defeat; that policy objectives of reform and recovery collide in both theory and practice. This

experience may also provide a basis for predicting future occupational patterns.

But not enough is known yet about what happens under the conditions of occupation; it is not yet possible to predict to what extent the same procedures will bring different results in different situations. At this stage the technology of military government is probably less advanced than that of any other phase of warfare. Much of this can be overcome by continued research, particularly in comparative fields of occupation administration. Our record of military government policy and performance can be improved in direct proportion to our knowledge of the arts and sciences of overseas occupation.

Appendix A
SCAP DIRECTIVES
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Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

4 October 1945

(SCAPIN 93)

Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government.
Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
Subject: Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil,
and Religious Liberties

1. In order to remove restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties and discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

a. Abrogate and immediately suspend the operation of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

(2) Establish or maintain restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information.

(3) By their terms or their application, operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion.

b. The enactments covered in paragraph a, above, shall include but shall not be limited to the following:

(1) The Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Ho, Law No. 54 of 1941, promulgated on or about 10 March 1941).

(2) The Protection and Surveillance Law for Thought Offense (Shiso Han Hogo Kansatsu Ho, Law No. 29 of 1936, promulgated on or about 29 May 1936).

(3) Regulations Relative to Application of Protection and Surveillance Law for Thought Offense (Shiso Han Hogo Kansoku Ho Shiko Rei Imperial Ordinance No. 401 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November 1936).

(4) Ordinance Establishing Protection and Surveillance Stations (Hoho Kansoku-Jo Kansei, Imperial Ordinance No. 403 of 1936, issued on or about 14 November 1936).

(5) The Precautionary Detention Procedure Order (Yobo Kokin Tetsuzuki Rei, Ministry of Justice Order, Shihosho Rei, No. 49, issued on or about 14 May 1941).

(6) Regulations for Treatment of Persons Under Precautionary Detention (Yobo Kokin Shoga Rei, Ministry of Justice Order, Shihosho Rei, No. 30, issued on about 14 May 1941).

(7) The National Defense and Peace Preservation Law (Kokubo Hoan Ho, Law No. 49 of 1941, promulgated on or about 7 March 1941).

(8) National Defense and Peace Preservation Law Enforcement Order (Kokubo Hoan Ho Shiko Rei, Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1941, issued on or about 7 May 1941).

(9) Regulations for Appointment of Lawyers Under Peace Preservation Laws (Bengoshi Shitei Kitei, Ministry of Justice Order, Shihosho Rei, No. 47 of 1941, issued on or about 9 May 1941).

(10) Law for Safeguarding Secrets of Military Materiel Resources (Gunto Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho, Law No. 25 of 1939, promulgated on or about 25 March 1939).

(11) Ordinance for the Enforcement of the Law of Safeguarding Secrets of Military Materiel Resources (Gunyo Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiko Rei, Imperial Ordinance No. 413 of 1939, issued on or about 24 June 1939).

(12) Regulations for the Enforcement of the Law of Safeguarding Secrets of Military Materiel Resources (Gunto Shigen Himitsu Hogo Ho Shiko Kisoku, Ministries of War and Navy Ordinance No.3 of 1939, promulgated on or about 26 June 1939).

(13) Law for the Protection of Military Secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho, Law No. 72 of 1937, promulgated on or about 17 August 1937, revised by Law No. 59, of 1941).

(14) Regulations for the Enforcement of the Law for the Protection of Military Secrets (Gunki Hogo Ho Shiko Kisoku, Ministry of War Ordinance No. 59, issued on or about 12 December 1939 and revised by Ministry of War Ordinance Numbers 6, 20 and 58 of 1941).

(15) The Religious Body Law (Shukyo Dantai Ho, Law No. 77 of 1939, promulgated on or about 8 April 1939).

(16) All laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations amending, supplementing or implementing the foregoing enactments.

c. Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under "protection or surveillance," or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance," or restriction of freedom:

(1) Under the enactments referred to in Paragraph 1 a and b above.

(2) Without charge.

(3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance," or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs, or assembly.

The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 October 1945.

d. Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in Paragraph 1 a and b above and that part of, or functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to:

(1) All secret police organs.

(2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(3) Those departments, such as the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Koisatsu Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the territorial administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.

(4) Those departments, such as the Protection and Surveillance Commission, and all protection and surveillance stations responsible thereto, under the Ministry of Justice charged with protection and surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly.

e. Remove from office and employment the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chief of the Bureau of Police of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of Osaka Metropolitan Police Board, the Chief of any other Metropolitan police, the Chief of the Police of the Territorial Administration of Hokkaido, the Chiefs of each Prefectural Police Department, the entire personnel of the Special Higher Police of all Metropolitan, Territorial, and Prefectural police departments, the Guiding and Protecting officials and all other personnel of the Protection and Surveillance Commission and of the Protection and Surveillance Stations. None of the above persons will be reappointed to any position under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice or any police organ in Japan. Any of the above persons whose assistance is required to accomplish the provisions of this directive will be retained until the directive is accomplished and then dismissed.

f. Prohibit any further activity by police officials, members of police forces, and other government, national or local, officials or employees which is related to the enactments referred to in Paragraph 1 a and b above and to the organs and functions abolished by Paragraph 1 d above.

g. Prohibit the physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons detained, imprisoned, or under protection and surveillance under any and all Japanese enactments, laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations. All such persons will receive at all times ample sustenance.

h. Ensure the security and preservation of all records and any and all other materials of the organs abolished in Paragraph 1 d. These records may be used to accomplish the provisions of this directive, but will not be destroyed, removed, or tampered with in any way.

i. Submit a comprehensive report to this Headquarters not later than 15 October 1945 describing in detail all action taken to comply with all provisions of this directive. This report will contain the following specific information prepared in the form of separate supplementary reports:

(1) Information concerning persons released in accordance with Paragraph 1 c above (to be grouped by prison or institution in which held or from which released or by office controlling their protection and surveillance).

(a) Name of person released from detention or imprisonment or person released from protection and surveillance, his age, nationality, race and occupation.

(b) Specification of criminal charges against each person released from detention or imprisonment or reason for which each person was placed under protection and surveillance.

(c) Date of release and contemplated address of each person released from detention or imprisonment or from protection and surveillance.

(2) Information concerning organizations abolished under the provisions of this directive:

(a) Name of organization.

(b) Name, address, and title of position of persons dismissed in accordance with Paragraph 1 e.

(c) Description by type and location of all files, records, reports, and any and all other materials.

(3) Information concerning the Prison System and Prison Personnel.

(a) Organization chart of the Prison System.

(b) Names and location of all prisons, detention centers and jails.

(c) Names, rank, and title of all prison officials (Governors and Assistant Governors, Chief and Assistant Chief Warders, Warders and Prison Doctors).

(4) Copies of all orders issued by the Japanese Government including those issued by the Governors of Prisons and Prefectural Officials in effecting the provisions of this directive.

2. All officials and subordinates of the Japanese Government affected by the terms of this directive will be held personally responsible and strictly accountable for compliance with and adherence to the spirit and letter of this directive.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. V. ALLEN
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

General Headquarters
Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers

APO 500,
4 January 1946.

AG 091 (4 January 1946) GS
(SCAPIN 548)

Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government
Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
Subject: Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations,
Societies and Other Organizations

1. You will prohibit the formation of any political party, association, society or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them or of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity, is the following:

a. Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or,

b. Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad, or,

c. Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples, or,

d. Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions, or,

e. Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries, or,

f. Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarist or a martial spirit in Japan, or,

g. Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.

2. A list of organizations, some or all of whose purposes are prescribed under the provisions of Paragraph 1 above, is given in Appendix A to this Memorandum. This list will not be regarded as inclusive. The organizations listed in that appendix and other organizations whose purposes or activities are those above mentioned or similar to them will be immediately dissolved, together with any organizations which they control or with which they are affiliated.

3. a. You will take such action immediately as may be required to prevent all transactions involving property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any organization dissolved or to be dissolved in accord with this Memorandum or of the type enumerated in Paragraph 1 hereof. All such property, including all books, files and records of such organizations, will be seized and held in your custody. You will obtain complete records of all such property and will keep them available for inspection as public records. Officials receiving such records will be held personally responsible for their safe keeping and use for the production of food, shelter or other necessities of life will be exploited as promptly as possible for these purposes.

b. You will promptly obtain and submit to this Headquarters the name and address and the position held by each person who has, at any time since 7 July 1937, served as an officer of any organization dissolved in accord with this Memorandum. Such information will also be kept available as a public record. Complete membership lists will also be furnished.

4. You will enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of this Memorandum and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms.

5. Until further order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, any organization shall be deemed, regardless of its declared purposes, to further purposes or activities contrary to the terms of this Memorandum if:

a. Any of its principal officers were (i) members of organizations abolished in accord with this order, or (ii) former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who have been on active duty since 1 January 1930 or, (iii) any person who has served in or with the military police (Kempei-Tai) or Naval Police, the TOKUMU KIKAN, KAIGUN TOKUMU RU, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations.

b. Its membership includes more than twenty-five percent of persons who were formerly members of an organization or organizations abolished or prohibited in pursuance of this Memorandum.

6. You will forbid the formation or activity of any party, society, organization, association or group whose purpose or activity consists of:

a. Proposing or supporting candidates for public office.

b. Influencing the policy of Government.

c. The discussion of the relations between Japan and foreign powers, unless it shall first have filed a declaration of (a) its name, (b) its purposes, (c) the address of its principal offices, (d) the names and addresses of its officers together with a statement as to their military or police service and the names of any associations, societies

or parties of which they are or have been members, (e) the names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and the amounts of their respective contributions, (f) a roster of the names and addresses of its membership, in the office of the mayor of the town or city in which it has or intends to have its principal office. Such declarations will be kept up to date as changes in purposes and membership occur. Declarations with regard to changes of membership and substantial contributions will be made as required by the Supreme Commander; reports of changes in officers or purposes will be made immediately. You will direct that the mayor of any town or city receiving such a declaration or any change forward two copies to an appropriate office of the Imperial Japanese Government in Tokyo. Both the original and one of the copies of such declarations will be kept available for public inspection at all times during ordinary business hours. No fees will be charged in connection with any of the foregoing and the procedure fixed for filing such declarations shall be such as to make compliance with these directions as simple and easy as possible.

The provisions of this paragraph which require the filing of a roster of the names and addresses of members will not apply to groups or other organizations of workers or employees who meet for the purpose of the discussion of questions relating to wages, hours and working conditions or the choice of persons to represent them in negotiations with their employers in connection with such questions.

7. The purpose of the provisions of Paragraph 6 of this Memorandum is to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations in Japan and to prevent the formation of secret, militaristic, ultranationalistic and antidemocratic societies and organizations. It shall not be interpreted nor shall it be applied in a manner which interferes with freedom of assembly, speech or religion except with respect to the purposes and activities specifically mentioned herein.

8. You will present your programme for the execution of the directions of this Memorandum, together with any laws, ordinances or orders to be issued in accord with it, for the approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Any laws or ordinances which you will enact in compliance with this Memorandum will provide that, upon such approval, they will be effective from the date of this Memorandum, regardless of the date of their enactment.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

INCLOSURE

List of organizations to be abolished referred to in Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government AG 091 (4 January 1946) GS. This list does not include all of the organizations which are to be dissolved in accord with the directions of the above Memorandum.

1. DAI NIPPON ISSHIN-KAI (Great Japan Renovation Society)
2. DAI NIPPON KOA RENMEI (Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance) and all its affiliated organizations
3. DAI NIPPON SEISANTO (Great Japan Production Party)
4. DAI NIPPON SEKISEI-KAI (Greater Japan True-Hearted Society)

5. DAI TOA KYOKAI (Greater East Asia Association)
6. DAITO JUKU (Eastern Academy)
7. GENRON HOKOKU KAI (Literary Patriotic Society)
8. GENYOSHA (Dark Ocean Society)
9. JIKYOKU KAIGI KAI (Current Affairs Discussion Society)
10. KAKUMEI-SO (The House of the Cry of the Crane)
11. KENKOKU-KAI (National Foundation Society)
12. KINKEI GAKUIN (Golden Pheasant Institute)
13. KOKURYUKAI (Black Dragon Society)
14. KOKUSAI KANKYO RENMEI (Anti-Communist League)
15. KOKUSAI SEIKEI GAKKAI (International Political Economic Society)
16. KOKUSUI TAISHUTO (Ultrationalist Party)
17. KOKUTAI YOGO RENGO (National State Protection League)
18. MEIRIN-KAI (Higher Ethics Society)
19. MIZUHO CLUB (Mizuho, archaic poetic term for Japan; literally French rice plant)
20. SONJO DOSHIKAI (Loyalist Comrades Society)
21. TAIKA KAI (Great Change Society)
22. TENKOKAI (Heavenly Action Society)
23. TOA RENMEI (East Asia League)
24. TOHO DOSHIKAI (Far Eastern Comrades Association)
25. TOHO KAI (Eastern Society)
26. YAMATO MUSUBI HONSHA (Yamato Solidarity Headquarters or Japanese Knot)
27. ZEN NIPPON SEINEN KURABU (All Japan Young Men's Club)

4 January 1946

(SCAPIN 550)

Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government
 Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
 Subject: Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from
 Public Office

1. The Potsdam Declaration states: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest; for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

2. In order to carry out this provision of the Potsdam Declaration, the Imperial Japanese Government is hereby ordered to remove from public office and exclude from government service all persons who have been:

- a. Active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression.
- b. Influential members of any Japanese ultranationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates; or
- c. Influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society or the Political Association of Great Japan, as those terms are defined in Appendix A to this directive.

3. The term "public office" as used in this directive shall mean and include:

- a. Any position in the government service which is customarily filled by one with the civil service rank of Chokunin or above (or equivalent rank under any reorganization of the civil service system); or
- b. Any other position in the government service not customarily filled by a member of the civil service which is equivalent or superior to the civil service rank of Chokunin (in the case of government corporations the term will include at least: Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor and Auditor).

4. The term "government service," as used in this directive, shall mean and include all positions in the central Japanese and Prefectural Governments and all of their agencies and local branches, bureaus (including Regional Administrative Bureaus) and offices and all positions in corporations, associations and other organizations in which said Governments or any of their agencies have a financial interest representing actual or working control.

5. The term "remove from public office," as used in this directive, shall mean to discharge the person from the public office which he holds and to terminate his influence and participation therein, directly and indirectly. Persons removed from public office will not be entitled to any public or private pensions or other emoluments or benefits without the consent of this Headquarters. An official removed under this procedure will be dismissed and will not be entitled to the hearing or other procedures precedent to removal to which he may have been entitled under Japanese Law.

6. The term "exclude from government service," as used in this directive, shall mean to bar the person in question from any position in the government service. Thus, persons removed from public office will be disqualified from holding any other positions in the government service. Also, persons who may not be holding public offices from which they must be removed may nevertheless be disqualified from taking a position in the government service. This disqualification from holding public office shall be continued until the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration quoted in paragraph 1 have been fulfilled in Japan.

7. The mere removal of officials from public office and the exclusion from government service of those persons described herein will not be sufficient to establish the new order of peace, security and justice envisaged by the Potsdam Declaration. If Japan is to achieve a peacefully inclined and responsible government, the greatest care must be taken to appoint new officials who will foster the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people and who will respect fundamental human rights and freedom of speech, religion and thought. If existing civil service qualification regulations provide obstacles to the appointment of such officials or unduly narrow the field from which appointments may be made, such regulations shall be amended or superseded.

8. The removals ordered by this directive shall be effected as expeditiously as possible, priority being given to the more important positions. Removal may be postponed in the case of individuals who are absolutely required to insure demobilization of the Japanese armed forces in the outlying theaters or to carry out the provisions of this directive. When their assistance is no longer absolutely required they will be dismissed. The names of such individuals, their positions, the reason for their disqualification, and the reasons for their temporary retention will be promptly reported to this Headquarters. The time of their final dismissal will also promptly be reported.

9. Appendix A contains a list of the categories of persons who must be removed from public office and excluded from government service by the Imperial Japanese Government in order to carry out the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this directive. Persons included in the categories listed in Appendix A shall be removed from public office as provided in Paragraphs 8 and 10 and shall thereafter be excluded from government service. However, if the Imperial Japanese Government represents that in order to carry on indispensable peaceful executive activities of such government, the temporary reinstatement of an individual so removed is essential and that it is impossible to obtain a suitable replacement, an application so stating, signed by a responsible official of the Imperial Japanese Government, may be filed with this Headquarters. Such applications shall contain a statement of the name, rank, position, duties and responsibilities of the individual involved; shall state fully the reasons why such temporary reinstatement is regarded as essential, the requested period of temporary reinstatement and the efforts made to obtain a suitable replacement. Such application shall be accompanied by a copy of the Questionnaire described in Paragraph 10, below. No such temporary reinstatement will be effected by the Imperial Japanese Government until this Headquarters has registered its approval in writing.

10. In order to insure that the government service is cleaned of undesirable personnel the following action will be taken:

a. The Imperial Japanese Government will instruct each of its Ministries or other appropriate agencies to remove from positions described in Paragraph 3 which are within its competence, any persons whom the records show or who are known to have been within the categories listed in Appendix A. A Questionnaire (see below) will be obtained from each such individual before he is notified of his dismissal.

b. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Government will instruct each of its Ministries or other appropriate agencies to prepare and distribute to all incumbents of positions described in Paragraph 3 and to future applicants for government positions which are within its competence, the Questionnaire contained in Appendix B. Such Questionnaires will be reviewed and on the basis of them and any other knowledge in possession of the Government, individuals will be removed from office or denied employment in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

11. Each Ministry or other appropriate agency will prepare a Plan for handling the Questionnaires which will provide for: (a) distribution; (b) collection; (c) review; (d) action on basis of information in Questionnaire; (e) classification and filing. This system should permit reference to the Questionnaire in terms of agency, rank of officials, and action taken (e. g., removal or retention).

12. Each plan will provide for screening of positions occupied by higher rank officials first. A duplicate set of completed Questionnaires will be provided at the Headquarters of each Ministry or other agency where it will be available for inspection or removal by this Headquarters.

13. In addition to the Questionnaires each Ministry or other agency will maintain at its headquarters an alphabetical file of Questionnaire Record Cards substantially in the form indicated in Appendix C available for inspection or removal by this Headquarters. The cards will be filled out in English (also in Japanese if desired). Identical

numbers, with an identifying symbol for each Ministry or other agency, will be assigned to each Questionnaire and the Record Card relating thereto.

14. In order that the forthcoming elections may provide a full opportunity for democratic elements in Japan to obtain memberships in the Imperial Diet denied them during the years of Japan's militaristic nationalism and aggression and in order to eliminate from the new Diet the influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, any person who comes within the categories described in Appendix A shall be disqualified as a candidate for any elective position in the Imperial Diet. Any such person shall be disqualified from standing at any time as a candidate for prefectural Governor or Mayor of a city (Shi). Also, all such persons shall be removed from and henceforth excluded from appointment to the House of Peers. The Imperial Japanese Government shall adopt measures to enforce this disqualification of candidates for elective office, including the issuance of necessary regulations, the publication of disqualification categories prepared in conformity herewith and the certification by each candidate that he is not thereby disqualified from standing for election. A comprehensive report of the measures proposed to be adopted will be furnished to this Headquarters.

15. The Imperial Japanese Government will make the following reports to this Headquarters (In English, in triplicate):

- a. Reports required by Paragraphs 8 and 14 hereof.
- b. An initial report of the Plan of each Ministry or other agency called for by Paragraph 11. This Headquarters may direct revision of any of these Plans if they are not considered adequate.
- c. A weekly report, divided into sections for the fields of competence of each Ministry or other agency, showing:
 - (1) Total number of positions whose incumbents are to be investigated.
 - (2) Number and type of positions investigated previously and during the current week.
 - (3) Number of persons removed or denied employment during the current week.
 - (4) Names, ranks, positions, and Questionnaire numbers of persons removed or denied employment during the current week.

16. This Headquarters will provide for inspections and investigations necessary to check compliance with this directive, and the Imperial Japanese Government will render any assistance required for the making of such inspections and investigations. Action taken by the Japanese Government with respect to removal or denial of employment and with respect to disqualification of candidates for elective office will be reviewed and may be reversed by this Headquarters.

17. Wilful falsification of or failure to make full and complete disclosures in any Questionnaire, report, or Application provided for in this directive will be punishable by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as a violation of the Surrender Terms. In addition, the Imperial Japanese Government will make any provisions necessary to provide adequate punishment in Japanese courts and under Japanese law for such wilful falsification or nondisclosure and will undertake such prosecutions as may be required.

18. In addition to the general provisions of this directive covering all public offices, this Headquarters has made and may make more restrictive requirements respecting employment of certain classes of individuals at all levels in special fields.

19. All officials and subordinates of the Imperial Japanese Government affected by the terms of this order will be held personally responsible and strictly accountable for compliance with and adherence to the spirit and letter of this directive.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

Inclosures:

Appendix A - Removal and Exclusion Categories

Appendix B - Questionnaire

Appendix C - Questionnaire Record Card

Appendix A

REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION CATEGORIES

A. War Criminals: persons arrested as suspected war criminals unless released or acquitted.

B. Career military and naval personnel, special police and officials of the War Ministries—any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:

1. Member of: Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals; Supreme Military Council; Imperial General Headquarters; Army and Navy General Staffs; Supreme Council for Direction of the War.

2. Commissioned officer in the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or in the Special Volunteer Reserve.

3. Commissioned or noncommissioned officers, enlisted men or civilian employees who served in or with the Military Police (Kempei-Tai) or Naval Police, the TOKOMU KIKAN, KAIGUN TOKUMU BU, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations.

4. Ministry of War (unless appointed since 2 September 1945): Minister; Permanent Vice-Minister; Parliamentary Vice-Minister; Parliamentary Councillor; Chief Secretary; all civilian officials of the civil service rank of Chokunin, or above, or who occupy positions normally held by persons of such rank.

5. Ministry of the Navy (unless appointed since 2 September 1945): Minister; Permanent Vice-Minister; Parliamentary Vice-Minister; Parliamentary Councillor; Chief Secretary; all civilian officials of the civil service rank of Chokunin, or above, or who occupy positions normally held by persons of such rank.

C. Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies—any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder, officer, or director of; or

2. Occupied any post of authority in; or

3. Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or

4. Made substantial voluntary contributions (a sum or property the value of which is large in itself or large in proportion to the means of the individual in question) to any of the organizations or their branches, subsidiaries, agencies, or affiliates (other than the organizations referred to in Paragraph D below) described in the Memorandum to the Japanese Government on "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations and Societies" AG 091 (4 January 1946) GS.

D. Persons Influential in the Activities of IRRAIRAPS, and the Political Association of Great Japan—any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder or national officer, a national director, national committee chairman, or a leading official of a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of; or

2. Been an editor of any publication or organ of:

a. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) and any of its affiliates.

b. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai) and any of its affiliates or agencies.

c. The Political Association of Great Japan and any of its affiliates or agencies.

E. Officers of Financial and Development Organizations involved in Japanese Expansions—any person who has at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 occupied any of the positions listed below:

Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor or Auditor of any of the following or, in territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces since 7 July 1937, manager of a branch of: South Manchurian Railway Company, Manchuria Development Company, North China Development Company, Central China Development Company, Southern Development Company, Taiwan Development Company, Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company, Nanyo Development Company, Oriental Development Company, Wartime Finance Bank, United Funds Bank, Southern Development Bank, Overseas Funds Bank, Chosen Colonization Bank, Deutsche Bank Für Ostasien, Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Manchukuo, Manchurian Development Bank, Korean Trust Company, and any other bank, development company or institution whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories.

F. Governors of Occupied Territories—Japanese officials who have held the positions listed below:

1. Korea: Governor General; Chief Civilian Administrator; Members of Privy Council.

2. Formosa: Governor General; Chief Civilian Administrator.

3. Kwantung: Governor General; Chief Administrator; Director of the Bureau of Pacification.

4. South Seas: Governor General; Director of South Seas Administration Office.

5. Netherlands East Indies: Chief Military Administrator; Chief Civil Administrator.

6. Malaya: Chief Military Administrator; Chief Civil Administrator; Mayor of Singapore.

7. French Indo-China: Governor General; Inspector General of Police; Director of Bureau of General Affairs; Financial Charge d'Affaires.

8. Burma: Advisers to the Burmese Administration; Chief of the Political Affairs Department of the Japanese Military Administration; Chief of the Internal Affairs Department of the Central Administration.

9. China: Advisers to the Nanking Puppet Government; Ambassador.

10. Manchukuo: Director of General Affairs Board; Vice-Director of General Affairs Board; Officers of the Central Organization of the Concordia Society.

11. Others: Responsible Japanese Officials controlling collaborationist native governments in the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government, the Philippine Puppet Republic, the Provisional Government of Free India, and Thailand.

G. Additional Militarists and Ultranationalists:

1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

2. Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire
Number
(to be assigned by
Ministry or other
appropriate agency)

(Instructions: This questionnaire shall be filled out in both Japanese and English. The English version will prevail if discrepancies exist between it and the Japanese version. Answers must be typewritten or printed clearly in block letters. Every question must be answered precisely and conscientiously and no space is to be left blank. If the question is to be answered by either "yes" or "no," print the word "yes" or "no" in the appropriate space. Use the supplementary sheets if there is not enough space in the Questionnaire. Omissions or false or incomplete statements are criminal offenses and will result in prosecution and punishment.)

A. Personal

1. List position for which you are under consideration, with Civil Service Grade _____

2. Name _____
(Surname) (First and Middle Name)

3. Other names which you have used or by which you have been known _____
4. Date of birth _____ 5. Place of birth _____
6. Height _____ 7. Weight _____ 8. Scars, marks, or deformities _____
9. Present address _____
(In full)
10. Permanent residence _____
(In full)
11. Identity-card type and number _____
12. List any instances when you have been arrested, together with the reasons therefor, and any crimes of which you have been convicted _____
13. Give any Civil Service rank and grade now held _____

B. Chronological Record of Employment and Military Service

14. In the space below, give a chronological history of your employment, including all of the positions which you have held since 1 January 1931. In reporting either governmental or military positions, be sure to give all of the ranks which you may, at any time, have held _____

C. Membership in Organizations

15. In the space below, report whether or not you are or were a member or a founder or organizer or an officer of the national office or of a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, or the Political Association of Great Japan. Report also whether or not you acted as editor for any publication of any of these associations or organized any branches or special activities for any of them _____
16. In the space below, report any other party, association, society, fraternity, club, union, institution, whether social, political, military, patriotic, professional, cultural, honorary, athletic or otherwise, of which you are or were a member. Make this report whether or not this society was secret. State whether or not you were a founder or organizer or leader, or occupied any post of authority in any such organization and whether you have been an editor of any of its publications _____
17. Has any member of your family held office, rank, or post of authority, or been otherwise influential in any of the organizations listed above? If so, give his name and address, his relationship to you and a description of the position which he held and of the organization _____
18. With the exception of regular membership dues, list and give details of any contributions of money or property which you have made, directly or indirectly, to any of the organizations listed above, including any contributions made by any natural or juridical person or legal entity on your behalf or through your solicitation or influence _____
19. Have you ever been the recipient of any titles, ranks, medals, testimonials, or other honors from any of the above organizations? If so, state the nature of the honor, the date conferred, and the reason _____

D. Record of Other Service

20. With exception of those you have specifically mentioned in Sections B and C above, list: _____

(a) Any part-time, unpaid or honorary position of authority or trust you have held since 1 January 1931 as a representative of the Army or Navy or of any National Ministry or other Central Government agency or as a representative of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, the Political Association of Great Japan, or their agencies, affiliates, or successor organizations.

(b) Any service of any kind you have rendered since 1 January 1931, in any military, police, law-enforcement, peace protection, or intelligence organization or in any organization concerned with protection and surveillance and control of thought, speech, religion, or assembly:

From	To	Name and type of organization	Highest office or rank you held, or type of your service	Date of appointment to highest office or rank	Duties

E. Writings and Speeches

21. List on a separate sheet the titles and publishers of all publications from 1 January 1931 to the present which were written in whole or in part or compiled or edited by you, and all public addresses made by you, giving subject, date and approximate circulation and in the case of speeches, the number in audience. If such publications or speeches were sponsored by any organization, give its name. If no speeches or publications, write "none" in this space _____

F. Corporate Positions

22. With the exception of those you have specifically mentioned above, list any corporate directorships or executive positions held by you since 1 January 1931 and where you served, whether in Japan proper or outside of Japan.

Corporation	Position held	Dates
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G. Remarks

23. The statements on this Questionnaire are true and I understand that any omission or false or incomplete statements are criminal offenses and will subject me to prosecution and punishment.

Signed _____ Date _____
(Signature of individual to whom the questionnaire relates)

(Certification of Service Superior)

(Instructions: This certification shall be signed by the service superior or other responsible official of the incumbent of public office, or, in the case of applicants for public office, by the official responsible for employing the applicant.)

I certify that the above is the true name and signature of the individual concerned and that, with the exceptions noted below, the answers made on this Questionnaire are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and the information available to me.

Exceptions (if no exceptions, write "none"): _____

Signed _____ Official Position _____ Date _____

Appendix C
Questionnaire Record Card

Questionnaire No. _____
Japanese Governmental

Name _____
(Surname) (First and Middle Name)

Address _____ Agency _____

Position which applicant holds or for which he is under consideration (with Civil Service Grade) _____

Action taken (check one): _____ Date _____

() Removed from position _____
(Describe position)

() Application for employment as _____ denied.
(Describe position)

() Retained in position _____
(Describe position)

() Application for employment as _____ approved.

Other action:

(Here record any application to Hq, SCAP, for approval of appointment or reinstatement, the action taken by Hq, SCAP, on such application, the action taken by the Japanese Government accordingly and the date of such action. Also record any other action concerning the individual, such as reversal of initial retention of the individual upon direction of SCAP, conviction of the individual for falsification or omissions in the Questionnaire, subsequent employment of the individual, etc.) _____

General Headquarters
Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers

APO 500
3 May 1946

AG 014.1 (3 May 1946) GS
(SCAPIN 919)

Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government
Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
Subject: Removal and Exclusion from Public Office of Diet Member

1. Under the memorandum of 4 January 1946, "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office" (SCAPIN 550), the Japanese Government was directed to disqualify any candidate for the Diet who had deceived and misled the people of Japan within the spirit and letter of that directive.

2. After the election on 10 April 1946, the Central Liaison Office was informed that the eligibility of one Ichiro Hatoyama, (member-elect of the House of Representatives from the First Electoral District, Tokyo) to hold any public office being open to

doubt in the light of evidence published subsequent to his screening by the Japanese Government, it was expected that his eligibility would be re-examined by the Government forthwith.

3. The Japanese Government having failed to act on its own responsibility, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has determined the facts relative to Hatoyama's eligibility and finds that he is an undesirable person within the meaning of Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Category G, Appendix A, SCAPIN 550 in that:

a. As Chief Secretary of the Tanaka Cabinet from 1927 to 1929, he necessarily shares responsibility for the formulation and promulgation without Diet approval of amendments to the so-called Peace Preservation Law which made that law the government's chief legal instrument for the suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and made possible the denunciation, terrorization, seizure, and imprisonment of tens of thousands of adherents to minority doctrines advocating political, economic, and social reform, thereby preventing the development of effective opposition to the Japanese militaristic regime.

b. As Minister of Education from December 1931 to March 1934, he was responsible for stifling freedom of speech in the schools by means of mass dismissals and arrests of teachers suspected of "leftist" leanings or "dangerous thoughts." The dismissal in May 1933 of Professor Takigawa from the faculty of Kyoto University on Hatoyama's personal order is a flagrant illustration of his contempt for the liberal tradition of academic freedom and gave momentum to the spiritual mobilization of Japan which, under the aegis of the military and economic cliques, led the nation eventually into war.

c. Not only did Hatoyama participate in thus weaving the pattern of ruthless suppression of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought, but he also participated in the forced dissolution of farmer-labor bodies. In addition, his indorsement of totalitarianism, specifically in its application to the regimentation and control of labor, is a matter of record. His recommendation that "it would be well" to transplant Hitlerite antilabor devices to Japan reveals his innate antipathy to the democratic principle of the right of labor freely to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of its own choice. It is a familiar technique of the totalitarian dictatorship, wherever situated, whatever be its formal name, and nowever be it disguised, first to weaken and then to suppress the freedom of individuals to organize for mutual benefit. Whatever lip service Hatoyama may have rendered to the cause of parliamentarianism, his sponsorship of the doctrine of regimentation of labor identifies him as a tool of the ultranationalistic interest which engineered the reorganization of Japan on a totalitarian economic basis as a prerequisite to its wars of aggression.

d. By words and deeds he has consistently supported Japan's acts of aggression. In July 1937 he traveled to America and Western Europe as personal emissary of the then Prime Minister Konoye to justify Japan's expansionist program. While abroad he negotiated economic arrangements for supporting the war against China and the subsequent exploitation of that country after subjugation. With duplicity, Hatoyama told the British Prime Minister in 1937 that "China cannot survive unless controlled by Japan," and that the primary motive behind Japan's intervention in China involved the "happiness of the Chinese people."

e. Hatoyama has posed as an antimilitarist. But in a formal address mailed to his constituents during the 1942 election in which he set forth his political credo, Hatoyama upheld the doctrine of territorial expansion by means of war, referred to the attack on Pearl Harbor as "fortunately...a great victory," stated as a fact that the true cause of the Manchuria and China "incidents" was the anti-Japanese sentiment (in China) instigated by England and America, ridiculed those who in 1928 and 1929 had criticized the Tanaka Cabinet, boasted that that cabinet had "liquidated the (previous) weak-kneed diplomacy toward England and America," and gloated that "today the world

policy drafted by the Tanaka Cabinet is steadily being realized." This identification of himself with the notorious Tanaka policy of world conquest, whether genuine or merely opportunistic, in and of itself brands Hatoyama as one of those who deceived and misled the people of Japan into militaristic misadventure.

4. Accordingly, in view of these and other considerations not herein recited, the Imperial Japanese Government is directed to bar Ichiro Hatoyama from membership in the Diet and to exclude him from government service pursuant to SCAPIN 550.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

General Headquarters
Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers

APO 500
26 September 1946

AG 095 (26 September 1946) PH
(SCAPIN 1231)

Memorandum for: Imperial Japanese Government
Through: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
Subject: Removal of Yoshisuke YASUMI, Pharmacy Section,
Bureau of Hygiene, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

1. Yoshisuke YASUMI, Pharmacy Section, Bureau of Hygiene, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, participated in furnishing false Japanese Government reports to the Permanent Central Opium Board, League of Nations, during the period 1931 to 1939, in order to conceal the amounts of heroin actually produced in Japan in those years. In addition, in his official capacity he made false statements to Narcotic Control Officers, Public Health and Welfare Section.

The Imperial Japanese Government will remove Yoshisuke YASUMI from public office immediately and exclude him from Government service.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ R. G. Hersey
for JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

Appendix B
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PURGE
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CASES OF PURGE VIOLATIONS PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF SIB*

Tokyo Supreme Public Procurator's Office

Date	Charge	Decision or Action
12 May 47†	Making false statement (two cases)	Not taken to court (insufficient evidence)
12 May 47	Making false statement (two cases)	Not guilty
10 Jun 47	Countersigning notice of recommendation	No public action
20 Aug 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
20 Aug 47	Making false statement	6 months imprisonment
20 Aug 47	Making false statement	Not guilty
29 Sep 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
25 Oct 47	Making false statement	6 months imprisonment; prison labor
28 Feb 48	Making false statement	Not taken to court
28 Feb 48	Making false statement	Not guilty
1 Mar 48	Making false statement	Not taken to court

Osaka Supreme Public Procurator's Office

16 Jan 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
25 Sep 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
25 Sep 47	Making false statement	500 yen fine
25 Sep 47	Making false statement	300 yen fine
30 Sep 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
4 Oct 47	Making false statement	Not an offence
7 Dec 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
- - - - 48†	Making false statement	3000 yen fine
- - - - †	Making false statement	5 months imprisonment
- - - - †	Making false statement	Not guilty

Nagoya Supreme Public Procurator's Office

5 Apr 47	Engaging in political activities	Not an offence
11 Apr 47	Making false statement	5000 yen fine
- - - - †	Engaging in political activities	Not an offence
- - - - †	Engaging in election activities	Not guilty
- - - - †	Continuity of influence	Not taken to court
- - - - †	Engaging in political activities	Not taken to court

Hiroshima Supreme Public Procurator's Office

22 Apr 47	Making speech of recommendation (two cases)	Not an offence
22 Apr 47	Making speech of recommendation (two cases)	5000 yen fine
4 Oct 47	Making false statement	No public action
6 Oct 47	Making false statement	No public action
8 Jan 48	Making false statement (two cases)	Not an offence

Fukuoka Supreme Public Procurator's Office

6 Apr 47	Making false statement (two cases)	Not taken to court
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*Individual names deleted.

†In some cases dates were not supplied by SIB. In other cases the date refers to the final disposition of the case.

6 Apr 47	Making false statement (two cases)	Not an offence
18 May 47	Making false statement (two cases)	Not taken to court
6 Jun 47	Making false statement (two cases)	Not guilty
15 Dec 47	Making false statement (two cases)	No public action
<u>Sendai Supreme Public Procurator's Office</u>		
16 July 47	Making false statement	500 yen fine
28 Dec 47	Making speech of recommendation	Not an offence
20 Aug 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
20 Aug 47	Engaging in political activities	Not an offence
20 Oct 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
17 Feb 48	Making false statement	No public action
- - - - *	Frequenting former place of employment	5000 yen fine
<u>Sapporo Supreme Public Procurator's Office</u>		
- - - - 47*	Making false statement	Not guilty
30 Apr 47	Making false statement	No public action
14 Jan 48	Making false statement	Not taken to court
3 Feb 48	Engaging in election activities	Not an offence
<u>Takamatsu Supreme Public Procurator's Office</u>		
10 July 47	Making false statement	Not taken to court
- - - - 48*	Engaging in political activities	3 months imprisonment

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE†

Organization and Personnel Changes

In December 1947, the Government decided to abolish the Ministry of Justice and organize the Attorney General's Office in its place. The Attorney General's Office Organization Law was promulgated as Law No. 193 on 17 December 1947, and sixty days later (15 February 1948) it was put into force. Matters concerning observation and surveillance of purgees constitute a portion of the control duties of the Attorney General as laid down in this law, and these functions were assigned to the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB).

The chain of command at the time the law went into effect ran from the Attorney General to his Prosecution Assistant (Kemmu Chokan), and finally to the SIB Chief. The SIB's observation of purgees was placed under the jurisdiction of the Inspection Section (Kansaka) on 25 February 1948, under the table of organization regulations (Presumably Secretariat Section Document No. 10) of the Attorney General's Office.

In order to carry out the work of the SIB in the various localities, the country was divided into nine regions, including Hokkaido (Center—Sapporo), Tohoku (Center—Sendai), Shinetsu (Center—Niigata), Kanto (Center—Tokyo), Tokai (Center—Nagoya), Kinki (Center—Osaka), Chugoku (Center—Okayama), Shikoku (Center—Takamatsu), and Kyushu (Center—Fukuoka). These are described in regulations concerning local "resident-officers" or agents of the Special Investigation Bureau (Tokubetsu Shinsakyoku).

*In some cases dates were not supplied by SIB. In others date refers to final disposition of the case.

†Prepared by Tsugunao Kubo and Haruo Hasegawa of SIB.

Chiho Chuzaikan Kitei). The Bureau assigned a chief resident-officer in each center and a resident-officer in each prefecture who carried out their work under the supervision of the Bureau Chief. In August 1950, the Chugoku Branch Bureau was transferred from Okayama to Hiroshima.

At the beginning of 1948, the number of personnel in the SIB was fixed at 174. However, in December of the same year, 76 new personnel were added to the bureau staff to carry out the work of observing purgees, thus increasing its regular staff to 250. Moreover, it was decided that the Attorney General would delegate to prefectural governors a part of the work of observing purgees. In 1948, 49 persons were appointed throughout the nation to carry out this portion of the work.

On 31 May 1949, a portion of the Law Establishing the Attorney General's Office (Homucho Setchi Ho) was revised by Law No. 136. The name of the Attorney General's Office was changed at this time from Homucho to Homufu. The title of Prosecution Assistant to the Attorney General (Kemmu Chokan) was changed to the Criminal Administration Assistant to the Attorney General (Keiseichokan).

The SIB was placed under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Administration Assistant to the Attorney General. Moreover, on 1 April 1949, the Organization Control Ordinance, a completely revised version of Imperial Ordinance No. 101, of 1946, was promulgated and put into force. Since the work of the SIB increased, the regular staff was increased by 137 members (total number of personnel became 387 on 31 May), and the three-section system of organization was changed to a four-section system on 1 June by Attorney General's Office Directive No. 1. The Observation Section which had jurisdiction over the work of observing persons affected by the purge memorandum became the Second Section. Also, the total number of personnel assigned to conduct surveillance of purgees at the prefectural level was increased to 149. On 1 July 1950, 150 new personnel were added to the staff of the SIB, making a total of 537. However, the number of agents assigned to the prefectures was reduced in 1950 to 104 under the Government's Administrative Reorganization Law.

A portion of the Law Establishing the Attorney General's Office was revised by Government Ordinance No. 263 on 18 August in view of various pressing domestic and foreign issues. The three posts of Deputy Chief were created within the SIB. Also 608 new personnel were added to the bureau staff, making a total of 1145. On the same day, Attorney General's Office Directive No. 103 was promulgated and put into force and the SIB became an organization with three departments and eight sections. The work of observing persons affected by the purge memorandum was placed under the control of the Observation Department which was composed of three sections. In addition to the old work of observing persons affected by the Memorandum, the watching of purged leaders of the Japan Communist Party was added to the work of the Observation Department.

The work related to registration of persons affected by the Memorandum, to observation of the movements of persons affected by the memorandum but who do not come under the jurisdiction of the Third Section, and to observation of militaristic, ultranationalistic, terroristic, and antidemocratic movement of persons affected by the purge was placed under the jurisdiction of the First, Second, and Third Observation Sections, respectively.

An observation section was also created within each prefectural office. This section in each branch bureau employed, on an average, ten or more persons.

This machinery, chain of command and personnel staff continued throughout 1951 and until 28 April 1952, when all ordinances pertaining to the purge were abolished with the promulgation of the Peace Treaty. The number of personnel engaged in the work delegated to the prefectures remained at the 1950 figure of 104 until the work was completely abolished.

Background, Character and Training of Personnel

The SIB's work of supervising purgees required personnel for the following functions: (1) registration of persons affected by the Memorandum; (2) announcement to the general public and to purgees of the requirements of various laws connected with the purge, including Imperial Ordinance No. 1 issued in 1947; (3) observation of the activities of persons affected by the Memorandum; and (4) prevention of violation of purge ordinance and investigation and disposition of purge-violation cases.

Thus applicants were required to possess the necessary qualifications for two general types of work, that is, general administrative work (such as registration) and ordinance research and investigative work to determine guilt relative to the violation of purge ordinance. Especially since the important part of the surveillance work was to investigate violations of purge ordinance, a considerable number of staff members engaged in surveillance work possessed the ability to investigate and the experience to do the second type of work. Some of them were also qualified for registration and ordinance research. Moreover, since senior officials of the Attorney General's Office had to be public procurators, many procurators on the active lists, who are well acquainted with interpretation and application of laws and regulations and whose principal work is criminal investigation, were appointed to high posts such as bureau chiefs, section chiefs, or assistants to the section chiefs in the SIB after the surveillance work had been assigned to the Attorney General's Office.

Naturally, no persons formerly connected with the Thought Police or those with militaristic, nationalistic or antidemocratic tendencies and tendencies to support violence were accepted because of the character of work to be performed by the Bureau.

The professional background of the Bureau personnel can be roughly classified into public procurators, police officers, public procurator's office secretaries, past and present general administrative government office employees, and civilian experts [personnel distribution in January 1950 was: persons formerly connected with police work, 40 percent; general government officers, 26.6 percent; public procurator's office, 10 percent (public procurators, 6.7 percent; public procurator's office secretaries, 3.3 percent); and others (recent graduates) 6.6 percent].

Thought Police officials who were dismissed en masse by the memorandum dated 4 October 1945 were not only barred from obtaining jobs in the Home and Education Ministries and in the police force, but they were also barred from reappointment to any positions involving public authority or responsibility. However, since this employment restriction made it difficult to secure qualified personnel, it was somewhat modified by the memorandum dated 13 June 1947.

In the SIB, however, the employment restriction was far more severe. Former regular Army and Navy officers and Kempei (Military Police) were barred from seeking employment even as temporary workers, junior clerks, or unskilled helpers (Soshi, Notification No. 254 addressed to agency chiefs from the Prime Minister on 12 June 1948).

Personnel training in the SIB may be summarized as follows:

At the time the Bureau was established, there was no planned personnel training; the Bureau was busy setting up its machinery and there was close liaison between its leaders and ordinary staff personnel. The personnel were trained on an individual basis.

In 1949, plans for personnel educational training were laid. In July, 25 members of the SIB and its branch bureaus were selected and bureau leaders and outside lecturers conducted study courses for one week on such subjects as "Social Trends," "Interpretation of the Purge Laws and Regulations," and "Problems and Techniques of Investigation."

Also, in October 1950, in addition to 50 members of the SIB and its branch bureaus, two or three persons from each prefecture who were in charge of surveillance work were called together, and a similar study course was conducted. The third study course was held in January 1951. This study course was conducted on organization, function, nature,

and details of the assigned work of the SIB to provide for the large body of newly hired employees following the sudden increase in personnel in August 1950.

For economic reasons, SIB leaders were usually assigned as lecturers. As to the purge questions, emphasis was placed on the study of the work carried out since the 6 June purge (leftist). As the staff gradually expanded, each branch bureau laid out its own study plans and conducted its own study courses.

The fourth study course was held in April 1951 and the fifth in July, both for one week. In October, officials of the Attorney General's Office in charge of criminal procedure and administrative litigation conducted classes on both "Theory of Evidence in the Code of Criminal Procedure" (Keiji Soshoho No Shokoriron) and "Theory of Evidence in the Administrative Litigations Law" (Gyosei Jiken Soshoho Tokureiho No Shoko Horiron). The study course at this time did not touch directly on the work of the Bureau, but was conducted mainly for an understanding of legal theories.

Only those study courses planned by the main bureau as a whole have been listed. Periodic study courses were also held by individual sections, and supplemental educational data and monthly surveillance reports were printed and distributed as study materials for Bureau personnel.

THE EXTENSION OF THE PURGE DIRECTIVES TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY*

The 6 and 7 June Purges

On 5 June 1950, a letter was sent to Prime Minister Yoshida by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. On the basis of the order contained therein Kyuichi Tokuda and 24 others constituting the leadership of the Japan Communist Party were named by the Prime Minister as being subject to the purge directive as of that date. Then, on the following 7 June, Haruki Aikawa and 17 others who were connected with the Japan Communist Party's newspaper Akahata were added to the purge list on the basis of another letter from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Prime Minister. Relative to these persons, the Prime Minister also named them as being subject to the purge directive on that same day. These constitute the 6 and the 7 June purges.

The 6 and 7 June Purges were epoch-making activities against persons connected with the Japan Communist Party. However, even from the standpoint of the purge-directive issue, there are believed to be various factors involved. Therefore, these purge-directive issues, including those which come later, will be taken up one by one and interpreted here with principal emphasis on their legal significance.

Purge of Leftists on the Basis of the So-Called Purge Directive (Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 4 January 1947)

Originally, the purge directive was based on Paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Declaration which states: "There is to be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world." Paragraph 10 states that "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

The purge directives were based on this fundamental principle and carried out in faithful execution of the Potsdam Declaration in order that Japan might eradicate militarism and ultranationalism and rebuild herself as a peaceful and democratic nation. To this end a memorandum (SCAPIN 550) was issued on 4 January 1946 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government.

*A statement by Makiyo Takahashi, Chief, Observation Section, SIB, Attorney General's Office.

The Japanese Government, with the intention of putting into practice the substance of this memorandum, enacted various laws and regulations connected with the purge from public offices.

These have been carried out up to the present time along the lines of the so-called Purge Directive (Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 4 January 1947) which is presently in force. However, by looking into the specific reasons for the purge, it is noted that Memorandum 550, Appendix A, paragraph A to G, and the supplementary laws and ordinances of the so-called Purge Directive—Cabinet Order, Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1, Annex 1, Paragraphs 1 to 7 of 4 January 1947 are generally directed toward those in the leader class who were directly or indirectly responsible for bringing on the past war.

Then, the basic job connected with these purges is to keep an eye on the activities of those persons who were designated in accordance with these directives and to prevent the resurgence or preservation of their old influence.

In this sense, when we compare this Purge Directive with the Organizations Control Ordinance (Government Ordinance No. 64 of 4 April 1949, issued on the basis of SCAP Memorandum 548 of 4 January 1946 aimed at eradication of past and present secret, militaristic, ultranationalistic, terroristic and antidemocratic organizations and also similar activities on the part of individuals), we find that, despite the similarity in their ultimate objectives, the Purge Directive's function is limited to only part of the problem of encouraging peace and democracy.

Nevertheless, as external and domestic situations later became extremely complicated, a timely opportunity to direct the Purge Directive toward the present leftist elements presented itself. In this sense the 6 June Purge which was based on General MacArthur's letter must be considered epochal. At the time the so-called Purge Directive was issued it was difficult to imagine that it would be used in purging the extreme leftist elements. It must be admitted that it is a remarkable development that the substance of MacArthur's letter, clearly indicating that the present movement is extremely antidemocratic, should have been ideologically introduced into the former purge framework.

The MacArthur letter dealing with the 6 June Purge set forth the significant objectives of the Purge Directive as part of the Occupation policy. It then states:

In general its range of application consists of dealing with those persons who, by means of their position or influence, were responsible for Japan's totalitarian policy which manifested itself in the form of rash ventures connected with subjugation and exploitation.

However, a new and no less pernicious body has recently appeared upon the Japanese political scene. This body distorts the truth, arouses the masses into terroristic activities, and changes this peaceful nation into a place of chaos and strife.

By these actions they attempt to interfere with the remarkable progress which Japan has made on the road to representative democracy. It is also trying to destroy the democratic tendencies which are speedily growing among the people of Japan.

Their high-handed methods bear a striking resemblance to the method used by the militaristic leaders in the past by which they duped the Japanese people and caused them to commit their mistake.

The result was that the names of Kyuichi Tokuda and 24 others who made up the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party were put on the list. Since these men were attempting to overthrow the peaceful and democratic system which was the Allied Powers' basic policy for Japan, they were to be considered as undesirable persons and had to be purged from public office. On this ground, the order was given to the Japanese Government to take immediate steps to effect prohibitions and restrictions and to carry out her duty in accordance with the two directives of 4 January 1946 (the above-mentioned directives No. 548 and 550).

In other words, they were ordered to carry out the purge provided for in the so-called Purge Directive. Thus, it happened that the Government, in order to carry out

the directive based on this letter, instituted the procedures for effecting the purge in accordance with the provisions of the Purge Directive.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the purging of leftist elements was not conducted at all prior to the 6 June Purge, or that it could not have been conducted legally. At the time the Choren (League of Korean Residents in Japan) was dissolved in accordance with the Organizations Control Law the principal figures of the Choren, who were leftists and extremist elements politically, were designated as purgees. However, this was a purge from public office which accompanied the dissolution of an organization. Its significance lies in the fact that those persons who were at any time in the headquarters, chapters, or other subordinate organizations of those organizations which were dissolved in accordance with Paragraph 11 of the Organizations Control Law in the capacity of founders, officials, or directors; persons holding key positions; editors of any publication or organ magazine or newspaper; or persons who voluntarily contributed large sums of money and who were named by the Attorney General as being classed under one of the categories were considered subject to the same treatment as those persons who were purged under Paragraph 12 of this same law. The 6 June Purge was the first occasion in which the Purge Directive was used to purge leftist elements from public office.

We must not think that the purge of the left wing started with the 6 June Purge, that the emphasis in the purge issue made a complete 180-degree swing from the right to the left, and that the direction of this emphasis was concentrated solely on the purge of the left wing.

The basic policy of the administration's plan is essentially that of peaceful and democratic reconstruction of Japan. Eradication of antidemocratic activities, whether the ideologies involved are left or right, is to be effected. There has been no change whatsoever in this basic policy even after the 6 June Purge.

Even from an independent point of view special concern must be directed, for the sake of Japanese democratization, toward both left and right extremist elements engaged in antidemocratic activities. We cannot help but admit that it is inevitable that we should devote our strength to the elimination of their influences and the correction of their errors.

Therefore, the simple conclusion is that, rather than a 180-degree shift having taken place, the following aspect was added; whereas past actions alone were previously made the basis for purge, they now are also being based on present actions.

Also, the scope has been enlarged and progressively developed so that those who engage in antidemocratic activities will be subject to purge regardless of whether they belong to the right or the left.

Connection Between the So-Called Purge Directive and the Organizations Control Ordinance *

As was mentioned in the preceding paragraph, leading officials of those organizations which had been designated for dissolution under the purview of the Organizations Control Ordinance were regarded heretofore as persons designated to be purged from public office by the Attorney General, and these persons, as purgees, are subject to all restrictive and prohibitive provisions of the Purge Directive (Articles 11 and 13 of the Organization Control Ordinance).

For such reasons, there has been a close connection in the past between the Organization Control Ordinance and the Purge Directive; in fact, the two were regarded as companion ordinances. The two became directly connected by General MacArthur's memorandum which became the basis of the 6 June purge.

In other words, the final paragraph of General MacArthur's memorandum on the 6 June purge directs that measures be set up to comply with the prohibitions, restrictions, and duties as set forth in the two directives of 4 January 1946, Memorandum 548 (original memorandum of the Organization Control Ordinance) and Memorandum 550 (original

*Koshoku Tsuiho Rei (SCAPIN 550), Dantaito Kiseirei (SCAPIN 548)

memorandum of the Purge Directive). Further, the prohibitive provisions are given in the seven items, a to g, under Paragraph 1 of Memorandum 548 (Article 2, Paragraphs 1 to 7 of the Organizations Control Ordinance).

Both organizations and individuals are prohibited from engaging in activities prescribed in the prohibitive provisions. For violations of any of the prohibitive provisions, organizations will be dissolved while individuals will be punished. Furthermore, such violations, in the case of individuals, may simultaneously become grounds for purge from public office according to Memorandum 550 (on which the Purge Directive is based).

In short, General MacArthur's memorandum stated that it would be possible to purge from public office through initiation of the necessary action required by the Purge Directive, any individual who violated the prohibitive provisions of Article 2 of the Organization Control Ordinance.

As to the application of the foregoing purge, it is stated that: (a) The interpretation of the issuing authority is final when any question arises as to the meaning of any instructions issued by SCAP, as indicated in Directive No. 2 issued after the termination of the war. (b) Any purge action taken by the Japanese Government will be reviewed by SCAP, as clearly stated in Memorandum 550. (c) The letter dated 4 February 1948 to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from Government Section, SCAP, made it clear that the Prime Minister shall be directly responsible to the Supreme Commander on matters concerning purge, and that the Supreme Commander reserves the inherent authority to intervene at any stage of the proceedings.

As a result, Japanese courts do not have jurisdiction over proceedings of removal or exclusion of individuals from public office. [A decision by the Supreme Court confirmed this letter on the point discussed in (c)].

In view of the afore-mentioned, the Japanese Government cannot purge arbitrarily according to its own volition.

There was also some discussion at the time of the 6 and 7 June Purges on the subject of whether the proceedings of designating a purge should be handled in the name of the Prime Minister by amending the purge standards (Items 1 to 7 of the Annex to the Prime Minister's Office Ordinance) set forth in the Prime Minister's Office Ordinance (refers to Cabinet Ordinance, Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 4 January 1946), which is the ordinance associated with the Purge Directive. However, the standards set forth in the Prime Minister's Office Ordinance were primarily for the purpose of enforcing the directive (Memorandum 550) of the Supreme Commander; the Japanese Government could neither expand nor curtail the standards at will because everything depended upon the will of the Supreme Commander.

The directive contained in General MacArthur's memorandum on the 6 June Purge referred to Memoranda 548 and 550, and, as previously mentioned, suggested inclusion in Memorandum 550 of the prohibitive provisions contained in Memorandum 548.

It clearly directs that administrative steps for the purge be taken based on the Memorandum.

In compliance with this order the Japanese Government took up the issue but it did not make any revisions, on the theory that there was no margin for any question of illegality or injustice even if the Prime Minister's Office Ordinance was not revised.

We can cite as an example the purge of Zentaro Taniguchi, the Japan Communist Party Diet member, who was removed from office by directive during the purge of left-wingers after the 6 and 7 June Purges. Diet member Taniguchi made a statement to a press group on 27 June 1950 at Japan Communist Party Headquarters to the effect that he would resolutely contest the Japanese Government's directive, based on the directive of 26 June from SCAP, suspending publication of the Japan Communist Party newspaper Akahata for a period of 30 days.

However, the aforementioned order of the Japanese Government was issued in accordance with a SCAP directive, and Taniguchi's action clearly came under the purview of Memorandum 48, Paragraph 1-A. In view of the purport of the aforementioned

directive on the 6 June Purge, it was clear that steps for his removal from public office must necessarily be taken according to the Purge Directive. Therefore the Japanese Government decided to purge Tamiguchi.

On the other hand, the purge of left-wingers gradually increased with the dissolution of organizations in accordance with the Organizations Control Ordinance.

Even if we give only two or three examples, we can name the cases of purge in connection with the dissolution of the Shinjuku Ku Committee (Shinjuku Ku Inkai), the Japan Printing Company Cell (Nippon Insatsu Saibo), or the Liaison Council Headquarters of All Trade Unions of Japan (Zenroren).

The Relationship Between the 6 June Purge and the So-Called Red Purge

As mentioned previously, the 6 June Purge was initiated to oust the left-wingers by enlarging, according to the directive set forth in the SCAP memorandum, the scope of Memorandum 550 dealing with public purges.

The purge proceedings were governed absolutely by the directives of the Supreme Commander. Although the same term "Purge" is used in "Red Purge," which has been effected since last summer following the 6 June Purge, it is not a genuine purge based on the holding of public office. It has been carried out voluntarily by state organizations, local public organizations and public enterprises to protect important organizations from the danger of destruction by Communist force, and harmful Communist elements. Staff personnel or private employees who did not perform their duties faithfully were simply discharged.

Therefore, this type of purge has not been carried out as a public purge, and those who have been ousted are not governed by the restrictive and prohibitive provisions of the Purge Directive.

As clarified in the memorandum for the 6 and 7 June Purges, the memoranda of 26 June and 18 July on suspending publication of the Akahata, and in the announcement made by General MacArthur on 3 May, the third anniversary of the proclamation of the Constitution, the grounds for this type of purge are the same as those for the public purge. It was simply determined that the activities of the Japan Communist Party were contrary to the Potsdam Declaration, which has the establishment of pacifism and democracy as its fundamental principle, and to the Allied Nations' policy for the control of Japan; that their activities utterly repudiated pacifism and democracy, which are the main principles of the Constitution and which the Constitution will uphold to the last; and that they seek to destroy the roots of peaceful order and of the individual freedom, rights, and integrity as guaranteed by the Constitution.

SIB ORDER 323 TO ALL GOVERNORS (Surveillance of Political Organizations)

Special Investigation Bureau, No. 323 18 Mar 47.

TO: All Prefectural Governors

Chief, Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Home Affairs

Chief, Security Bureau

Concerning the strict enforcement of registration applications of political parties, associations, and other organizations based upon the 1946 Imperial Ordinance No. 101, and investigation of various organizations in this respect.

The 1946 Imperial Ordinance No. 101 (concerning prohibition of the formation of political parties, associations and other organizations) is very important for the complete fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration by our country and the restoration of our country into a peaceful state. Its aim is to prohibit secret, militaristic, extremely nationalistic and antidemocratic actions and the formation of such organizations, to disseminate the details of the various political organizations, and to try to contribute to the promotion and development of peaceful, democratic tendencies and actions.

Consequently, even the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has exercised deep concern with respect to the strict enforcement of this Imperial Ordinance.

Nevertheless, judging by the actual results of the past, there are still numerous unsatisfactory points regarding the execution of above aims at the central and local government offices. Moreover, it is regretted that the aims have not been thoroughly driven home to the organizations concerned and the general public. We deeply regret that the situation has been such as to cause the General Headquarters to often point out the existence of unregistered organizations' carelessness in registered statements and delay and incompleteness in the various investigations concerned.

In view of the fact that organizations and actions opposing the spirit of this Imperial Ordinance will make their appearance owing to the increasing complexity of the recent situation such as the straitened circumstances of the peoples' livelihood and unrest in the social order, the following matters must be borne in mind hereafter to leave nothing to be desired in connection with the strict enforcement of prompt submission of accurate registration applications, thorough investigation of organizations concerned, and the investigation and control of organizations and actions which run counter to this ordinance.

Appendix C
POLITICAL PURGE
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MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

<u>Election</u>	<u>New Members</u>	<u>Previous Members^a</u>	<u>Former Members^b</u>	<u>Statutory Total</u>
1. 1 Jul 1890	300	---	---	300
2. 15 Feb 1892	153	147	---	300
3. 1 Mar 1894	137	134	29	300
4. 1 Sep 1894	100	170	30	300
5. 15 Mar 1898	163	102	35	300
6. 10 Aug 1898	76	187	37	300
7. 10 Aug 1902	226	93	57	376
8. 1 Mar 1903	93	249	34	376
9. 1 Mar 1904	109	218	52	379
10. 15 May 1908	181	157	41	379
11. 15 May 1911	179	167	35	381
12. 25 Mar 1914	148	178	55	381
13. 20 Apr 1917	131	183	67	381
14. 10 May 1920	242	179	43	464
15. 10 May 1924	221	198	45	464
16. 20 Feb 1928	173	237	56	466
17. 20 Feb 1930	125	289	52	466
18. 20 Feb 1932	123	279	64	466
19. 20 Feb 1936	122	273	71	466
20. 30 Apr 1937	79	346	41	466
21. 3 Apr 1942	201	245	20	466
22. 10 Apr 1946	375	48	43	466
23. 25 Apr 1947	222	237	7	466
24. 23 Jan 1949	192	246	28	466

^a Previous members are those elected in the immediately preceding election.

^b Former members are those elected prior to the immediately preceding election.

AGES OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

<u>Election</u>	<u>Ages</u>									<u>Average, Yr, Mo.</u>
	<u>25- 29</u>	<u>30 —</u>	<u>31- 39</u>	<u>40- 49</u>	<u>50- 59</u>	<u>60- 69</u>	<u>70- 79</u>	<u>80- 89</u>	<u>90- 99</u>	
1. 1 Jul 1890	---	---	136	114	36	14	---	---	---	42.4
2. 15 Feb 1892	---	---	95	133	55	17	---	---	---	44.0
3. 1 Mar 1894	---	---	97	137	52	13	1	---	---	44.3
4. 1 Sep 1894	---	---	100	130	58	12	1	---	---	44.9
5. 15 Mar 1898	---	---	84	145	12	1	1	---	---	44.9
6. 10 Aug 1898	---	---	81	149	57	11	2	---	---	44.7
7. 10 Aug 1902	---	---	78	187	92	17	2	---	---	45.1
8. 1 Mar 1903	---	---	80	190	87	17	2	---	---	45.1
9. 1 Mar 1904	---	---	60	179	116	22	2	---	---	48.8
10. 15 May 1908	---	---	45	171	142	19	2	---	---	48.6
11. 15 May 1911	---	---	38	173	132	37	1	---	---	48.6
12. 25 Mar 1914	---	---	35	147	149	46	4	---	---	48.4
13. 20 Apr 1917	---	---	30	124	172	52	3	---	---	51.1
14. 10 May 1920	---	---	52	151	197	56	8	---	---	50.6
15. 10 May 1924	---	---	45	161	177	72	9	---	---	51.0
16. 20 Feb 1928	---	---	28	173	165	91	9	---	---	51.1

AGES OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Continued)

Election	Ages									Average, Yr. Mo.
	15- 29	30 ---	31- 39	40- 49	50- 59	60- 69	70- 79	80- 89	90- 99	
17. 20 Feb 1930	---	---	20	168	167	104	7	---	---	52.7
18. 20 Feb 1932	---	---	22	158	193	83	10	---	---	52.2
19. 20 Feb 1936	---	---	22	124	197	97	26	---	---	54.2
20. 30 Apr 1937	---	---	25	136	192	86	27	---	---	53.9
21. 3 Apr 1942	---	---	15	135	195	103	16	2	---	54.1
22. 10 Apr 1946 ^a	3	1	42	153	192	86	9	1	---	51.3
23. 25 Apr 1947	7	3	72	185	155	40	6	1	---	48.1
24. 23 Jan 1949	1	6	81	202	131	43	7	---	1	48.0

^a Commencing with the 22d General Election the eligibility age was lowered from 30 to 25 "full" years. Prior to the 22d election, age was counted not in full but according to the so-called kazoeodoshi or calendar year age.

NAMES AND DATES OF POLITICAL PURGE (Designations by Party^a)

Name	Date of Designation	Name	Date of Designation
<u>Liberal Party (Jiyu To)</u>		Tsunejiro Hiratsuka	16 Apr 1947
<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Representatives</u>		Gyo Mori	23 Apr 1947
^b Ichiro Hatoyama	7 May 1946	^b Eisaku Hara	1 May 1947
^b Ichiro Kono	6 Aug 1946	Kansuke Kazama	8 May 1947
^b Bukichi Miki	6 Aug 1946	Tomejiro Okubo	8 May 1947
^b Tadao Watanabe	6 Aug 1946	^b Tanzan Ishibashi	16 May 1947
Shozo Masukawa	24 Mar 1947	^b Mitsuhiro Ishii	16 May 1947
Kozo Mitsubayashi	24 Mar 1947	^b Samin Watanuki	19 May 1947
Ryozo Morisaki	25 Mar 1947	^b Noboru Tanimawa	24 Jun 1947
Masazuni Ando	26 Mar 1947	^b Reikichi Kita	26 Jun 1947
Taiichi Furusawa	26 Mar 1947	^b Ryozo Hiraoka	3 Jul 1947
Seijuro Arafune	28 Mar 1947	Tsunikichi Koto	25 Jul 1947
Natsuo Eto	28 Mar 1947	Shingoro Hori	29 Oct 1947
Shosaku Ishii	28 Mar 1947	^b Ryuta Komine	25 Nov 1947
Shinkuro Murayasu	28 Mar 1947	<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Councilors</u>	
Jutaro Narita	28 Mar 1947	Norimoto Masuda	19 Mar 1947
Tsukasa Kamizuka	29 Mar 1947	Takeo Ikeda	22 Mar 1947
Torajiro Sato	31 Mar 1947	Shigeyo Takeuchi	7 Apr 1947
Mototake Yonezawa	31 Mar 1947	Shazaemon Keimatsu	24 Jun 1947
Isaji Tanaka	1 Apr 1947	<u>Governor and Candidates</u>	
Manabu Shiozuki	2 Apr 1947	Yorinobu Ikeda	12 Mar 1947
Yuji Abe	4 Apr 1947	Choemon Kikuchi	12 Mar 1947
Tosuke Kobayashi	5 Apr 1947	Torao Nakayama	30 Mar 1947
Matsuhei Matsuoka	7 Apr 1947		
Katsuichi Yamamoto	7 Apr 1947		

^a Prepared for this study by the Supervision Section, Prime Minister's Office, and corrected as of 29 Jul 1952.

^b Removed from Diet.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Designation</u>		
<u>Progressive Party (Kaishin To)</u>			
<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Representatives</u>			
^b Yuji Satsuma	6 Aug 1946		
^b Mitsugu Tanaka	6 Aug 1946		
Kenzo Matsumura	6 Sep 1946		
^b Gen Nagai	23 Oct 1946		
^b Sanehiko Yamamoto	16 Dec. 1946		
^b Kanae Kobayashi	24 Mar 1947		
Denzo Okubo	24 Mar 1947		
Junji Ebe	27 Mar 1947		
Hidekichi Shirai	27 Mar 1947		
Toshio Kaneya	29 Mar 1947		
Zenichiro Yasaka	29 Mar 1947		
Koichiro Yamaguchi	30 Mar 1947		
Suteshi Hara	31 Mar 1947		
Wataru Narahashi	31 Mar 1947		
Shigeharu Nakagawa	4 Apr 1947		
Masukichi Hirano	5 Apr 1947		
Keiichiro Inoue	5 Apr 1947		
Ken Inukai	8 Apr 1947		
Ryukichi Teshirogi	8 Apr 1947		
Kazuo Sasamoto	9 Apr 1947		
Shigeru Hori	10 Apr 1947		
Eikichi Terada	16 Apr 1947		
Yoshinari Kawai	22 Apr 1947		
^b Ren Hayashi	1 May 1947		
^b Chujiro Hosoda	2 May 1947		
Junji Fujitsuka	25 Jun 1947		
Yakyu Shimada	25 Jul 1947		
Seizo Mogami	30 Sep 1947		
Isamu Narishima	30 Sep 1947		
^b Gosafuro Omiya	13 Nov 1947		
^b Heima Hayashi	26 Nov 1947		
Katsufumi Hotta	26 Mar 1948		
<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Councilors</u>			
Tamejiro Shimada	19 Mar 1947		
Tomoichi Ikeda	5 Apr 1947		
Yoshitaka Otani	9 Apr 1947		
^b Tokuzo Takekoshi	12 Jun 1947		
^b Risuke Tonooka	12 Jun 1947		
<u>Governor and Candidates</u>			
Sonosuke Nagasaki	8 Apr 1947		
^b Yasusato Futami	10 Apr 1947		
<u>Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakai To)</u>			
<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Representatives</u>			
^b Takato Inatomi	6 Aug 1946		

^b Removed from Diet.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Designation</u>		
^b Mitsu Kono	18 Sep 1946		
^b Tsunekichi Yamazaki	26 Oct 1946		
Seiichi Harada	25 Mar 1947		
Unkichi Yaegashi	27 Mar 1947		
Seiichi Kimijima	29 Mar 1947		
Saburo Machida	29 Mar 1947		
Yoshio Morimoto	29 Mar 1947		
Haruji Tahara	2 Apr 1947		
Keijiro Sato	5 Apr 1947		
Takeo Tamarushima	5 Apr 1947		
Tamotsu Hasegawa	8 Apr 1947		
Katsuo Imasato	8 Apr 1947		
Kotora Tanabashi	9 Apr 1947		
Takaichi Nakamura	11 Apr 1947		
Yoshio Shibata	11 Apr 1947		
^b Yoshio Hino	1 May 1947		
^b Hitoshi Imamura	1 May 1947		
Matsojiro Yamamoto	8 May 1947		
^b Rikizo Hirano	14 Jan 1948		
^b Shogetsu Tanaka	25 Jan 1949		
<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Councilors</u>			
Masami Hamada	19 Mar 1947		
Shigio Inoue	19 Mar 1947		
Kesamatsu Kodaira	19 Mar 1947		
Ryusuke Miyazaki	19 Mar 1947		
^b Jiichiro Matsumoto	25 Jan 1949		
<u>Governor and Candidates</u>			
Yuzo Amaya	19 Mar 1947		
Yonosuke Kikuchi	11 Apr 1947		
Masakazu Ono	11 Apr 1947		
Kazuo Moriya	8 May 1947		
<u>Japan Communist Party</u>			
^b Kenichi Ito	6 Jun 1950		
^b Shigeo Kamiyama	6 Jun 1950		
^b Shoichi Kasuga	6 Jun 1950		
^b Sanzo Nosaka	6 Jun 1950		
^b Yoshio Shiga	6 Jun 1950		
^b Kyuichi Tokuda	6 Jun 1950		
^b Katsumi Kikunami	7 Jun 1950		
^b Zentaro Taniguchi	28 Jun 1950		
^b Kazuyoshi Dobashi	30 Aug 1950		
^b Susumu Kamimura	6 Sep 1951		
^b Kenji Kawada	6 Sep 1951		
^b Kanichi Kawakami	6 Sep 1951		
^b Kazuyoshi Sunama	6 Sep 1951		
<u>Member of and Candidates for House of Councilors</u>			
^b Teru Takakura	6 Jun 1950		
^b Karoku Hosokawa	6 Sep 1951		

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Designation</u>
<u>Others</u>	
Satomi Hakamada	6 Jun 1950
Hiroshi Hasegawa	6 Jun 1950
Ritsu Ito	6 Jun 1950
Kozo Kameyama	6 Jun 1950
Shojiro Kasuga	6 Jun 1950
Shigeo Kishimoto	6 Jun 1950
Yojiro Konno	6 Jun 1950
Korendo Kurahara	6 Jun 1950
Saneki Matsumoto	6 Jun 1950
Ichiro Matsumoto	6 Jun 1950
Kenji Miyamoto	6 Jun 1950
Ryu Nosaka	6 Jun 1950
Satoji Sato	6 Jun 1950
Shigeo Shida	6 Jun 1950
Hareichi Shirakawa	6 Jun 1950
Tsunesaburo Takenaka	6 Jun 1950
Hiroshi Tosaka	6 Jun 1950
Haruki Aikawa	7 Jun 1950
Mitsuo Aneba	7 Jun 1950
Toshio Aoyama	7 Jun 1950
Hidezo Fukida	7 Jun 1950
Tatsuo Kawamura	7 Jun 1950
Taro Miyamoto	7 Jun 1950
Noriro Moriya	7 Jun 1950
Tomio Nishizawa	7 Jun 1950
Tadashi Okamata	7 Jun 1950
Yoshiro Sakano	7 Jun 1950
Koichi Shimada	7 Jun 1950
Shosaku Sugama	7 Jun 1950
Katsuyuki Takahashi	7 Jun 1950
Takeo Takei	7 Jun 1950
Kenzo Takemoto	7 Jun 1950
Soji Uchino	7 Jun 1950
Kazuo Fukumoto	6 Sep 1951
Muraichi Horie	6 Sep 1951
Komei Hosaka	6 Sep 1951
Iwao Iwamoto	6 Sep 1951
Eiichi Iwata	6 Sep 1951
Saburo Kimura	6 Sep 1951
Jin Nishidate	6 Sep 1951
Ryuji Nishizawa	6 Sep 1951
Bunkichi Okada	6 Sep 1951
Etsuro Shiino	6 Sep 1951
Fumio Sugimoto	6 Sep 1951
Ichizo Suzuki	6 Sep 1951
Ichizo Wada	6 Sep 1951
Kentaro Yamabe	6 Sep 1951

Other Small Parties

<u>Members of and Candidates for House of Representatives</u>	
Yoshimasa Kato	22 Mar 1947
Tetsutaro Ota	24 Mar 1947

^b Removed from Diet.

Masakiyo Kita	28 Mar 1947
Masayoshi Nagata	28 Mar 1947
Toshikazu Nagata	28 Mar 1947
Masao Hatano	29 Mar 1947
Takeo Shimanuki	29 Mar 1947
Hirosuke Murai	4 Apr 1947
Ippei Ogawa	5 Apr 1947
Morio Sato	5 Apr 1947
Toranosuke Sato	5 Apr 1947
Kenichi Yoshida	5 Apr 1947
Minezo Miyamoto	7 Apr 1947
Susumu Nakajima	7 Apr 1947
Hiroshi Hatsukade	8 Apr 1947
Toshio Hirano	8 Apr 1947
Usaburo Tsuchizaki	9 Apr 1947
Toshoya Oda	14 Jan 1949

Members of and Candidates for House of Councilors

Hiroshi Kashimura	19 Mar 1947
Munenori Miyagawa	19 Mar 1947
Fusae Ichikawa	24 Mar 1947
Iwao Tabushi	2 Apr 1947
Hitoshi Tanaka	29 Oct 1947

Governor and Candidates

Yonekichi Takashima	12 Mar 1947
Taichi Tateno	12 Mar 1947
Ryotaro Nagayasu	19 Mar 1947
Yoshigasu Irimajiri	1 May 1947

Independent

Members of and Candidates for House of Representatives

^b Masaji Kai	6 Aug 1946
Taneo Nakazuka	19 Mar 1947
Kenji Inada	22 Mar 1947
Kiyoshi Iwakami	22 Mar 1947
Saburo Kuki	22 Mar 1947
^b Ichirokei Kusano	22 Mar 1947
Sadao Ando	25 Mar 1947
Hamakichi Takizawa	25 Mar 1947
Kantaro Doi	25 Mar 1947
Takeo Mitamura	27 Mar 1947
Takeo Ogino	27 Mar 1947
Yoshikuma Sato	27 Mar 1947
Meiji Sengyoku	27 Mar 1947
Shozo Aso	28 Mar 1947
Yohachi Goto	28 Mar 1947
Makoto Kobe	28 Mar 1947
Yoshinori Nishihara	28 Mar 1947
Rikuro Shinohara	28 Mar 1947
Sukeyuki Iijima	29 Mar 1947
Shinichi Toda	29 Mar 1947

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Designation</u>
Fusajiro Nakagawa	30 Mar 1947
Taneo Miyazawa	31 Mar 1947
Mamoru Nishini	31 Mar 1947
Hideo Ikeda	1 Apr 1947
Kawmon Matsuo	1 Apr 1947
Eiichi Nakayama	2 Apr 1947
Shigenao Okubo	2 Apr 1947
Kishimatsu Watanabe	3 Apr 1947
Yuji Ito	4 Apr 1947
Taichi Mogi	4 Apr 1947
Kuwashi Tokunaga	4 Apr 1947
Takeo Yuki	4 Apr 1947
Mitsutaro Hasegawa	5 Apr 1947
Minoru Hatae	5 Apr 1947
Shichiro Hosumi	5 Apr 1947
Masao Inoue	5 Apr 1947
Susuinu Ochi	5 Apr 1947
Tokuo Shibata	5 Apr 1947
Teruo Tsutsuki	5 Apr 1947
Yochisada Furuoya	7 Apr 1947
Tosaburo Makino	7 Apr 1947
Takeshige Ishikuro	8 Apr 1947
Seichi Shigemasa	8 Apr 1947
Tamenobu Igawa	10 Apr 1947
Teiichi Murakami	11 Apr 1947
Tadaicki Nakazawa	11 Apr 1947
Shoichi Ono	11 Apr 1947
Sakae Teshima	11 Apr 1947
Kenkichi Takayama	14 Apr 1947
Tetsutaro Ito	17 Apr 1947
Chogoro Nakamura	1 May 1948
Hatsue Kobayashi	8 May 1947
Isoichi Asada	19 May 1947
Ketsu Kato	30 Aug 1947
Isamu Hara	11 Oct 1947
Takashi Ishimatsu	11 Oct 1947
Heikichi Ito	29 Oct 1947
Tadayuki Nakajima	15 Oct 1947
Hisakichi Maeda	11 Oct 1947
Shu Yabe	29 Oct 1947
Atsushi Takahama	11 Nov 1947

Members of and Candidates for House
of Councilors

Shigeo Emoto	19 Mar 1947
Takeo Fujisawa	19 Mar 1947
Kaichi Kanda	27 Mar 1947
Masaji Mori	19 Mar 1947
Teruya Tsurusawa	19 Mar 1947
Mamoru Yamada	19 Mar 1947
Osamu Yamanaka	19 Mar 1947
Chuzo Mitsuchi	20 Mar 1947
Saburo Hayakawa	24 Mar 1947
Ryohei Sasagawa	27 Mar 1947

^b Removed from Diet.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Designation</u>
Takeshi Koga	30 Mar 1947
Ryosaku Shimizu	2 Apr 1947
Sakihei Fujiwara	7 Apr 1947
Kikuo Mitsuhashi	8 Apr 1947
Chuicho Nakazawa	11 Apr 1947
^b Keinosuke Zen	1 May 1947
^b Koichi Yagi	2 May 1947
Shinichi Hori	19 May 1947
^b Takashi Yoshimatsu	19 May 1947
^b Seiroku Ikai	12 Jun 1947
^b Inokichi Chuma	12 Jun 1947
^b Kizaemon Ueno	12 Jun 1947
^b Sozaemon Yanagawa	12 Jun 1947
Masao Hotta	25 Jun 1947
Takeo Mizuno	25 Jun 1947
Mikita Sakata	17 Jul 1947
Kozo Kanamaru	25 Jul 1947
Shinei Sato	29 Oct 1947
Kenji Yamaguchi	11 Nov 1947
Makoto Ugatin	18 Nov 1947
^b Kyoichi Hattori	14 Apr 1948
<u>Governor and Candidates</u>	
Yaroku Komatsubara	12 Mar 1947
Seiichi Fukaya	19 Mar 1947
Isamu Ogawa	19 Mar 1947
Dairoku Okada	19 Mar 1947
Tadaatsu Kawaguchi	24 Mar 1947
Mitsumichi Tarao	24 Mar 1947
Korenobu Sannomiya	22 May 1947
Takumaro Saito	26 Jun 1947
^b Wakaji Kawamura	25 Jul 1947
^b Tetsuji Tachi	16 Oct 1947
Ei Kumano	11 Dec 1947

TABLE C1
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946 ^a				6	10		4			1		11	32
Shinnin				5	3								8
Chokunin				1	7		4			1		2	15
Others												9	9
Total				6	10		4			1		11	32

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Kenji Kojima	Pres, Central Liaison Office	Apr 1946	74	0	Shigeru Yoshida	67	39
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Tsutomu Nishiyama	Vice-pres, Central Liaison Office	May 1946	60	7	Nyuro Kano	59	1
Kyuro Kano	Vice-pres, Central Liaison Office	May 1946	59	1	Jiro Shirasu	43	0
Shutaro Matsuura	Parliamentary Councilor	Aug 1946	49	0	Manabu Shiozaki		0
Tateo Mirishige	Chief, Central Bureau	Feb 1947	44	20	Tokuji Yamanaka	42	18
Sadao Iguchi	Chief, General Affairs Division, Central Liaison Office	Jul 1946	46	24	Koichiro Asakai	39	16

^aNo purges occurred in the Foreign Ministry after December 1946.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Home Affairs

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					5								5
1947 ^a				1					1	4	2		8
Shinnin					1								1
Chokunin				1	2					1	1		5
Others					2				1	3	1		7
Total				1	5				1	4	2		13

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Zenjiro Horikiri	Minister	May 1946	60	36	Guzo Mitsuchi	74	51
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Chiaki Saka	Vice-minister	May 1946	50	26	Seiichi Omura	53	27
Goro Koizumi	Chief, Police and Public Order Bureau	May 1946	50	22	Norboru Tanigawa	49	21
Ren Hayashi	Parliamentary Vice-minister	Apr 1947	65	0.4	Nagahiro Nagano	54	36
Hiroshi Akiyama	Chief, Police Affairs Section	Nov 1947	38	15	Atsushi Nakagawa	39	14
Shigenori Hata	Chief, Fourth Section, Investigation Bureau	Oct 1947	39	13			

^aNo purge occurred in the Home Ministry after November 1947.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Finance

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					6								6
1947					1						1		2
1948 ^a					1								1
Shinnin					2								2
Chokunin					5								5
Others					1						1		2
Total					8						1		9

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Keizo Shibasawa	Minister	May 1946	49	0	Tanzan Ishibashi	61	0
Tanzan Ishibashi	Minister	May 1947	62	1	Tetsu Katayama	58	0
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Masanichi Yamagiwa	Vice-minister	May 1946	44	20	Yoshimi Yamada	46	22
Kenjo Nakamura	Chief of Accounts Bureau	May 1946	41	19	Uichi Noda	42	18
Bunzo Kubo	Chief of Financing Bureau	May 1946	47	19	Shozo Ezawa	43	0
Kogoro Ueki	President of Monopolies Bureau	May 1946	45	20	Shosaku Sugiyama	45	20
Nobutane Kiuchi	Chief of Liaison Office	May 1946	45	0	Takeshi Watanabe	39	15

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Finance after May 1948.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Justice

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946				1	33			1					35
1947					1						9		10
1948 ^a	1								1				2
Shinnin				1	1								2
Chokunin					24								24
Others	1				9			1	1		9		21
Total	1			1	34			1	1		9		47

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Namisque Nakano	Prosecutor-General	Apr 1946	62	35	Tokutaro Kimura	60	35 (as lawyer)
Tokutaro Kimura	Minister	May 1947	61	1.3	Yoshio Suzuki	52	1.4
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Wataru Kurokawa	Chief Prosecutor (Tokyo)	May 1946	54	28	Hiroshi Sato	53	27
Ryp Masaki	Chief Prosecutor (Nagoya)	May 1946	54	27	Tasaburo Nagai	58	32
Takeichiro Moriyama	Chief Prosecutor (Fukuoka)	May 1946	55	29	Toshio Watanabe	56	29
Futaro Ikki	Chief Prosecutor (Miyagi)	May 1946	52	27	Kakuji Ikeda	59	26
Toahi Hirano	Superintending Prosecutor (Chiba)	May 1946	44	20	Miyoji Tanaka	52	26
Taito Ota	Superintending Prosecutor (Kofu)	May 1946	43	18	Kuro Ikeda	54	27
Tomokai Yoshie	Superintending Prosecutor (Maebashi)	May 1946	46	22	Tamizo Otsu	49	24 (as lawyer)
Saburo Fujita	Superintending Prosecutor (Takamatsu)	May 1946	48	25	Ryosuke Kosaka	50	23

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Justice after September 1948.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Justice (Continued)

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
Gosaburo Ikuhima	Superintending Prosecutor (Fukuoka)	May 1946	49	26	Suekuma Ichikawa	52	28
Jiro Kanazawa	Superintending Prosecutor (Osaka)	May 1946	57	29	Yuauke Saito	54	28
Toneo Nakamura	Superintending Prosecutor (Kanazawa)	May 1946	45	19	Kaiji Nagoshi	47	23
Yoshiro Nakamura	Superintending Prosecutor (Hakodate)	May 1946	48	22	Asanosuke Kusaka	45	20
Kenzo Ono	Superintending Prosecutor (Nigata)	May 1946	55	26	Eisuke Inuma	51	24
Kinishi Sato	Superintending Prosecutor (Akita)	May 1946	45	20	Munesumi Cho	52	27
Shigeo Tozawa	Superintending Prosecutor (Sendai)	May 1946	51	24	Tamon Yuda	48	21
Tamon Yuda	Superintending Prosecutor (Sendai)	May 1946	48	21	Takuro Oka	57	23
Takeo Yoshimura	Superintending Prosecutor (Kyoto)	May 1946	53	28	Noboru Nakamura	57	28 (as lawyer)
Kunikazu Kichara	Chief of Prison Affairs Bureau	May 1946	47	20	Zenichi Okada	44	19
Shoji Hayaashi	Prosecutor (Sendai)	May 1946	46	17			
Daikichi Imoto	Prosecutor (Tokyo)	May 1946	41	17			
Ryun Ichihara	Prosecutor (Supreme Court)	May 1946	53	24			
Toahio Oka	Prosecutor (Osaka)	May 1946	44	19			
Katau Ikeda	Prosecutor	May 1946	53	27			
Katsukiyo Adachi	Prosecutor	May 1946	52	23	Hideo Kurokawa	48	23

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Justice (Continued)

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Sonin</u>							
Isamu Hiramatsu	Prosecutor	May 1946	43	16			
Toshiro Koga	Prosecutor	May 1946	41	13			
Kinji Miki	Prosecutor	May 1946	44	18			
Kozaburo Tamazawa	Prosecutor	May 1946	41	15			
Takeshi Tsuneto	Prosecutor	May 1946	42	17			
Kampeï Sekigawa	Prosecutor	May 1946	50	23			
Kozo Yamaguchi	Prosecutor	May 1946	43	12			
Tatsukichi Kawawani	Prosecutor	May 1946	56	26			

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Education

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total ^b
1946					4	17	12	3	1	1		15	53
1947 ^a	5										26		31
Shinnin					1								1
Chokunin					3	17	12	3	1	1		1	38
Others	5										26	14	45
Total	5				4	17	12	3	1	1	26	15	84

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Isamon Maeda	Minister	May 1946	61	36	Nosel Abe	63	40
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Yoshio Tanaka	Vice-Chief of School Education Bureau	Jun 1946	46	10	Seisuke Inada	41	10
<u>Sonin</u>							
Motosuke Hara	Chief of Scientific Education Bureau	Nov 1947	42	16	Idemi Hirano	44	18

^aNo purge occurred in the Education Ministry after November 1947.

^bOther 81 persons are Education Officials in Universities under Educational Ministries' Jurisdiction.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					5								5
1947 ^a										2	2	143	147
Shinnin					1								1
Chokunin					4								4
Others										2	2	143	147
Total					5					2	2	143	152

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Kenzo Matsumura	Minister	May 1946	62	0.5	Senpachi Soejima	64	38
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Hachiya Obama	Vice-minister	May 1946	64	28	Yoshio Kusumi	40	17
Akira Koro	Parliamentary Vice-minister	May 1946	58	5	Rinji Oishi	68	0
Shoichi Nishimura	Chief of Land Development Bureau	May 1946	47	20	Shigataro Sasayama	44	18
Yoshitaka Namikawa	Chief of Staple Food Administration Bureau	May 1946	47	23	Yoshio Kusumi	40	17
<u>Sonin^b</u>							
Seizo Yasuda	Chief of Agricultural Insurance Section, Agricultural Administration Bureau	Oct 1947	42	18	Goichiro Shono	36	7

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry after December 1947.

^bThe lowest class in the higher civil service.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA

(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Trade and Industry
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry)

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					5	1		1					7
1947*				1	1	1				2	29	1	35
Shinnin					2								2
Chokunin				1	4	2		1					8
Others										2	29	1	32
Total				1	6	2		1		2	29	1	42

Details of Purge and Succession

Person removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Sanburo Ogasawara	Minister	May 1946	60	1	Jiro Hoshijima	58	1.4
Mitaujiro Ishii	Minister	May 1947	56	31	Tetsu Katayama	58	0
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Nanto Kohiyama	President of Coal Board	May 1946	59	0.6	Daigoro Yasukawa	59	0
Tadaharu Mikai	President of Trade Board	May 1946	60	0	Kota Tsukada	60	0
Shoji Suganami	Chief of General Affairs	May 1946	43	19	Teijiro Yoshida	42	19
Koichi Hidaka	Technical Official	May 1946	58	5	(None)		
Daigoro Yasukawa	President of Coal Board	June 1946	59	0	Reinosuke Kan	62	0
Shigoru Matsumura	Technical Official	Aug 1946	61	0.6	(None)		
Shigeru Hori	Parliamentary Vice-minister	Apr 1947	46	12	Eiji Tominaga	47	0
Kota Tsukada	President of Trade Board	June 1947	61	0.5	Kotaro Nagai	59	0.4
<u>Sonin</u>							
Yoshikata Tokugawa	Chief of Encouragement Section, General Affairs Division, Patent and Standards Bureau	Dec 1947	40	24	Yukio Hara	38	17

*No purges occurred in the Ministry of Trade and Industry after December 1947.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Welfare
(Including Officials of Labor Ministry)

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					7				1				8
1947 ^a			1						1	1	3		6
Shinnin					6				1				7
Chokunin					1				1	1	3		7
Others			1										
Total			1		7				2	1	3		14

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Koichi Yamaguchi	Vice-minister	May 1946	46	21	Seiichiro Yasui	55	23
Tetsuomi Sudo	Vice-president of Protection Board	May 1946	50	24	Seiichiro Yasui	55	23
Seiichiro Irie	Vice-president of Repatriates Relief Board	May 1946	45	19	Kinji Ito	45	22
Tsuneya Takahashi	Chief of Labor Administrative Bureau	May 1946	45	19	Eichi Yoshitake	43	17
Minoru Kurihara	Chief of Social Affairs Bureau	May 1946	44	20	Yoshisuke Kasai	40	16
Shigetami Sawa	Chief of Sanitation Bureau	May 1946	45	20	Minoru Katsumata	55	22
Tsunemichi Yonezawa	Chief of Children's Bureau	Sep 1947	41	16	Tokuo Kojima	38	15

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Welfare after November 1947.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL INDUSTRIES)

Ministry of Telecommunication and
Ministry of Postal Services
(Ministry of Communication)

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946				2		1							3
1947			1			1					89		91
1948 ^a				2	1		1		1				5
Shinnin													
Chokunin			1	1		2							4
Others				3	1		1		1		89		95
Total			1	4	1	2	1		1		89		99

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Shigeyoshi Matsumae	President of Communication Board	Apr 1946	45	21	(None)		
Yoshio Miyamoto	Chief of Radio Bureau	June 1946	40	18	Takeshi Arisjima	41	17
Otojiro Watanabe	Chief of Telegraph and Telephone Bureau	Mar 1947	42	28	Jiro Nakayama	46	22
Koichi Kuroiwa	Chief of Hiroshima Communication Bureau	June 1947	41	21	Ryukichi Coto	43	18
<u>Sonin</u>							
Shiro Mizutani	Chief of Foreign Telegraph and Telephone Section	Nov 1947	39	16	Shigetaka Yamagishi	37	14

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Communication after September 1948.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Transportation
(Including Officials of Japan National
Railway Corporation)

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					1					1	1		3
1947				2	1		1				4	338	346
1948 ^a	237			1									238
Shinnin				1	1								2
Chokunin				1	1		1			1	1		5
Others	237			1							4	338	580
Total	237			3	2		1			1	5	338	587

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor of purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Takao Tanaka	Minister	May 1946	57	3	Giichi Murakami	60	20
Tsunejiro Hiratsuka	Minister	Apr 1947	65	0.8	Kaneahichi Masuda	48	21
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Gyoji Arai	Parliamentary Vice-minister	Oct 1946	59	27	Shoichi Matsuda	61	2
Hisao Shirakawa	Parliamentary Councilor	Nov 1946	49	4	Manichi Tsuji	40	0
Takashi Hirayama	Vice-minister	Jul 1947	49	25	Eisaku Sato	45	26
Sakuhei Fujiwara	Chief of Central Meteorological Observatory	Apr 1947	62	37	Kiyoo Wadatsu	44	21
Tatsusuke Hamachi	Chief of Tokyo District Construction and Maintenance Division	May 1947	43	21	Shukichi Koyake	42	19
<u>Sonin</u>							
Nobu Sato	Chief of Maritime Affairs Section, Maritime Transport Bureau	Dec 1947	47	1.6	Iwao Mori	35	11
Tatsuo Hozumi	Chief of Harbor Division, Kobe Maritime Transport Bureau	Dec 1947	56	7	Kozo Yomoda	33	8
Sadao Yamada	Chief of Harbor Section, Kanto Maritime Transport Bureau	Dec 1947	58	9	Kyozaaburo Hirota	34	9

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Transportation after April 1948.

TABLE C1 (Continued)
PURGE INCIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE DATA
(CENTRAL MINISTRIES)

Ministry of Reconstruction
(Board of Reconstruction)

Purge Incidence

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
1946					3								3
1947 ^a										1	6		7
Shinnin					1								1
Chokunin					1								1
Others					1					1	6		8
Total					3					1	6		10

Details of Purge and Succession

Persons removed	Position from which removed	Designation date	Age	Experience, yr	Successor to purgee	Age	Experience, yr
<u>Shinnin</u>							
Yohim Kobayashi	Minister of State, President of Reconstruction Board	May 1946	72	0.6	Mikishi Abe	62	4
<u>Chokunin</u>							
Mitsumaro Matsumura	Vice-president of Reconstruction Board	May 1946	51	27	Tadayasu Shigeta	44	18
<u>Sonin</u>							
Hikoji Takatsu	Chief of General Affairs Section, Reconstruction Board	May 1946	36	12	Kenshiro Morooka	36	10
Gentaro Shikashi	Chief of Land Adjustment Section, Land Bureau	Oct 1947	40	18	Shiroemon Hirata	48	19

^aNo purges occurred in the Ministry of Reconstruction after November 1947.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SELECTED PURGED CANDIDATES
AND THEIR SUBSTITUTES

Progressive Party

Purged Candidate	Prefecture	Substitute Candidate	Relationship with Purged Candidate
Naka Funada Kurio Morishita	Tochigi Tochigi	Kyoji Funada Takeshi Togano (un- successful candidate)	Younger brother Younger brother
Mogami Seizo Isamu Marushima Tsuneo Kanemitsu	Tochigi Chiba Oita	Togano Satoko Hideko Mogami Noriko Marushima Yoshikuri Kanemitsu (Liberal)	Younger brother's wife Wife Wife Son
Tadao Oasa Takeo Kozaka	Kumamoto Nagano	Yorizo Matsuno Zentaro Kozaka (Liberal)	Son Nephew
Sankuro Ogasawara Kenzo Matsumura	Aichi Toyama	Kurio Nakagaki Hisao Sato	Nephew Private secretary Through the influence of Matsumura, Sato be- came a Councilor of Welfare
Takedayu Kogure	Gumma	Kyohei Suzuki	Private Secretary Through the influence of Kogure, Suzuki became a Councilor of Justice
Katsumi Kawasaki Kunitaro Koyama Daisuke Takaoka Keisuke Inaba Kozo Yamamoto Fusanosuki Maeda Setsuo Kodani Chozaburo Kodaka Shigejuro Morita	Mie Nagano Niigata Niigata Hokkaido Hyogo Okayama Chiba Aomori	Hideji Kawasaki Kunitaro Ida Tadahiro Takaoka Osamu Inaba Saburo Shiikuma Kyohei Horikawa Tsuruyo Kondo Ichiro Kodaka Gizo Tomabechi	Son Son-in-law Younger brother Younger brother Private Secretary Private Secretary Younger sister Son Morita's son became the private secretary to the Chief Secretary
Kazuo Miura Yonezo Maeda	Aomori Tokyo	Bunji Tsushima Ren Hayashi (later purged)	Selected replacement Lawyer employed by Maeda (employee)
Munenori Akagi	Tochigi	Yutaka Kikuchi	Kikuchi was formerly election manager for Akagi
Yoshio Moriya Takeii Yatsunami Tooru Iwase Shinya Uchida Ko Nakaigawa Kunekichi Yamamoto	Miyagi Tokyo Chiba Tochigi Tochigi Tochigi	Tomoo Moriya Tatsuo Yatsunami Satoru Mori Yasuo Ebata Shosuki Miyara Tsunesuke Muto Hyo Hara	Son Son Nephew Political friend Political friend Political follower (kobun)
Tadaharu Machida Sakusaburo Uchigasaki	Akita Miyagi	Teisuke Iizuka Shurichi Homma	Secretary Purgee was substitute teacher in school (student)

Socialist Party

Rikizo Hirano	Yamanachi	Seiko Hirano	Wife
Kenji Yamazaki	Shizuoka	Michiko Yamazaki	Wife
Taketaro Kawakami	Hyogo	Kyohei Horikawa	Private Secretary

Liberal Party

Tsuruhei Matsuno	Kumamoto	Yorizo Matsuno	Son
Ichiro Kono	Kanagawa	Kenzo Kono	Younger brother

Imperial Rule Assistance Association

Shinsuki Kishi (war criminal)	Yamaguchi	Eisaku Sato	Younger brother
Kiyoshi Akita	Tokushima	Daisuke Akita	Son

OCCUPATION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES^a

Election	No. of Seats	Agriculture	Commerce	Industry	Mining	Fishing	Printing and Publication	Landowner	Medicine	Banking	Press and Journalism	Education	Law	Public Servant	Military	Religion	Trade Union	Others	Unemployed
1	300	129	26	2	1	0	0	0	3	4	9	0	20	11	1	0	0	20	74
2	300	144	32	2	1	1	0	0	3	3	14	0	22	5	1	0	0	13	59
3	300	137	33	1	1	0	1	0	5	4	11	0	28	2	0	0	0	0	77
4	300	155	35	1	2	0	0	0	1	5	12	0	21	4	2	0	0	0	62
5	300	128	51	1	4	0	0	15	4	4	8	1	22	1	1	0	0	13	47
6	300	134	39	2	5	0	0	11	3	6	4	1	24	17	0	0	0	4	50
7	376	120	47	9	7	0	1	0	10	19	11	4	51	7	3	0	0	9	78
8	376	129	52	7	6	1	1	0	9	16	11	3	54	4	2	0	0	8	73
9	379	129	59	5	3	3	0	0	3	12	18	3	59	4	1	0	0	6	74
10	379	105	57	1	6	5	2	0	7	7	18	3	64	8	0	0	0	8	88
11	381	81	76	8	10	4	1	0	6	15	22	3	61	10	2	0	0	6	76
12	381	84	82	6	5	17	1	0	2	15	34	5	53	9	0	0	0	0	68
13	381	81	74	9	9	5	3	0	15	8	27	6	57	1	0	0	0	11	75
14	464	93	125	14	12	4	2	0	9	12	23	7	69	21	3	0	0	3	67
15	464	81	134	18	5	2	5	0	15	3	30	8	66	12	4	0	0	6	75
16	466	66	93	7	5	4	3	0	8	5	40	7	67	36	13	0	0	20	81
17	466	67	101	7	4	4	2	0	10	1	24	11	77	41	14	0	0	23	61
18	466	53	91	15	5	2	5	0	6	0	44	10	73	40	7	0	0	15	99
19	466	75	70	14	2	3	4	0	6	0	50	13	84	27	4	0	0	12	102
20	466	81	97	16	1	2	4	1	10	1	66	8	82	8	8	0	0	47	34
21	466	70	114	15	6	2	3	7	11	3	57	10	74	15	15	0	0	30	33
Post war { 22	466	66	131	19	2	9	4	0	15	0	39	41	43	21	0	0	0	54	22
23	466	51	157	13	5	5	4	0	5	0	43	30	50	24	0	7	58	16	8
24	466	36	169	12	6	9	2	0	4	0	48	23	45	42	0	4	39	24	3

^a Source for this data was "Shugiin Yoran," and chart in custody of Data Section, House of Representatives (includes some duplications where members listed more than one profession).

INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT ON 1942 ELECTIONS

The wartime elections (30 April 1942) in totalitarian Japan were carried on under a facade of political competition. The parties were in a process of absorption, and of course there was no party campaigning against the conduct or the objectives of the Pacific War, as it was euphemistically called.

The Tojo Government made use of the Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogi Kai (Council for the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society) in securing a list of candidates worthy of government support. This list included men connected with the empire's overseas affairs, army and navy personnel, members of the national bureaucracy, a few scholars and critics, acceptable prefectural assemblymen, members of farm associations serving as prefectural advisors, and IRAA members. Two hundred and thirty of the recommended candidates were members of the outgoing diet seeking re-election.

There were, however, other candidates for the 428 seats. The figures for Osaka, Nagano, Fukuoka, and Yamagata (the local areas specifically studied in Chapter 6) are shown in Table C 2.

TABLE C2
SUCCESS OF 1942 ELECTION CANDIDATES
RECOMMENDED BY TOJO CABINET
COMPARED WITH OTHER CANDIDATES

Districts	Total Seats	Recom. Candidates		Nonrecom. Candidates		Total No. of Candidates
		Total	Successful	Total	Successful	
Osaka	21	20	17	32	4	52
Nagano	13	13	13	12	0	25
Fukuoka	18	18	15	27	3	45
Yamagata	8	8	6	13	2	21

Obviously the fact that an opponent was recommended by the Government did not discourage candidates: there were only 59 recommended candidates in these four areas, and 84 who had not received the official nod. The batting average of the former was considerably higher, however, for 51 of them were elected, and only 9 of the latter. Government support was as close to a guarantee as even a totalitarian nation could offer a candidate.

The 1946 elections brought out a greater total number of candidates, and a much larger percentage of them were new.

TABLE C3
SUCCESS OF NEW AND RE-ELECTED CANDIDATES,
1942 AND 1946 ELECTIONS

Districts	Total Cand.		No. Elected		Total Re-elected				Total New Candidates			
	1942	1946	1942	1946 ^a	1942		1946		1942		1946	
					No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Osaka	52	141	21	18	12	57.2	4	22	9	42.8	14	78
Nagano	25	76	13	14	6	46.1	2	15.7	7	53.9	12	84.3
Fukuoka	45	100	18	18	7	38.8	2	11	11	61.2	16	88.8
Yamagata	21	36	8	9	5	62.5	0	0	3	37.5	9	100

^aRe-districting altered the number of seats allowed each prefecture in 1946.

In 1942 the number of successful new and re-elected candidates was roughly equal, but in 1946 the preponderance of new candidates was overwhelming (see first section of this appendix). The candidates from industrial circles in these four regions increased in 1946, as did those from religious life, while members of the liberal professions and educators were relatively less numerous and less successful in 1946 than in 1942.

A tabulation of these professional backgrounds will suggest the differences among candidates in the totalitarian elections of 1942 and the first "free" election of 1946.

TABLE C4
OCCUPATIONS OF CANDIDATES IN 1942 AND 1946 ELECTIONS

	Industry		Religions		Lib. Professions		Pub. Officials		Organ. Officials		Education		Unempl. *		Total, No.
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Osaka 1942															
Candidates	24	46.1	0		18	34.6	1	2.9	8	15.4	1	2.9	0		52
No. elected	7	33.0	0		10	47.6	0		3	14.2	1	4.7	0		21
Osaka 1946															
Candidates	80	56.5	8	5.6	29	20.4	6	4.2	11	7.8	4	2.8	4	2.8	142
No. elected	8	41.6	2	10.4	1	5.2	1	5.2	3	15.6	0		3	18.6	18
Nagano 1942															
Candidates	10	40.0	0		7	28.0	7	28.0	0		1	0.4	0		25
No. elected	6	46.1	0		1	7.6	6	46.1	0		0		0		13
Nagano 1946															
Candidates	43	54.2	0		23	30.2	4	5.5	1	1.3	2	2.6	3	3.9	76
No. elected	8	56.8	0		4	28.4	2	14.2	0		0		0		14
Fukuoka 1942															
Candidates	16	35.5	0		12	26.6	0	17.7	8	17.7	1	2.2	0		45
No. elected	5	27.7	0		4	22.2	3	16.5	6	33.3	0		0		18
Fukuoka 1946															
Candidates	59	54.0	4	3.7	19	17.4	4	3.7	5	4.6	4	11.9	14	3.7	109
No. elected	6	33.3	1	5.6	1	5.6	1	5.6	2	11.1	3	16.6	4	22.2	18
Yamagata 1942															
Candidates	7	32.9	0		11	47.6	2	9.4	1	4.7	0		0		21
No. elected	2	25.0	0		5	62.5	0		1	12.5	0		0		8
Yamagata 1946															
Candidates	18	56.0	1	3.0	8	24.0	1	3.0	3	9.1	0		2	6.1	33
No. elected	3	33.3	1	11.1	2	22.2	1	11.1	0		0		2	22.2	9

*Includes housewives, who were accorded the suffrage for the first time in the 1946 elections.

Appendix D
INDIVIDUALS PURGED—POLITICAL
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DOCUMENTS INVOLVING PURGE AND RELEASE OF NAOTAKE SATO

The case of Naotake Sato is the only recorded instance of the removal of purge restrictions from a Japanese Government official because of error in the original designation.

Document 1 (5 August 1946) is the CIS clearance approving Sato's appointment in the Foreign Ministry.

Document 2 (27 March 1947) is the purge letter from the Government Section to the Japanese Government.

Document 3 (2 April 1947) is a letter from Prime Minister Yoshida to Gen Whitney, Government Section, request clearance of Sato and rescision of his purge.

Document 4 (9 April 1947) rescinds Document 2.

Document 5 (14 April 1947) is Prime Minister Yoshida's response to Document 4.

All documents were supplied to the writer from his personal files by Mr. Sato, then Speaker of the House of Councillors.

DOCUMENT 1

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
Civil Intelligence Section**

APC 500
5 August 1946

Memorandum for: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
Subject: Approval of Appointments

On the basis of information currently available, the individuals listed below, previously screened by the Japanese Government have been cleared by this Headquarters for retention in or appointment to the positions indicated.

Applicant	Position
SATO, Naotake	Officials of the Foreign Ministry (1st rank)
(Signed)	J.B.S. Compliance Officer

DOCUMENT 2

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Government Section

APO 500
27 March 1947

Memorandum for: Central Liaison Office
Subject: Administration of SCAPIN 550
(SATO, Naotake)

1. The action taken by the Imperial Japanese Government in screening SATO, Naotake, has been reviewed and disapproved. SATO is to be removed from his position of Privy Councillor and excluded from public service as an undesirable person, since he comes within the scope of CATEGORY "G," Appendix "A" of SCAPIN 550.
2. SATO, Naotake was an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy and therefore falls within Interpretation of Category "G" by the Japanese Government as a person "who held between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1947 the position of. . .Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to. . .Italy."

COURTNEY WHITNEY
Brigadier General, U S Army
Chief, Government Section

Received: 31 Mar 11.30 A.M.
Shukan: PP
Copy: D of GA
Vice-Minister
Vice-President
D of FG
Injima-Chi

DOCUMENT 3

April 2, 1947

My dear General (C. Whitney)

Mr. Naotake Sato, our veteran diplomat, was directed to be excluded from public service by Scap memorandum (APO 500) dated March 27, 1947, enclosed herewith.

I wish to state that Mr. Sato was not an Ambassador stationed in Italy, but sent there in 1940 as head of a mission with the rank of Ambassador, for the purpose of negotiating amendments to the Trade Agreement between Italy and Japan. His work was purely of technical nature, and he stayed in Italy for less than a month.

On the other hand Mr. Sato is well known for his liberalism, and, I may say, will be highly useful for the democratization of Japan.

It is, therefore, earnestly desired that his case be reconsidered in the light of the above circumstances. A detailed statement is enclosed for your information.

Yours sincerely,

Shigeru Yoshida

DOCUMENT 4

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Tokyo, Japan

9 April 1947

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of April 2nd concerning the application of the Purge Directive of January 4th, 1946 (SCAPIN 550) to Mr. Naotake Sato, together with the accompanying statement has been carefully considered.

Based upon the information in the questionnaire, Mr. Sato came within the purview of the Purge Directive, as stated in my memorandum of 27 March 1947 to the Central Liaison Office. However, the explanation which you submitted to me concerning his activities in Italy, and his speeches in the Diet, indicates that Mr. Sato was not an active exponent of militant nationalism.

In the light of all the facts now disclosed, I am pleased to be able to advise the rescission of my previous memorandum.

Very truly yours,

COURTNEY WHITNEY
Brigadier General, U S Army
Chief, Government Section.

The Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

DOCUMENT 5

April 14, 1947

My dear General,

On my return from Kochi last Saturday, I received your note of April 9 advising me of the rescission of your previous memorandum concerning Mr. Naotake Sato.

I am extremely glad that my old colleague has been exonerated, and he is now free to go ahead with his campaigning for the House of Councillors, of which will, when elected, prove undoubtedly a most valuable member with his world wide experience, his staunch character and his liberalism.

I thank you with all my heart for the swift and timely action you have taken in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,

Shigeru Yoshida

Brigadier General Courtney Whitney
Chief, Government Section,
General Headquarters

DOCUMENTS INVOLVING PURGE OF DAISABURO TSUGITA

PETITION FOR RE-EXAMINATION

41 Otsuka Nakamachi
Bunkyo, Tokyo

Shigoru Yoshida, Esq.,
The Prime Minister

Dear Sir:

In regard to my petition dated May 10, 1948, I received your decision that I come under the purge order. But I believe your decision is based on misunderstanding of the facts.

So that I tender you now documentary evidences in order to make you convinced that you are quite wrong.

I shall be very grateful to you if you kindly give my case careful consideration, and rescind your decision.

Yours truly,

Daisaburo Tsugita

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The reason the Prime Minister designated me on September 13, 1946 is that I was a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (cf. Documentary Evidence No. 1).

But this is contrary to the fact. Let me bare the truth of the matter. Immediately after the General Election of 1942, I was invited to the Premier's official residence where I found some fifty persons assembled. Premier Tojo proposed to organize a new whole-nation political party, and it was agreed to have a preliminary meeting for this end the following day. My political stand up to that time, however, was diametrically against that of Tojo and his plan to organize a new political party under Government's guidance. So I took French leave forever, and know nothing about the progress of the conference.

By and by, the society was established, but as Mr. J. Yokoyama, the leader of the Society, affirms, I had no connection with that (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 2).

This will be enough to convince you how far from the truth is the presumption that I took up the post of Director of the Society in May 1942. Moreover, as Mr. Ryoza Makino affirms, there was an agreement among some of us to oppose stoutly the project. (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 3).

To my great surprise, the Tokyo Asahi dated August 23, 1944, reported that the Society nominated me as a director. Of course, this was done without my consent. What does this mean? Without a moment's delay, I went to the office of the Society to propose to cancel the nomination. Mr. Seinosuke Hashimoto, then Director of General Affairs of the Society, confirms this fact and he adds that I had never attended the conference and participated with the campaign (cf. Doc. Evid. Nos. 4, 5, 6).

Such being the case, I was never in the position of director. On the contrary, I continued to stand against Tojo Cabinet supported by the Society.

Since 1937, as a member of the House of Peers, I have exerted myself as best I might to contend against all the preceding cabinets (from Hayashi Cabinet to Koiso Cabinet). For they professed militarism and despotism while I embraced pacifism and parliamentarism. Mr. Jiro Kobayashi, ex-Chief Secretary of the House of Peers, verifies this according to the minutes of the House of Peers (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 7).

What I did during those days are known to all, I believe, but let me mention some of them.

1. I strongly held to my opposition of war against China. Consequently I and my friend Mr. Giichi Matsumura were not granted the decoration as rewards for participation in the China Affair, an honour which almost all of the members of the Imperial Diet were awarded (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 8).
2. I always raised objections to bring such bills as General Mobilization and the Defence of the Realm Act into existence, as they aim to arrange preparation for war (cf. Doc. Evid. Nos. 9, 10).
3. I always insisted upon controlling by means of severe punishment those who intend to change policy by assassination or by violent schemes, and those who approve and justify them (cf. Doc. Evid. Nos. 11, 12).
4. I opposed to rule over colonies nationalistically (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 13).
5. I opposed to set up Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and refused to participate in it (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 14).
6. I entered a protest against the inclination to oppress and weaken parliamentarism (cf. Doc. Evid. Nos. 15, 16).

Such had been my attitude toward all the preceding cabinets, and when Tojo Cabinet forced the Pacific War, bringing our gentle people into vortex of war, one thing left for me to do was to overthrow the cabinet, because so far as the cabinet lasts, it was impossible to bring peace and let our people free from the bonds of the military caste. So that I dared to form a plan to overthrow the cabinet and made my best for this end until the Cabinet resigned en masse (cf. Doc. Evid. No. 17).

Under these circumstances, how was it possible for me to join the Society and take the post of Director?

January 18, 1946.

Dear General MacArthur:

Let me first introduce myself. I am the former Minister of State and Chief Secretary of the Cabinet of the Japanese Government who resigned from post recently. I resigned because since the receipt of your Memorandum to the Japanese Government dated January 4, 1946, concerning "the Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office," political conditions became such as made it difficult for me to continue performing my duties. I am, however, neither one of those "who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest," nor "active exponents of militaristic nationalism and aggression," nor "influential in the activities of the

Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society or the Political Association of Great Japan."

During the past ten years as a member of the House of Peers I have:

- (1) opposed conducting war in China. For that reason I and my friend Mr. Yoshiichi Matsumura were not granted the decoration as rewards for participation in the China Affair, an honor which almost all of the members of the then Imperial Diet were awarded;
- (2) opposed the drafting of all bills aiming at establishing wartime organization such as the National Mobilization Law, the Defence Public Peace Law, etc.;
- (3) opposed effecting changes of policies by means of assassination and other violent schemes or giving encouragement or justification to tendencies towards recognizing such methods of procedure. Therefore I have consistently claimed that such methods should be controlled by means of severe punishment. As examples I may point to my question at the Special Committee for the Revision of the Public Peace Regulations in the 76th Diet or the one also asked by myself at the first reading of the Wartime Special Criminal Bill in the 79th Diet;
- (4) been nominated director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society without my consent or knowledge. It goes without saying that I did not perform anything for that society.

But if the Appendix A to the Memorandum mentioned above is to be taken literally, it appears that I am to be excluded from public office as having been the national officer or director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. I believe this is not fair.

This does not concern only myself. There are not a few among my friends who are not militarists or who have actively opposed militarism but who, for the same reason as mine, are exposed to the risk of losing their political future. Instances are as follows:

(a) Hatsutaro Haraguchi (Member of the House of Peers), Lieutenant-General retired from active service since 15 years. Widely known as pro-American and opponent of war, he was persecuted during the war because of his opposition to it and was defeated in the election of the members of the House of Representatives. But now it appears that he has to resign his post as a member of the House of Peers on account of his having been officer of the Army. That Mr. Haraguchi is not a militarist must be fully known to Commander Eichelberger or to Brigadier-General Fellers.

(b) Katsu Kawasaki (Former Member of the House of Representatives), a statesman who, along with Mr. Takao Saito, has fought against militarism and the military clique. Having been, however, army councillor twenty years ago, it seems that he is henceforth not allowed to run as a candidate for the election of the members of the House of Representatives.

(c) Tamon Maeda (Former Minister of Education and Member of the House of Peers), who once represented the Japanese Government at the International Labor Office. Immediately before the war he was in the United States and worked for friendly relations between Japan and America. After his return to Japan on the exchange ship, he was placed under strict surveillance as pro-American so that he was even not allowed to make public speeches. With the progress of the war, however, Tojo, as a means of recovering popularity, appointed several unconventional persons to the post of prefectural governors. Among them was Mr. Maeda who was made governor of the Niigata Prefecture. This made him automatically head of the branch of the Imperial Rule

Assistance Political Society, a fact forming the only reason why he also may have to leave the House of Peers.

All such irrational and unfair results are due to the assumption that those who filled the positions enumerated in the Appendix A to the aforesaid Memorandum uniformly come under the category of militarists. Thus it comes to that those who are not militarists or who have fought against militarism and have been persecuted by the military clique during the war are now branded as militarists and eliminated from the political world of Japan.

This is a measure not only unfair to the persons concerned but also a great misfortune to Japan as a whole. And since I believe this is never your intention, I herewith venture to beg for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Daizaburo Tsugita

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 2

Affidavit

During my incumbency as the director of Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (from May 1942 to June 1943), Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita was never in the post of director.

Josei Yokoyama

October 9, 1948

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 3

Affidavit

At the time of the inauguration of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, I had a chance of meeting Mr. Giichi Matsumura and Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita, members of House of Peers, in the House of Peers and exchanged views about Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

Usually my political stand has been different from the stand taken by those two gentlemen. Consequently, my political opinion used to be contradictory to the view of both of them.

However, I found at that time that with regard to the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society there was incidentally a complete agreement of opinion among us three in regarding that association as useless and harmful. Subsequently we three made a pledge that we would not cringe to power and blindly follow current tendency, and that we would also make our attitude quite clear as to the opposition to Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. We pledged also that we would endeavor for the welfare of our country with our own independent opinion.

I hereby certify the above mentioned fact.

Ryozo Makino (sealed)

November 25, 1947

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 4

Affidavit

It is true that Dr. Daizaburo Tsugita was nominated as a director by Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, but this was done without his knowledge. He came to our office and said, "This is quite embarrassing, please cancel my name from the list at once." So I took proceedings to gratify his wishes.

Seinosuke Hashimoto,
Ex-director of General
Affairs of the Society

October 20, 1948

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 7

Affidavit

While I was connected with the House of Peers (from Hayashi Cabinet to the end of the war), Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita, an outspoken man, used to give his opinion freely against the cardinal policies of all the cabinets, emphasizing pacifism and parliamentarism. This clearly pointed out in the minutes of the House of Peers.

Jiro Kobayashi
Director of General Affairs
in the House of Councillors

October 1948

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 8

Affidavit

In December 1943, on the occasion of the bestowal of rewards to the members of the House of Peers for meritorious services in connection with the China Incident, Giichi Matsumura and Daizaburo Tsugita, members of the House of Peers, were awarded with none.

At that time, the President of the Bureau of Decorations, noticing the omission of the names of the above said gentlemen in the preparatory documents regarding the bestowal of rewards, made an inquiry to the Chairman of the House of Peers and received the answer that both of them had absolutely declined the acceptance of such rewards and therefore they were exempted from the bestowal.

I hereby testify the above mentioned fact.

Yasuji Seki (sealed)
President of the Bureau
of Decorations

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 9

Testimony

In February 1938 when National Mobilization Bill was presented to the Diet, the House of Peers had a meeting for preliminary investigation in order to enable the members of the House to hear the explanation of the Bill from the representatives of the Government. On that occasion, Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita, member of the House, expressed his view opposing the Bill, on the ground that this Bill attempted to transfer extremely extensive power to the Executive Organ, unduly restricting the legislative power of the Diet, contrary to the spirit of our Constitution. And he had a heated debate with Mr. Masao Taki, President of the Bureau of Legislation.

I hereby testify the above mentioned facts.

Kiko Ohkohchi
Former member of the House
of Peers

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 10

The speech (copied from shorthand record) and voting made by the appellant in the House of Peers at the 76th session of the Diet.

February 28, 1941, in continuation of the first reading of
National Defence Security Bill (Kokubo Hoan Ho-an).

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"I have heard the address of Mr. Godo. In one of the passages of his speech, he stated that the bill now on the agenda contains a good many defects. However, in view of the international situation which is, according to the explanation of the government, increasingly tense and menacing, and also due to the shortness of time available for the committee to rectify those defects, Mr. Godo said that he took the attitude of supporting the original draft.

"I also shared the opinion of Mr. Godo to the effect that the bill was full of defects, and thought it my duty as member of the Diet to rectify those mistakes, and gave my signature to the amended bill. However, if the international situation is really so tense that it does not allow any amendment within a due time, as was explained by Mr. Godo, I shall not be adamant in adhering to the amendment. So the question depends upon whether or not the government really stated in the Committee that the international situation is so grave and imminent that any amendment would delay the solution. But the report of the Chairman of the Committee mentioned nothing on this particular point and we are unable to know the relevant fact, as the Committee was a secret one and there was no shorthand record. However, this particular point is very important, as it might affect our attitude regarding voting. I therefore request the Chairman of the Committee to kindly take pains to explain to us, in a secret session if necessary, whether such expositions as before mentioned were really given by the government and to reveal to us its content, if there was any such statement."

The Chairman gave a reply to the effect that there was no particular statement in the Committee with regard to the imminent tense situation prevailing nowadays. (Incidentally, the amended bill was rejected, by voting, by 163 votes versus 77 votes at that time and the government's bill was adopted.)

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 11

Address by the appellant in the Special Committee of
the Bill of Maintenance of Public Order (Chian Iji Ho)
in the House of Peers in the 76th session of the Diet
(26 December 1940 to 26 March 1941)

...Omission...
February 26, 1941
...Omission...

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"...In 1934, the Government presented the Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order to the 65th session of the Diet. In those days, internal atmosphere here already fumed with violent political thoughts and actions, and the incidents of Blood Oath League (Ketsumei Dan), Troop of God-sent Soldiers (Shimpei Tai) and the plot in Kawagoe, etc. happened in succession. In view of this trend, the House of Peers opined at that time that it was necessary to try to curb violent actions with more strict control and punishment than it was the case with ordinary acts of violence which came under the ordinary criminal law. In their views, the concurrently projected amendment to the Law of Maintenance of Public Order presented an auspicious opportunity to insert an article to the then existing regulations for the control of acts of violence based on right-wing ideas (Fascistic). In reply to this view, however, the Government at that time did not recognize any necessity of putting the right-wing movement under special control and adhered to that opinion up to the last. Thus the amendment failed to be carried. Since that time the situation has aggravated and right-wing ideas discarding parliamentarism are still rampant and are threatening now to be translated in action. Nevertheless, the Government's stand on this question seems to be just the same as it was in the 65th session.

"Hereupon, what I want to know is this, whether the Government made any serious inquiries and research into the present trend of right-wing movement so as to justify their optimistic view that the ordinary criminal law can adequately cope with those dangerous movements."

(Mr. Shotaro Miyako, representative of the Government, gave a reply to that interpellation)

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"What was explained now by the Government representative does not add any fresh knowledge to what I already knew. I do not need such a reply. In a nutshell, the question is, in what degree one recognizes the gravity of the present right-wing movements trying to undermine constitutional government. We are firmly convinced that those Fascist movements are becoming more and more intense and constitute a terrible menace to the present civic life.

"They have now gathered strength and have already emerged above the horizon. Danger is imminent. We must provide a special legislation to combat this horrible movement. We can not leave this matter merely to ordinary criminal law alone. This is my contention. On the contrary, the Government is of the opinion that there is no need of special provision: 'your apprehension is ungrounded,' 'ordinary criminal law is adequate and sufficient for its control.' This is the view taken by the Government.

And this difference of views which separates us from the Government is exactly the same as the one which made the House of Peers oppose the view of the Government in 1934: the difference based upon the difference of observation on both sides which was not endorsed by facts at that time in 1934. So the arguments were fruitless. Now, the situation has changed. I should not like to repeat now the fruitless arguments. But I would merely point out the facts which happened since 1934, and which will certainly throw a new light on the question whether the government's view was right or wrong. Two years after the time, in 1936, on the very same date of today five years ago, what we call 'February 26 incident' happened. And young military officers committed terrible murderous crimes. Those people were imbued with the ideas which were fostered under the guidance of right-wing leaders even since 1930 and 1931—no, since earlier than those days.

"They really advocated the suspension of the Constitution and the overthrow of the present political system, and attempted to wage civil war for the purpose of attaining the above mentioned object. This object they aimed at exactly coincides with what the House of Peers tried to combat, for which they insisted to insert an article to the Amendment Bill of 1934; namely, the attempt of illegally destroying the function of government organs provided by the Constitution. This incident clearly shows that the Government's observation in 1934 was wrong and the House of Peers' apprehensions were tragically right. And what struck me as a most cynical phenomenon is that the Cabinet which assured us in 1934 that there is no need of having any special anxiety about the right-wing movement was headed by Viscount Saito and Viscount Takashashi as Finance Minister, the most outstanding figure in the Cabinet. And both of them became victims of assassination at that time. I still remember remarks made by a friend of mine at that time who wondered how the officials of high authority responsible for police control could attend the funerals of these lamentably murdered statesmen and visit their graves without shame. . . However, it is futile to linger on this sort of argument trying to find who is responsible and who is not; this is like counting the age of the deceased child. The most important thing is how to take precautions, steps to avoid the repetition of similar tragedies with regard to this matter, the Government still adheres to the former view of denying the necessity of special control over right-wing movement, while I unfortunately held an entirely different opinion. In my opinion, the situation now is more aggravated than at the time of the 65th session of the Diet. When the opinions are different between the Government and the outsiders, it may be inferred that the Government's view is right, because it is equipped with more means of investigation and information. But the fact which I cited a moment ago clearly evidences that even the Government sometimes makes mistakes and misjudgments. Therefore, I request the Government to pay more attention to this matter and to take a most serious attitude as to the control over right-wing movement. If my opinion is adopted and a special legislation is accepted for the control of the right, it will be very gratifying, even if no actual case to which this control law is to be applied really happens for five, ten, or twenty years following since the enactment of the law. Even though I were ridiculed by others on account of my stupid misapprehension as to the possibility of such inimical incidents, I would gladly accept resentment and ridicule, if nothing to necessitate the application of the law actually happens. On the other hand, if the Government's view should prove to be wrong and mine to be right in the recurrence of treacherous plots in the future, this would be the most regrettable disaster to the State. Even to think of this, one cannot help shuddering. So I stated before, I have no intention of repeating endless arguments. What I really want is that authorities of police control should reflect more seriously, and as it was pointed out yesterday by my colleague Mr. Taguchi, I wish the authorities to be free from prejudices and try to observe the situations impartially and endeavour sincerely to suppress inimical movements of the right, even if it might come to nothing fruitful. I wish to conclude my interpellation with this expression of my strong desire."

February 28, 1941

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"I wish to move an amendment to the original Bill. The amendment I am going to propose is to insert the phrase: 'or destroying illegally the function of Government organs provided by the Constitution' under the phrase 'disavowing the system of private property' of Article 10. Thus Article 10 will read as follows: 'those who organized an association or joined the association in cognizance of the fact with the intention of disavowing the system of private property and destroying illegally the function of Government organs provided by the Constitution shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment of ten years or less than ten years.' In addition to that I wish to move to add a clause next to the Article 11 which reads as follows: 'Those who made propaganda regarding the matter pertaining to the object mentioned in the preceding Article with the intention of achieving that object shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment of three years or less than three years'."

(The motion of amendment was adopted)

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"The reason why I initiated this amendment may be quite clear from my former interpellation and the reply of the Government which were repeated in the past few days. I will, therefore, be very brief in explaining the matter.

"The amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order presented by the Government in this session has nearly the same contents as the one presented in the 65th session of the Diet in 1934. In the 65th session, the House of Peers made a number of amendments to the original Bill. However, the Bill became abortive due to the disagreement of the opinions between the House of Peers and the House of Representatives in the Joint Assembly. The amendment I am going to move now to article 10 and Article 11 of the original Bill is, in a nutshell, the resumption of what the House of Peers tried and failed in amendment in 1934. . . the amendment draft which I have now read was what was resolved by the House of Peers in the past year. It was in 1934. The present-day social atmosphere regarding violence or other illegitimate means aiming at obstructing political structure and the consequent necessity of control over those pernicious movements have increased rather than decreased in comparison with the situation in those past days. For that reason, I wish to move the amendment which has the object of maintaining the same position taken by this House in 1934. In so doing, I wish to solicit your support."

(In voting, the amendment was rejected)

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 12

The speech made by the appellant in the House of Peers in the 79th session of the Diet (copied from shorthand records)

First reading of Amendment Bill of the Civil Law and other three bills (including Special War-time Criminal Law)

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"According to the explanation made by the government now, the bill of Special War-time Criminal Law has the purpose of maintaining internal public order during

the war. In this connection, what I wish to inquire is whether or not the government is going to present the Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order (Chinan Iji Ho) in this session. I recall that the government gave a pledge to the House of Peers last year, in the '76th session of the Diet that they will present the Amendment Bill in this session. But so far there has been no amendment yet, and some whisper that they will not present it at all. This question has a relevant importance in the examination of Article 7 of the present Bill to the effect that one has to punish severely those who committed murder with the intention of disturbing national administration in war time. So I want to present the government: whether they are going to present the Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order. If not; why?"

(Mr. Tsusei Iwamura, Minister of Cabinet, gave a reply)

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"I am sorry I cannot thoroughly understand what the Minister of Justice has said just now. It seems to be a habitual practice in the Diet debate that whenever the members of the Diet express their desire or suggestion regarding certain policies, the government representatives assure lightly that they will make investigations or inquiries in the future and later on when they are pressed for the realization of the matter, they evade responsibilities and resort to excuses. This is a customary practice of government officials and a very unpleasant one indeed. But the reply put by the Minister of Justice just now is more than that. It is really appalling. What the Government pledged in the past session with regard to the Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order was not such a light thing as investigation or inquiry, but the promise of presenting the Bill in this session, which cannot be liquidated by the answer given by the Minister of Justice now.

"This question dates back to 1934. In 1934 in the 65th session, the Government presented the Bill of Maintenance of Public Order, the content of which nearly coincided with the content of the one which passed the Diet last year. if my memory is correct. In 1934, when the Bill was investigated by the Committee of the House of Peers, it gave rise to divergent opinions. Above all, the feeling of resentment was quite intense among the members at the leniency of the Bill towards right-wing movement compared with the severity with which it tried to control left-wing movement. In those days, so-called 'terrorism' was rampant, and Mr. Junnosuke Inoue, Baron Takuma Dan and Tsuyoshi Inukai, the Premier, were the lamentable victims. Besides, there were several abominable plots such as God-sent Troop (Shimpei Tai) or Teichin Tai which aimed the assassination of Mr. Suzuki, President of Seiyu Kai Party.

"In the face of such a turbulent situation, the majority of the Committee opined that while they recognize the importance of controlling communistic intrigues, it is quite urgent to suppress horrible right-wing terrorism. Therefore, insertion of an appropriate regulation clause concerning right-wing movement into the Bill was strongly recommended. On the other hand, the Government was reluctant to such special treatment of right-wing movement and opposed the amendment. Nevertheless, the Committee decided to adopt the amendment which was as follows: 'Those who organized an association or joined the association in cognizance of the fact with the intention of disavowing the system of private property and destroying illegally the function of government organs provided by the Constitution shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment of ten years or less than ten years.'

"This amendment was adopted in the plenary session of the House of Peers. Thus the amendment was sent to the Joint Assembly of the two Houses, but the session expired before any decision was taken by the Joint Assembly. So the Bill as a whole did not pass the Diet. By this event, however, I think the opinion of the House of Peers regard-

ing the desirability of control over right-wing movement was clearly indicated at that time.

"About ten years elapsed since that time, and the situation justifying the former apprehension increasingly aggravated. Nevertheless, the Government, entirely ignoring the decision of the House of Peers, presented almost the same Bill regarding the Maintenance of Public Order last year, in the 76th session, omitting the amended part. So we in the Committee resented the Government's ignoring attitude and strongly urged insertion of a clause for the intensified control of right-wing movement. In the early stage of the Committee, the Government insisted that such a legislation was needless, but later on, when we tried to move an amendment clause, they gradually yielded to our stand, and recognized the necessity of intensifying the control over right-wing movement. However, they pleaded for the postponement of legislation as to this particular point due to the impossibility at that time of finding suitable words or phrases covering the meaning, for they said they found the wording of the amendment drafted by the Committee was rather inadequate. And furthermore they used an expression at that time which implied the pledge of presenting the said amendment in the next session. For confirmation's sake, I wish to read now the reply of Mr. Heisuke Yanagawa, the then Minister of Justice, from shorthand records. He said:

The amendment which aims at the control of illegal destroyers of government organs provided by the Constitution is accepted in its implication. But it requires further investigation for adequate wording. I wish the matter to be adjourned for some time. We will certainly take steps of legislating in the near future after careful investigation.

"Viscount Funabashi, however, rose at that time and stating that the words used by the Minister of Justice, 'the near future,' were ambiguous, requested a more distinct reply. Upon this, Mr. Tanagawa replied:

By the near future in my statement, I meant that as soon as possible we will present the Bill. If we succeed in obtaining adequate wording for legislation, we shall promulgate the law, and if it were before the session of the Diet, even in the shape of Urgent Imperial Ordinance. Otherwise, we shall present the Bill to the next session of the Diet.

"This word, 'next session,' I take, means the present session of the Diet.

"On that occasion, I and some of my colleagues thought that in spite of this definite statement of the Government, we should go ahead with the amendment, because we unfortunately could not trust the Government as to this matter. The Government had really no intention of strictly controlling right-wing movement. The difficulty of phraseology was, in our view, used simply as an excuse for evading responsibility. Otherwise, it would not be impossible to find suitable wording for legislation, as the Government is equipped with a good many efficient legal experts. Now the Government promised the presentation of the Bill embodying the decision of the House of Peers in the forthcoming session, but the Cabinet may change before the arrival of the next session, or other excuses might be employed for the failure of presentation of the Bill in the next session. The House of Peers has competence of its own for legislating. Unbounded by the opinion of the Government, we must go ahead with our own task. This was our opinion at that time. The majority of the Committee, however, took the view

that in the light of the clearcut statement of the Government with regard to the presentation of amendment Bill in the next session, the Committee should support the original draft, and that report was adopted by the plenary session. This is the process which this particular legislative work took heretofore. Therefore, the Government is now under a very strict obligation on this point. They must, at any rate, present the Amendment Bill to the Diet in this session. Nevertheless, the Government, according to the explanation made by the Minister of Justice just now, takes the view that in this session, we have only to deal with the legislation relevant to wartime and the Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order shall not be presented for this reason, in spite of the pledge done by the Government in the past. Well, then we come to the question: What is wartime legislation? It is quite evident that legislation especially to be applied to wartime affairs, and needless for peacetime comes, in the first instance, under the category of wartime legislation. At the same time, legislation effective and applicable both for peacetime and wartime shall not necessarily be excluded from the category of wartime legislation. For instance, in the Amendment Bill of Civil Law which is now on the agenda, there is an article regarding the elimination of the status 'illegitimate child' from civil law. This proposition has to be considered necessary in peacetime as well as in wartime. Consequently, this part of amendment must have been sent to the Diet in this session of wartime legislation. Hereupon, what I wish to make the point clear on this matter is this: 'whether the question of the control over right-wing movement is now considered by the Government unnecessary and absolute in wartime, while in peacetime they agreed to recognize its importance?' If it were really so, I would yield to the view that the aforesaid Amendment Bill shall not be presented in this session. However, the situation which necessitated intensification of the control over right-wing movement since the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, the necessity of maintaining national unity during the war makes such a control absolutely urgent. What is the opinion of the Government on this point? This is the first question. Secondly, with reference to Article 7 of Special Wartime Criminal Law which provided penalty for those who commit murder for the purpose of disturbing national administration in wartime, which may cover, according to the explanation of Minister of Justice, terrorism of the right wing as well as the left, and thus may give some satisfaction to what was contended by the House of Peers, I should like to say a few words. Now, when we take up the text of Article 7 of this new Bill, in comparison to our Amendment Bill of Maintenance of Public Order, there is a remarkable difference between the two in the scope of the control. The former merely covers the case in which homicide is committed with the purpose of obstructing national administration. But the latter wants to punish any action whatsoever which might tend to illegal destruction of the functions of government organs provided by the Constitution.

"In a word, Article 7 of the new bill is far more lenient than the one which was pledged by the Government to be carried out last year. To offer on the part of the Government to present Article 7 of this new law as a suitable of the pledged amendment of the Law of Maintenance of Public Order and solicit us to be satisfied with this may be compared to the case of producing ten yen note, on the part of the debtor, for the debt of 100 yen and urge the creditor to consider all the debt liquidated with this ten yen only. However, mild and lenient the creditor may be, he must be very much embarrassed, if such an offer is made. If such a proposition turns out in a case of lawsuit, any court of justice anywhere in this country will not fail to give judgment against the debtor. The Minister of Justice who supervises all the courts of justice in this country now makes his statement in this House following the same logic as this unscrupulous debtor. Does the Minister of Justice think that such statement is not contrary to political virtue? This is my second point. I wish to request the answer of the Minister of Justice."

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 13

The speech made by the Appellant in the Budget Committee
of the House of Peers in the 74th session of the Diet
(copied from shorthand records)

February 22, 1939

Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita:

"... Now winding up this particular point with this, I wish to turn to the next point for interpellation. The second item of question is this: what will be the effect upon the minds of the Formosans, in case the policy of the control of transferable (towards the mainland) rice is put into effect in Formosa? When this policy is put into effect in Formosa, the result will be the reduction of income of Formosan farmers. In rough estimate, if the Governor General's Office compulsory purchases rice to be shipped to the mainland for the price cheaper than the current price by two years, the price of Formosan rice will be reduced in uniformity by two yen per Koku according to the rule of 'one article one price.' When one computes the whole production of rice in Formosa at ten million Koku per year, the reduction of income on the part of Formosan farmers by this lowered price will amount to twenty million yen. If we distribute this loss of money evenly among four hundred thousand farmers' households, the loss of income for each family will be averagely fifty yen. This estimate is the outcome of what I heard from the authorities of Formosan Government the other day on my inquiry. It is quite a grave question to create, on the part of the Formosan Government, such a situation in which the average income of Formosan farmers is to be reduced by fifty yen per household. This control policy was planned in view of special condition of Formosa, and I know its application is confined merely to Formosa, not to be extended to the mainland or Korea. But if a likewise policy, aiming at the encouragement of crops other than rice, were adopted in the inland with the result of reducing farmers' income by fifty yen per family, what would happen in public opinion? Its enforcement would be extremely difficult, perhaps almost impossible in the face of harsh criticism and turbulent opposition. Well, then, what would be the situation in Korea? I don't know very much about Korea, so I asked the opinion of several experts of Korea among the members of this House about the possibility of carrying out a likewise policy in Korea, if there were any such need on the part of the Government. And the unanimous opinion of these experts whom I consulted was that such drastic and provoking measures are far beyond feasibility in Korea. I believe that view is quite right. It is incredible for a person who has common sense to accept the theory that a policy impossible to be applied to the homeland and Korea without provoking indignance of people can be easily carried out in Formosa. According to the explanation of Formosan authorities who participated in the gathering of some members of this House the other day, in the earliest stages there was indeed some opposition and grievances among people, but since approximately the end of last year, due publicity was given to this policy in newspapers and bulletins, and pamphlets explaining the matter in plain words were published and distributed among the farmers, by which they believed that lately farmers have understood the situation. From my point of view, I would say I am rather struck by the naivete of such easily made prospects. It was at the latest at the end of the year before last that this proposition was brought to consideration among the authorities of Formosan Government. Even since those days, I have heard of rumour about this matter. Of course, there were among the Formosan people a lot of apprehension regarding this matter, but Formosan authorities kept this matter in secret—I cannot understand why—and prohibited its publicity in newspapers and other publications. It was only in November last year, after the decision of the Committee of Investigation of Important Products of Formosa, as was mentioned by the Minister of Overseas Affairs just now, that the

ban was lifted on the publicity of this matter. So it was only at most two or three months ago that the people at large learned of this matter through newspapers. It is of course forbidden to criticize the policy with a disapproving tone. Such a criticism is not allowed to be printed. On the other hand, leaflets or pamphlets advocating the policy were published by the Government and distributed among farmers as was explained by Government representatives. If it is conceived that, through such methods, Formosan people understand the situation and agreed to the policy, it must be called a piece of appalling optimism.

"According to the statistics prepared by the Formosan Government, 60 percent of Formosans do not understand Japanese language. The percentage of illiterate people in rural parts must be enormously higher than the average. Under the circumstances, is it possible to persuade the people of the adequacy of the policy by means of publication of pamphlets which were distributed among rural people only two or three months ago?

"Formosans are also a part of Japanese people. So if they really understand the meaning of the policy, they would not hesitate to accept the burden. This is clearly evidenced in the case of the war. Formosans are aware of their duty for cooperation in waging the war. They willingly contribute their money, treasures, and other war-time services, because they clearly understand that we must win the war. But with regard to the policy of rice control, Formosan people cannot comprehend its meaning. They know that they have to suffer the reduction of their income, but cannot understand why they must suffer a sacrifice. Neither can I understand its justification, after having the explanation of authorities and receiving a number of reference documents. How could plain Formosan farmers understand its significance, even though mere bundles of pamphlets were scattered among them a few months ago? Now, I request a reply from the Minister of Overseas Affairs about one point which is this: Formosa has been under Japanese jurisdiction ever since forty years ago. During those years, our administration has made a progress step by step and the people have been satisfied with our rule. This is what I understand about Formosan administration. Now then, the Government is going to try to take new measures by which one has to impose on the farmers a policy of reducing their income for the reason of encouraging cultivation of agricultural products other than rice. Does the Minister of Overseas Affairs really believe that such a policy gives satisfaction to the farmers and creates good effects upon the minds of Formosans who have been heretofore pleased with Japanese administration and have adored our benevolent policy towards them? Now, China Incident has entered the long-range stage of warfare. Our country is now aiming at the establishment of a new order of Great Asia. The most important thing in this stage is to obtain the hearty confidence of Chinese people in our cause and make them trust us and cooperate with us for the common aim. This was what the Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated in this Committee the other day. Such being the case, it is most essential for that purpose to love and protect Formosans with special care, because Formosans are of the same stock of race and speak the same language as the Chinese. If you wish to exert a good influence on Chinese psychology, you must embrace and love our Formosans, which is more effective than a hundred sermons and thousand propagandas about pro-China policy. What is the view of Minister of Overseas Affairs on this matter?"

(Mr. Kamei Hatta gave a reply)

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 14

Affidavit

At the time of the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, I had an opportunity to talk with my colleague Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita in the antechamber of

the House of Peers. On that occasion Mr. Tsugita said, "I am planning not to enter that Association." And he actually did not enter it to the last.

I hereby testify to above mentioned fact.

Yahachi Kawai (sealed)
Former Member of the House of Peers

November 19, 1947

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE NO. 17

Affidavit

One summer evening, in 1944, (I do not remember the date) when I, together with Mr. Daizaburo Tsugita, called on Mr. Kantaro Suzuki, Vice-president of the Privy Council, Mr. Tsugita stated his pessimistic views as to the prospects of the war, and pointed out that absolute secrecy is preserved by Tojo as to the actual facts, thus deceiving the Emperor and his people. Then, Mr. Tsugita compared Tojo with Kajido, a high-handed Chinese politician, and emphasized that the Tojo Cabinet should be overthrown by all means.

I affirm the above to be true in every particular.

Kazue Yakushiji

October 1948

Appendix E
REACTIONS TO THE PURGE
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PURGE OF PROMINENT LEADERS*

Purge of Hirano

One of the typical examples of the November 1947 purge is that of Mr. Rikizo Hirano, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Katayama Cabinet. The following account is based on statements to this writer by Mr. Suehiro Nishio, who at that time was Chief Cabinet Secretary. Also, Nishio wrote "Seven Years Backstage," which reveals the political conditions in occupied Japan for the Sangyo Keizai. (Industrial and economic journal.)

The case began on 31 October 1947 when the local press carried reports that Minister Hirano was to be purged shortly. Mr. Hirano, who was then touring Niigata, dismissed the rumors as groundless, whereupon Premier Katayama urged Hirano to return to Tokyo immediately, explained the circumstances to him, and advised him to resign at once. However, Mr. Hirano would not comply. On 4 November, therefore, the Premier relieved Mr. Hirano of his post.

Mr. Hirano and at least ten Socialist Diet members who were affiliated with the All-Japan Farmers' Union and who supported Mr. Hirano branded the act a plot by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, and the press played up the long-standing Nishio-Hirano feud.

The circumstances which led Premier Katayama and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio to decide upon the dismissal of Mr. Hirano follow.

When, at the time of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet in May 1947, a roster of Cabinet members was submitted for approval to the Deputy Chief of the GS, Colonel Kades, it was disapproved because Mr. Rikizo Hirano was not desirable. Mr. Nishio, who had submitted the roster, consulted with Premier Katayama and Mr. Hirano. They decided the Premier should submit through Colonel Kades to General MacArthur a letter stating that "as Mr. Hirano is absolutely essential to the Cabinet, special consideration in his case will be appreciated," and Mr. Hirano, with the help of Mr. Jiro Shirasu, with whom he was intimate, started working on a friend in G-2. Consequently, the controversy over Mr. Hirano's qualifications was dropped for the time being.

During his term as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, however, Mr. Hirano frequently clashed with Mr. Hiroshi Wada, then Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board, whom Nishio and Katayama supported. Consequently, Minister Hirano naturally began to resent Mr. Nishio and frequently criticized the government of which he himself was a member. Katayama and Nishio in time came to regard Hirano as a nuisance.

On 11 October, Mr. Hirano, who was touring Nara-ken at the time stated, "There are indications that the Cabinet will call a general election in the near future." This gave the impression that the Katayama Cabinet was facing a crisis.

About noon, 25 October, Colonel Kades called on Premier Katayama at the latter's official residence. Kades talked to the Premier and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, with Assistant Cabinet Secretary Sone acting as interpreter.

*By Shigeyoshi Aikawa (Yomiuri Press).

At this meeting, Kades said,

Hirano, to begin with, was never cleared for the position but because of Premier Katayama's letter to General MacArthur, he was allowed to join the Katayama Cabinet. However, Minister Hirano is no longer faithful to Premier Katayama, and everything he does is injurious to the Cabinet. Accordingly, there is no longer need for dillydallying, and he should be dismissed immediately.

On this occasion, neither Mr. Katayama nor Mr. Nishio pleaded on Mr. Hirano's behalf as they had once done. Although the Premier is empowered to appoint or dismiss Cabinet members, it was not a simple matter to dismiss Mr. Hirano—Nishio and Hirano immediately after the war had lived in the same room (Wada Building) and cooperated in organizing the Socialist party. Also, Mr. Hirano could cause a lot of trouble if he should join the Opposition. Thus, the proposal offered Katayama and Nishio must have been a timely solution, because if Hirano should "fall under the purge act," it would be a simple matter to oust this political enemy from the Cabinet.

If Katayama and Nishio believed that Mr. Hirano was an undemocratic person who should fall under the purge act, or that it was the duty of the Government to abide by the wishes of the Occupation Forces, they should have excluded Mr. Hirano from the Cabinet at the start. Instead, they convinced the Occupation authorities that they needed Mr. Hirano in the Cabinet and, later, when he refused to cooperate, they purged him. This action was not at all justified. If Mr. Hirano caused disunity in the Cabinet and hindered the Government's administration, the Government should have said so when he was dismissed, and the purge act should not have been invoked against him.

The fact that Mr. Hirano on his screening application failed to mention that shortly before the end of the war he had been an editor of the magazine The Imperial Way constituted the grounds for his purge.

The Central Public Service Screening Committee, which had been established by the Government to determine the applicability of the purge act to each individual, began examining Mr. Hirano's case on 16 December, and, finally, on 26 December the Committee by a vote of seven to two cleared him, giving the following reasons:

The Imperial Way Society was in no way connected with the IRAA and, judging from the fact that the Society was denounced as an organization impeding the total war effort of Japan and was dissolved in April 1942 by Premier Tojo, it is not proper to regard it in the same light as other patriotic organizations. However, because the Society's leaders were ex-militarists and because of its ideological trends, we are of the opinion that the organization falls under Paragraph G. Although Rikizo Hirano was the editor and publisher of the organ, Imperial Way, this was merely in name only, and he was not actually the responsible person. Furthermore, reviewing his past record, we find that he advocated the liberation of the farmers in spite of oppression by militarists during the war, and in spite of the fact that he was a rightist leader, and we cannot regard him as an ultranationalist.

Committee members who voted to clear him were: Eiichi Makino, Chairman of the Committee and Doctor of Laws (ex-professor at Tokyo University); Tatsuo Iwabuchi (political critic); Yosusaburo Hara (President of the Japan Powder Company); Masuo Kato (Kyodo News Service); Kazuo Okochi (Tokyo University professor); Tadai-chiro Tanimura (ex-Vice Minister of Justice); and Tomonori Shirogane (former judge of the Court of Administrative Litigation). Those who voted against Hirano were Torazo Kumamoto (Japan Federation of Labor Unions) and Shinkichi Unno (Free Legal Circle).

On 27 December, the Government, shocked by the decision reached by the Committee, notified the Committee that the decision placed the Government in an embarrassing position. As a result, Makino, Shirogane, and Okochi switched their votes. When the final vote was taken 13 January, the Committee reversed its previous verdict and, by a vote of five to four, found that Mr. Hirano was subject to the purge act.

The behind-the-scenes developments leading to this decision were as follows: Chairman Makino, acting on instructions from the Government, first talked to Shirogane. With him, he then called on Okochi, told him about GHQ wishes and, saying, "All except Mr. Iwabuchi have agreed to vote against Hirano, so...." requested him to do the same. Thus, Mr. Okochi decided to vote against Mr. Hirano.

Mr. Hirano's wife, Shigeko, was indignant when she learned of this; she called on Mr. Okochi 15 January and reproached him for his insincerity. Nonplussed, Mr. Okochi gave Mrs. Hirano the following note (from Mr. Okochi's memoirs):

At the final vote on Mr. Hirano's qualifications held 13 January, I voted that he was subject to the purge act for the following reasons:

At the Committee meetings which preceded the vote, I pointed out that "It is only proper for the Screening Committee to either (1) reconfirm the seven to two interim decision of 26 December, clearing Mr. Hirano, or (2) reach a unanimous decision that he is subject to the Act. Any other decision will only invite charges of political corruption against the Committee."

I perceived that all members, including the Chairman, understood my point. Later, when I met the Chairman, in private, he revealed his opinion that Mr. Hirano was subject to the purge act and that, under the circumstances, the Committee should purge him. However, I held to my previous statement, and told him that if all members of the Committee (except, of course, Mr. Iwabuchi) who had voted for Mr. Hirano should consent, after making a comprehensive study of the facts, to vote as the Chairman suggested then I would have no choice but to follow suit. I requested that the Chairman, in such an event, get the members to agree to his position.

The day before the voting (January 12), the Chairman, accompanied by Mr. Shirogane, called at my home and told me that an understanding had been reached with the other members of the Committee. I attended the Committee meeting the following day, thinking that the result of the voting would be eight to one (the latter vote to be cast by Mr. Iwabuchi) against Mr. Hirano. When the votes were counted, however, the result was five to four. I was greatly shocked to learn that no arrangements had been made as to how the Committee members should vote. I had, therefore, cast my vote under an illusion. I would have acted according to the Committee's interim decision of 26 December had I foreseen this outcome. As I myself had brought up this point at the Committee meetings, I believe the other members of the Committee know how I felt. . . .*

Mr. Hirano decided to seek court action, and on 26 January 1948, submitted to the Tokyo District Court an application for a provisional disposition nullifying the Committee's decision, so that he could continue to serve in the Diet and to hold other public offices. Chief Judge Yoshihiro Niimura of Civil Section 14 of the Tokyo District Court, to which the application was submitted, conferred with Judges Masao Yanagawa and Yoshitaka Moriya and decided to suspend the Committee's action, informing Premier Katayama to that effect. The issue thus developed into a conflict between the executive and judicial branches. The Government issued a statement that "this decision is a usurpation of the executive power by the judicial power," and this was countered with statements from opposition legal circles. The public cheered the underdog, the Judicial Department, for its courageous attitude, and for a time it appeared that the purge of Hirano, despite GS efforts, would end in failure. Thus, SCAP was driven to exercise its authority and intervene. Brigadier General Whitney of GS issued a directive to Chief Justice Mibuchi of the Supreme Court, and the latter, on 5 February, released the following statement in response to this directive:

1. Regarding the provisional disposition made in the case of Rikizo Hirano at the Tokyo District Court, today at 1600 hours, Allied Forces GHQ called my attention to the following facts:
 - a. that exclusion of undesirable persons from public office has been directed in a SCAP memorandum dated 4 January 1946;
 - b. that the machinery and procedures for the implementation of said memorandum have been established with SCAP approval;

*From Hiromi Kurihara, Facts about the Purge of Hirano, Kazama Book Store.

- c. that the Premier is directly responsible to SCAP for all actions required of him by the directive;
 - d. that SCAP, although he generally leaves all matters pertaining thereto to the discretion of the Japanese government, reserves the authority to intervene therein regarding any phase of proceedings related thereto;
 - e. that in consequence, Japanese courts have no jurisdiction over procedures for removal or revocation related to the implementation of the directive mentioned previously.
2. Therefore, the Supreme Court hereby declares invalid the judgment passed on the case mentioned above by the Tokyo District Court on 2 January, said court having no jurisdiction over the matter.

It was generally believed that the reason Colonel Kades loathed Mr. Hirano to such an extent was as follows.

In General MacArthur's headquarters there were two factions: the New Deal faction of GS, headed by Whitney and Kades, and the faction which included Major General Willoughby of G-2, Eighth Army Commander Eichelberger, Chief of the Administrative Staff Colonel Bunker, and Chief of the Public Relations Office Colonel Baker. The GS policies which had leftist inclinations and the G-2 conservative policies often resulted in differences of opinion, particularly in the reorganization of the police system. Mr. Yoshida and the Liberal party were on friendly terms with G-2, due largely to the efforts of Jiro Shirasu, whereas the Socialist and Democratic parties were supported by GS. This section loathed Shirasu in particular. Mr. Hirano, on the other hand, in spite of his membership in the Socialist party, had friends in G-2, and despite GS opposition to his joining the Katayama Cabinet, he was, as previously mentioned, able to enter the Cabinet because of G-2's influence. As a Cabinet minister, he turned his back on GS, but maintained steady contact with G-2 authorities. Therefore, he was disliked all the more by GS and, eventually, was purged. Even Mr. Nishio believes it was this way.

Purge of Inukai and Narahashi

Another example of the political exploitation of the purge act is found in the purge and de-purge of Inukai and Narahashi. This case is an example of how the Japanese government, rather than SCAP authorities, used the purge act to weaken its political enemies.

As I have already mentioned, Takeshi Inukai of the Progressive party, in conspiracy with Wataru Narahashi, Takeshige Ishiguro, and Hitoshi Ashida, dissolved the Party and formed the Democratic party in March 1947. This was a plot to deny State Minister Shidehara the presidency of the Progressive party. In addition to that, they attracted several Liberal party Diet members, thus enraging Yoshida and Shidehara. As a result, Mr. Inukai was purged for having served as an adviser to the Nanking government; Narahashi for having connections with militarists in his Peiping days; and Usaburo Chizaki, who took an active part in the formation of the new Party, for his affiliations with the Patriotic Labor Association. Takeshige Ishiguro was purged at the same time. Thus, the leaders of the Progressive party were completely routed. In an attempt to purge Mr. Ashida at that time, the Government sought to dig up derogatory evidence. Mr. Ashida's wartime presidency of the Japan Times was to be the grounds for his purge, but because of the small circulation of the paper, Mr. Ashida survived the purge by the smallest margin.

As a result of the second postwar general election held 25 April 1947, the Socialist party became the leading party, and a coalition cabinet was formed with the Democrats.

In February of the following year, the Katayama Cabinet resigned en masse, and Mr. Ashida formed a new Cabinet on 10 March 1948. Although it was a coalition cabinet of the Democrat and Socialist parties, the Government's majority in the Diet was very small. Furthermore, in the Socialist party, a group of leftists was seeking a chance to overthrow the Cabinet. For these reasons, Mr. Ashida was having difficulty unifying the Cabinet and maintaining close coordination with the Socialist party. Therefore, he

keenly felt the necessity of de-purging Inukai and Narahashi in order to strengthen the Government and the Democratic party, the main government party, and therefore frequently made earnest requests to GS. As a result, Mr. Narahashi and Mr. Inukai were finally de-purged on 22 May and 20 July respectively.

Although their purge and de-purge were both handled by the Central Public Service Screening Committee and the Central Public Office Qualifications Appeal Commission, no one believed in these committees after the Hirano Incident; and the political world was only mildly surprised at this latest example of political exploitation of the purge act.

Purge of Matsumoto

Another good example of the purge being used for political motives is the case of Jiichiro Matsumoto, a member of the Socialist party. Matsumoto comes from the Suiheisha* and for a long time he worked to raise the social status of his class. In his struggles to gain equality for his class, he even attacked the residence of Prince Tokugawa, a member of the privileged class. In the prewar Diet, he became popular as the member who never wore a necktie. As a member of the left-wing Socialist party, Matsumoto, by rights, did not belong on the purge list, but because he was an influential member of the Yamato Hokokukai (Japan Society), a patriotic organization, and an IRAA candidate during the war, he was purged. He, however, appealed his case on 3 March 1948 to the Screening Appeals Committee established by the Katayama Cabinet. After examining his case, the committee decided to de-purge him, but before an announcement to this effect could be made, the Ashida Cabinet fell and was succeeded by the second Yoshida Cabinet. Because of Matsumoto's past record and his opposition to the Emperor System (according to custom, Matsudaira, the President of the House of Councilors, and Matsumoto, the Vice-President at that time, were received by the Emperor at the opening ceremony of the Diet immediately after the war, but Matsumoto, stating that he thought it silly to walk like a crab before the Emperor, turned his honor down—he had also instigated a prison riot), Prime Minister Yoshida did not favor his de-purge. He, therefore, sent a note to General MacArthur requesting that Matsumoto be purged.

According to an article written by John Osborne in the 27 November 1950 issue of Life magazine, General MacArthur was fully aware of what was behind the note, so he ordered General Whitney, Chief of GS, to keep Matsumoto on the purge list.

Another example of the purge being used for political motives is contained in the action taken by the Yoshida Cabinet in regard to the de-purge of Hatoyama. Of the 32,089 individuals who appealed to the second Screening Appeals Committee established by Ordinance No. 39, dated 8 February 1949, 10,090 were de-purged. On 13 October 1950, the Yoshida Cabinet obtained the approval of SCAP, and released this list.

The following is an excerpt from an article titled, "Behind the Scenes of the De-purge Program," by Toshio Kojima (lawyer; socialist), a member of the second Screening Appeals Committee, which appeared in the 10 April 1952 issue of the magazine Kaizo:

At a committee meeting held 17 August 1950, the Chief of the Secretariat announced that the Government had received a verbal order from SCAP which stated that the Screening Committee had no authority to consider the memorandum case of Ichiro Hatoyama, and others, and that this case would be personally handled by GHQ. We were taken aback by this announcement for, prior to this, Attorney General Ueda, the Government representative, had informed us that the Screening Committee had the authority to consider even memorandum cases. Under further questioning, we learned that Yoshida had entertained some doubts concerning the de-purge of the memorandum cases. He, therefore, dispatched Chief Secretary Okazaki to GHQ, and obtained their opinion.

This was the so-called verbal order from GHQ.

*Suiheisha—a special class, the so-called ETA or untouchables of JAPAN.

There are two types of memorandum cases: first, individuals specifically ordered purged by GHQ, and second, individuals once cleared by the Screening Committee but overruled and purged by GHQ. Many of the memorandum cases were purged for insignificant causes. Moreover, because there were many capable individuals who, we believed, if de-purged could have contributed greatly to the reconstruction of Japan, the action taken by the Yoshida Cabinet, regardless of whether it was a plot or diplomatic blunder, constituted a great loss to the nation. The Screening Committee had previously requested that the Government and GHQ refer to the Committee findings and take immediate action regarding memorandum cases, but the Committee never obtained the cooperation of the Government.

Later, the Chief Secretary made an announcement that it was the opinion of GHQ that the Screening Committee had no authority to consider memorandum cases and, consequently, the de-purge of Hatoyama was postponed for one year. It is even said that this was one of the causes for Hatoyama suffering a stroke. However, in spite of his poor health, Hatoyama nevertheless caused a great deal of confusion within the Liberal party. Now, suppose he had been de-purged while in good health? It is possible that he would have taken an active part in the organization of a new party, and this, in turn, would have affected the very existence of the Yoshida Cabinet. The public suspected that the delay in the memorandum cases was caused by Yoshida's influencing SCAP in order to prolong the life of his Cabinet, and it is the unanimous opinion of well-informed persons that although Yoshida himself may not have been responsible for the delay, he tolerated the actions of his subordinates. Probably these sources are not too far wrong.

Purge of Ishibashi

Ishibashi, Finance Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet, was purged 11 May 1947. Because Ishibashi vigorously opposed SCAP policies (ESS) during his tenure of office, he was disliked by SCAP. Since his was a memorandum case, it was generally believed that he was purged for disciplinary reasons—that is, for noncompliance with SCAP directives. Ishibashi, who, before the war, generally expressed his liberal ideas in the *Oriental Economic News*, considered the purge unjust. He, therefore, prepared a lengthy note of protest, and at a press conference of Japanese and foreign correspondents at the Industrial Club, announced that he would appeal his case to Washington. His actions thus further angered SCAP authorities. Even now, Ishibashi personally believes that his purge was a dastardly act carried out by an irate SCAP.

INSIDE STORY OF THE OCCUPATION*

The Potsdam Declaration, the Surrender Document, and the United States' Initial Post-Surrender Policy implied the necessity for a purge; nevertheless, the actual purge directives came as a surprise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff purge directives were classified Top Secret; the Japanese government leaders who frequently visited various GHQ staff sections had no forewarning of the purge. But, meanwhile, information leaked out, and there were growing rumors of a possible intensive purge in the National Diet and among the political parties. The GS 1 December 1945 report states:

Yusuki Tsurumi, de facto leader of the original Progressive party (adviser of the present Progressive party), appeared at the office of SCAP's chief counter-intelligence officer, stated that there were rumors that a directive ordering the expulsion and disqualification of over 200 Diet members was under preparation, and urged GHQ to clarify the situation.

The leaders at that time were ill at ease; they did not know what kind of measures the US authorities would take. However, it was the common belief of all concerned that some decision was imminent; and the Japanese leaders were greatly disturbed. When Mr. Tsurumi visited the counterintelligence officer, GS had already completed a draft of the directive. On 5 December this draft was forwarded to various staff sections for coordination. Amidst the turmoil resulting from the rumors, Japanese authorities were unable to obtain any definite information before the end of the year.

On 4 January 1946, despite the New Year celebrations, the responsible CLO personnel (the sole contact with GHQ) were on duty, because it was a GHQ workday. Mr. Eki Sone, Chief of the Political Division (presently Right-wing Socialist Councilor) was also present. They were informed by GS that an important order was forthcoming. When they received it, they realized that it was the Purge Directive.

At that time, Prime Minister Shidehara was sick in bed; the directive was received just after Chugo Iwata, Minister of Justice, substituting for the Prime Minister, had finished his formal New Year's opening address. Asao Sato, Chief of the Cabinet General Affairs Section, told Tsugita, Chief Cabinet Secretary, that "an important announcement is probably forthcoming." When he returned to the Prime Minister's official residence, he was informed of the Purge Directive. He immediately rushed to the Prime Minister's private residence and outlined the development to the ailing Prime Minister. After hearing him, the Prime Minister said: "That's truly a grave matter. I will ask Mr. Yoshida (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to negotiate immediately."

For several days, informal talks were held, but GHQ was determined to carry out this measure, and it became apparent that nothing could sway this determination.

Calling Chief Cabinet Secretary Tsugita to his side, the ailing Prime Minister said: "Besides being bedridden, this new development makes it impossible for me to hold this position any longer. I shall submit a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc."

Mr. Tsugita considered that the Cabinet's resignation would be one way of expressing contempt for the directive. Consequently, he summoned the Cabinet ministers to an emergency meeting. As he was about to inform them of the Prime Minister's intention, there was a telephone call from Imperial Household Minister Sataro Ishiwata,

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saying: "Please try to prevent any resignations for the time being. Because there is no one who can take Mr. Shidehara's place, he will inevitably receive the Imperial command to form a new cabinet even if he submits a resignation en bloc. However, it is impossible to entrust this responsibility to a bedridden person. Please try to discourage the move to reshuffle the Cabinet."

Mr. Tsugita kept this request to himself and reported the wishes of the Prime Minister to the Cabinet; but all the Cabinet ministers opposed the proposed move. They unanimously agreed that those who fell into the purge classifications should resign, while the remaining ministers should cooperate in reshuffling the Cabinet. However, Mr. Tsugita was reluctant to go alone, to report the Cabinet ministers' decision to the Prime Minister. Consequently, Agriculture and Commerce Minister Matsumura accompanied him. In this way, the Prime Minister, for the moment, abandoned his plan for resignation.

Mr. Wataru Narahashi said:

At that time I was Chief of the Legislative Bureau; realizing that things had become completely unfavorable for me, I submitted a written resignation to Prime Minister Shidehara. Thereupon, I was summoned by Foreign Minister Yoshida. As soon as I entered the Foreign Minister's official residence (the present official residence of the Chief of the Economic Stabilization Board), he said bluntly, "I've been to Mr. Shidehara's home and found him sick in bed. Since you sent in your resignation, he says that he would quit the Cabinet. What will you profit by resigning? I thought you had better sense. You had better rid yourself of such shortsighted views."

I thought to myself that he had described the Loyalists of the Meiji Restoration. Therefore I withdrew my resignation immediately. Mr. Yoshida then left me, saying that he was going to call on Mr. Shidehara. Then I received a telephone call from Mr. Shidehara. He told me that Mr. Yoshida himself was now considering resigning to take full responsibility for Prince Hashimoto's incarceration. It seemed so senseless that the very person who had scolded me when I submitted my resignation was planning to quit. I saw Mr. Yoshida, and, after a lengthy conversation, he decided to remain in his post.

GHQ issued the Purge Directive because it believed that the Japanese government would never undertake such a large-scale purge without an order from the Supreme Commander.

Staff Section Maintains Silence and Rejects Negotiations Request

GHQ considered the purge not as a punitive action, but as a means to oust all the old reactionaries and to replace them with young leaders. GHQ also issued the Purge Directive in time to affect the first postwar general election, scheduled for April. Needless to say, it was a heavy blow to Japan's political circle. Among the Cabinet ministers, only Prime Minister Shidehara, Foreign Minister Yoshida and Welfare Minister Ashida were expected to be unaffected by the directive. Furthermore, an extensive spring cleaning of the political parties was plainly necessary.

Prime Minister Shidehara, who abandoned his plan for resignation en bloc, petitioned General MacArthur stating that the directive was more severe than a court sentence because there was no provision for appeal. However, GHQ turned a deaf ear to Japanese efforts to negotiate, saying that it was a "supreme order." Conferences were held almost every day, beside the bed of the ailing Prime Minister, to decide what steps the Japanese government should take. Realizing that it was impossible to request GHQ to retract the directive, Japanese authorities believed that there was no other alternative than to work for the alleviation of the severe directive by submitting a counterproposal to GHQ. For example, the Government planned to propose the establishment of a screening committee to consider borderline cases, decide from his past record and activities whether the person fell under one of the categories of the directive, and finally notify the person concerned of the result of the investigation—the individual concerned could then resign when he recognized the facts as presented.

The authorities felt that if this proposal were adopted, a considerable time margin would result and the number of persons subject to the purge would be substantially reduced. Of course, GHQ rejected this proposal on the ground that it would go counter to the US postsurrender policy. Thus, on 25 January, Brigadier General Whitney, Chief of GS, met Prime Minister Shidehara and explained the meaning of the Purge Directive.

Meanwhile, government authorities had been contacting GHQ through various channels and considering the details of the directive while collecting various information. Although it was GS which drafted the purge policy, CIS issued implementation directives and supervised government policy-enforcement. With Lieutenant Colonel Markham as its chief, CIS was a large section, employing Niseis which issued a directive for each individual case. The Japanese liaison agencies which contacted these sections learned that, because this directive was based on an FEC decision, it could not be revised; and that although there was a detailed appendix to this directive, it would be withheld from the Japanese government and the Japanese authorities would be demanded to draw up a detailed implementation plan based on this directive. With the greatest secrecy, GHQ had investigated the Japanese bureaucratic setup and the activities of the Japanese leaders. Then, fully informed, it filed complaints with the Japanese authorities.

Meanwhile, the number of visitors to GHQ increased considerably. These visitors consisted not only of government officials, but also of those who were eager to find out for themselves the fate in store for them. Through their respective channels, they intended to completely understand the implications of the directive. GHQ could not tolerate this situation any longer, and, on 21 January, issued an order to all staff sections, prohibiting them from supplying any opinions or explanations to Japanese. This meant that GS would handle all Japanese requests and interviews. Mr. Sone, Chief of the CLO Political Division, was appointed to negotiate on operational details. He had to deal with Colonel Kades and was told that the Japanese authorities should compile a list of would-be purgees, categorized according to the designated classifications. Thereupon, the Japanese authorities drew up a list, sparing as many as possible, from this action and presented it to GHQ. However, possessing the report of a detailed secret investigation, GHQ immediately rejected the list as incomplete.

Consequently, the Government set up a subcommittee and entrusted it with the formulation of this "appendix." The subcommittee was composed of Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi, Chief of the Legislative Bureau Ishiguro, Chief of Local Bureau of the Home Ministry (presently Liberal Councilor) Yuichi Gori, Chief of the above Ministry's Police Affairs Bureau (presently Liberal Diet Member) Naboru Tanikawa, Chief of the Cabinet Personnel Section Saichi Shibue, and Chief of the Political Section Sone. As they were told to complete the job in time for the forthcoming general elections, they hurriedly started work.

On 9 February, the first US-Japanese Joint Conference was held with GS and CIS; and decisions were made on Categories C (influential members of ultranationalistic societies) and D (influential members of IRAA, etc.). On 27 February, Categories A (war criminals), B (career military personnel), and F (governors of occupied territory) were decided. Category G (other militarists) was established on 10 March.

Mr. Eki Sone said:

While the committee was drafting the appendix, the Japanese authorities set up such paragraphs as those dealing with "recommended Diet members." These paragraphs were not inserted on the initiative of the Japanese government, but were based upon a strong request to draw up a provision that would affect almost all present Lower House members in order to maintain the prestige of the GS. This was tantamount to a demand to draw up the appendix in such a way as to affect as many persons as possible. Upon realizing that the Occupation authorities were resolved to carry out a major reform calling for expulsion of all old hands, I thought to myself that it would be better for us to undergo this trial and build up a new Japan. However, the Cabinet leaders planned to boycott this measure by opposing every move and by delaying the realization of this reform

as much as possible. This often brought about worse results. Mr. Narahashi and I considered it more advantageous not to ignore the intentions of the Occupation authorities, but it was Mr. Yoshida who said things that irked them.

Special Police Officials are First Targets

Although the purge directive came virtually as a bolt from the blue for the Japanese, there was, actually, a prior warning; the order for dismissal of all Special Police officials, issued 4 October 1945. Along with the abolition of the Public Peace Preservation Law and the release of political criminals, this was so great a blast that it caused the resignation en bloc of Prince Higashikuni's Cabinet. The problem of releasing political criminals caused an uproar in the days of the Suzuki Cabinet. After Prince Higashikuni's Cabinet came into power, a measure pertaining to political criminals was being drafted by the Justice Ministry, but the Occupation authorities acted before this measure was realized.

About 1900 hours, 4 October, the Home Ministry also received information that an important announcement was forthcoming. It was learned later that this announcement dealt with the dismissal of all Special Police officials. When Home Minister Iwao Yamazaki (now a Liberal member of the Diet) and Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau (now Deputy Mayor of Osaka) Masami Hashimoto hurried to the Prime Minister's official residence and met Chief Cabinet Secretary Ogata, they found that a directive in English had already been received. This directive designated Special Police officials, Thought Police officers, and those engaged in protection and surveillance as having been active in restricting freedom of speech and assembly, and called for the removal of the Home Minister, Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau, Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, chiefs of the prefectural police departments and chiefs of Special High Police. Thus, the Home Minister and all others mentioned in the directive submitted their resignations. It was the first time in the history of Japan that resignations stated, "I have no other recourse than to resign in accordance with the SCAP order."

The Cabinet considered this action on the part of the Allied authorities unreasonable and that the Government had no other alternative than to offer passive resistance in view of the fact that it was completely powerless. Thus, the Cabinet believed that resignation en bloc was the only way to express its opposition to this directive. Regarding the problem of Special High Police, there was a strong wish to abolish the Special High Police system among the leaders of the Home Ministry immediately after the war, and Home Minister Yamazaki was advised in regard to this matter. At the same time, it was also urged that the Thought Police be completely disbanded and that the Special High Police be reorganized as part of the Public Safety Department. This department was to work solely to preserve the Emperor System. Although the Home Minister supported this plan, he believed that it was not necessary to carry it out immediately. However, before anything definite was accomplished, GHQ had acted. Being fully informed of the nature of the Special High Police, Occupation authorities would have taken this step even if the Japanese authorities had effected a reorganization.

On 8 September, immediately after the occupation of Japan by US Forces, a CIC officer and a Nisei interpreter came into the office of the Chief of the Special High Police at the Metropolitan Police Board. Two armed enlisted men entered the room before them and took posts in front of and behind Chief Kentaro Uemura of the Special High Police. The officer asked Mr. Uemura where his office was. He replied that this was his office, but the officer did not believe him, and said, "Aren't you the Chief of the Special High Police? You must have a secret office somewhere. Lead us to that office!"

No matter how Mr. Uemura tried to convince the officer that there was no other office, it was in vain. He was further asked to reveal the location of political criminals. Thereupon Mr. Uemura related that they were being held in jail after being given

court trials, and that some were held at police stations. The officer did not believe this either, because he thought that the Special High Police was similar to the German Gestapo and Soviet GPU. After this volley of questions and answers, they sealed all the rooms occupied by the Special High Police but did not immediately undertake an investigation. It was evident that US authorities had known of the Special High Police since before the Occupation and that the release of political criminals was also called for in the established policy.

One day before the directive for the removal of Special Police officers was received, an article on a press interview with Home Minister Yamazaki was carried in the Stars and Stripes. This article contained Home Minister Yamazaki's opinions on freedom of speech, assembly, and press; set forth in answer to questions supplied by Allied correspondents who had previously interviewed the imprisoned political criminals, including Communist party members. However, probably because of an error on the part of the interpreter, it was absolutely contrary to what the Home Minister had actually said. To a certain reporter's question on how the Communist party would be controlled in the future, the Home Minister replied, "As in the past, it will be strictly controlled."

It was believed that this idea did not conform with the existing Allied policy. Home Ministry officials assumed at that time that this newspaper article had some connection with the dismissal directive.

The directive for the release of political criminals was issued a little after that removing Special Police officials. As soon as Mr. Kyuichi Tokuda and other members of the Communist party were released from prison, they boarded waiting trucks and, waving Red flags, demonstrated before the Home Ministry. The purged Home Ministry officials who had been completing the remaining work observed this scene with inexplicable feelings.

Although the expulsion of Special High Police officials actually presaged enforcement of the purge, the Japanese authorities had not expected such a large-scale house-cleaning. Although most of its members were covered by the purge categories, the Shidehara Cabinet decided not to resign en bloc, but, instead, petitioned General MacArthur to spare temporarily such indispensable persons as Finance Minister Shibusawa, Justice Minister Iwata, Commerce Minister Ogasawara, and State Minister Matsumoto. This appeal was approved. Thus, the Cabinet succeeded in surmounting the insecurity caused by the resignation of Cabinet ministers subject to purge.

Mr. Kentaro Uemura said:

Upon entering my office, the CIC officer was at first very aggressive. It was probably because he thought that the Chief of the Special High Police was a powerful behind-the-scenes man. After a few visits, he began to understand my position. He visited me casually, without any escorts. My subordinate section chiefs were called by the CIC and questioned in detail about the Special High Police, but later this was also suspended almost completely. All chiefs of prefectural police departments and Special High Police officials resigned. However, Mr. Eikichi Masuhara (now Director-General of the National Police Reserve) was asked to remain, despite the fact that he was all set to resign, because there was no competent successor.

Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto's Purge

Yoshida Rejects Exemption Directive. The clause calling for the expulsion of Tojo-sponsored Lower House members elected in the wartime Tojo Election was inserted, not by GHQ, but by the Japanese authorities in accordance with the GS instruction to extend the scope of the purge. Thus, on 4 January 1946, Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto of the Socialist party was purged because he had been a Tojo-sponsored Lower House member. Mr. Matsumoto considered this action illegal and immediately filed a protest. At the same time, piles of appeals for his de-purge flooded into the Japanese

government and GHQ every day from the Equality Society throughout the country. Mr. Matsumoto said:

At the time of the Tojo election, the Home Ministry authorities approached me and told me that they would like to sponsor me, on condition that I dissolve the Equality Society, but I declined that offer. However, realizing that I would be elected even without a recommendation, they sponsored me anyhow, in order to avoid friction with the Equality Society and at the same time to make it appear that the election sponsored by the IRAA was fair and just.

Nevertheless it was difficult for the Shidehara Cabinet to demand the de-purge of Mr. Matsumoto above. Thus, Mr. Matsumoto asked Mr. Shintaro Fukushima (now President of the Pacific Baseball League), private secretary to the Prime Minister, to negotiate with GHQ, but Mr. Fukushima replied, "I do not think a private secretary like me could do much. Instead, I will bring a letter signed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary."

In the letter, Mr. Fukushima outlined the reasons for excluding Mr. Matsumoto from the purge; he indicated his background, his devotion to the unpopular liberation movement, and the fact that he was subject to pressure during the war and was deprived of his political freedom. Because Chief Cabinet Secretary Wataru Narahashi had returned to his Fukuoka constituency for the election campaign, Mr. Fukushima placed Narahashi's name at the end of the letter, and called on Colonel Kades. After reading the letter, Colonel Kades said,

GHQ never issued an order for the expulsion of Tojo-sponsored Diet members. It was suggested by the Japanese government. Therefore, these matters should be settled by the Japanese government. We are only planning the purge program. You should talk to Lieutenant Colonel Markham of CIS, the agency which is actually implementing the purge.

When he went to CIS, he was told that Colonel Markham was away. Consequently, he left the letter with Deputy Chief Schindell and requested him to show it to Colonel Markham as soon as he returned. Then he went immediately to campaign for his friends.

The final day for registration of general election candidates was 3 April 1946. About 1000 hours, Chief Sone of the Political Division received a telephone call from Colonel Markham, "I've received a letter from Narahashi regarding Jiichiro Matsumoto. I believe Matsumoto should be exempted from the purge."

Sone rushed over to Markham's office and said, "It has been the policy of the Japanese government not to make any exceptions. You place us in a difficult position with such a statement."

However, the Colonel insisted, "It is the policy of GHQ not to purge Yukio Ozaki and Jiichiro Matsumoto under any circumstances."

After a number of questions and answers, Mr. Sone inquired whether this statement should be interpreted as an order, to which the Colonel replied yes.

At that time the Government maintained a provisional screening committee composed of Cabinet ministers, and Home Ministry and CLO officials. Because Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi was away, Sone asked Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiro Kiuchi (now a Councilor of the Democratic Club) to report the matter to Prime Minister Shidehara, and asked Chief of the Local Bureau Yuichi Gori to inform the Home Minister. Because Foreign Minister Yoshida had returned to Oiso, it was impossible to contact him immediately. Thus it was impossible to act on the exemption of Mr. Matsumoto before the registration of candidates ceased. Consequently, Mr. Matsumoto gave up his intention of being a candidate, and, in his place, Mr. Shogetsu Tanaka was registered.

Mr. Sone finally succeeded in contacting Foreign Minister Yoshida and described the latest development. Whereupon the Foreign Minister inquired, "Is that a written order?"

Upon hearing that it was not, he rejected it, saying that he could not accept any verbal order. Thus Sone was forced to go to GHQ to report to Colonel Markham that the order would not be carried out. Markham was greatly enraged, but could do nothing.

Mr. Eki Sone said:

Foreign Minister Yoshida did not like the idea that I had been carrying out my duties regarding the purge program by frequently consulting Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi, since both of us were members of the screening committee. Moreover, the Foreign Minister and I were not on very good terms. I presume that these matters constituted one reason for the Foreign Minister's rejection of the verbal order. Although Colonel Markham was enraged by this matter, it was the one and only time that Foreign Minister Yoshida was the victor--inasmuch as GHQ was unable to issue a written order exempting Mr. Matsumoto in accordance with the Foreign Minister's demand. GHQ refrained from issuing a written order because it feared that since such an order would remain as evidence, it would give rise to sharp criticism from various quarters and might develop into an international issue. Taking the responsibility for this incident, I submitted my resignation, but because my post was so important that it could not be left vacant for a single day, I decided to carry on my duties until my successor was appointed. Thereafter, I made up my mind to report all matters to General Affairs Division Chief Iguchi of the CLO (now Ambassador to Canada) instead of directly informing the Foreign Minister.

General Headquarters Reaffirms Exemption. After the general election, Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi returned. On hearing of GHQ's intention to exempt Mr. Matsumoto from the purge, he said, "Why should we turn down such a splendid order permitting us to make purge exemptions."

After much deliberation, it was considered that Mr. Matsumoto would be de-purged automatically if he filled a public office. Consequently, in late April, he was appointed a member of the Social Work Committee of the Welfare Ministry. Nevertheless, when Mr. Matsumoto intended to be a candidate of the House of Councilors in March of the following year, he was told that the existing policy did not allow Tojo-sponsored Diet members to be candidates even if they were de-purged. Thus, it was again feared that Mr. Matsumoto would be disqualified.

At that time, the Yoshida Cabinet was in power, and Mr. Shintaro Fukushima, who had served as private secretary to Prime Minister Shidehara and had written the first letter requesting Mr. Matsumoto's exemption, was no longer in office. However, as he was most familiar with this problem, Mr. Fukushima called on Colonel Markham at GHQ and discussed the matter in Colonel Kades' presence. As a result, it was decided that "the GHQ permission to de-purge Mr. Matsumoto, issued the previous year, holds good even now." They sent a written order to that effect to the Japanese government. Mr. Matsumoto received his qualification papers just three days before registration of candidates closed and was barely able to register his name. After he was elected, he was appointed Vice-President of the House of Councilors, and what he said and did in the House caused a great commotion among the conservative parties.

Mr. Shintaro Fukushima said:

Mr. Sone told me that Colonel Markham issued the order for the de-purge of Mr. Matsumoto, having been greatly impressed by the letter which I had written to him. I am very proud of that letter. When the Shidehara Cabinet was in power, Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi took the main role in working for the de-purge of Mr. Matsumoto, and Foreign Minister Yoshida was very seldom consulted. Consequently, there is no doubt that the Foreign Minister considered Mr. Matsumoto's de-purge a scheme contrived by Narahashi and Fukushima.

Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto said:

The feudalistic atmosphere of the defunct House of Peers still remained in the House of Councilors. As soon as I was appointed Vice-President, I decided to eliminate this atmosphere. First of all, I did something unusual during the opening address. Hitherto the texts of addresses of this nature were written by the Secretariat, and the person in my position only read what was written. However, I supplemented it with my own opinion. For example, "In the days of the Hirota Cabinet, I once called for the dissolution of the House of Peers. However, Prime Minister Hirota refused to comment on it, saying that such a matter concerns the Imperial authority. Hirota who said such a thing is now confined to the Sugamo Prison, while I stand here"

This astounded the councilors of the Liberal and Democratic parties, who immediately began heckling loudly. Next the so-called crab-walk incident took place. Although it was the custom for the President and Vice-President of the House of Councilors and the Speaker and Vice-Speaker of the House of Representatives to be received in audience by His Majesty at the opening ceremony of the Diet, I did not follow the others to pay my respects to the Emperor at the opening ceremony of the 2nd Diet session (December 1947). Because it was considered impolite to show their profile to the Emperor, they walked sideways, facing His Majesty, and when they came in front of the Emperor, they bowed and withdrew. They reminded me of crabs walking sideways. Because I considered that by doing so, they were treating the Emperor as a divine person, I refused to go. When I went to the entrance to see His Majesty off, Speaker Komakichi Matsuoka and Vice-Speaker Manitsu Tanaka of the House of Representatives and President Isuneo Matsudaira of the House of Councilors came and asked me why I did not pay my respects to the Emperor. I explained my stand and suggested that we quit that crab-walk in the future. They all agreed with me and President Matsudaira even said that he once fell down when he was walking sideways. However, this incident developed further, and some councilors planned to present a nonconfidence motion against me, but because GHQ announced its support of my stand, the motion was not introduced. Later, the Imperial Household Economic Conference was held and it was decided that a total of 26 million yen would be presented to those who had renounced their Imperial titles. I opposed this action, stating that they possessed enough property to provide for their needs, but it was passed by majority vote. Consequently, I told the members of the Imperial family, "I hope you will accept this sum gratefully, because it is the fruit of the earnest work of the people."

Also about this time, the Akasaka Detached Palace was removed from the Imperial Household property and placed under Government control. Saying it was a historical structure, the Government did not allow it to be used for general purposes and left it vacant. Hearing that the Government was planning to construct buildings for the Attorney General's Office and the Supreme Court, I thought that, in view of the prevailing lack of funds, the Government should make use of the Akasaka Detached Palace. However, the Government had no such intention. Later, I thought of utilizing the palace as the office of the Equality Society, and brought this matter to the attention of GS Legislative Division Chief Williams. Because he approved my plans, I took the matter up with the Government authorities. Upon hearing my intention, they hurriedly decided to use the detached palace as the Diet library.

I straightforwardly criticized the travel expenses of the Emperor, but I later found out that these matters served to incite the so-called "royalist" politicians led by Foreign Minister Yoshida. However, it was presumably because of these matters that I was placed in an awkward position when the problem of my purge was brought up again.

Qualification Problem Raised Third Time. In September 1948, the problem of Mr. Matsumoto's qualification came up for the third time. This time, it was GHQ which brought it up. It stated that this problem was taken up in accordance with a letter sent to GS by a Japanese. Many of those concerned thought that, in view of the friction between the left and right wings of the Socialist party, it was sent by a member of the right wing. Government Section requested the SIB to investigate a wartime organiza-

tion called the Yamato Patriotic Society. As a result of the investigation, conducted under the personal guidance of Mr. Reisaku Takiuchi, SIB Chief, it was found that Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto was listed as its director. In view of the fact that Mr. Matsumoto's purge would have serious political consequences because he had been Vice-President of the House of Councilors, SIB Chief Takiuchi called Mr. Matsumoto and the ex-leaders of the defunct Yamato Patriotic Society to inform them of the details of this matter. As a result, he found out that "Mr. Matsumoto attended the All-Japan Promoters' Rally held at the Nakanoshima Public Hall in Osaka 5 May 1941 under the auspices of the Yamato Patriotic Movement Headquarters, but upon realizing that this movement aimed to dissolve the Equality Society, Mr. Matsumoto immediately severed his relations with it."

The SIB considered that this would hardly constitute grounds for Mr. Matsumoto's purge and sent a written report to GS. However, this report was left untouched in the desk drawer of Mr. Napier, who was in charge of the purge program in GS. During this time, it was believed that Napier himself had undertaken the investigation by contacting political party leaders and asking their opinions on the problem of Mr. Matsumoto. The Japanese authorities waited but GHQ did not announce its decision. Mr. Matsumoto became impatient and consulted GS Legislative Division Chief Williams with whom he was well acquainted. He was told,

Go to Napier with Attorney General Yashio Suzuki (Right-wing Socialist Diet member). I will be there with you to find out whether the report, which you say was sent by the SIB, reached Napier. If we go there, he won't be able to postpone the subject any longer.

This suggestion was made because Williams and Napier were not on very good terms and in order to avoid comment on matters handled by one or the other.

Mr. Matsumoto immediately called on Attorney General Suzuki and asked that he accompany him, but Attorney General Suzuki replied,

Because we sent that report, why should we bother to go? I cannot tell whether a personal call would bring a favorable result or not, because there have been instances when direct negotiations have had adverse consequences.

He tried to dissuade Mr. Matsumoto from visiting GS. Commerce and Industry Minister Chozaburo Mizutani (Right-wing Socialist Diet member) dropped in at that moment and said that he also thought it would be better to follow Mr. Suzuki's advice. Mr. Matsumoto then thought of telling them of his conversation with Williams, but he refrained because that interview was strictly off-the-record, and might put him in an awkward position. In accordance with their advice, Mr. Matsumoto gave up his plan to visit GHQ.

While Mr. Matsumoto's qualification was suspended, state control was transferred from the Katayama Cabinet to the Ashida Cabinet. Because the Showa Denko incident was exposed, the problem of Mr. Matsumoto's qualification was placed at the bottom of the file. Mr. Shintaro Fukushima, who was well-acquainted with the Matsumoto issue, was appointed Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary. Later, when he met Mr. Napier Mr. Matsumoto's status came up, and he was told, "Matsumoto is O.K."

After being told this by Mr. Fukushima, Mr. Matsumoto was greatly relieved because he thought his status, which had come up for the third time and which had been left for a considerable length of time without any definite decision, was nearing settlement.

Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto said:

Since I established the Equality Society in 1922, I have been working for the emancipation of the Eta class. Besides the Equality Society, there was another organization concerned with the problem of the Eta class, called the Yuwa Jigyo Kyokai. This organization was established with funds presented by Emperor Meiji. The true object of this organization was to win over the Eta class; Mr.

Kiichiro Hiranuma was in full control of the organization. However, with the inauguration of the IRAA in 1940, the Yamato Patriotic Movement Headquarters was set up to unify these two organizations. In May of the following year, the promoters' rally was held in Osaka, but all the speakers called for the dissolution of the Equality Society. I told them that I would not dissolve the Equality Society and left, saying that I intended to continue the Equality Society movement even if I must do so singlehanded. This was my final association with the organization. My status became an issue because I was listed as one of the directors of this body, but I never consented to accept such a post. In accordance with Mr. Suzuki's advice, I gave up my plan of calling on Napier with him. If it were for somebody else, I'm sure I would have forced Mr. Suzuki to accompany me, but when it comes to my own affairs, I hesitate and cannot force my views. If I had gone to Napier, I don't know what would have happened.

Mr. Matsumoto's Death Sentence. In the November 1951 issue of Life, US edition, John Osborne printed Prime Minister Yoshida's letters to General MacArthur and GHQ in an article entitled, "My dear General." Although it was not printed in the Japanese edition, it gave rise to considerable talk in political circles. Among these notes, there is a letter dated 1 January 1949 addressed to General Whitney, Chief GS which requested approval of Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto's purge. It read in part as follows:

... Some quarters are apt to charge the Japanese Government that it is planning some political move, but I assure you that there are no such plans. The Japanese Government treats all people fairly and acts by strictly adhering to the laws. Consequently, it has decided to list Mr. Matsumoto among the purgees. I am sure you will approve this action of the Government ...

To this, Osborne added the following note:

Both MacArthur and Whitney were well aware of what was behind this letter. The new election was to be held shortly. The Prime Minister planned to remove Matsumoto from the scene. Thus, MacArthur refrained from sending a written reply, and, instead, Prime Minister Yoshida was verbally advised through Whitney to wait until after the election.

Although Prime Minister Yoshida's letter was dated 1 January, Attorney General Shunkichi Ueda was actually called by GS on 2 January, and told that it approved Mr. Matsumoto's purge. However, he was advised that because the general election was under way and because Mr. Shogetsu Tanaka and Mr. Haruji Tahara, who were to be purged on the same grounds as Mr. Matsumoto, were engaged in election campaigns, he should announce this matter after the election; otherwise it might be misinterpreted as a deliberate action to prevent their election. Thus, immediately after the election, the Government announced the purge of Mr. Matsumoto, Mr. Tanaka, and Mr. Tahara. This was on 24 January.

Mr. Matsumoto with Secretary-General Jiro Kobayashi of the House of Councilors immediately called on Attorney General Ueda, and demanded, "What is the meaning of this outrage!"

The Attorney General replied, "Please wait twenty days. If the Appeals Examination Committee holds its meeting yours will be the first on the list."

To which, Mr. Matsumoto charged, "Nonsense! To a politician, this is equivalent to a death sentence..."

He threw the purge notice on the Attorney General's desk, saying that he could not accept it. After Mr. Matsumoto left the room, Mr. Kanju Kato and ex-Attorney General Susuki came in to see Attorney General Ueda about the same matter. They charged, "Why did you change from exemption to nonexemption?"

The Attorney General answered, "His purge exemption was not decided. His purge was requested and that went through."

Mr. Suzuki could only accept this statement.

Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto's purge status was brought up during the Shidehara Cabinet, was taken up during the succeeding Yoshida, Katayama, and Ashida Cabinets, and was finally decided upon by the second Yoshida Cabinet. This was the most exceptional incident of the purge program.

Mr. Shunkichi Ueda said:

When I was appointed Attorney General, Mr. Matsumoto's problem was suspended and I was asked by GS to look into the matter. However, the papers concerning Mr. Matsumoto had been sent to GS after Chief Takiuchi of the SIB had investigated the details. It was strange that it did not give its approval no matter how long we waited. About a month later, I was called by Mr. Napier and told that Mr. Matsumoto will not be exempted from purge; that the Government requested the purge. Although GHQ indicated that it had entrusted the Government with the purge authority, the actual situation was extremely complicated. This wasn't known to the general public, and gave rise to various misinterpretations. When GHQ informed me of its approval of Matsumoto's purge, I thought it would cause further misinterpretation if I were to announce it after the election, but GHQ told me to withhold it until after the election. This is a typical American way of thinking.

Personally, I think Mr. Matsumoto's background did not wholly warrant his exemption from purge. Although Mr. Matsumoto avers that he was an outsider, he was one of the leaders of the Yamato Patriotic Movement. However, the gap between his goal and the goal of this movement gradually widened, and he severed his relations with the movement. Thus, there was no definite ground to assure his exemption. Personally, I had no objection to his purge exemption, but as I was not a member of the Appeals Committee, I could do nothing. Mr. Matsumoto's status became an issue, probably because GHQ did not favor Mr. Matsumoto and because of the friction between the right-wing and left-wing factions of the Socialist Party.

Mr. Jiichiro Matsumoto said:

After being purged, I met Mr. Napier. What he said at that time was very ambiguous. Mr. Napier told me he had nothing to do with my purge; I said he had plenty to do with it and demanded that he withdraw such an unfair purge order. Then he said, "Isn't former Attorney General Suzuki a leader of the Socialist Party?"

I said, "Do you mean that he favored me because he is a leader of the Socialist Party? Then, I can say that Mr. Ueda opposed me because he is a leader of the opposition party. I believe you should draw a fair conclusion."

He only repeated that he had nothing to do with my purge.

Sometime before this interview, I heard that someone told Mr. Napier he should see Mr. Matsumoto and his reply was, "There are very few such big bosses in the world."

My de-purge was taken up by the Appeals Examination Committee, but no definite conclusion was reached. On 13 October 1950, the de-purge of 10,090 persons was announced, but my name was not included in the list. The de-purgees listed by the Appeals Examination Committee number 10,091 persons including myself, but when the list was submitted to GHQ, through Prime Minister Yoshida, my name was omitted and it was cut down to 10,090 persons. Although Mr. Haruji Tahara and Mr. Shogetsu Tanaka, who were purged on the same grounds as myself, were included on the list, I was not de-purged. Such an inexplicable thing actually happened. I took this matter up with the Government and the Appeals Examination Committee, but was unable to obtain a clear-cut answer. My de-purge was finally decided on 13 July 1951. Shortly before this, just prior to his departure for Europe, Mr. Masaburo Suzuki met Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki and inquired about it. Thereupon he was told that it would be taken up by the Appeals Examination Committee not later than 10 July. However, Mr. Suzuki told Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki that he also wanted the Prime Minister's promise. Prime Minister Yoshida sent a note to Mr. Suzuki that it would be done "as the Chief Cabinet Secretary had said." Nevertheless, the action came three days later than the designated date.

Purge of Hatoyama and the Rise of Yoshida

Cabinet Formation and Purge Conducted Simultaneously. Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama was also one of those who advocated ending the war. While staying at Karuizawa, he often came to Tokyo and strove to end the war. He reached the conclusion that the only way to save war-defeated Japan was to consolidate the people by establishing a new political party. On 11 August, Mr. Hitoshi Ashida called on Mr. Hatoyama at Karuizawa to report the surrender of Japan. Because Mr. Hatoyama had laid sufficient groundwork for this new party, the idea of the Japan Liberal party materialized soon after his return to Tokyo at the end of the war. Since his home at Otowa had been destroyed by fire, he stayed at the home of Mr. Shojiro Ishibashi in Azabu and prepared for the formation of a new party centered around the members of the former Dokokai factions and the Imperial Rule Assistance Dietmen's League. Mr. Bukichi Miki offered to cooperate, though he was a member of the former Minseito faction. Mr. Tsuruhei Matsuno was the last to become a member of the Party because he had been bedridden as the result of an injury received in Saitama-ken, Honjo-machi, where he had been evacuated during the war. The Party was formed on 9 November and 52 representatives participated.

At the time of the formation of the Shidehara Cabinet, the Liberal party was to send a Cabinet Minister, and Mr. Hatoyama had Mr. Masazumi Ando in mind. However, Prime Minister Shidehara appointed Mr. Hitoshi Ashida. Furthermore, he appointed Mr. Wataru Narahashi as Legislative Bureau Chief for personal reasons. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Mr. Narahashi withdrew from the Liberal party. The number of Liberal party members was very small at that time; they were fully confident, however, that they would obtain at least 160 members in the April general election and achieve political power as a major party. Allied reporters seemed to have come to him because they felt he would emerge as prime minister in the first general election after the surrender. When Mr. Hatoyama went to GHQ at its invitation, party executive members rejoiced as if he had become prime minister. Even Mr. Hatoyama jokingly said in the GHQ elevator, "I'll probably ride this elevator once more when I receive the Imperial command. I hope that will be the last ride."

A member of GHQ standing next to him responded, "On the other hand, if you do become the prime minister you must use this elevator many times to make laws."

In short, the situation for the Liberal party looked very bright. Mr. Hatoyama had thought about the formation of a new party ever since he was in Karuizawa. His intention was with some Socialist party members to form a new political party.

When he first met Socialist party members at Kojunsha, after returning to Tokyo from Karuizawa, he asked Suehiro Nishio, Rikizo Hirano, and Chozaburo Mizutani to join in forming a new political party. They discussed the matter for about ten days. However, the opinion of Mr. Nishio and Mr. Hirano was: "We still prefer to work with another party. However, let us work as friendly parties. As long as our two parties can obtain the majority, what else do we want?"

From this time, there was a tacit cooperation agreement between the Liberal and Socialist parties. Thus the Liberal party began to look forward with confidence to the cabinet formation.

A purge storm struck just at that time. Thirty Liberal party Diet members were purged. It was said that Mr. Hatoyama would be purged as an advisor of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association. This was publicized by some members of the Progressive party, his political enemy. However, Mr. Hatoyama had never accepted the appointment and the Central Screening Committee decided that he did not fall within the purge category. GHQ approved this, and he ran as a candidate. In the general election, the Liberal party won 139 seats and became the major party just as they had expected. However, they could not obtain the majority. Therefore Mr. Hatoyama began to work for a coalition cabinet with the Socialist party.

However, before the general election, rumors of the purge of Hatoyama began to spread. Many persons reported this news to him. Nevertheless he was very optimistic and did not give the matter any thought. He was too occupied with planning a

new cabinet. However, preparations for his purge were being made secretly behind the scenes.

Mr. Tsuruhei Matsuno said:

At the time of the formation of a new political party by Mr. Hatoyama, I was staying at the home of Mr. Ishibashi with him. About that time, the Chinese reporter, Mr. Te-ho Sun, called upon Mr. Hatoyama. I joined them a little later. We told him that we had opposed the policy of the Seiyukai Party which did not recognize the Chiang regime. Judging from his talk, it seemed that Allied reporters were confident that Hatoyama would become the new prime minister. The result of the general election gave us 140 seats. Although this was below 160, it was only slightly below our expectations. When I returned to Kyushu, Mr. Hatoyama advocated the Anti-Communist League. I was worried about this, because the Soviet Union was a powerful member of the Allied Forces. However, Mr. Hatoyama was defiant, because that was his conviction, and it was a real problem for Japan. To him the advocacy of the Anti-Communist League was only natural.

Anti-Communist Statement Creates Sensation. Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama now reflects upon his purge as follows:

Generally speaking, I was too careless. There was no ground for my purge. During the last phase of the war I often heard the Moscow broadcast criticize me. This greatly worried Junichi Furusawa (now Director of the Bank of Japan), my son-in-law.

My advocacy of the Anti-Communist League under such circumstances seemed to have made matters worse. At that time, the son of Mr. Daikichiro Tagawa was in Shanghai. I heard that upon learning of my Anti-Communist statements when he returned to Japan, he told his father, "This will be fatal to Mr. Hatoyama. He might be purged."

He was right. The American reporters at that time, and Americans who came later, told me that there were many pro-Communist members in the GHQ, and they were the ones who purged me. Actually I should say that I had purged myself with my anti-Communist statement. It can be said that I was careless.

Another reason: Wataru Narahashi (Chief Cabinet Secretary) widely publicized that the United States demanded the purge of Hatoyama from the political world. At the Liberal Party Organizing Committee and Executive Board meetings I attacked the Government on the basis of Narahashi's words by saying, "What's the matter with the Government? Why doesn't the Government tell them (Occupation authorities) clearly that there is no ground for my purge? The Government is not cooperative."

It was carelessness to concentrate on the attack and neglect the defense. For instance, I should have asked GHQ whether there were grounds for such a rumor and should have requested further investigation--stating I had no knowledge of any guilt.

Once a GHQ colonel came to the Liberal party headquarters to see me. I was requested by phone to come to the Party Headquarters. I answered, "I cannot go today."

Therefore I was requested to make an appointment for the next day or the day after that. However, I refused.

At that time, I was under doctor's strict orders confining me to my quarters. Prior to this, I made a speaking tour of Aomori. The train was overcrowded and, of course, there was no seat available in the third-class cars. I returned to Tokyo in a freight car, warming myself over a charcoal fire. Poisoned by the charcoal gas, I spit blood. I was ordered by two doctors to take three weeks' absolute rest. Therefore, I had to refuse the request. However, in spite of such illness, I left for Shikoku the very next day on a speaking tour, because I could not make any change in the schedule. It was very risky. However, when I returned to Tokyo, I was completely well. Therefore, this gave the impression that I had lied. Even a GHQ colonel was not too big for me. Because of my belief that America is a nation of freedom and justice, I sometimes criti-

cized America unreservedly to American reporters, who visited me, saying, "Why did America use atomic bombs? What an unpardonable action that was!"

It can be said that I was completely lacking in the proper attitude for a citizen of a defeated nation. Probably that is one reason for my purge. However, the criticism by Mark Gayn of the Face of the World referred to some questionable parts translated to serve ulterior motives out of context. He distributed the extracted English translation to reporters. I believe there was no data with which to attack me, unless only parts were translated. I think the reporters severely attacked me on this basis and effected my purge as Gayn mentioned. Even at that time, I did not take the matter too seriously. I had too much confidence in myself. Justice is not always victorious in this world.

At that time no party could win the majority, and the political situation was at a standstill. Mr. Hatoyama intended to cooperate with the Socialist party. He believed that coalition with the Socialist party was possible because there was a tacit agreement with that party. However, the Socialist party became defiant after it had won 92 seats and was not very enthusiastic about Mr. Hatoyama's proposal for cooperation. Because of Hatoyama's position, Prime Minister Shidehara was appointed President of the Progressive party through the efforts of Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi and Mr. Takaru Inukai, Progressive party Secretary-General. However, Mr. Hatoyama was still planning the formation of a coalition cabinet with the Socialist party and had no intention of cooperating with the Progressive party. In general, it was not easy for any party to cooperate with another party.

Cooperation with the Socialist Party Not Realized. Apparently Prime Minister Shidehara had an idea of forming a second Shidehara Cabinet through cooperation with other parties. The Liberal, Progressive, and Socialist parties were hoping to get into power, and it was impossible to predict the outcome. Under such conditions, Prime Minister Shidehara called Mr. Hatoyama at his Otowa home by telephone and asked him to come to the Prime Minister's official residence. In accordance with the advice of Tsuruhei Matsuno and Ichiro Kono, who were there at the time, he visited Prime Minister Shidehara the next day without previous preparation.

The Prime Minister said, "Your Party has only 140 seats. Because your Party did not win the majority, it is impossible to control the Diet, isn't it? What is your plan?"

Mr. Hatoyama answered that he intended to obtain the cooperation of the Socialist party. It seemed that the Prime Minister was secretly hoping for a coalition with the Progressive party. That was not all. Mr. Hatoyama even wanted to request the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to resign en bloc as soon as possible. Mr. Hatoyama's association with the Socialist party was established at the time the Liberal party was formed, and Mr. Hatoyama believed that the agreement for a coalition cabinet had been concluded before the election. However, the situation had changed after the election. The Hatoyama-purge rumor was too strongly publicized within political circles. Caught in the intraparty situation, the Socialist party was not enthusiastic. Informed by Socialist party Secretary-General Tetsu Katayama that the Socialist party had no intention of helping Hatoyama, Welfare Minister Ashida advised Mr. Hatoyama that it would be better to cooperate with the Progressive party and that this would expedite the cabinet formation. Mr. Hatoyama would not listen because of his strong confidence in the cooperation of the Socialist party.

Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama said:

After the end of the war, I met Mr. Nishio, Mr. Hirano, Mr. Mizutani, and others at Kojunsha and asked them to join to form a new political party. However, they preferred to work with a separate party and wanted to work as friendly parties, obtaining the majority with two parties. At that time, Mr. Hirano asked me to give a written pledge. I only gave him a verbal promise, because I thought it was silly for statesmen to exchange a written contract. It was for this reason that I told Shidehara of my intention to cooperate with the Socialist party. However, their attitude changed after the election, in anticipation of my purge. The Socialist party began to think of the possibility of a Katayama Cabinet. It is true

that the Socialist party promised me cooperation. I once reproached Katayama for his breach of promise. He answered that he was aware of the bargain but that party opinion varied. It was not that: the Socialist party wanted to gain political power. Because of this change in attitude, the Liberal party was forced to go along with Shidehara in spite of its plurality.

About one month had elapsed when I was asked by Shidehara to see him. I should have refused, saying, "You are unaware of the real situation. You have already lost the popularity and are not qualified to become prime minister. It is unnecessary for me to see you!"

In that case, he would have had to abandon forming a cabinet, and I would naturally have formed a cabinet. If I had been a prime minister at that time, they could not have purged me on such grounds. It was a mistake on my part to accept Shidehara's request. Shidehara said that he could not report to the Throne about the next cabinet before there was anything definite. I should have rejected this as uncalled for, and it would have been the proper thing to do. In any case, there was too much delay and no arrangements could be made. Finally, a report was to be made to the Throne. It can be said that GHQ had adequate time to prepare for my purge during the one-month delay.

Mr. Rikizo Hirano said:

I never asked Mr. Hatoyama for a written promise. At that time, we did not meet Mr. Hatoyama at Kojunsha in order to organize a new political party. We only intended to work with Hatoyama's group during and after the election to fight the influence of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society which controlled the wartime Diet. However, we did not talk about any definite method such as the formation of a coalition cabinet.

The dark shadow that was hampering the formation of a Hatoyama Cabinet was the purge. Therefore, the Hatoyama group exerted every effort to collect information. There were two opinions: one, he would not be purged; the other, he would not be purged if he gave up the idea of cabinet formation and cooperated with the Shidehara Cabinet as a State Minister. Mr. Hatoyama alone could decide how to interpret the information and what action to take.

Purge Maneuver Makes Steady Progress. The move to purge Hatoyama was steadily developing behind the scenes. Many persons regarded his advocacy of the Anti-Communist League as premature and strong ground for his purge. According to them, "...at that time the Soviet Union was still regarded as an ally who had fought side by side with the Western powers." Judging from the international situation, his advocacy of the Anti-Communist League on 22 February was premature. All the nations, including the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China were keenly watching whom the defeated Japanese would elect as prime minister in the first general election after the war, and whether he would be a desirable person to the Allied powers. The "progressive group in GHQ was disgusted with the Japanese conservatives. This group was ready to react violently if an undesirable prime minister were elected..."

In addition to such an international situation, the political situation within the country made matters worse. Reliable information that "Hatoyama falls under the category of the purge directive" was submitted to GHQ by the Japanese. It was evident that the information was supplied by an anti-Hatoyama group. The Japan Communist party members also opened up Mr. Hatoyama's old wounds. In accordance with this information, CIC began work. It collected old data disadvantageous to Mr. Hatoyama from the Japanese political circles. Thus, the grounds for his purge—for instance, his book Face of the World, the Takizawa Incident, which took place when he was the Education Minister, the Easter Conference—were steadily assembled.

On 6 April, prior to the general election, in order to hear the general election plan of each party, foreign reporters in Tokyo invited the representatives of four major parties to the Correspondents' Club in Marunouchi. However, it was a well-known fact that this was a Hatoyama-inquisition party. They later acknowledged that this party was nothing but a trick planned by GHQ progressive elements and some radical re-

porters like Mark Gayn "to strike down Hatoyama." A certain CI&E Section staff member secretly distributed extract translations of the Face of the World among the reporters. Using it as a basis, sharp questions were directed at Mr. Hatoyama. He was not even given the chance to explain that it was a translation only of those parts which would serve certain ulterior motives, and that their misunderstanding would be eased if they read the book. One reason for this might be that he did not know much about the Face of the World, because the book had been actually written by Mr. Kanichi Yamaura, though it was published under the name of Hatoyama. At any rate, it was a merciless press interview. Compared with the attitude of the Allied reporters at the beginning of the Occupation, when they were confident that he would become the next prime minister, this was like a trap. However, Mr. Hatoyama, a born optimist, did not yet fully realize the possibility of his purge. He believed that these rumors and ill-treatment would all disappear if the Party won in the general election and he could form a cabinet.

Mr. Tatsuo Iwabuchi said:

Someone either from CIC or some similar agency came and asked me about Hatoyama. The Chinese Mission also asked my opinion of him. I asked them their purpose. They explained the main points and questioned me. After my explanations, they said, "If what you say is true, he does not fall under the category of the purge directive."

I said that there are no grounds to purge him. They listed several reasons for his purge. This was four to five days prior to the announcement of his purge, but GHQ had already decided to purge him.

When I stressed the fact that he should not be purged, they frankly admitted, "Although, GHQ has already decided to purge him, he does not fall under the category of the purge directive. If what you say is true, the purge is a mistake." Therefore, I could not decide whether they would purge him or not.

I asked for their source of information but they said they could not answer. I then asked, "If you cannot answer me in regard to that point, there is no use to question you any further. However, since you have come to ask me questions, I believe it is only fair that you answer my question: Was the decision made on the basis of an investigation conducted by GHQ or was it made in accordance with information submitted by some Japanese?"

They answered it was the latter. I asked them if they would tell me the name of the Japanese, and they said "No."

"I think I know the man. If I mention his name will you answer me?"

"Then give his name."

"Isn't it Narahashi. . . ?"

"Yes."

However, Narahashi was not the only person who furnished information to GHQ. There were other sources--the Communist party and Kanji Ishihara. The information obtained from these three was identical. I was later told by GHQ that it was impossible for the Communist party at that time to gather the data because it was immediately after the release from prison of its members. Somebody must have supplied the information to the Communists. Ishihara's information was used by the Chinese Mission, while Narahashi's letter was submitted directly to GHQ.

Purge Announced as Hatoyama Forms Cabinet. The effort to form a second Shidehara Cabinet was unsuccessful in the face of strong public opposition. It was defeated by an all-party united front. The Hatoyama faction was determined to form a single-party Cabinet after giving up the coalition with the Socialist party.

Just at that time, Mr. Sone, CLO Political Division Chief, went to CIS. The status of Hatoyama was brought up. CIS demanded that the Japanese government re-examine Mr. Hatoyama on the following grounds: (a) As Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Tanaka Cabinet, he presided over the Eastern Conference which laid the foundation for Japanese territorial expansion to the Continent. (b) He was Chief Cabinet Secretary during the formulation of the Peace Preservation Law, which most drastically prevented the

democratization of Japan. (c) He suppressed liberal professors. As Minister of Education, he was responsible for the Takizawa Incident.

Needless to say, the Face of the World was mentioned. Mr. Sone immediately felt that Hatoyama's position was precarious, and that this was a GHQ hint for his purge. He reported this matter immediately to the Government. He did not report directly to Foreign Minister Yoshida, because he had clashed with Yoshida in regard to the Jiichiro Matsumoto Incident and had sent in his resignation. He reported instead to Mr. Sadao Iguchi, General Affairs Division Chief. Mr. Iguchi reported this news at the meeting held at the Foreign Minister's official residence every morning.

Mr. Eki Sone said:

After the purge of Mr. Hisaakira Kano, Mr. Jiro Shirasu, who had displayed shrewdness at the Foreign Minister's official residence, was appointed CLO Vice-Chief. He was intimate with Creswell, Chief of CIS. Creswell had lived in Japan before the war as a military attaché to the American Embassy, was familiar with Japan, and was one of the immediate subordinates of Brigadier General Willoughby. These men were of the opinion that it was unreasonable to apply the purge program to Japan. Thus, in GHQ, there was the difference in opinion between GS, which was in charge of the purge problem, and G-2. Therefore, in regard to the Hatoyama case, General Willoughby and Creswell criticized the GS attitude and were apparently of the opinion that Hatoyama would not be purged. They seemed very optimistic and did not take my information seriously.

The report from Ambassador Atcheson (later killed in a plane crash), GHQ Political Adviser, reached Mr. Hatoyama. It said that the early formation of a Cabinet would save Hatoyama from his purge. Not only that, Foreign Minister Yoshida, Hatoyama brain-truster, was very optimistic at first. When the rumor of the Hatoyama purge was rampant, Mr. Shirasu, CLO Vice-Chief, visited the Hatoyama residence and reported, in the presence of Mr. Ichiro Kono, that Hatoyama would not be purged. This made Mr. Hatoyama all the more confident.

However, the situation at GHQ was getting worse. As a result of an interview with Chief of Staff General Marshall, Foreign Minister Yoshida became fully aware that nothing could be done. Mr. Shirasu, in compliance with Foreign Minister Yoshida's wish, went to Hatoyama to give advice: "If you only give up the idea of becoming prime minister, you will not be purged. Why don't you become Finance Minister?"

However, Mr. Hatoyama would not give in. He took the stand that it was not his way to abandon his plan for such a reason, and took a "do what you please" attitude. The procedure for forming a Cabinet had been almost completed. He had already decided on the Cabinet Ministers without consulting anyone and had the list with him. He was ready to submit it to the Throne as soon as he was given the Imperial command.

Prime Minister Shidehara was also at a loss because of too long a delay in the formation of the new cabinet. Public criticism became unbearable. He consulted Foreign Minister Yoshida. The Foreign Minister seemed to have given up, in view of Mr. Hatoyama's stubbornness. He made up his mind to recommend Mr. Hatoyama as the next prime minister. On 4 May, Foreign Minister Yoshida dispatched a letter to SCAP in which he stated, "...Baron Shidehara has decided to recommend to the throne that it order Mr. Hatoyama to form a new Cabinet. ...Baron Shidehara wishes to know beforehand whether you approve this recommendation...."

In reply to this, Foreign Minister Yoshida received a letter from GS Chief General Whitney: "In regard to that problem, the Supreme Commander has already issued the directive to the Japanese Government before the receipt of your letter."

This directive was entitled the Removal and Exclusion from Public Office of Diet Member and dated 3 May, one day earlier than the letter of Foreign Minister Yoshida. Apparently this had been done intentionally. The directive specified that he fell under the provisions of Category G; as grounds for the purge it mentioned the Peace Preservation Law and four other already-mentioned points. The CLO must have been in a hurry; it sent the English version of the directive instead of a Japanese translation

to the home of Mr. Ishibashi, where Hatoyama was staying temporarily. At that time, Mr. Hatoyama was not at home; he had gone to ask Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe to join the new Cabinet as a State Minister to handle the revision of the Constitution.

It was a very windy day. When he was informed of his purge, he remarked with a gloomy look, "I don't like a windy day."

Soviet Union Takes Firmer Stand than United States. Ichiro Hatoyama said:

I am not at all sorry for being purged. Everybody felt sorry for me, but I did not. I realized that a victorious nation could commit an outrage, and I could not blame anybody.

Apparently the CLO must have been in a hurry; it sent me an English version of the purge directive instead of a Japanese official document. As I was purged as a Diet member, I lost the premiership at the same time. I still have the original purge directive from GHQ. I had already prepared the list of Cabinet ministers ready to submit to the Emperor when I received the Imperial Command to form a Cabinet. I decided the Cabinet members without consulting anyone and had the list with me. The 8 April issue of Red Star attacked me. Burton Crane, of The New York Times, wrote that that article was very similar to the purge notice issued by GHQ. The nature of the directive was just that. They purged me not on plausible grounds but because of political circumstances.

I had enough evidence to prove that my purge was unjustified. For example, I had the diaries which I kept during the five years of war. I had them at my daughter's home for fear of having them found at my home. In these diaries I wrote such matters as criticisms of the Tojo government, and the necessity of ending the war. In addition, I had some letters to Kazuo Kojima and Masazumi Ando, criticizing the absurdity of the war. I submitted the above to GHQ as counterevidence. If they saw them, they should have de-purged me immediately. Actually, however, they did not look at the papers at all. What an infringement of human rights! Anyway, among the Occupation personnel there were persons uneducated and ignorant of the meaning of liberty. As second and first lieutenants, they investigated us. However, newspapermen like Mark Gayn have more education. Therefore, when such people as they attacked me, it was often taken seriously.

In the final analysis, apparently, they found me unsatisfactory because I criticized the United States unreservedly, and they regarded me as uncooperative, rude to GHQ, a liar, and unresponsive to their requests.

Tsuruhei Matsuno said:

Shirasu came over and said, "There is not much chance. Apparently he is safe as long as he does not form a cabinet. I suggest that someone else take over formation of a cabinet."

The talk was confidential because it was unwise to let the party members know about this. Because Yoshida was Foreign Minister, I had him check whether Hatoyama was subject to the purge directive. It was, however, impossible to judge from the documents received by the Japanese government. When I had a talk with Yoshida, we even decided to have Hatoyama quit if his position were precarious. After all, it was not the United States that pushed the purge of Hatoyama; it was the Soviet Union.

After much deliberation, we reached the conclusion, "If the Party President cannot receive the Imperial command, he does not qualify as president. Therefore, there are only two ways left open to him—to resign from the presidency or to carry on according to his beliefs though he might run into drastic opposition and perhaps removal from office because of the Occupation." One day before he was purged, we heard, "There will be something important tomorrow."

Hatoyama was undaunted and remained cool. It can be said that he did give some thought to the idea of giving up to avoid the danger. He had even said that no one except Yoshida should take over. Anyway, it was Hatoyama's belief that he had to fulfill his responsibility as Party President, even if it meant a purge. Because he did what he thought right, we have nothing to regret. The late Toshio Shimada said to me, "If he had quit and become Speaker of the House and let

someone else receive the Imperial command to form a Cabinet, he would have succeeded in taking over in a few years without getting hurt. You fellows inevitably fail because of your strong compulsion to see a thing through."

To this, I answered, "Your line of action is probably less risky, but too much calculation causes failure."

Wataru Narahashi said:

When I became aware of the fact that the position of Mr. Hatoyama was precarious from the Occupation standpoint due to his anti-Communist statement, I suggested that it would be better to abandon the idea of becoming prime minister. I also suggested that he become Speaker for one or two sessions until international opinion improved in regard to him.

However, the eager Hatoyama camp attacked me, "Narahashi is trying to stop Hatoyama from becoming the premier by saying that Hatoyama would be purged."

When Mr. Shidehara said that he would ask GHQ to approve Mr. Hatoyama, I suggested that Mr. Shidehara have Foreign Minister Yoshida meet Chief of Staff General Marshall again to ascertain whether Mr. Hatoyama would be approved as premier or not. Mr. Shidehara said, "Yoshida is optimistic. At any rate, I will have him ask again."

When the Foreign Minister met Chief of Staff General Marshall, the Chief of Staff told him that such a proposal would mean the immediate purge of Mr. Hatoyama. After this interview, Yoshida said, "It was no good. There is nothing we can do except to have him resign."

Mr. Hatoyama was of the belief that not even General MacArthur would come out strongly against the president of the major party elected by the people in accordance with the principle of democracy. I said to him, "You must be careful because General MacArthur has power over the Emperor, not to mention the prime minister or the candidate for prime minister."

Anyway, Mr. Hatoyama insisted on taking the chance. Hearing this, Mr. Yoshida left for home, disgusted, after saying that he would have nothing to do with it.

Mr. Shidehara said, "Mr. Yoshida is irresponsible. Dropping Hatoyama now after all that flattery is too hard on Hatoyama. Let's call Yoshida again for a talk."

The three of us talked over the matter and reached the conclusion that Mr. Shidehara should submit the name of Hatoyama to the Throne.

At the very beginning, the memorandum directed to the CLO states that "the Japanese Government having failed to act on its responsibility, the General Headquarters finds that Hatoyama is an undesirable person, and directs his purge." In spite of this in black and white, I am accused of purging him. I cannot bear such accusation.

I do not believe that General MacArthur would purge the prime minister of a nation, a man like Mr. Hatoyama, unless there is some pressure which would cause an international situation. I believe Mr. Yoshida took the matter too lightly. Mr. Shidehara had often said to me, "Why did Mr. Yoshida assure Mr. Hatoyama so positively that he would not be purged?"

Mr. Eki Sone said:

Mark Gayn once pressed GS to purge Hatoyama. So far as GHQ was concerned, top-level men reached the conclusion that it was advisable to have the Japanese government purge Hatoyama on its own initiative. However, because the Japanese government did not do it, GHQ issued the memorandum. The true picture can be obtained by piecing together what Mark Gayn wrote and various other available data. The fact that Mr. Shirasu took the matter lightly despite the warning was because Foreign Minister Yoshida successfully checked GS in the Jiichiro Matsumoto case. Since Yoshida flatly refused to receive a verbal order and demanded a written one, GS finally gave in. The purge could be directed easily enough by issuing a memorandum. However, in the case of saving a person from the purge, the procedure was not so simple. Explanation had to be made to the FEC.

The Government did not oppose the Occupation Forces. Actually, GHQ lost to the logical reasoning of Yoshida. At that time, GS was chagrined. On the other hand, the case of Hatoyama was easy; it was easy to purge him. Nothing was more effective for GHQ than to display its ability to purge a postwar prime minister with a memorandum. Setting aside the question of right or wrong, it would certainly be welcomed by the American press, not to mention the Soviet Union. I believe both Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Shirasu had not grasped this point.

Because the outlook of the Hatoyama case was such, Foreign Minister Yoshida became angry with Political Division Chief Sone and fired him. Some persons believed that Mr. Sone was working with GS. On the other hand, on 3 April, Mr. Sone had submitted his resignation because of the Matsumoto case, but had been retained by Vice-Minister Matsushima. He felt that he was giving "appreciation service," and left indignant. (However, his resignation was rejected by his seniors and he became Chief of the Fukuoka Liaison Office in August 1946.)

Foreign Minister Yoshida Refuses to Assume Presidency. The purge of its Party President just prior to the issuance of the Imperial command dumbfounded the Liberal party. To most Party members, the purge of their president was most unexpected because they were unaware of the inside facts though they had heard rumors to that effect. The Party was thrown into confusion.

Everyone wondered who would take over the presidency. However, Hatoyama, Yoshida, and Matsuno had already often discussed this matter, and Hatoyama had clearly expressed his thoughts; he wanted Yoshida to take over. However, Mr. Yoshida flatly refused.

When Mr. Hatoyama was purged, he and Mr. Matsuno met Foreign Minister Yoshida again. Mr. Hatoyama formally stated, "I have nothing to regret. As Party President, I did my best. There is nothing I can do now. Will you please take over?"

However, the Foreign Minister flatly refused, saying, "I do not believe I can take over the presidency. I am all right as Foreign Minister, but I am not qualified to become Party President."

Hatoyama and Matsuno insisted, "There is no one but you."

The Foreign Minister, however, did not accept. They were compelled to stop asking him. On the evening of the same day, they discussed the matter. Mr. Ichiro Kono was also present in this discussion. Mr. Kono said, "A person who is well-informed on the international situation and who can act successfully as liaison between the Emperor and General MacArthur would be the best. From such a standpoint, how about Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira?"

Mr. Hatoyama asked Mr. Kono if he was acquainted with Mr. Matsudaira. Upon learning that he was not, Mr. Hatoyama said, "Then how about Kazuo Kojima?"

Aged Kojima Also Refuses. Since it was decided to ask the aged Kojima, Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Matsuno visited his home at Setagaya Kyodo the next day. Mr. Kojima was in bed with a fever of about 38 degrees C. They told him of the purge and asked him to take over. The old man flatly refused their request saying, "I have retired from the political world. I refuse."

Previous to this, when the rumor of the Hatoyama purge was circulating, Mr. Hatoyama visited Mr. Kojima. At that time, the old man encouraged him by saying, "If the Anti-Communist statement is wrong, why don't you fight it bravely. If you get purged, that's that."

At that time, Mr. Hatoyama studied the old man's thoughts, wondering if he would succeed him. He realized that he would not, but after the refusal by Mr. Yoshida, Mr. Hatoyama made another visit to Mr. Kojima. Mr. Kojima did not accept partly because Mr. Hatoyama had not asked him to become Party President, but had only asked him to take over the Party and represent it. In other words, Mr. Hatoyama wanted to have him represent the Party—as, for instance, to be Chairman of the Executive Board, and to receive the Imperial Command to form a Cabinet: "We must form the

Cabinet tomorrow. If you do it, you can form a splendid Cabinet and the people will feel relieved."

"You ask me to become Prime Minister? That's nonsense! I once persuaded Inukai not to become Prime Minister. I also persuaded Gonnohyoe Yamamoto. How could I ever take the premiership!"

He suggested Yoshida.

"I have already asked Yoshida but he has refused. It will be different if Yoshida accepts, but since he does not, we must ask you by all means."

They repeated their arguments and Mr. Hatoyama had to give in in the end.

Tatsuo Iwabuchi said:

In my opinion, Mr. Kojima was the first candidate for the presidency and Yoshida the third. It was a mistake for Hatoyama and Matsuno to have asked Mr. Kojima directly. In regard to the revision of the Constitution and other post war reforms, I never consulted Mr. Kojima, but I believed Mr. Kojima was the only person who could manage the very important basic problems. At the beginning, Yoshida worked with us to terminate the war and entered the Prince Higashikuni Cabinet through the efforts of Konoye and Obata. However, he was not active in such problems as the revision of the Constitution, and the relation between us became cool. In that sense, I was disappointed in him.

Hatoyama was not 100 percent competent, but Mr. Kojima was. I told Mr. Kojima that there was no other person but he who could form a postwar Cabinet, though I felt he might be too old to become President of the Liberal party. Mr. Kojima said, "If that is the case, you should have asked me."

I was in no position to do so. Hatoyama should have asked Kojima to take over, regardless of what happened to the Liberal party. However, Hatoyama was purged and wanted Kojima to succeed to his post and take charge of the Party during his purge period--and he wanted to return to his post upon being depurged. Therefore, the negotiation ended in failure. Mr. Kojima was offended at the idea of Hatoyama trying to assign him as caretaker during his absence and recommended Yoshida. I told him, "Yoshida is a stubborn fellow but has his good points. However, he has given me rough times so often that I am not too enthusiastic about him."

Then Mr. Kojima said, "I'll try."

After Mr. Kojima's refusal, Mr. Hatoyama and the others decided to ask Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira. They requested that Foreign Minister Yoshida ask him because he was intimate with Mr. Matsudaira; Mr. Hatoyama also paid a formal visit to Mr. Matsudaira's home. Mr. Matsudaira refused. It was the fourth day after Hatoyama's purge. At the executive conference Mr. Hitoshi Ashida insisted, "Matsudaira does not intend to become President of the Party. The President should be elected from among the Party members."

Some executives believed that since there was no good candidate it would be advisable to elect Mr. Ashida as President. However, upon hearing Mr. Ashida's statement, Mr. Ichiro Kono and Mr. Bukichi Miki were infuriated and said, "Don't get any wrong ideas!" and got into an argument. Men like Mr. Kono sensed that Mr. Ashida was trying to become the President himself and attacked him.

Regardless of such a movement within the Party, Mr. Matsuno concentrated his entire efforts on having Yoshida accept. He talked to the Foreign Minister once more, "Since Kojima refuses to accept, you must do it."

Because the Foreign Minister had no intention of accepting, he (the Foreign Minister) went to ask Kojima. However, the aged Kojima refused. Instead, Kojima earnestly asked the Foreign Minister to accept. The inner circle of the Foreign Minister's friends, for instance, Mr. and Mrs. Takakichi Aso and Mr. Jiro Shirasu, absolutely opposed his taking over as Party President. On learning this, his father-in-law, Mr. Nobuaki Makino, rushed to Tokyo from Abiko where he had retired and told him emphatically not to accept the post, which was not in his line. Because Foreign Minister Yoshida assured them that he would not accept, Mr. and Mrs. Aso felt relieved and returned to Kyushu.

Foreign Minister Yoshida Finally Accepts. Prime Minister Shidehara also eagerly tried to persuade Foreign Minister Yoshida to accept. As the result of Mr. Hatoyama's purge, the political situation changed completely and the Socialist party became the leading political party. Prime Minister Shidehara was compelled to permit Secretary-General Katayama to form a Socialist Coalition Cabinet. This was also regarded as a move to gain time to reorganize the Liberal party, which had been placed in confusion because of the purge of Mr. Hatoyama. Prime Minister Shidehara felt that the Liberal party could elect its President while the political responsibility was given to the Socialist party. He thought the best man for the post was Foreign Minister Yoshida. He felt that if Foreign Minister Yoshida formed a cabinet, he, unlike Mr. Hatoyama, would probably cooperate with his Progressive party. He believed that Yoshida would at least give a helping hand. The conservative camp did not want to turn over the government to the Socialist party, and it was believed that even if the Socialist party tried to gain a majority through cooperation with other parties, it would fail as a result of a split within the Party. The Liberal party was waiting for a new president to take over, ignoring the proposal from the Socialist party for political cooperation.

Wataru Narahashi said:

It is said that we tried to form a second Shidehara Cabinet. Government Section stated to me that the Shidehara Cabinet should resign after the stabilization of the political situation and the formation of a new cabinet. Anyway, at that time, the expansion of the Left-Wing Popular Front was beyond control. I thought that at such a time, the President of the leading party should be sacrificed in order to save the situation. However, GS had a different idea. Therefore, the Shidehara Cabinet had to exert an all-out effort until the political situation was stabilized. This cabinet position was attacked as a second cabinet formation maneuver. Actually, however, General MacArthur stated he would never interfere in the domestic policy nor permit the Emperor to interfere. He requested that the Shidehara Cabinet strive to form a new cabinet. At that time, the popular front under the leadership of the Communist party planned the complete overthrow of the Government. The Shidehara Cabinet would not resign unless the Communist party was isolated and the political situation stabilized. The situation became all the more difficult because GHQ considered Mr. Hatoyama, who won the major party presidency, ineligible to form a cabinet.

We did not have any intention whatsoever of organizing a new party and forming a cabinet in order to save the political situation by ignoring the election results. The popular front had become so influential as to make it possible for it to cause a crisis in Japan. It was expected that, if that did happen, GHQ would establish a military administration. We did not want a military administration. Therefore, we strove to the last, despite public attacks. GHQ had pampered the leftist elements, including the Communist party, too much. For its mistake, I believe we were given the task of settling the matter.

Mr. Tsuruhei Matsuno continued to talk to the Foreign Minister. He did not give up, no matter how often he was refused. The demands of the conservative faction began to exert pressure on Mr. Yoshida to accept. The effort of the Socialist party to obtain the cooperation of other parties to form a cabinet seemed to end in failure. The time came: it was about 0200 hours—early morning of 13 May. Mr. Matsuno went to the Foreign Minister's official residence at midnight to evade the reporters. The front gate was closed, so he climbed over the stone wall to see Foreign Minister Yoshida. He made the last attempt. Finally, the stubborn Foreign Minister gave in. He said he would give the answer later.

During the day, Hatoyama, Matsuno, and Kono waited for the Foreign Minister's answer. However, because there was no answer, Mr. Matsuno became impatient and phoned the official residence. There was an answer: "He has a visitor."

When he telephoned the second time, the answer was that he was taking a walk in the garden. On the third call, they received, as usual, an insolent reply that he had returned to Oiso.

The next morning, the Foreign Minister finally accepted formally.
Mr. Tsuruhei Matsuno said:

When Hatoyama was likely to be purged, Yoshida, as Foreign Minister, did what he could. He brought information obtained through Shirasu and others. When Chief of Staff Sutherland resigned because of illness, Yoshida visited him and asked whether something could be done for Hatoyama. This was unusual for Yoshida because he was not the kind to do such a thing. At that time, the Chief of Staff answered that Hatoyama's purge seemed unlikely. Because of the special relation between Yoshida and Hatoyama, Yoshida tried his very best, regardless of difficulties. These two and Kojima often met at Yoshida's home during the tenure of the Tojo Cabinet to discuss ending the war. Therefore they continued to remain on good terms.

In regard to the de-purge of Hatoyama, Yoshida also worked behind the scenes. If such actions were revealed, he would have had to answer as the Prime Minister. Therefore, he never revealed this to anyone, and he even kept it away from Hatoyama. However, he went to see important GHQ officials to discuss the matter. And they seemed to have understood him. However, it was not the time for the Hatoyama de-purge.

Three Conditions for Acceptance

Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama said:

From the beginning, I thought Yoshida was competent. When he was the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, I did not know him too well. I only thought he was somewhat snobbish. However, since our trip to England together, I realized that we had a great deal in common. He struck me as a very good man and a person with sound ideas. I have been on very intimate terms with Yoshida ever since. I was in Europe about the time of the outbreak of the China Incident. I sent a letter to Konoye inquiring about the Incident, because I feared that, as the result of bungling, the Incident could develop into a war with Great Britain and the United States. Konoye answered that there was no such fear. He assured me that it would not expand because of the containment policy. On the contrary, however, the incident became more and more serious. Worried about the Incident, I consulted Yoshida in London. After returning to Japan, I talked with him once or twice a week trying to find some means to check the arbitrary actions of the militarists. However, Ichiro Kono was opposed to Yoshida. He said that such an old man was incompetent. I said that I would take a chance with him.

Hitoshi Ashida was a man of good sense. When I was purged, he advised me to retire from political life. He said to me, "After the end of the war, you formed a new political party, and as a result of the first general election, it became the majority party. The fact that you organized the Liberal party and that you were purged should be given a special write-up in political history. Because you have rendered such distinguished service, you had better retire from political life."

He said this at the time when Kono and others were extremely indignant at my purge. They harbored a strong antipathy for Ashida and even insisted on expelling him at any cost. However, I did not get angry with him, because I believed he was a man of good sense who gave careful thought to various developments. I thought retirement from public life was a plan worth considering.

In regard to a successor to the Liberal party president, Foreign Minister Yoshida met Mr. Hatoyama secretly. Yoshida said, "As I am a diplomat, I cannot raise money. Therefore, you will have to raise money. Leave personnel matters to me and do not interfere. I will resign whenever I want to or when you become eligible."

Mr. Hatoyama replied, "I will not interfere in personnel matters, but, as a Liberal party member, I will assist you for the sake of the country."

Yoshida added, in his characteristic manner, "I will take charge of the Party during your purge. I will increase the influence of the Party and return its leadership to you."

These are the so-called three conditions which Yoshida offered to Hatoyama, and they promised to carry out these conditions. The leaders of the Liberal party were unaware of this meeting.

On 15 May, Ichiro Kono, Tsunejiro Hiratsuka, and Tomejiro Okubo went to the Foreign Minister's official residence and formally asked the Foreign Minister to assume the position of Liberal party president. The Foreign Minister said to them, "I offered conditions to Mr. Hatoyama. Did you come here knowing these conditions?"

They did not know the conditions. They were forced to give their unconditional consent to the terms and ask him to take the post, because they considered that it was no use expressing any opinion since Mr. Hatoyama had consented. (Afterwards, they rebuked Mr. Hatoyama for not informing them beforehand of the conditions.) Their talk with the Foreign Minister was concluded in about fifteen minutes. Foreign Minister Yoshida said emphatically to Mr. Kono at that time, "You seem to be working for a coalition with the Socialist party, but I will not."

As estimated by the conservative faction, the Socialist party, which had begun to form a new cabinet, began to think of forming a noncoalition cabinet as a result of its failure to conclude a policy agreement with the Liberal party. However, Prime Minister Shidehara, who was the only person authorized to receive the Imperial command, did not agree with the Socialist party. The Socialist and Communist parties protested to him that his refusal to consent was beyond his powers, but he did not reply. As soon as Foreign Minister Yoshida became Liberal party president, Shidehara, as planned, transferred the premiership to Mr. Yoshida to form a national cabinet. Thus the Socialist party lost its leadership.

As he had emphatically told Mr. Kono, Foreign Minister Yoshida had no intention of forming a coalition with the Socialist party. He sought a coalition with the Progressive party. However, as a matter of formality, he asked some Socialist party members to become cabinet members.

Dr. Taro Takemi acted as the messenger because a physician was able to frequent the cabinet formation headquarters without attracting attention. Formation of the cabinet did not progress smoothly. Both the Liberal and Progressive parties were dissatisfied with the selection of ministers, which had been made exclusively by Shidehara and Yoshida. State Minister Takeshige Ishiguro of the Shidehara Cabinet was to remain as Chief Cabinet Secretary. This infuriated the Liberal party. Therefore, Joji Hayashi was selected as a cabinet member on the recommendation of such men as Mr. Hatoyama, to appease the Liberal party. However, efforts were being exerted to select cabinet members from "the Professor Group." Mr. Seiichi Tohata was asked to become Agriculture and Forestry Minister, but he refused. At one time, the cabinet formation headquarters was about to abandon the idea of forming a cabinet, but the selection of cabinet members was completed successfully after persuading Mr. Hiroshi Nasu to become a cabinet member. However, it was later found that Mr. Nasu and Mr. Chuzo Iwata, who was to become the Justice Minister, were subject to the purge directive. Formation of the cabinet was resumed and Mr. Takutaro Kimura (present Justice Minister) was selected as Justice Minister and Mr. Hiroo Wada, Chief of the Agricultural Administration Bureau (ex-Liberal Diet Member and present Left-wing Socialist Councilor) as Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

Confusion to the Last. Having completed the selection of cabinet members, Foreign Minister Yoshida finally relaxed with his new secretary, Mr. Aisuyasu Fukuda, in a living room downstairs, facing the garden of his official residence where the cabinet formation headquarters had been established. About 2000 hours, he was called on the telephone. Taking the receiver, he listened. Suddenly he shouted, "What!" and then, "I refuse!"

Then he hung up the phone. Lighting a cigar, he said, "I refuse to become the Prime Minister!" and went out into the garden. There he said to himself, "Well, I feel much better. I don't have to become a statesman."

It was a phone call from Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama; he had opposed the selection of Hiroo Wada as Agriculture and Forestry Minister. The Foreign Minister entered the room from the garden, indignantly saying, "He broke his promise! What does he think I am? A fool?"

He took a letter out of a box and showed it to Secretary Fukuda. It was a roll of letter paper on which the three conditions reached by him and Hatoyama had been carefully written and signed "We have promised." Yoshida said, "Despite the fact that he promised not to interfere in personnel matters, he broke his promise first. I will not take over."

Secretary Fukuda soothed him, saying, "It's much better for you in the Foreign Office because politics are so troublesome."

Soon afterwards they were told there were visitors. The visitors came in the room. They were Joji Hayashi and Hideo Sudo, sent by the Liberal party. They said to the Foreign Minister, "The selection of Mr. Wada has thrown the Liberal party into confusion, but this does not mean that you have been slighted."

The Foreign Minister replied emphatically, "I will not accept."

In regard to the cabinet formation, the Liberal party recommended Niro Hoshijima as Commerce and Industry Minister, Etsujiro Uyehara as Home Minister, Tanzan Ishibashi as Finance Minister, and Ichiro Kono as Agriculture and Forestry Minister. The Foreign Minister was opposed to the appointment of Mr. Kono. On the other hand, Liberal party members were opposed to the appointment of Mr. Wada, emphasizing that he was a Communist and that he was involved in the Planning Board Case during the war. On 21 May, the day before the investiture of the new cabinet members, the executive members still maintained that they did not care whether Yoshida gave up the cabinet formation. As the list of the cabinet members had to be submitted by 2000 hours, Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Sudo strove to mediate between Yoshida and the executive members. However, this mediation was unsuccessful until that night. As a last resort, just before 2000 hours, Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Sudo finally said to Mr. Bukichi Miki of the Party Executive Board: "Only two minutes more. Will you persuade the Liberal party to consent to the appointment of Mr. Wada as Agriculture and Forestry Minister?"

Mr. Miki replied, "All right. The only way is to take a chance. Never mind! Submit the list of cabinet members. I'll take the responsibility."

In opposition to the methods of Mr. Yoshida, the Liberal Diet members, who had been affiliated with the Party since its establishment, met at Azabu Gazembo-cho, at 0300 hours the next morning. Cabinet member candidates were also present. Mr. Hiratsuka insisted that he would not join the cabinet unless Mr. Yoshida did not appoint Mr. Wada. On the other hand, Mr. Hoshijima and Mr. Uyehara had no objection. Mr. Miki went to the Foreign Minister's official residence to try to persuade him to drop Mr. Wada. However, the Foreign Minister, showing his written agreement with Mr. Hatoyama, said that there could be no objection. Thus the Liberal party, which had nearly succeeded, was forced to yield because of this promise. However, this concession on the part of the Party was partially because the Foreign Minister's relinquishment of the right to form a cabinet necessarily meant the loss of political leadership to the Progressive or Socialist party. Thus, the first Yoshida cabinet was formed and Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, who was later called a symbol of the Occupation, began his first premiership.

Bukichi Miki said:

If Yoshida had failed to form a cabinet, the Liberal party would have been in a state of dissension in regard to the Party President issue. Both the Progressive and the Socialist parties seemed unable to form a cabinet. Thus, all the Japanese political parties would have become incompetent to take over the administration and GHQ would have established direct military rule. Therefore I complied with the request of Hayashi and Sudo.

Mr. Ichiro Kono said:

At that time, there was the food problem. The delivery allotment of rice was made by each prefecture. Therefore, failure to form a cabinet would have

completely checked the rice delivery and would, finally, frustrate the food program. Therefore, there was no alternative but to agree to the appointment of Wada as Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

Purge Category Extended

Prime Minister Strongly Opposes Purge of City, Town, and Village Heads. During the year after the purge directive of 4 January 1946, 8899 persons were investigated by the Government, of whom 7832 were cleared and the rest purged. This was the first purge program, which was directed at top-level politicians and administrators. Before the April general election Privy Councilors were screened first, followed by Diet members and officials of each ministry. The Home Ministry headed the list with 340 purgees, followed by the House of Peers with 118.

Needless to say, GHQ considered that this purge program could not be complete unless the purge were extended to the local government. Colonel Kades, GS, said to the Foreign Ministry officials concerned, "The Japanese government is conducting the purge program in a lukewarm manner. Therefore, GHQ is being criticized by the nations concerned. A more thorough effort must be made to settle the purge problem."

Just as expected, a brief directive was sent to the Japanese government on 17 August 1946 to extend the purge to local levels. The statement read,

The Japanese government should prepare at once a plan for the exclusion of personnel deemed undesirable from prefectural and municipal Assemblies, and the exclusion of all purged personnel from all other influential political or economic posts.

As political circles had gone through a period of shock, confusion, and reorientation, and the Government had been stabilized, GHQ seemed to deem it proper to initiate the second phase of the removal and exclusion program. It concluded that the presence of undesirable elements in the local government threatened the democratization program and checked installation of new leaders. Furthermore, a large number of Japanese letters supporting the purge program and urging the extension of the purge to local levels poured into GHQ. Since the beginning of the Occupation, there were many letters from the Japanese in regard to various problems, and they aided GHQ in various respects. In regard to the purge program, these letters were particularly helpful. Some of them were submitted with ulterior motives by the Communists. Therefore, GHQ was forced to conduct further investigations. It proposed the extension of the purge to those who were city and town mayors and village heads between 1937 and the end of the war.

However, the Japanese government opposed this proposal, saying, "Such an extension of the purge is unreasonable because the purge directive was originally directed against those who had driven Japan into the war."

Mr. Hisanari Yamada (present Tokyo Metropolitan Government Liaison Section Chief), who had succeeded Mr. Eki Sone as CLO Political Division Chief, talked with GS about this extension problem. As a result, GS began to understand the opposition of the Japanese government and modified the extension of the purge to local levels; in other words, since executive members of the IRAA were subject to the purge directive, GS considered that the extension of this category to local levels would make it possible to exclude those who had been city and town mayors and village heads before 1940, when the IRAA was formed. However, Prime Minister Yoshida was strongly opposed to this local purge. Therefore, the tentative plan of the Japanese government made no progress whatsoever.

Colonel Kades emphatically said to Mr. Yamada, CLO Political Division Chief,

What is the matter with the Japanese government in delaying the formulation of a plan? If that is the case, we have no alternative but to make a plan and thrust it on the Japanese government. To tell the truth, this extension has been ordered by FEC. Therefore, we are not free to change this extension program. Is the Japanese government fully aware of this fact? You should tell this to Prime Minister Yoshida.

Mr. Yamada felt that, such being the case, it was impossible to pigeonhole or oppose the extension program. He replied,

Our opposition is useless because you are not free to change the extension program if it has been ordered by the FEC. Although you are unable to stop the program, I believe you are free to moderate the purge program in consideration of the history of those who are subject to it. The enforcement of such a foolish program would be ridiculed by the Japanese people in the future. Therefore, we will formulate a plan.

Mr. Yamada was caught between the Prime Minister and GHQ. He felt that the only way was to present a middle-of-the-road plan to solve this problem. His middle-of-the-road plan was that persons who had been city and town mayors and village heads and who had been also local branch chiefs of the IRAA should be barred for four years from holding the posts of city and town mayors and village heads, but those who had been town mayors should be able to be city mayors and town assemblymen but not town mayors.

Mr. Yamada and other officials concerned felt that whatever the FEC said, it was quite unreasonable to extend the purge to the level of excluding those who were responsible for the war, and that although GHQ might call it the purge, the Japanese government did not regard it as such. The Japanese government regarded it as one method to expedite Japanese democratization by excluding the bosses who were in power in local government for a long time and replacing them with new leaders.

Mr. Yamada argued with Colonel Kades on this point and finally persuaded him to understand. It was finally agreed that Mr. Yamada would explain it to the Prime Minister, and that Colonel Kades would explain it to General Whitney and General MacArthur.

Not only the Prime Minister, but almost all the cabinet members, including Home Minister Seiichi Omura (present Liberal Diet member), were opposed to the purge of town and city mayors and village heads. Mr. Yamada reported his talk with Colonel Kades to Mr. Shirasu, CLO Vice-Chief, and then to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was indignant and flatly rejected it. Mr. Yamada answered that, although the purge of city and town mayors and village heads was insulting, he thought that it was most advisable to accept the GHQ plan. The Prime Minister retorted, "We don't have to worry about everything they say."

Mr. Hisanari Yamada said:

I think the reason Prime Minister Yoshida was strongly opposed to the purge was that he believed that although GHQ said it had been ordered by the US Government, strong opposition could make GHQ withdraw the plan because it had not been ordered by the US Government, according to Mr. Shirasu. The Prime Minister indignantly said that I was too obedient to GS and that we did not have to accept everything they said.

"If that is the case," I answered, "the only alternative is for the Prime Minister to talk to them directly."

The Prime Minister answered that he would dispatch a letter to GHQ instead of going there personally. I argued with him, although I thought it was useless.

Prime Minister Yoshida does not like to write a long letter. He briefly wrote that the purge of those who had been city and town mayors and village heads would only result in the expansion of Communism. I considered that, if this problem had been decided by the FEC and if efforts were to be made to have the plan withdrawn, it was necessary to give data to General MacArthur good enough to persuade the FEC. Therefore, I said that at first a brief letter would serve the purpose, but, since a memorandum had been received, the Prime Minister should dispatch a detailed report on the views of the Japanese government to answer the memorandum. However, CLO Vice Chief Shirasu disagreed with me, saying that the Prime Minister should write only that Communism would spread. Agreeing with Mr. Shirasu, the Prime Minister wrote a brief letter, covering only half a small page.

On receipt of this letter, GS called me, and Kades said angrily, "Did you persuade the Prime Minister to act in regard to this problem? I thought the plan hard to carry out, but I promised to do my best. However, since we have received such a letter as this, if the Japanese government assumes such an attitude, we will teach them a lesson."

As a result, the informal negotiation ended in failure; a memorandum was issued by General MacArthur directing the purge of those who had been city and town mayors and village heads from 1937 to the end of the war and of those who had served as local branch chiefs and members of the IRAA during the same period.

Some local branches of the IRAA had chairmen of the board of directors, advisors, councilors, and consultants. They were purged, although their duties had been only nominal. This extension of the purge meant the exclusion of all local influential persons. According to information from GS, Mr. Shirasu believed that GS could be persuaded by expressing the opposition of the Japanese government to General MacArthur. In fact, however, the memorandum was issued for this drastic extension of the purge program. Surprised at this, Mr. Shirasu directed me to ask GS to narrow the scope of the purge.

Government's Request Rejected. Government Section decided to extend the purge to local levels and presented its report to General MacArthur together with a note. It was clearly stated in the note that GS was not satisfied with the purge program of the Japanese government:

The Japanese government has shown an increasing tendency not only to ignore the spirit and intent of the purgedirective, but to evade and circumvent its literal provisions.

It even emphasized that outwardly the Government presented a good front, but had shown indications of obvious political dishonesty. Furthermore, citing as an example Mr. Keizo Seki who, upon being purged from the presidency of the Textile Industry Control Association, defined as a public office, assumed the presidency of the Textile Trade Association, described as a private organization, the note stated that such shifts from public office to other influential pos.s made a mockery of the purge, and, if they became general, could make GHQ look naive. As a result of this strong dissatisfaction, GHQ was probably determined to extend the scope of the purge.

On 23 October, a memorandum for the extension of the purge was dispatched by General Whitney to the CLO Chief. The memorandum prescribed the wide extension of the purge:

Persons removed or excluded from the local government should be barred from holding national government posts as well. Mayors of cities and town and village heads whose term of office antedates the termination of the war should not be allowed to succeed themselves in office. Holders of important positions in the local government should be screened. Influential members of local branches of the IRAA should be removed from local public office.

Upon receipt of this memorandum, Prime Minister Yoshida directed CLO Political Division Chief Yamada to have another talk with GS, and he himself sent a long letter to General MacArthur on 31 October, in which he stated,

I think the purge should be conducted in light of the conditions of Japan... and it must be done justly. It is the responsibility of the Government to the people to decrease unjust practices as much as possible... the regimentation of the military regime had been engineered by a clique of professional soldiers, of Government officials, right-wing reactionaries, and some members of the zaibatsu. The people, including local public officials, were merely the passive objects of that regimentation. For instance, in regard to the IRAA, national officers of the organization were responsible for misleading the people, but local officials shared neither the ideals nor a feeling of comradeship with the central executives... With regard to the purge, the important thing is for the people to realize its justification. The purge should be conducted with the thorough conviction of the people that "justice is being done where it is due,"

and when it goes beyond the limit, it is bound to cause distrust of the Government and of the purge.

In addition, Prime Minister Yoshida presented his arguments against the GS memorandum, listing the following points:

1. The Japanese Government had claimed that the criteria set for national officials should remain as the criteria for screening local officials, but since this had proved unacceptable to the GHQ, it had evolved a system of dual criteria, one for local office and the other for national office, under which an individual deemed ineligible for local office might still hold a post on the national level. Otherwise a person who had previously been deemed ineligible might be subject to purge under the new criteria. This will reflect upon the prestige of the Japanese Government.
2. The Government has misgivings about any provisions which would prevent wartime mayors of cities and town and village heads from retaining their respective posts.
3. Although the Government has agreed to purge the chiefs of local IRAA chapters, it is opposed to the purge of other influential chapter members.
4. The Government does not support General Whitney's view that officials on the local level had played an important part in gearing the country for war. They are considered to be indispensable to the rehabilitation and democratization of the country.

On the following day, General MacArthur dispatched a letter to the Prime Minister, in which he merely reiterated what he had previously stated, and rejected every request of the Japanese government:

1. There appears to be no justification for exempting local executive officials from the purge.
2. In regard to the city and town mayors and village heads, although they cannot succeed themselves in office, they are eligible for any other national, local, or elective or appointive posts, unless they fall under other provisions of the purge.
3. Some distinctions should be made among various offices of local IRAA chapters. As soon as this one remaining point has been disposed of, the revised plan should be made effective by the Government.

Tragi-comic Purge of Relatives of Purgee within Third Degree. The opposition of Prime Minister Yoshida and his Government ended in failure. The only thing they could do was to ask GS to modify the extension of the purge as much as possible. Therefore, CLO Political Division Chief Yamada negotiated with GS and, as a result, it was decided that only executive members of local IRAA chapters who had taken an active role would be purged, while nominal executive members such as advisers, consultants, and counselors would be spared. Since the basic principle of the purge directive was irrevocable the Government aimed to hold the number of purgees to a minimum.

On 8 November, the Cabinet held a meeting and formally announced the extension of the purge program. Mr. Yamada immediately reported this decision to GS to prevent it from making an unfavorable change in the program. In accordance with the demand of US authorities, those who held unimportant posts in the local assemblies and governments were subject to screening under the extended criteria. Furthermore, persons who were chiefs of local branches of the Imperial Ex-servicemen's Association were also earmarked for purge, although this had never been demanded by GHQ. In accordance with the extension of the purge to local levels, local screening committees were set up in each prefecture and in each city with a population of more than 50,000. Thus, the purge extension was established on 4 January 1947, one year after the issuance of the original directive. Under this purge program, however, there was a provision that any relative of a purgee within the third degree by blood, marriage, or adoption, should be barred from succeeding to the appointive office from which the purgee had been removed.

The Japanese government was strongly opposed to this provision, but was unable to get GHQ to withdraw it. Mr. Eisaku Sato (present Construction Minister), who was Director-General of the Railway at the time of the first Yoshida Cabinet, was the first person affected. The Government asked GHQ to approve his appointment as Transportation Minister. But this request was rejected, probably because his elder brother Mr. Shinsuke Kishi (present Reconstruction League President) was a war crimes suspect. Government Section had maintained that measures should be taken to check the influence of "undesirable persons." Therefore, GS planned that any relative of a purgee within the third degree should be barred from succeeding to the office from which the purgee had been removed. The Japanese government was very strongly opposed to this plan, saying that it was too strict. On 21 December, Mr. Jiro Shirasu wrote a letter and sent it to General MacArthur as a note from Prime Minister Yoshida. The letter read:

... I remember reading something about a law or practice in China centuries ago under which all the relatives of a man who was found to have committed a grave offense, were sentenced accordingly. But under the modern concept of justice, all relatives of criminals, even murderers, are spared from any punishment.

To declare anyone "undesirable" because his relative, within the third degree, has been declared "undesirable" seems contrary to the prevailing idea of justice....

The letter ended with a request for the General's permission to implement the final draft without inclusion of that provision. Five days later, the General dispatched a reply, in which he did not change his stand but only reiterated that this provision was to prohibit the continuity of the influence of purgees and give fair assurance that the purge would not become a mockery through the device of dummies. Thus, the Government was compelled to accept the memorandum. The reason GHQ proposed this prohibition and added a new provision that "those purged should not exert their influence" was because it was aware that those who had been purged still extended influence on their former political parties or companies. However, this awareness partially resulted because GHQ received letters stating that Mr. So and So was a purgee but still controlled his former company.

Hisanari Yamada said:

The purge of chiefs of local branches of the Imperial Ex-servicemen's Association and the prohibition of any relative of a purgee within the third degree from succeeding to the office from which the purgee had been removed, gave rise to various problems. For example, a member of a rice distribution center, who had been chief of a local branch of the Imperial Ex-servicemen's Association, had to resign his office, because he was a public official; his wife or child was not eligible to succeed to his office. Therefore, we had GHQ establish an exception.

Government Section feared Prime Minister Yoshida. It was said that GS considered Mr. Yoshida, who had been a diplomat, probably well-versed in international problems. He knew that GHQ had strongly demanded extension of the purge because it was laid down by the FEC. Therefore, Mr. Yoshida was possibly aware that the execution of the new purge program would be beneficial to Japan.

However, each purge program was rejected at the Cabinet meeting. Government Section went so far as to investigate who was opposed to it. The Section considered that Prime Minister Yoshida, who was well aware of the circumstances, could not be opposed to it. Therefore, it must be State Minister Etsujiro Uyehara, Home Minister Omura, or Justice Minister Tokutaro Kimura (present Director-General of the National Safety Board).

I am not in a position to declare who the person was. I got the impression that Mr. Yoshida had been assuming an aggressive attitude behind their backs but had never personally negotiated with GS.

Mr. Joji Hayashi Reprimanded. The following provision was added to the purge directive:

Those who were purged should be barred from assuming the political control.

This was a result of the report from Mark Gayne. When he met Mr. Hatoyama after the latter's purge, Mr. Hatoyama, who was very frank, said, "The purge of the political world leaves only the small fry. All present Cabinet Ministers come to me for advice."

Gayne asked, "Who comes?"

Mr. Hatoyama replied, "Yoshida comes. Joji Hayashi comes frequently."

Mark Gayne appealed to GHQ, "Such is the state of affairs in Japan. The purge is looked upon as a joke."

About the next day, Mr. Yamada, CLO Political Division Chief, received instructions from GS as follows:

We will have an important interview today. Come with Joji Hayashi, Chief Cabinet Secretary. You can act as the interpreter.

It was said that it was from General Whitney. Because this was so sudden, he had no idea what the important interview was about. Anyway, he told Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi, and they went to GS together. They were about to enter, as usual, the office of Deputy-Chief Kades. Then Kades said, "Please wait a while." He had an unusual look.

After waiting a while, they were led to the conference room. Each division chief and senior division member was seated around the table (arranged in a U shape). At the head of this table sat Deputy-Chief Kades and Mr. Rizzo. Mr. Hayashi and Mr. Yamada were directed to sit in front of them. It was an imposing scene and the two wondered. Shortly, General Whitney entered the conference room and began to talk without even sitting down. He paced the floor as he talked. First he explained the spirit of the purge directive and then said,

Whether Japan enforces this faithfully or not, will affect greatly whether Japan regains her sovereignty early. Recently, however, Japanese government leaders visit frequently the home of an influential purgee for advice. Even this purgee has said that leaders cannot get along by themselves without his advice. This is just a challenge to the Occupation policy. Moreover, if this practice is continued, I cannot guess how many years the restoration of the Japanese sovereignty will be delayed. Therefore, this must be stopped at once. If this practice is continued, the GHQ might be forced to make a basic change in the Occupation policy... Mr. Hayashi, who is present here, is involved.

It was a long speech of about thirty minutes. As there was no interpreter, Political Division Chief Yamada related the substance of this speech to Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi and said, "You may explain if you have something to say."

The Chief Cabinet Secretary replied, "Yes."

He was about to begin to speak. Then someone said suddenly, "The conference is concluded."

Thus, neither one was given an opportunity to talk; not only were they rebuked but were given a stern warning. Before returning, they dropped in to the office of Deputy-Chief Kades. Mr. Yamada asked, "Apparently today's speech has something to do with Mr. Hatoyama. Is it true?"

Kades answered, "You can obtain the full particulars from Mr. Hayashi. It is not necessary for me to explain."

Political Division Chief Yamada asked, "Mr. Hayashi, apparently it has something to do with Mr. Hatoyama. Can you recall anything along this line?"

Mr. Hayashi answered, "You are right."

Political Division Chief Yamada wrote the notes for the interview and handed them to Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi. He said, "Everything said by Whitney is correct. Anyway, his speech was eloquent."

In the final analysis, this became the reason for the later provision, "Prohibition of Political Activities."

Simultaneously with this, a provision was added: "The person purged should be barred from visiting his former office and company." This was added because of another member of the Liberal party, Mr. Ichiro Kono. He was Secretary-General of the Liberal party and purged at almost the same time as Bukichi Miki (after the purge of Mr. Hatoyama). The immediate ground for this purge was that his interpellations at the time of the Yonai Cabinet were militaristic. However, they felt that there was a deeper reason.

In adopting the property tax limit, the GHQ directive called for exemption under 30,000 yen. However, the Liberal party insisted upon exemption up to 100,000 yen. Therefore, Mr. Miki, Mr. Kono, and Mr. Reikichi Kita attended the conference of the Bureau Directors of the Finance Ministry and strongly opposed the 30,000 yen plan. Because the Finance Ministry relayed this fact to GHQ, they were purged. This was the reason given by Mr. Kono. Mr. Miki was purged as soon as he was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. In regard to the purge of these two, the Prime Minister sent a letter to General MacArthur requesting reconsideration, "because the Party executives say that in the event that both are purged, the party management will encounter serious difficulties, I request your consideration."

"Because the Party executives say" was Yoshida's style of expression. Needless to say, however, this was not approved. GHQ was informed that Mr. Kono continuously visited the Tokiwaya in Marunouchi, where the headquarters of the Liberal party was located, even after he was purged. Investigation found that Mr. Kono's office was also located in Tokiwaya. Consequently, a new provision was added to the purge directive, "that a person purged should be barred from visiting his former office or company, or should be barred from holding an office in the same building."

Economic Purge

Ordinary Director Narrowly Escapes Purge. While the question whether to apply the purge program to the prefectural level was being debated, GHQ had to prepare for an economic purge program.

In keeping with the concept of applying the purge program locally, it was the GHQ aim to apply the purge directive to the economic field—on the ground that all Japanese industries, enterprises, etc., in cooperation with the militarists, had made big profits and actively supported Japan's program of foreign expansion and exploitation. The concept of the economic purge was planned by GHQ before the Occupation. In accordance with the instructions issued in September, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the following policy:

No person shall be allowed to hold positions of responsibility or influence in important private enterprises who have been active exponents of militant nationalism or aggression.

In accordance with this concept, GHQ began to apply the purge program to the economic field. However, they stated that this was of a preventive rather than punitive nature, and insisted that it was designed to ensure that the militarists and ultranationalists would not again be in a position to direct Japanese economy to support aggression. Government Section told the Japanese government that it was natural to apply the purge directive to the economic fields, and, in view of the fact that a considerable number of persons in the economic fields were arrested as war crime suspects, the purge directive should be applied, for war responsibility, to those who were excluded from this. It also informally issued instructions to the CLO, that all the following companies would be regarded as subject to purge.

1. Companies, including peace industries, which have a capitalization exceeding 100 million yen.
2. Listed influential zaibatsu companies which have a capitalization exceeding 30 million yen.

3. Companies which have manufactured arms and munitions, regardless of the amount of the capitalization.

4. Conspicuously monopolistic companies, for instance, those which have produced more than ten percent of the total Japanese production.

Mr. T. A. Bisson, a person with leftist ideas and the adviser to Colonel Kades, and Miss Eleanor Hadley were principally in charge of the economic purge program. These two persons prepared the plans and often reported them to the Japanese government. Of the two, Miss Hadley played the leading role. She very actively supported the dissolution of the zaibatsu and was a very hard-working woman. Upon her return to the United States, she published a book entitled Japanese Zaibatsu, and made a lecture tour throughout the country. Her opinion was,

In Japan, not only the zaibatsu, but the structure of the big companies has a strong feudalistic nature. For instance, Japanese company officials remain with the same company. While in the United States, an official of one company easily goes to another company upon request. In contrast, Japanese company officials never do that. That is the reason why the feudalistic nature of a Japanese company cannot be rooted out. Therefore, Japanese economic democratization cannot be achieved simply by the dissolution of the zaibatsu; the feudalistic human relation must be severed. The former Japanese economic structure must not be revived to rehabilitate Japan. I think it is necessary for Japanese economy to consider capital accumulation from a socialistic standpoint.

Some have accused her of being a Communist. However, the Japanese in general regarded her as a New Dealer. To conform with her opinion, the scope of the economic purge was steadily extended. The financial field was also added to the purge list on the ground that it was very influential in spite of its small capitalization. The Japanese government strongly opposed placing the "ordinary director" within the purview of the purge extension. Talks were held repeatedly. On 3 January 1947, one day before the announcement, CLO Political Division Chief Yamada and Vice-Chief Mitsuo Tanaka (present Consul General at San Francisco) were forced to settle the problem within the day. They stayed at GS from 1600 hours to 2100 hours and worked to exclude ordinary directors from the purge list. From about 2000 hours they argued with Colonel Kades. According to the American system, the position of auditor is very important, while in Japan the auditors as well as ordinary directors are not so important. They presented many arguments on this point. However, the difference in system and operation, made arguments fruitless. Finally Mr. Yamada and Mr. Tanaka said,

The application of the purge directive to the level of the ordinary directors means nothing but the complete destruction of the Japanese economy. If the exclusion of the ordinary directors from the purge list cannot be accepted, we have to commit suicide.

Colonel Kades finally went to General Whitney. About twenty minutes later, he answered, "It is impossible, because it has been already reported to General MacArthur with the view of public announcement tomorrow."

However, they did not give up. Finally General Whitney gave in and informed General MacArthur. As a result, the Japanese claim was accepted. Prior to the announcement on 4 January, the final effort of the Japanese government was successful.

Sons Narrowly Escape Purge. In connection with the economic purge, GHQ planned to purge sons of the zaibatsu families. In view of the fact that persons who were excluded from the economic purge were holding influential positions among the zaibatsu, the Occupation authorities wanted to include them in the purge program. This was the origin of the plan. However, it was deemed unnecessary because the zaibatsu concerns were already within the scope of the purge. However, GHQ still insisted upon the purge of the sons.

The Japanese government often submitted the following opinion to GS:

For instance, the son of the president of the Mitsubishi Company is a student. It is unreasonable to purge him. The sons of the zaibatsu families were prohibited from working in zaibatsu-affiliated companies by the Law for Termination of the zaibatsu Family Control. What other punishments do you want to mete out. You shouldn't mind if they become city office workers. It is too cruel to exclude them from all positions.

Finally Mr. Yamada, CLO Political Division Chief, treated the matter as a joke, "Then, how about permitting them to at least become Tokyo Metropolitan dog-catchers?" As a result of this joke, the plan came to nothing.

The economic purge plan was formed by GS in coordination with ESS after the April 1946 election, and the economic purge directive was issued 4 January 1947. During these nine months, various changes had taken place. At the beginning, negotiations were begun between GHQ and Japanese government officials. The Japanese government officials on the basis of these talks drafted a plan during the subsequent three months. However, GHQ was not satisfied. It felt that the Japanese government had minimized, as usual, the extent of the purge.

Government Section had obtained sufficient data to gauge the extent of the purge program, through the efforts of Miss Hadley, and had prepared the program on the basis of this data. On 20 August 1946, GS requested the Japanese government to prepare and submit an economic purge plan to GHQ as soon as possible and, at the same time, made an official announcement. These were the GHQ new tactics. It believed that the announcement of the plan would result in the resignation of a considerable number of affected persons prior to the actual promulgation of the plan as a law. At the same time, it proposed that Japanese government officials work out the plan on their own initiative, without prior consultation with GHQ. In September, the Japanese government submitted an informal draft as a feeler to see if it was moving in the right direction. However, GHQ suggested that a list of the names of all affected organizations be added. As a result, a new draft was prepared.

On 22 October, the Japanese government plan was formally accepted. After further discussion with other sections concerned, GS requested, in a memorandum, a further change of the Japanese plan. GHQ finally approved the new plan on 21 November. As a result, the following organizations, companies, etc., became subject to purge:

1. Fifty listed national policy companies, special banks, etc.
2. Sixty organizations designated by the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Law.
3. Fifty-four organizations established under special legislation, and government-subsidized organizations.
4. Two hundred and thirty-eight companies which were deemed to be an excessive concentration of economic power.

Later, in coordination with ESS, the investigation of eleven companies was continued and the plan was revised little by little. Thus, on 4 January 1947, the Japanese government promulgated the ordinance for the implementation of the economic purge. Compared with the first Japanese plan, the number of the affected companies was larger. The national policy companies were reduced to 26, the number of companies designated by the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Law reached 78, and those deemed excessive concentrations of economic power amounted to 278. As a result of this, all former leading figures in the Japanese economic field were removed. About 3200 persons became subject to the purge directive, and most of them resigned prior to the promulgation of the Imperial Ordinance. Thus the objective of the GHQ "economic purge" was almost accomplished.

The Butokukai Also Attacked

The scope of the purge program was extended and entered the second phase. At that time, the Great Japan Military Virtue Association was added to the purge list. This happened in a strange manner.

One day, a certain CIS officer in charge of censoring mail opened a sealed letter. This was addressed to a Military Virtue Association instructor from a former colleague. In accordance with the GHQ order, military virtue training in schools was prohibited and the instructors were out of work. It was a letter to console each other and it read in part, "Let's keep our morale. The American Forces will soon leave. Our day will come again...."

The GHQ English translation "Military Virtue Association" (Butokukai) gives a very dangerous impression. This was because there was no appropriate English term for Japanese "Bu." The fact that a former member of an association with such a dangerous name wrote "our day will come again" was a matter of no small significance to this officer. Furthermore, although nothing had been uncovered, the suspicion of a "Japanese underground system" which had been brought up by the Bamou* Incident was still fresh in our mind.

GHQ suspected this letter. It thought it necessary to consider this in connection with the underground system. After investigating the Military Virtue Association, G-2 recommended to the Chief of Staff its dissolution by order to the Imperial Japanese Government in accordance with the Purge Directive, on the ground that "this is an organization affording military training for the perpetuation of militarism or martial spirit in Japan."

The Japanese government was given a verbal order to this effect. It surprised Political Division Chief Yamada and Vice-Chief Tanaka of the Foreign Ministry. They disagreed, saying,

"What nonsense! The Butokukai is not a rightist organization. It has never attacked the Foreign Ministry. In contrast, other rightist organizations always attacked and applied pressure to the Foreign Ministry accusing the Ministry of weak-kneed diplomacy."

However, their opposition was not accepted. The Japanese government was instructed, on 1 November, to add the Association to the list of organizations under Category G, and to dissolve the organization, all its branches, and any organizations which it controlled or with which it was affiliated.

Previous to this, the Association had reorganized itself in accordance with its pre-war setup. However, the GS report explained this reorganization thus:

This step was taken to cover up its wartime record and to continue its activities under the camouflage of democratic reorganization. The reorganization which took place was superficial and designed to replace those officials who had been apprehended as war criminals or who, having fallen under the purge directive, might discredit the society in the eyes of the Occupation were they to remain at their posts.

The Yoshida Cabinet opposed this GHQ view. Home Minister Etsujiro Ueyehara (present Liberal party Adviser) personally presented a petition to General Whitney in which he attempted to prove that the Association was not guilty of furthering militant nationalism among the Japanese people. The petition stated that:

...after the commencement of the Pacific War, it was inevitable that the various setups internally moved to a wartime footing and the Butokukai could claim no exception to this rule...and with the object of coordinating military arts and of the advancement of bayonet drill and shooting, the Ministry of Welfare planned to establish a new martial arts organization.

Discussing this part, GS said that "he had to tacitly admit that the Butokukai afforded military training." General Whitney flatly rejected the opposition of the Japanese government.

In his reply to the Home Minister, Ueyehara stated that

I am advising State Minister Kanamori that all influential members of this Association or any branch thereof from 6 December 1941 to 2 September 1945

*Indicates exact Romaji translation of the original Kana.

will be treated as falling within the provisions of Category G, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary.

This was the first formal document in regard to the purge of the Military Virtue Association. The extent of the purge of Association officials was not decided soon. Finally even the Yoshida Cabinet, which had strongly opposed their purge, had to admit that during the war, the Association became an instrument of the militarists. The Association was dissolved by a Home Ministry Ordinance instead of by the purge directive; had the action been taken under the Purge Directive, all officers, directors, or influential members of the Association would automatically have been subject to purge.

However, if all influential members of the Association are treated as subject to Category G in accordance with the decision of General Whitney, each official was to be judged on the individual merits of his case. Not only that, the critical period differs. The Japanese government worked to shorten the period as much as possible and to neutralize the purge. The CIO was dealing with Napier of GS in regard to this problem, the question was not settled by the Yoshida Cabinet, and was handed over to the Katayama Cabinet. General Whitney sent a memorandum to Chief Cabinet Secretary Suehiro Nishio, in which he changed "all influential members within the period of 6 December 1941 to the termination of war" into "within the period 22 March 1942, when the Butokukai was brought under direct government control, to the end of the war." Furthermore, it stated that the critical period for officers on the prefectural level began with September 1942.

Thus, undergoing various changes, the details of the purge of Military Virtue Association were finally decided 25 July 1947. After an extensive investigation, GHQ decided to apply the purge to the officers who were active in the Association after its 1942 reorganization. As a result, many Home Ministry bureaucrats were affected. Prime Minister Katayama presented a petition to GHQ requesting some appropriate measures before effecting the purge of these "influential members," because otherwise several hundred indispensable Government officials would be purged. Government Section, which was favorably impressed with the Katayama Cabinet, permitted their gradual resignation. Those who were purged after the examination reached 1312.

The Case of Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi

Strong Opposition to Finance Policy. GHQ, especially the ESS, began to strongly disagree with the finance policy of Ishibashi of the Yoshida Cabinet. First was the matter of cancellation of war indemnities. This problem had begun to be mooted about during the Shidehara Cabinet and continued into the Yoshida Cabinet. However, this problem was not easily settled, because Finance Minister Ishibashi objected strongly to the method of cancellation of indemnities proposed by GHQ. His objection was not directed at the principle of the cancellation of war indemnities; he insisted that it would be bad for the Japanese economy if the banks and insurance companies were hit by having to take the losses. While wrangling over this issue, Major General Marquat, Chief of ESS, decided to return to the United States on leave because of his mother's illness or for some other reason. Presumably, he ordered his Deputy Chief, Colonel Ryder, to "settle this matter while I'm away."

However, Finance Minister Ishibashi did not agree to the ESS plan. Talks were continued after the plan had been polished repeatedly. Finally, Colonel Ryder reached the end of his endurance and thrust forward the last note. The Finance Minister refused it, saying, "If that's the case, please issue a directive. If a directive is issued, there is nothing I can do."

Major General Marquat returned from the United States to find the problem still unsettled. He became enraged and immediately asked for conference with Prime Minister Yoshida. At that time, he came to a Diet session and conveyed GHQ's desires to the Prime Minister, State Minister Shidehara, and Finance Minister Ishibashi in a strong tone.

The Prime Minister was perplexed. As a last resort, it was decided that the Prime Minister send a letter to General MacArthur. Finance Minister Ishibashi gave GHQ and Japanese government opinions and requested that it be settled once and for all in the presence of General MacArthur. The Prime Minister signed and submitted it; he received a reply several days later. Although there were changes on the minor points, the plan demanded by GHQ remained on the whole the same. This was a clear defeat.

Mr. Koichiro Asami (present Minister to Great Britain) who was Chief of the CLO General Affairs Division, warned the Finance Minister that GHQ's ill feeling toward him was very strong. When Major General Marquat met the Finance Minister, he personally whispered to him,

To tell the truth, I am having a difficult time because there is a rumor circulating in the General Headquarters that the Finance Minister is strongly opposing the Economic and Scientific Section. Therefore, please be careful.

The Finance Minister replied,

I am not disagreeing in any way. I am doing all I can for the success of the Occupation policy, because it is indispensable to Japan. If the Occupation ends in failure, you Americans can just return to the United States. However, the Japanese you leave will suffer. For instance, during the war, for the acts of the military leaders, the people suffered. Because it is the people who will suffer, we should be permitted to express our views and have all problems decided thoroughly.

The Section Chief agreed with him but again told him to be careful because rumors are annoying.

Soon afterwards, the problem of the budget for the Occupation Forces came up. As a result of the survey made by the Finance Ministry, it was made clear that the Occupation Forces' budget was being used very freely. Therefore, Finance Minister Ishibashi, after consultation with each ministry, requested the Occupation Forces through Mr. Mikishi Abe, Director-General of the Reconstruction Board, to modify their use of the budget, and the Japanese government would do the same thing. This became a big issue. GHQ called local commanders for a conference in Tokyo which continued for about a week. As a result of this conference, construction was restricted and second and first lieutenants were forbidden to authorize construction at their own discretion. However, there was no denying that the ill feeling toward the Finance Minister became stronger.

When the 1947 budget was approved, there was a mutual understanding that there would be no supplementary budget. In fact, it was rather a strong demand on the part of GHQ. Notwithstanding, the Finance Minister received information that there was an indication of a demand for increased war termination (i.e., demobilization) expenses from a certain GHQ section. He thought that it was outrageous. When he wrote to General Marquat on some other business, he called it to the general's attention by adding,

There is a rumor that GHQ will demand an increase in war termination expenses. I wish you would consider it because I shall not assume any responsibility should that happen.

This remark caused an uproar in ESS. Prime Minister Yoshida heard about it from GHQ and said to the Finance Minister, "I have heard that you spoke strongly in your letter to GHQ. That is very awkward."

As a result of these incidents, the feeling increased in GHQ that the Finance Minister was opposing GHQ policy. In GHQ there was strong criticism that he was "the big figure opposing the Occupation policy," and, naturally, the feeling increased that he should be removed in one way or the other. To the ESS complaint, GS seemed to consider that the scope of the press purge would be expanded, and perhaps it would be possible to remove Ishibashi for his responsibility for the Oriental Economic News.

The Public Information Media Purge was demanded by GHQ simultaneously with the expansion of the local and economic purges. However, its scope had not been decided. Shortly thereafter, GHQ demanded the press purge.

Close Study of the Oriental Economic News. The main reason for GHQ's opposition was Finance minister Ishibashi's disagreement with the GHQ economic policy. However, domestically, it was due to the movement of the Hatoyama Group to make Ishibashi the Vice-President of the Liberal party. GHQ heard that Karoku Tsuji, who was considered by GHQ a political wirepuller and who formed one ring of an underground organization, had called the executive members of the Liberal party and ordered them to support Ishibashi. GHQ feared that Ishibashi could become the central figure of the group opposing GHQ. To the Occupation authorities, this was most "undesirable." It may be said that the threat to Mr. Ishibashi's political life increased, as he grew in importance within the Party.

The Government had no plan, though it was ordered to establish the category of the Public Information Media Purge. Therefore, the Central Screening Committee decided to form a subcommittee to draw up a plan. Mr. Shikao Matsushima, Mr. Masuo Kato, and Mr. Tatsuo Iwabuchi from the Committee and Mr. Tsuyoshi Ota, Chief of the Executive Office (present Chief, Research Bureau, Bank of Japan), Dr. Hisanari Yamada, Chief of the CLO Political Division, and Mr. Mitsuo Tanaka, Deputy-Chief, began to confer. Then, GHQ asked the subcommittee what it thought of the Toyo Keizai Shimpō (Oriental Economic News). The committee members wondered as to the reason for such a sudden question.

What on earth does it mean? Does GHQ Headquarters want to find out what we think about establishing a Public Information Media Purge category? Or, does it want to purge the Toyo Keizai for political objectives?

However, because of the GHQ order both Mr. Kato and Mr. Tanaka began to investigate. Mr. Tanaka conducted an all-night investigation of the News and Mr. Kato of The Oriental Economist of the same affiliate, to determine whether there were articles in these publications which would fall under the purge directive. However, as they could not find such articles, they reported that there were no articles which fell under the category. Apparently, GHQ was very dissatisfied with the answer.

Consequently, GHQ ordered the CLO Political Division to conduct a further investigation. As a result of its investigation, the CLO found 38 articles which might fall under the category; on the other hand it found 36 articles which opposed the Government and the militarists. For example, there was an article which introduced Mein Kampf, by Hitler. To GHQ this was the best reason. However, the CLO insisted that:

At that time, Germany rose to power and her policy was led by Mein Kampf. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in introducing it. The over-all balance must be studied as to what direction the magazine intended to lead the public opinion as a whole, by giving the opposite view at the same time.

However, Colonel Kades did not agree. He said, "Never do that! Anyway, if a pistol is fired and injures the other party, the crime cannot be atoned."

The Japanese office objected, "If we proceeded in this manner, we would find many magazines with many bad articles because it was during the war. The Toyo Keizai can be considered among the better magazines."

However, GS remained adamant and issued investigation orders one after another. It seemed that GS was determined to find the News subject to the purge directive. Political Division Chief Yamada and others felt that GS intended to apply the purge directive to Mr. Ishibashi. Therefore, they reported this to Prime Minister Yoshida. At that time, however, the Prime Minister had received optimistic information.

Despite the threatening situation, the Finance Minister himself seemed nonchalant and used to laugh when he was warned by others. He had complete confidence, because he thought that in the event the News was subject to the purge, all newspapers and magazines throughout Japan would be purged and such an absurdity would never hap-

pen. Both Prime Minister Yoshida and Mr. Jiro Shirasu, who had worked on this problem, were also optimistic. When the Prime Minister and Mr. Shirasu happened to walk abreast with the Finance Minister in the corridor of the Diet, the Prime Minister said, "Please be relieved. That problem has been settled."

The Finance Minister looked puzzled because he had not given this problem any thought and had nothing to worry about.

In April 1947 before the election, Mr. Yasuto Shudo, who had been placed by the Finance Minister in charge of liaison with GHQ, met General MacArthur's aide, Colonel Bunker, with whom he was on intimate terms; he was warned: "The situation is very bad. It is very critical; Prime Minister Yoshida himself, and no one else, must see General MacArthur at once and take some action."

When the Finance Minister received this report, he was about to go on an election campaign tour. He therefore had no time to meet the Prime Minister. He instructed Mr. Shudo to meet and consult with the Prime Minister while he was away. When Mr. Shudo requested something be done, the Prime Minister replied, "As Prime Minister, I am the highest responsible person for the purge. I am more familiar with the situation than you. There is nothing to worry about."

About one week later, Colonel Bunker called on Mr. Shudo and instructed him to do what he had been told the other day, because the situation was very bad. Upon receiving this report, the Finance Minister immediately conveyed it to the Prime Minister. At that time, however, the Prime Minister was aware that the GHQ attitude toward the Finance Minister was too firm and that nothing could be done. Therefore, in order to be prepared for the resignation of Ishibashi, he began secretly to select the next Finance Minister. Though there were no open movements, GHQ preparations for the purge were progressing behind the scenes.

Mr. Yasuto Shudo said:

I was told that Finance Minister Ishibashi was in a precarious position. The only way to a fair decision was for Prime Minister Yoshida to meet General MacArthur and ask him to decide the matter by considering the arguments of both parties without waiting for the one-sided decision of GS. After getting the approval of Mr. Ishibashi, I then called on the Prime Minister and told him the facts. The Prime Minister denied it strongly. "If Mr. Ishibashi is purged because of the Toyo Keizai, responsible persons of any other magazine would also be purged. I just can't imagine the purge of Mr. Ishibashi. Don't worry about it." Therefore I was obliged to drop the matter. But I was not necessarily relieved by the talk with the Prime Minister.

Considerateness of the Prime Minister Is in Vain. The fact that the Subcommittee which began to establish the scope of the Public Information Media Purge, answered that the Oriental Economic News had no articles which fell under a purge category displeased GS. Government Section practically directed the dissolution of the Subcommittee which had such a person as Iwabuchi as a member. The Subcommittee withdrew from the case. Subsequently, Mr. Mitsuo Tanaka, Deputy-Chief of the CLO Political Division, drafted a plan in coordination with GHQ. Finally, a category was established with the News on the lowest line. The plan was to make Mr. Ishibashi the target of investigation by any means; for example, by establishing the category for magazines with a circulation of 10,000. In accordance with the Public Information Media Purge, GHQ directed the reexamination of officials attested personally by the Emperor by Constitution Day, 3 May.

It meant that even Cabinet members were not to be given special consideration. Thereupon, the Central Screening Committee commenced investigating the press purge in accordance with the GS directive. Committeemen Kazuo Okochi and Fukichii Unno took charge of the investigation for the News. Okochi reported, "There are only two questionable articles and that is all." The Committee decided unanimously on 2 May that Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi did not fall under the purge category. When this report was

made to GHQ, General Whitney threw the report back disapproved on 6 May. The Committee held another conference and refused,

If you want to disapprove it, purge him with the authority of GHQ, because that is the GHQ prerogative. We cannot purge any person who has no article which falls under the category and cannot assume responsibility for the purge.

On 8 May, when Finance Minister Ishibashi called on ESS Chief Marquat, he inquired,

Apparently there is someone who intends to purge me. I have heard that a statement of the reason for the purge of Ishibashi was issued from ESS. Is it true?

The Chief replied with an air of surprise:

If that were so, I should be the first person who should know about it. The question of the purge of the Finance Minister should be brought to me for consultation. At one time, the feeling within the Section toward you was very bad, but it has improved. However, the Economic and Scientific Section has a large staff and someone might have said it. I don't know about it. If so, I will investigate the matter.

The Finance Minister returned to the Finance Ministry. After a while, Financial Commissioner Takeshi Watanabe, who handled the Finance Ministry liaison with GHQ (present minister to the United States) rushed into the Minister's office, saying, "Minister, you finally got it!"

"What did I get?" asked the Minister.

He said, "The purge memorandum!"

"Is there any document?"

To this question, Watanabe replied, "No, but I will go and get it!" and dashed out.

In fact, that morning, General Whitney had suddenly called on Prime Minister Yoshida and had handed him a directive to purge Finance Minister Ishibashi. Very shortly, Financial Commissioner Watanabe returned with the purge memorandum. The Finance Minister read it. It read as follows:

As editor and president of the Oriental Economist he was responsible for the policies of that publication which supported military and economic imperialism in Asia, advocated Japan's adherence to the Axis, fostered belief in the inevitability of war with the Western Powers, justified the suppression of trade unions, and urged the imposition of totalitarian controls over the Japanese people.

The Finance Minister called on Prime Minister Yoshida immediately and said, "I finally got the purge memorandum."

The Prime Minister looked very astonished and said, "Really? How do you know it?"

The Finance Minister replied, "This is it. A copy of the purge memorandum."

The Prime Minister changed color and telephoned the official in charge of the Foreign Ministry and blasted, "Why did you issue it after all my orders?"

The other party apparently said that it did not issue the purge memorandum.

"You deny having issued it, but the Finance Minister has the memorandum. Don't make any more slips in the future."

In disgust he hung up the telephone with a bang. Upon hearing this, the Finance Minister was a bit surprised and asked, "What on earth do you intend to do by keeping a secret from me?"

Yoshida answered plainly, "The Cabinet will last only about one week. Therefore, I intended to keep it away from you during that time, because I hate to have you unhappy before then. I thought we would resign together."

As a matter of fact, it was after the general election and the Socialist party, which had become the major party, was about to form the Katayama Cabinet. Thus, the end of the Yoshida Cabinet was near.

Just Feel that You Were Bitten by a Mad Dog. Commenting on Prime Minister Yoshida's effort to keep the purge memorandum secret from Mr. Ishibashi until the resignation en bloc of the Cabinet, Mr. Ishibashi said,

That's funny. The position of the Finance Minister will end simultaneously with the Cabinet resignation. However, by the purge memorandum, I will become ineligible to be a Diet member and will be unable to return to the Toyo Keizai. This is very important to me, because all that I have done will be undone.

The Prime Minister looked understanding. Ishibashi continued:

I don't mind the purge. However, I cannot stand a purge based on grounds contrary to the facts. I believe it is also a dishonor to the Cabinet and for that reason I cannot remain quiet. As I will immediately write a refutation, please submit it to GHQ.

Upon returning home, he wrote the refutation and submitted it with the English translation to the Prime Minister. The next day, the Prime Minister telephoned him and said, "Let's see what more we can find out about that matter."

The CLO continued the negotiations as ordered by the Prime Minister. At that time, the category of the Public Information Media Purge had not been formally established. Therefore, the Prime Minister apparently had the CLO appeal on this basis. On the evening of 16 May, the Prime Minister sent Chief Cabinet Secretary Joji Hayashi and a Foreign Ministry liaison official to deliver a message to the official residence of the Finance Minister. They said,

The Prime Minister negotiated in various ways with GHQ, however, all was in vain. Since nothing can be done, the purge will be announced tomorrow. The Prime Minister requests that his position be understood.

Mr. Ishibashi said:

The decision for the purge is the prerogative of the Prime Minister. Do what you please. However, I cannot acknowledge it.

Mr. Ishibashi refused to acknowledge it, despite the following explanation of the inside facts,

The Foreign Ministry official in charge had told the Prime Minister that the GHQ stand had stiffened and had even said, "We will send him to Sugamo." Upon learning this, the Prime Minister was at a loss and finally gave up.

Early next morning, Mr. Ishibashi received a telephone call from the Prime Minister to a meeting; he called on the Prime Minister at the official residence of the Foreign Minister. There was a commotion, because of the information that Mr. Tetsu Katayama would call on the Prime Minister to form a cabinet. Giving a cold as an excuse, the Prime Minister did not see Mr. Katayama.

When the Finance Minister called the Prime Minister, he actually looked as if he had a cold. He came out in kimono, looking pale. He repeated the words of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi. Mr. Ishibashi said, "I refuse to acknowledge it. First of all, it is a disgrace to the Cabinet. If you want to do it, it's up to you."

"Just feel that you were bitten by a mad dog," replied the Prime Minister. Mr. Ishibashi left, saying, "That may be right."

The Prime Minister returned immediately to his residence at Oiso.

Consequently, the purge of Mr. Ishibashi was announced by the Cabinet on 17 May. The purge of Commerce and Industry Minister Mitsujiro Ishii and Minister of Justice Tokutaro Kimura was announced on the same day by the Central Screening Committee. Mr. Ishibashi's purge was announced by the Cabinet, because the Committee had decided that he did not fall under the category.

Mr. Tatsuo Iwabuchi said:

The purge of Mr. Ishibashi was announced in the newspapers on 18 May. I went to the Committee at once and said, "What nonsense for the Prime Minister to purge Mr. Ishibashi at his own discretion without consulting the Committee. The principle is that the Prime Minister shall take action in accordance with the investigation of the Committee. Call the Prime Minister!"

The Cabinet said, "The Prime Minister will not come."

I said, "Then, call Tokujiro Kanamori, the competent minister (present Head of the Diet Library)." But the Minister, who had been in another room, just disappeared.

The Chairman of the Committee asked whether Chief Cabinet Secretary would do and called Hayashi. I said to Hayashi, "How can you account for the action of the Prime Minister who approved it, ignoring the intention of the Committee? Will you mind if we make an official statement that the Committee decided that Ishibashi does not fall under the category on the basis of these reasons?"

Hayashi replied, "Even if I say that you must not, you probably will not listen to me."

I said, "That is not the point. Anyway, give the Prime Minister notice. I will make a public announcement."

Hayashi could give no answer. After that, Ishibashi made an official inquiry to the Committee:

"I cannot understand the grounds for my purge. I want to know the results of the investigation."

Therefore the Central Screening Committee issued the following official document: The Committee has decided that Ishibashi does not fall under the category. However, it is in no way responsible for the subsequent disposition.

On 19 May, Mr. Ishibashi submitted an inquiry to the Central Screening Committee and Prime Minister Yoshida stating that he could not understand the grounds for his purge as announced by the Cabinet and that he could not even appeal by producing counter evidence. The Central Screening Committee answered him with what Mr. Iwabuchi said, but the Prime Minister did not answer.

"Memorandum" from General Headquarters.

Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi said:

Shortly after being purged, I received the memorandum issued by GHQ. Apparently it was released at the Press Club for the foreign correspondents. It is a GHQ memorandum giving the reason for the purge of Ishibashi. It was dated 1 May 1947, signed by Analyst Wiggins, by Maj Napier, Chief of Public Service Qualification Division for approval, and by GS Chief Whitney for enforcement. It was an absurd memorandum. The articles mentioned were not necessarily all written by me. For one reason or the other, translations were wrong. Because of such absurdity, I wrote a refutation of each article, and had them printed. Subsequently, on 27 October 1947, I released it to the Japanese press in the morning and to the foreign correspondents in Tokyo in the afternoon. Using the GHQ memorandum, the foreign correspondents asked me various questions. Someone asked, "Who do you think is responsible for this?"

I replied, "Probably Whitney because he signed it."

"How about MacArthur?"

"He probably is responsible as Whitney's superior."

This press interview did not put me in a favorable position. I was even charged with defying MacArthur. However, some discussions were raised in foreign countries. From what I have heard, when there was a rumor that GHQ would arrest me, Colonel Bunker denied such nonsense. I thought that if I did get arrested, I would be put on trial. The Japanese newspapers could not be depended upon, because they could not report the facts. Because I was purged without being given a chance to clear myself, I felt that if I were arrested, I would be given the opportunity to explain. However, I was not arrested. I was told that Colonel Bunker gave up, saying, "Ishibashi has no chance now to be de-purged."

As I look back, I do not believe that Yoshida and Shirasu purged me. All I can say is that they did not work too enthusiastically to check my purge. It is

possible that they had given up from the first, thinking that all would be in vain. The reason for this point of view is as follows:

Sometime later, an influential American magazine, Fortune, had an article strongly criticizing MacArthur's policy. MacArthur wrote a reply to this criticism, in which he criticized me severely as an inflationist. I had nothing to do with this article in Fortune, but it is possible that I was suspected of having suggested the writing of it.

The man who is responsible for the comment was Rood, a noncareer military man who worked under Colonel Kramer, Chief of ESS before Marquat. He used to visit the Toyo Keizai, so I knew him very well. From such a standpoint, I could be suspected. "He had contacts with Ishibashi from before and the material came from the Toyo Keizai." MacArthur also wrote in his letter, "The influential magazine is not necessarily correct. The reason is that its former president fostered inflation when the first Yoshida Cabinet was trying to prevent it."

Therefore, I believe that the bad feeling toward me existed before the purge and continued for a long time. He said that my policy was resistance to the GHQ financial and economic policy. It might be so.

The contact with ESS Chief Kramer was made because he read The Oriental Economist. On 30 September, immediately after Japan was occupied, I was called in by Colonel Kramer. I wondered why I was called. He said, "When I begin the reform of the Japanese economy, please help me."

I replied, "I will help you, but research data, etc. are not in Tokyo. They have been moved to Yamanashi and Fukushima."

He said, "We will furnish you motor transportation."

I replied, "Don't do that. If we get them now, I have no place to put them."

He proposed, "I will issue an order to requisition a nearby building."

I said, "Don't do that. I will build one. However, I need some help because of certain difficulties."

He said, "All right," called in someone, and dictated, while pacing the floor, a directive to the CLO to construct a building for The Oriental Economist.

For a long time after that, the News submitted reports to GHQ every week. At first, GHQ brought various problems, including the dissolution of the zaibatsu. Moreover, the News submitted opinions and made investigations. Thus, at the beginning I was on good terms with ESS.

After I was purged, Hiroshi Chiba, my son-in-law, (present Charge d'Affairs at interim to Mexico) happened to sit with Napier at a friend's home. I heard that when the friend introduced him as Ishibashi's son-in-law, Napier said, "Are you? He must feel offended. At that time, we had to purge Ishibashi. As he was about to become a kind of symbol, we took drastic action."

Could it be called a typical political purge? Anyway, it was somewhat of an honor that the lowest level of the purge category was established at the News. However, because of it, many persons were affected. I think, however, the purge was good for me. It was the case of an amateur who suddenly entered a political career and was assigned to an important position, not a petty one, owing to some chance. Therefore, I cannot imagine what would have happened if everything had gone well and I had become the Vice-President of the Liberal party. What happened to Mr. Ashida and Mr. Nishio could have happened to me. I appreciate the fact that I was not subjected to some dishonorable experience.

After Mr. Ishibashi released the refutation to the foreign correspondents, these newsmen went to GS Chief Whitney for his opinion. He did not permit them to interview him, only grinned. He knew well that it was disadvantageous to cope with them. He only said, "Ishibashi predicted the war with the United States and Great Britain 15 months before the attack on the Pearl Harbor. That is sufficient for his purge."

Purge of Mr. Rikizo Hirano

Wavering Katayama Cabinet Stiffens Attitude of General Headquarters. On 25 October 1947, several months after the formation of the Socialist Katayama Cabinet, Colonel Kades (Government Section), came to the Prime Minister's official residence

to see the Prime Minister. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sone served as interpreter. He said:

I came here today under General Whitney's orders. We have doubted from the beginning whether Agriculture and Forestry Minister Rikizo Hirano (present Right-wing Socialist Diet member) is qualified for public office. However, we took no action because he was said to be indispensable to the formation of the Katayama Cabinet and a valuable help to Prime Minister Katayama. But, just look at his subsequent actions! Can the Prime Minister overlook them? His eligibility to hold public office must be re-examined by the Central Screening Committee immediately.

It was, so to speak, a verbal order. During this conversation, the Chief Cabinet Secretary entered the room. After Colonel Kades left, the three discussed the matter. It was immediately before Agriculture and Forestry Minister Hirano's trip to Niigata. So, they decided to have Attorney General Yoshio Suzuki (right-wing Socialist Diet member) advise him to resign. On 27 October, Prime Minister Katayama called Attorney General Suzuki and informed him of Colonel Kades' notice.

He said repeatedly, "That's too bad!"

He persuaded the Attorney General to urge Mr. Hirano to resign, but requested that the GHQ notice be kept away from him.

It is true that, when forming the Katayama Cabinet, the eligibility of Mr. Hirano to hold public office was brought up. There was the same doubt in the April general election. It seemed that GHQ had accepted a tip probably sent in by the Communist party. When forming the Katayama Cabinet, it was requested that the Cabinet members be carefully investigated. In view, however, of the balance within the Socialist party, there was no alternative but to appoint Mr. Hirano a Cabinet member. When Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio presented the list of Cabinet Ministers to GHQ, Colonel Kades said, "Mr. Hirano cannot be appointed because of his doubtful eligibility."

The Chief Cabinet Secretary rushed back to the official residence and talked with the Prime Minister and Mr. Hirano. Mr. Hirano said, "I request that the Prime Minister ask General MacArthur once more. I will tackle this problem from another angle."

The Prime Minister sent General MacArthur a long letter to the effect that, "If Mr. Hirano is disapproved, the formation of a Cabinet will become difficult. Even if a Cabinet is formed, it will take considerable time. Therefore, I request your special consideration."

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio went to GS with this letter, explained the situation, and asked for approval. Colonel Kades replied, "I will think it over."

On the other hand, Mr. Hirano worked on Major General Willoughby, G2, through Mr. Jiro Shirasu. He insisted that there was something suspicious about the purge of farmers' movement leaders who were oppressed during the war. Thus, another petition was submitted to General MacArthur through this channel. As a result, GS which had indirectly assisted in the formation of and favored the Katayama Cabinet, passed over the eligibility of Mr. Hirano on condition that he help Prime Minister Katayama.

Colonel Kades brought up the matter of Mr. Hirano's eligibility because he had not helped the Prime Minister but was actually a liability. A day before Colonel Kades called on the Prime Minister, Major Napier in charge of the purge in GS called at the Central Screening Committee and said to its members and Executive Office Chief Ota, "All persons and even Cabinet Ministers should be equal before the law. I ask that the Committee screen strictly according to its objective and fair judgment without submitting to authority."

Government Section had secretly collected information and had come fully prepared.

Despite its brilliant start, the Katayama Cabinet became very unstable as a result of the split between the right and left wings. There were internal dissensions in regard to its policies toward the official price of rice, state control of coal mines, the supplementary budget, etc. To make the matter worse, there was the intensification of

the difference in opinion between GS and G-2 within GHQ. The Hirano case came up with such Occupation and domestic political situations in the background.

Mr. Hirano held the key to delicate problems in the Socialist party. He is a die-hard anti-Communist. He established the All-Japan Farmers' Union by severing connections with the Communist members of the Japan Farmers' Union. He wielded latent power within the party. In Party policies, he was openly and strongly opposed to the Party left-wingers. In regard to the official price of rice, he continued heated arguments with Director of the Economic Stabilization Board, Hiroo Wada, at the Cabinet meetings. He opposed the so-called Nishio-Wada Line which supposedly held the leadership of the Katayama Cabinet. He was so influential that a rumor about the New Hirano Party was frequently circulated.

Furthermore, it was a fact that he had closer connections with the Liberal party than any other member of his Party. When the Yoshida Cabinet attempted to form a patriotic front opposing the popular front by winning over the Socialist party, he was the most enthusiastic Party member.

The first Yoshida Cabinet faced the Communist-led labor offensive from its formation. Mr. Kyuichi Tokuda led the sit-down tactics in front of the Prime Minister's official residence. Subsequently, there were successive demonstrations and rallies. The Japanese Communist Party did everything to intensify the struggle. At this moment there was a serious food crisis, culminating in the organization of rice-demand demonstrations on the part of the masses. Both the rice demonstration and labor offensive threatened the Yoshida Cabinet. To save the political situation, the Yoshida Cabinet thought of winning over the Socialist party. The object was to form a patriotic front consisting of the three parties (Liberal, Progressive, and Socialist) in opposition to the popular front. On 4 August 1946, after the labor offensive had hit its climax with the May Day and May Day food demand demonstrations, Prime Minister Yoshida and Secretary Atsuyasu Fukuda secretly met Suehiro Nishio and Rikiza Hirano, Socialist party leaders. The Chiyoda Club Building, standing alone in the ruins of Nagatacho, was selected as the meeting place in order to maintain the secrecy of their meeting. The object was to obtain the cooperation of the Socialist party in regard to food and other important problems, independent of any party stand. In this meeting, however, the Prime Minister did not mention anything about coalition. The meeting was just a chat. In November, the second meeting was held at the same place. Nishio, Hirano, and Fukuda met there at the appointed time. However, the Prime Minister did not come. They were uneasy; the Prime Minister arrived about thirty minutes late. To slip away from the reporters, he got out of his car at Hikawa Shrine and walked. Donning Japanese clothes and cape, he was in a complete sweat. In this second meeting, as in the first meeting, he just rambled and made no mention of a coalition at all. Mr. Nishio felt, "He is a man to beat."

There were successive strikes. In September, there were general industrial strikes of the Teikoku Petroleum Company Workers' Union, the All-Japan Seamen's Union, and the National Railway Workers' Union. In October, there were strikes of the Press, Correspondents and Radio Workers' Union, the Japan Electric Industry Workers' Union, etc. With the political slogan, "Overthrow the Yoshida Cabinet," all labor offensives were concentrated on the year-end struggles. Prime Minister Yoshida began to feel more and more that there was no alternative but to win over the Socialist party in order to weather the labor offensive.

In late December, the Prime Minister proposed another meeting with Nishio and Hirano. It was a cold night. When they met at the same place, the Prime Minister finally revealed his real intention. He asked the Socialist party to join his Cabinet. He was ready to offer them three Cabinet positions (Commerce and Industry, Labor, and Construction). He intended to create the Labor Ministry and the Construction Ministry.

Mr. Nishio said, "The labor policy of the Yoshida Cabinet is no easy task. We do not oppose a coalition with the Socialist party, because it will help the Yoshida Cabinet

along this line. In view, however, of the internal situation of the Socialist party, the Yoshida Cabinet should first resign en bloc and then make a formal offer for a coalition. Of course, we are willing to enter into preliminary negotiations and arrangements. However, we find it difficult to form a coalition unless the Cabinet resigns en bloc."

The Prime Minister had no such intention. Thus, the negotiations failed.

On 8 January 1947, the four met at the same place. The Prime Minister showed a disposition to resign en bloc if he reached an agreement with the Socialist party. Mr. Nishio agreed on condition "that, if possible, the present Cabinet Ministers will not remain, particularly Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi; that the Socialist party demand the posts of the Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board, of the Ministers of Labor, Agriculture and Forestry, and Commerce and Industry; and of two State Ministers; and that the Cooperative Democrat party and the People's Cooperative party each get one State Minister in the Cabinet."

About six months had elapsed since the first meeting of the four. This secret conference was held unnoticed and had reached this point after much difficulty. It was the result of absolute secrecy at the request of the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Prime Minister secretly informed Mr. Mosaburo Suzuki, leader of the leftist faction of the Socialist party, through Agriculture and Forestry Minister Hiroo Wada. Mr. Nishio and others were displeased with this action of the Prime Minister.

Preparations for the coalition were made by Mr. Hirano and Mr. Fukuda. They reached the final agreement to save the face of both parties by revising to a certain extent the financial policy of Ishibashi and to designate Socialist party members in the next cabinet. Hereupon, they sounded out GHQ through General Willoughby. Mr. Tetsu Katayama and Mr. Komakichi Matsuoka were approved, but the two main figures, Mr. Nishio and Mr. Hirano, were disapproved. This was bad news to the coalition move. Without Nishio and Hirano taking the lead in the coalition, the next cabinet would have been unstable.

It was the practice of the Japanese government to consult GS in regard to such political problems. There was, however, a wide difference between GS and the Yoshida Cabinet in all important political problems, including the purge. About this time, therefore, they had turned their backs on each other. That is why they sounded out GHQ through General Willoughby; G-2 was more favorably disposed toward the Yoshida Cabinet. G-2 and GS within GHQ were hostile to each other.

On 15 January, Mr. Nishio and Mr. Hirano met the Prime Minister at the Foreign Minister's official residence. Secretary Fukuda met with them. The Prime Minister replied that Finance Minister Ishibashi would remain and that the Socialist party would have three portfolios—of Commerce and Industry, Labor and Construction, and one state Minister—and that the Cooperative party would be refused. He said, "We are faced with a difficult situation. When I went to GHQ to obtain an informal approval of the next Cabinet, I was told, 'It is awkward for us to do so in opposition to Soviet Delegate Derevyanko who said at the Allied Council for Japan that Nishio, Hirano, and others should be purged. How about waiting a little while?'"

Mr. Nishio had already disagreed with the conditions offered by the Prime Minister. Upon hearing this statement, he said unpleasantly, "In that case, it is out of the question."

Mr. Fukuda interrupted, "Why not push the coalition? If the Prime Minister appeals directly to General MacArthur, I think everything will turn out favorably."

The Prime Minister said, "I am sorry for my improper handling. Mr. Nishio, why don't you see General MacArthur yourself? I will give you a letter of introduction. The General who has examined you for the past two or three months says that you are a key man."

Nishio said bluntly, "I may have a chance to see him, but I do not want to see him on this question." A disagreeable atmosphere developed. When Mr. Hirano stood up to leave, Mr. Fukuda followed him and persuaded him to work for a coalition. Then

Mr. Hirano talked with Mr. Nishio in another room. Mr. Hirano explained to him, "At any rate, let us push the talk. The question of eligibility will be settled through the coalition. Therefore, every effort should be exerted to form a coalition."

However, Mr. Nishio had lost all enthusiasm. He said, "Under such terms, we find it difficult to obtain the approval of the Party. The main object is not the formation of a coalition, but its smooth working. In such a situation, I've lost confidence."

Mr. Hirano agreed reluctantly. Upon returning to the former room, Nishio said, "Let us drop the matter because we cannot agree on the terms and also it is not wise to press the eligibility issue too far."

Mr. Fukuda, however, continued the coalition talks through Mr. Hirano. Mr. Hirano thought that, even if Finance Minister Ishibashi remained, a final agreement would be reached by revising his financial policy. He discussed the matter with Chairman Katayama. Apparently the Chairman also placed hopes on Mr. Hirano's negotiation. Chief Cabinet Secretary Joji Hayashi called at the Chairman's residence at Yanaka on a snowy day. Thus the talks progressed toward the Big Three Conference of Party leaders Yoshida, Katayama, and Shidehara. To get Mr. Hirano into the next cabinet, efforts were made to obtain the GHQ approval through the Prime Minister. Mr. Nishio was aware of the talks, but assumed an indifferent attitude. He felt that as Secretary-General he should conduct such talks; therefore, any talks without consulting him would end in failure because it was not the standard procedure.

At the Big Three Conference held 29 January, the Prime Minister made a final appeal to the Socialist party for coalition. His alignment of the cabinet ministers was as follows:

Liberal party—Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister, Home Minister, Finance Minister, and Transportation Minister.

Progressive party—Communications Minister, Welfare Minister, and two State Ministers.

Socialist party—Labor Minister, Construction Minister, Commerce and Industry Minister, and one State Minister.

Independent—Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board, Agriculture and Forestry Minister, Justice Minister, and Education Minister.

Needless to say, Yoshida's conditions were that Finance Minister Ishibashi would remain and that no minor parties would have members in the Cabinet.

Chairman Katayama said, "I cannot give an immediate answer."

The Prime Minister and his men thought that Mr. Katayama would give immediate approval at the final conference because he had given approval at previous informal talks. They were surprised at his unexpected reply. Mr. Katayama left the conference, saying, "I have to consult the party members."

The Socialist party held a Central Executive Committee meeting that night and decided to refuse. Thus, the talks failed. Soon after receiving the formal reply from the Socialist party, the Prime Minister received a message from General Willoughby that Hirano was eligible as a cabinet member. However, it was too late.

(Finance Minister Ishibashi immediately resumed the coalition talks. Despite completed arrangements, the talks ended in failure because the Prime Minister did not approve.)

It is a matter of record that the Socialist party felt Mr. Hirano had drawn too close to Prime Minister Yoshida through the coalition talks. This added one element to the background of the purge of Hirano.

GHQ Orders Reexamination. During the Katayama tenure, Liberal party President Yoshida proposed a new conservative party. He was thinking of winning over, if possible, the Hirano faction. For example, he stated at Wakayama on 21 October, "The idea of a new conservative party will be based on anti-Communism and a laissez-faire policy. The policy of Agriculture Minister Hirano is very similar to ours... There will be a change of government about late November."

This statement spurred the Katayama Cabinet and the Socialist party. On the other hand, Mr. Hirano's speech was, in a sense, in conflict with Cabinet policy. For instance, he said at Nara on 11 October,

At this time, when we are faced with many vital problems, I think it most democratic to solve them by replacing the present government with the new government through an election. At present, the Cabinet's internal dissension gives the people a gloomy impression. To be rid of this, another election should be held.

It was natural that any speech or action which affected the Katayama Cabinet attracted the attention of GS. To make matters worse, GS found out through its information net that Mr. Hirano had approached, through Mr. Jiro Shirasu, G-2, which was at odds with GS and frequently met Colonel Tait, a subordinate of General Willoughby's. This infuriated GS and placed Mr. Hirano in a very precarious position.

Mr. Eki Sone said:

When the question of state control of coal mines brought instability to the Katayama Cabinet, Mr. Hirano remarked nonchalantly that the Katayama Cabinet would be overthrown by the question of state control of coal mines, and that it would be replaced by a Liberal party Cabinet. With Mr. Shirasu, he frequented G-2, which was at odds with GS. Government Section was well aware of such matters. According to Colonel Kades, Mr. Hirano's status was temporarily shelved, because, although his qualification was deemed doubtful at the time of the formation of the Katayama Cabinet, the Prime Minister had sent a letter to the effect that formation of the Cabinet would be difficult without Hirano. However, no final decision had been made on his eligibility. Is it not true that his actions are completely against the Katayama Cabinet? What does the Japanese government intend to do about it? The Central Screening Committee should reexamine his eligibility now that it has been reorganized with nongovernmental members.

He interpreted these words of Colonel Kades as an indirect warning to the Japanese government.

I informed Prime Minister Katayama and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio, but everyone shunned such a troublesome problem. For that reason, Colonel Kades could stand it no longer and rushed to the Prime Minister's official residence. On behalf of General Whitney, he verbally demanded the re-examination of Hirano's eligibility, though he did not directly give instructions for the disqualification by the Central Screening Committee nor dismissal of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister.

When requested by Prime Minister Katayama to urge the Agriculture and Forestry Minister to resign, Attorney General Suzuki did not take it as a pleasant duty. However, he asked Hirano to meet him at the Prime Minister's official residence in the morning, two days later. The Agriculture and Forestry Minister was to leave on an inspection tour of Niigata to ask the farmers to make rice deliveries because the problem of the official price of rice had been settled. The Attorney General broke the news to him, "Mr. Hirano, I urge you to resign the post of Agriculture and Forestry Minister because you are subject to the purge. If you resign, the question of ineligibility will be settled quietly."

The Agriculture and Forestry Minister was astounded and refused to consider it, saying, "There is something suspicious. It seems strange that I'll be purged if I remain as Agriculture and Forestry Minister and that, if I resign, I will be saved from the purge. If I am to be purged, I will be purged regardless of whether I am a Cabinet Minister or not. I will not resign for such a reason."

He went directly to see Prime Minister Katayama and asked, "I have just been informed of the matter by Mr. Suzuki. Has GHQ ordered my purge?"

For some unknown reason, the Prime Minister said "No," covering up the facts. That night, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister left for Niigata, leaving word that he had gone to request rice deliveries. At the press conference on the very same

night, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio was pressed by some reporters for a statement about the purge of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister. At first he evaded the question. However, he finally let out the secret by stating, "There is evidence to the extent that where there is smoke, there is fire."

Newspapers played up the purge of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister. On the night of 30 October, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone from his hotel at Niigata and asked, "Has there been any order from GHQ?"

The Prime Minister still said, "No". Thereupon, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister said that he would return to Tokyo on 4 November according to schedule. However, the Prime Minister said, "Please return to Tokyo as soon as possible."

At that time, the Prime Minister was determined to persuade the Agriculture and Forestry Minister to resign his post and to dismiss him should he refuse to do so. On the following day, the Prime Minister asked the Agriculture and Forestry Minister to return immediately to Tokyo.

The Agriculture and Forestry Minister felt that this was "Nishio's doing." In a fighting mood, he took the train from Nagaoka late at night.

Government Dismisses Hirano. Upon returning to Tokyo, Mr. Hirano became aware that he was in a tight corner. He felt he had no choice but to fight. He was determined to fight resignation to the end. On the night of 3 November, he met Prime Minister Katayama for the first time since returning to Tokyo. The Prime Minister was slow in making decisions. Once made, however, he was stubborn. Upon meeting the Agriculture and Forestry Minister, he asked him to resign immediately. In his reply to "Why?" the Prime Minister answered, "Because of Cabinet dissension."

Mr. Hirano retaliated, "If it's Cabinet dissension, Mr. Nishio and Mr. Wada are equally to blame."

The Prime Minister changed his expression and said, "Because you are uncooperative."

The Agriculture and Forestry Minister said indignantly, "You should know how I have cooperated with the Socialist party since its formation. As to my work as Agriculture and Forestry Minister, ask my officials." He said emphatically, "I shall not resign."

The Prime Minister said, "Then I shall dismiss you in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

The Agriculture and Forestry Minister left, saying, "Do as you please!"

When he went downstairs, he was surrounded by reporters. At the same time, the dismissal of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister was announced upstairs.

This was not all for him. There was the purge awaiting him. The GS definitely ordered the Government to re-examine his eligibility. In June 1947, not long after the formation of the Katayama Cabinet, a charge was made by a certain Mr. Kazumitsu Nagano of Aichi-ken that Mr. Hirano had made an omission in the purge questionnaire. Mr. Hirano had failed to mention the fact that he was a leading figure of the Imperial Way Society and the editor and publisher of its official organ Kodo. Several copies were submitted as evidence.

Mr. Yoshio Suzuki said:

According to the Criminal Affairs Bureau Chief, it was the practice to submit such a case not only to the court but also to GHQ. There was fear that the Opposition would get onto it. Therefore I talked to Mr. Hirano and told him that I had to conduct a re-examination. About October, the purge questionnaire of the Agriculture and Forestry Minister submitted for the election was being questioned because he had omitted the All-Japan Federation of Farmers' Unions and the National Socialistic Science League. Thus, his indictment could no longer be avoided. Previous to this, during the Public Information Media Purge, more than ten kinds of periodicals, including the Kokusui and Kodo, had not yet completed the final examination. The final decision was still pending. I ordered more evidence to be gathered because I thought that one or two copies of the Kodo would not produce sufficient evidence, but, actually, these copies were

enough to decide his future fate. Finally, the question of his eligibility was referred to the Central Screening Committee.

In early December, Kodo fell within the category of the purge. It naturally followed that the eligibility of Mr. Hirano would be examined on the ground that he had been its editor and publisher. The Central Screening Committee at that time consisted of the following nine members: Chairman Eiichi Makino, Tatsuo Iwabuchi, Yosusaburo Hara, Masuo Kato, Kazuo Okochi, Tadaichiro Tanimura, Tomonori Shirogane, Torazo Kumamoto, and Fukichi Unno. Hirano was eligible by a vote of seven to two. Mr. Unno and Mr. Kumamoto, affiliated with the Socialist party, voted him ineligible.

The decision surprised the Government. This was immediately reported to GS. Colonel Kades was offended by the report and called in Chairman Makino to demand re-examination.

Mr. Rikizo Hirano said:

The Central Screening Committee asked about my relations with the National Socialist party and the National Socialistic Science League. In view of the fact that neither had fallen within the provisions of Categories C and G, I was confident that I would not be purged on this point. Committee Member Yosusaburo Hara kindly conducted the research of the National Socialist party by referring to old books at the Waseda University Library. Since it was difficult to find grounds for my purge, Colonel Kades told each committeeman that I should fall under the category of the purge directive. As a result, Committeeman Iwabuchi advised Colonel Kades, "If GHQ says such a thing, the purge notices already issued will become null. I believe it is better to entrust Hirano's purge issue to the Committee."

Colonel Kades had to follow his advice. However, this information surprised the Japanese government. The Central Screening Committee seemed unwilling to purge him. The Government appealed to GHQ that the Katayama Cabinet would fall unless Hirano was purged. Therefore, Major Napier, in charge of the purge, demanded of Chairman Makino in the presence of Colonel Kades the purge of Hirano regardless of the grounds. As a result, Chairman Makino seemed to have realized the situation and changed his mind. However, it was necessary to control a majority of the committeemen to purge me. The result of the former vote was seven to two. In order to split the committeemen, the Chairman explained to Committeeman Shirogane the dire situation and won him over. He needed one more vote and chose Committeeman Okochi.

Chairman Makino, accompanied by Shirogane, visited Kazuo Okochi on the evening of 12 January. He told him that all the members except Iwabuchi had given consent to Hirano's purge and requested him to vote likewise. Okochi thought it was useless to insist upon Hirano's eligibility after everybody had already given consent and promised to vote for Hirano's ineligibility. On the following day, the last review committee was held. Chairman Makino read the statement of the reason for my purge written by himself. After that it was proposed to decide the case by vote. The "o" mark was used for eligible and "x" mark for ineligible. The result of the vote was five to four and I was decided ineligible only by one vote. The decision on 26 December was completely overturned. The committeemen, who had maintained my eligibility, were dumbfounded. After investigating who had become turncoats, Mr. Makino and Mr. Shirogane were definite and it was revealed that Committeeman Okochi looked suspicious.

Therefore, my wife (Shigeko) asked Mr. Okochi. He answered that he wrote "o". The voting cards were examined but the "o" presumed to have been made by Mr. Okochi could not be found. My wife visited Okochi again and pressed him, "You have done a terrible thing. The political career of Hirano has received a fatal blow!"

Finally Mr. Okochi told her that he had been fooled by Chairman Makino and explained the circumstances. Thus, he wrote a note for me which later became an issue.

Committeeman Okochi's note was generally as follows: "15 January: At the final voting in regard to Mr. Rikizo Hirano's qualification which was

held 13 January, I voted in favor of his purge. This action of mine was based upon the following reasons:

"At the committee meeting held before the balloting, I pointed out to Chairman Makino that the Central Screening Committee had no other alternative than: first, to reaffirm the 7-2 vote against his purge drawn at the committee meeting on 26 December, and second, to vote unanimously in favor of his purge.

"If some other decision were made, there would be talk that the committee was influenced by political maneuvers. I thought the chairman and all the committeemen agreed with my view. Later, when I met the chairman in private, he hinted that Mr. Hirano would fall under the purge category and that there was nothing he could do about it. Then I repeated what I said at the meeting, and indicated that if all the other members (including Mr. Iwabuchi) who had been opposing his purge, supported the chairman's stand, and decided, from a general standpoint, that this borderline case warranted purge action, I could do nothing but to follow suit. Moreover, I told him that if such were the case, he should strive to align the committeemen. One day before the voting, on 12 January, the Chairman and Committeeman Shirogane called on me at my home and informed me that they had obtained the consent of all other committeemen. Consequently, I attended the meeting on the following day, believing that the result would be eight votes in favor of his purge to one (Mr. Iwabuchi) against this action. However, when the votes were opened, the result was quite different from what I had expected because the purge action was decided with a count of five to four. I was surprised to find that the committeemen were not aligned for the balloting. Thus, I can say that I had drawn an erroneous conclusion and had voted with that mistaken conception. If I had known that all the committeemen (except Mr. Iwabuchi) would not vote in favor of his purge, I wanted the committee to act in accordance with the tentative decision reached at the meeting held 26 December. That is what I had clearly stated at the committee meeting and I am sure all other committeemen know about this matter.

/s/ Kazuo Okochi (Seal)"

It is only natural that this note became an issue. Consequently, it was even argued that the Central Screening Committee should take another vote. However, Chairman Makino did not comply, saying, "What has been decided cannot after reconsideration be revised."

Therefore I was determined to fight it out and took legal action for a temporary injunction at the 14th Civil Section of the Tokyo District Court. The legal action was as follows:

"I have fallen under the purge by one vote of Committeeman Okochi. However, if he had voted according to his conviction, I would not have fallen under the purge. Consequently, deception is involved in the decision. Therefore, I plan to take legal action to charge that the purge decision is void. In the event that twenty days elapse from 18 January before the legal action, the purge will come into force. I, therefore, wish to have my eligibility as a member of the House of Representatives insured until the purge issue has been decided by the court."

This issue came before Chief Judge Niimura. Consequently, in February the court issued a temporary injunction. That night, the temporary injunction was delivered to Prime Minister Katayama by a bailiff. The Government was very much surprised.

On the following day, I went to the Diet in triumph. Speaker of the House Matsuoka asked me to leave. Secretary General Oike did not say anything to me about my presence at the Diet and only said, "There should be nothing wrong if there has been a temporary injunction."

Mr. Kazuo Okochi said:

I do not know how the count seven to two was derived. As I recall, there was no clear voting in the Central Screening Committee on 26 December. Apparently, it was supposed that the vote was generally divided seven to two, according to the opinion of each committeeman. This is only my imagination, but it is possible that Chairman Makino had gone to GHQ to obtain its opinion in regard to the vote result. At that time, there were available many data in GHQ which had been collected by the Second Section in charge of Right-wing of the

Special High Police of the Metropolitan Police Board. I suppose that Chairman Makino changed his mind when he was shown data concerning Mr. Hirano which we had never seen. I was of the opinion that, from the nature of the Central Screening Committee, the purge, regardless of the person, should never be decided by one or two votes. I thought that, if possible, unanimity would be desirable, and so, I often told Chairman Makino. It was also desirable in the case of Mr. Hirano. However, the result of the voting of the Central Screening Committee on 13 January of the following year was not like that. I felt that this was a mess. The Chairman also strove to obtain the unanimous opinion of the committeemen, but in vain.

Then, Mrs. Hirano called on me and said suddenly, "I suppose that this was the result of the intrigue of Nishio. Will you please write what you were asked to do by Nishio."

Needless to say, I had never been asked anything by Mr. Nishio. However, Mr. Hirano was positive that this was Nishio's intrigue. Being stumped, I wrote a note with a pencil and handed it to her, saying, "Please show it only to your husband."

This was the note in question. This all happened because I had sympathized with Mr. Hirano.

The Katayama Cabinet, which was confused upon receiving the temporary injunction in regard to Mr. Hirano, opened the Cabinet meeting on 4 February, and declared, "The Temporary injunction of the court is a violation of the Constitution; the judicial power has exceeded administrative authority."

However, Mr. Jadahiko Mihuchi (deceased), Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, said, "A court decision once made cannot be withdrawn, unless it is appealed to the higher court."

Government Section Chief Whitney who received this report from the Government called Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Mibuchi in the afternoon of that day and told him, "Japan has no judicial power concerning the purge."

As a result of consultation with judges after returning to the office, the Chief Justice decided that the decision could not be withdrawn, despite the GHQ order. General Whitney continued to demand the withdrawal of the decision even after receiving this answer. Finally, on 5 February, the Chief Justice of the Tokyo District Court yielded to the order and withdrew the temporary injunction.

Thus, the purge of Hirano which had been delayed so often was decided. Apparently, this was the result of his intense fighting spirit. Moreover, he was continuously questioned even after that; he was indicted because he had failed to enter in the questionnaire the fact that he had been the editor and publisher of the magazine Kodo, and a central committeeman of the National Socialist party. Consequently, he was sentenced to one and a half years imprisonment in the first trial, and was declared not guilty in the second trial. Having undergone such a trying experience, even a strong man like him was finally worn out, and he suffered temporarily from melancholia.

Appendix F
PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES
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PROCEDURES FOLLOWED

The public opinion poll cited in Chap. IV was taken by the National Public Opinion Research Institute, an organ of the Prime Minister's Office. This organization, among the first scientific organizations of its type in postwar Japan, was set up at the suggestion and with the assistance of SCAP technicians. Twenty-six interviewers participated in the present study.

The first sample was drawn from Tokyo, largely for reasons of economy and speed. Interviews were held with 444 respondents drawn at random from rice ration lists selected according to geographical areas in the Tokyo Metropolitan District. Characteristics obtained from the sample are shown in Table F1. The age sample (both sexes)

TABLE F1
STATISTICS DERIVED FROM PUBLIC OPINION ANALYSIS
(Tokyo Metropolitan Area)

Characteristics	Men, %	Women, %
<u>Occupation</u>		
Salaried employee	32.1	14.9
Laborer	26.4	31.2
Company director, public servants	2.8	1.0
Free-lance	2.8	4.1
Owner of commercial & industrial establs.	24.4	24.9
Farmer	2.8	4.1
Other	0.8	2.0
Unemployed*	7.4	7.2
<u>Standard of Living</u>		
Obscure	0.8	3.1
High	6.3	7.2
Middle	43.6	30.2
Lower Middle	39.9	38.5
Low	9.1	20.8
<u>Education</u>		
Obscure	0.2	7.2
0-6 yr	21.2	31.2
7-9 yr	22.4	16.6
10-12 yr	25.8	38.5
Over 12 yr	30.1	6.2
<u>Experience in Public Life</u>		
Obscure	4.3	5.2
Before, during war	5.4	6.2
Before, during, after war	4.3	3.1
After war only	9.1	2.0
None	72.6	83.3
<u>Age, yr</u>		
20-24	18.6	20.8
25-29	14.9	10.4
30-39	23.5	33.3
40-54	29.0	26.0
55 and over	13.7	9.3

*Where possible, the occupation of the head of the family is customarily used in Japan for dependents.

for the Tokyo area corresponds to within 2 percent of the age sample for the national totals. National educational figures and those from Tokyo are compared with the totals used in this poll (Tokyo, Osaka, and two Yamagata villages). (See Table F2.) No comparable national statistics exist for the categories of Occupation, Standard of Living or Experience in Public Life, listed in Table F1.

TABLE F2
COMPARISON OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
(National, Tokyo, Osaka, 2 Yamagata Villages)

Education	National		Tokyo		Total Sample ^a	
	Men, %	Women, %	Men, %	Women, %	Men, %	Women, %
Obscure	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	9.2
0-6 yr	33.1	51.5	22.4	35.8	24.7	38.1
7-9 yr	41.9	30.1	56.3	59.1	24.0	15.7
10-12 yr	15.0	16.6	--	--	23.3	31.5
Over 13 yr	10.1	1.8	21.1	4.9	27.5	5.2

^aTotal sample includes Tokyo, Osaka, and 2 Yamagata villages.

TABLE F3
STATISTICS DERIVED FROM PUBLIC OPINION ANALYSIS
(Osaka, Ueda, Funagata)

Characteristics	Osaka, %	Ueda, %	Funagata, %
<u>Occupation</u>			
Salaried employee	25.8	4.2	8.5
Laborer	31.3	13.6	17.0
Company director, public official	3.3	1.0	--
Free-lance	2.9	1.0	--
Businessman, industrialist	30.0	3.1	5.3
Farmer	0.4	20.5	58.5
Other	1.2	--	--
Unemployed	4.6	2.1	3.1
Charcoal Mfr	--	--	4.2
Farmhand	--	2.1	2.1
Unknown	--	2.1	1.0
<u>Standard of Living</u>			
Obscure	0.4	5.2	2.1
High	4.2	4.2	3.1
Middle	38.1	28.6	25.5
Lower Middle	39.4	44.2	48.9
Low	17.7	17.8	20.2
<u>Education</u>			
Obscure	--	2.1	6.3
0-6 yr	20.7	29.4	40.4
7-9 yr	31.7	57.8	44.6
10-12 yr	28.8	6.3	6.3
Over 12 yr	18.6	4.2	2.1
<u>Age, yr</u>			
20-24	13.1	19.9	8.5
25-29	14.8	15.7	11.7
30-39	25.4	23.1	29.7
40-54	35.1	25.2	26.5
55 and over	11.4	13.6	23.4

Characteristics derived from interviews held in Osaka and the villages of Ueda and Funagata are listed in Table F3.

As might be expected, rural interviewees had suffered relatively little war damage (50.5 percent of the Tokyo respondents suffered "heavy" damage, as compared with 15.7 percent in Ueda and 21.2 percent in Funagata).

The interviews were standardized in form, and responses were given orally. The results were tabulated mechanically. The questions were asked during the course of an interview lasting an estimated thirty minutes on the average. The questions were formulated as follows (the exact wording, of course, being lost in the translation).

OUTLINE OF INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONS

"I have come from the National Public Opinion Research Institute of the Prime Minister's Office to make a public opinion survey. I'm sorry to trouble you when you're busy. As you know, with the war's end, when the Occupation troops came, a system called the purge was instituted, preventing those who held certain public offices during the war from holding public offices. Today I would like to ask you about this public office purge."

1. Were there any very intimate friends of yours purged? How close were they? Are there some acquaintances? For what wartime activities were they purged?
2. Because of the purge the leaders in the nation, in cities and villages, and in other walks of life, were changed after the war. When you first heard of the purge what were your feelings? Did you think it was proper, or couldn't it be helped because it was executed by SCAP; or do you have any other opinions?
3. Has that feeling changed now?
4. De-purging started out gradually the year before last and now that all of the purgees have been de-purged, what feeling did you have when you heard of this de-purging? What did you think of the timing of the de-purge? Was it too early, too late, or just right?
5. (Omitted)
6. In general, was the purge too severe, about right, or not severe enough?
7. Do you think the purgees in general had wartime responsibilities as leaders, or did they merely cooperate with national policy during the war?
8. Do you think that if there had been no purge the wartime leaders would have retired from office voluntarily? Why?
9. If they remained in public office without being purged, do you think they should take responsibility in some other way for their wartime acts?
10. If they had remained in public office, do you think they would have obstructed the carrying out of Occupation policy? Would there have been friction or would the Occupation have been carried out smoothly anyway?
11. Did you sense any difference between the purgees and their replacements, or were they generally the same type of people? What differences did you notice, if any? Did they have in general a more democratic way of thinking? In what way? In their efficiency in their work, were the purgees or replacements superior? If the replacements were inferior, did this retard the building of new Japan?
12. Do you think there were many purgees who found it difficult to earn their daily livelihood?
13. Do you think the general public was sympathetic to the purgees during their removal from office, or was it indifferent?
14. Did you feel sympathetic or indifferent?
15. Do you think the purgees lost the respect of the public because of the purge, or did they continue to be respected? Did you lose any respect for them?
16. Do you think the purge had an effect on the attitudes, beliefs, or emotions of purgees? Did they reconsider the implications of their own careers? Did they consider themselves at fault in any way? How?
17. Do you think that in various future elections the de-purgees will try generally to make a come back? Do you think they will be successful if they do?

When compared with postwar leaders, which group has the best chance at future polls?

18. Do you think the return of the de-purgees in social life will have an important effect on Japan's future? Why?

19. As you know, the purge was ordered by the Occupation Forces, but the Japanese government actually carried it out. How well did it perform this function? Do you think that the work was carried out with some reference to Japanese opinions, or did Japanese officials simply carry out orders? Were there any cases where the Japanese government misused its authority in the purge program, such as in putting political pressure on opposing parties? Do you know whether there was an appeals system or not? Do you think it would have made any difference?

20. What do you think were the general effects of the purge on Japan?

21. For what purpose do you think America carried out the purge? Was punishment one of the great purposes of the purge? Do you think the War Crimes Trials were carried out for the same purposes, or were they different? If so, how?

22. Did the purge result in attitudes favorable or unfavorable to the United States, or did it have no effect?

23. Do you feel grateful toward the Occupation as a whole, or do you think the whole program was wrong? Explain.

24. If Japan had won the war over the United States would the Japanese have imposed a purge on her wartime leaders?

25. Do you think that World War II was unavoidable for the self-defense of Japan, or do you think Japan could have found other solutions without recourse to war? How did you feel about this at the outbreak of the war?

26. Do you think there is any danger of Japan's going militaristic at the present time?

27. (Poll records: date, time, length of interview, name of polltaker and checker; age, education, means of livelihood, level of living, extent of war damage, previous experience as public servant.)

SUMMARY OF TOKYO UNIVERSITY QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PURGE COMMITTEE*

This summary, cited in Chap. II, is based on 294 responses to questionnaires sent by Tokyo University Institute of Social Science and distributed by prefectural screening boards. Of those asked to respond, 27.2 percent of the public servants and 48.8 percent of the teachers completed and returned the questionnaires. Where the responses total less than 100 percent, the remainder did not answer the questions.

1. Do you believe the present organization of the commission is proper?

Yes (80%)	No (20%)	A. Public servants, unpurged (135)
Yes (81.2)	No (18.8%)	B. Teachers, unpurged (32)
Yes (40%)	No (20%)	C. Public servants, purged (5)
Yes (18.9%)	No (72.1%)	D. Teachers, purged (122)
2. Do you believe the members of the commission are appropriate persons for this position?

Yes (82.2%)	No (16.3%)	A. (135)
Yes (71.9%)	No (28.1%)	B. (32)
Yes (20%)	No (40%)	C. (5)
Yes (9.9%)	No (82.6%)	D. (121)
3. Do you think the method used for selecting commission personnel was proper?

Yes (71.9%)	No (25.9%)	A. (135)
Yes (59.4%)	No (40.6%)	B. (32)
Yes (40%)	No (20%)	C. (5)
Yes (10.7%)	No (78.7%)	D. (122)

*Committees here refer to Teacher and Public Service purge committees:
The summary is based on 294 responses.

4. Do you think the commissions should adopt a new system of purging?

Yes (62.2%)	No (32.6%)	A. (135)
Yes (59.4%)	No (37.5%)	B. (32)
Yes (80%)	No (20%)	C. (5)
Yes (82%)	No (9.8%)	D. (122)
5. Do you think enough time is spent in reviewing each case?

Yes (63.4%)	No (30.6%)	A. (134)
Yes (68.8%)	No (28.1%)	B. (32)
Yes (20%)	No (80%)	C. (5)
Yes (33.1%)	No (51.2%)	D. (121)
6. Do you think the requirement that those being screened should appear before the committee is proper?

Yes (61.2%)	No (38.8%)	A. (134)
Yes (78.1%)	No (21.9%)	B. (32)
Yes (80%)	No (20%)	C. (5)
Yes (95.9%)	No (3.2%)	D. (122)
7. Do you think the boards and commissions were impartial?

Yes (82%)	No (16.5%)	A. (133)
Yes (71.9%)	No (18.8%)	B. (32)
Yes (0%)	No (100%)	C. (5)
Yes (3.1%)	No (91.8%)	D. (122)
8. Do you think the committees emphasized not only the concrete evidence (such as writings or speeches) but also actual participation (in militarism, for example) as well?

Yes (54.1%)	No (44.4%)	A. (135)
Yes (75%)	No (18.8%)	B. (32)
Yes (0%)	No (100%)	C. (5)
Yes (7.4%)	No (85.2%)	D. (122)
9. Have unfair practices of personal favoritisms (family relationships, bribes, etc.) been eliminated from the screening process?

Yes (86.7%)	No (10.4%)	A. (135)
Yes (78.1%)	No (18.8%)	B. (32)
Yes (20%)	No (40%)	C. (5)
Yes (9%)	No (89.7%)	D. (122)
10. Has pressure from the outside exerting influence upon screening procedures been eliminated?

Yes (83.7%)	No (12.6%)	A. (135)
Yes (71.9%)	No (25%)	B. (32)
Yes (80%)	No (20%)	C. (5)
Yes (6.6%)	No (67.2%)	D. (122)
11. Have excessive powers on the part of the chairman been removed?

Yes (87.4%)	No (8.1%)	A. (135)
Yes (84.4%)	No (12.5%)	B. (32)
Yes (20%)	No (20%)	C. (5)
Yes (25.4%)	No (37.7%)	D. (122)
12. Have steps been taken to prevent bureaucratic elements from exercising excessive power (over the purge)?

Yes (85.9%)	No (8.9%)	A. (135)
Yes (84.4%)	No (9.4%)	B. (32)
Yes (0%)	No (40%)	C. (5)
Yes (25.6%)	No (41.3%)	D. (121)
13. Did the screening commissions make use of data other than that provided in the respondents' questionnaires?

Yes (59.3%)	No (36.3%)	A. (135)
Yes (62.5%)	No (34.4%)	B. (32)
Yes (40%)	No (40%)	C. (5)
Yes (9.8%)	No (77%)	D. (122)

Appendix G
ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE PURGE
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INCIDENCE OF ECONOMIC PURGE

a. Classified by Industry

Industry Commercial Enterprise	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice- Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir. ^a	Dir.	Sta. Aud. ^b	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
1. Development	(3) ^c	(21)	1 (16)	(2)	(15)	4 (93)	(6)	1 (37)	(20)	6 (213)
2. Zaibatsu Holding Co.	(3)	2 (7)	(2)	(4)	(14)	(13)	(1)	(8)	(0)	2 (52)
3. Banks	4 (12)	7 (26)	4 (25)	(1)	8 (43)	10 (109)	5 (14)	1 (53)	(1)	39 (284)
4. Trust	(6)	1 (7)	(0)	(1)	(14)	(11)	(6)	(5)	0	1 (50)
5. Securities & Invest- ment Co.	(1)	1 (2)	0	0	1 (6)	(5)	(1)	(3)	0	2 (18)
6. Insurance	(5)	2 (6)	(1)	0	5 (27)	1	(7)	(2)	0	8 (48)
7. Mining	2 (17)	3 (37)	2 (6)	1 (19)	14 (66)	(14)	1 (4)	1 (36)	0	24 (199)
a. Coal	1 (13)	1 (18)	(1)	(7)	11 (46)	(7)	(3)	(20)	0	13 (115)
b. Iron	(1)	2 (5)	2 (1)	(4)	2 (2)	(5)	1	(10)	0	7 (28)
c. Others	1 (3)	1 (14)	1 (4)	1 (8)	1 (18)	(2)	(1)	1 (6)	0	4 (56)
8. Oil	(3)	4 (12)	1 (2)	1 (2)	3 (19)	3 (4)	(1)	1 (15)	0	13 (58)
9. Communication	0	(4)	(1)	0	(3)	(3)	0	(3)	0	(14)
10. Communication Construction	(2)	1 (1)	(2)	1 (2)	5 (10)	1	1 (1)	1 (3)	0	10 (21)
11. Air Transportation	0	(4)	(3)	0	(4)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	(14)
12. Railways	1 (1)	2 (3)	4 (5)	3 (3)	1 (1)	3 (2)	1 (1)	1 (6)	0	16 (22)
13. Steamship Co.	(2)	6 (5)	2 (8)	6 (10)	6 (17)	0	0	(10)	(1)	20 (53)
14. Land Transportation	0	(3)	(1)	(1)	(7)	2	(3)	0	0	2 (15)
15. Warehouses	(5)	1 (1)	0	1	3 (10)	0	(1)	(7)	0	5 (24)

^aStanding Director.

^bStanding Auditor.

^cParentheses give "provisional designation" or number of persons barred from public office.

Industry	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
16. Electricity	0	6 (11)	4 (20)	0	(13)	1 (17)	3 (9)	1 (14)	0	15 (84)
17. Gas	1	1 (1)	(1)	0	3	0	(1)	0	0	5 (3)
18. Chemical Industries	(10)	5 (18)	2 (2)	7 (7)	11 (41)	2 (4)	(5)	1 (15)	0	28 (102)
19. Heavy Industries	3 (20)	10 (20)	2 (8)	5 (16)	21 (81)	2 (19)	1 (7)	2 (34)	(1)	46 (206)
20. Light Metal	(8)	5 (13)	1 (1)	6 (10)	4 (19)	(2)	(3)	1 (10)	0	17 (66)
21. Airplane Manufacturers	1 (2)	3 (7)	(2)	1 (2)	3 (14)	1 (5)	2	(5)	0	11 (37)
22. Cement	1	2 (2)	1	1 (3)	2 (2)	0	0	(3)	0	7 (10)
23. Automobiles and Rolling Stock	(4)	1 (7)	0	1	1 (11)	0	0	(5)	(1)	3 (28)
24. Other Manufacturing Companies	4 (15)	9 (13)	3 (6)	5 (10)	12 (41)	0	3 (5)	2 (21)	0	38 (111)
25. Spinning (Fiber)	(7)	3 (6)	(5)	1 (1)	12 (30)	6	1 (2)	4 (9)	0	27 (60)
26. Tobacco	(1)	(5)	(4)	(4)	(9)	(2)	0	(2)	0	(27)
27. Real Estate	(1)	1	0	0	(2)	0	(1)	0	0	1 (4)
28. Timber	0	(2)	0	(1)	(2)	0	(1)	0	0	(6)
29. Paper Pulp	(3)	1 (6)	1 (3)	(1)	2 (6)	0	1 (1)	(3)	0	5 (23)
30. Food	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
31. Fishing	(1)	(2)	1 (4)	2 (7)	(11)	0	1	(5)	0	4 (30)
32. Construction	1 (1)	2	0	0	1 (2)	4	0	1 (2)	0	9 (5)
33. Trading	(11)	2 (18)	1 (1)	1 (2)	4 (30)	2 (1)	2 (10)	(7)	0	12 (80)
Total	18 (144)	81 (270)	30 (129)	43 (109)	122 (570)	46 (305)	22 (92)	18 (324)	(24)	380 (1967)

INCIDENCE OF ECONOMIC PURGE

b. Classified by Companies

Development Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Karafuto Kaihatsu K.K. (Karafuto Development Co.)		(1)	(1)			(5)		(2)	(7)	(16)
Kita Shina Kaihatsu K.K. (North China Dev. Co.)		(3)	(4)			(10)		(6)		(23)
Manahu Nochi Kaibatsu K.K. (Manchurian Agri. Land Dev. Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)			(1)		(3)
Manahu Takushoku Kaisha (Manchurian Dev. Co.)		(1)				(9)		(4)		(14)
Minami Manahu Tetsudo K.K. (South Manchurian Railway Co.)		(2)	(4)			(18)		(6)		(30)
Nakashina Shinko K.K. (Cen. China Dev. Co.)		(2)	(3)			(5)		(2)	(2)	(14)
Nanyo Kohatsu K.K. (Southern Dev. Co.)	(1)	(1)		(1)	(8)	(11)		(7)		(29)
Nanyo Takushoku K.K. (Southern Dev. Co.)		(3)				(8)	(3)	(1)	(5)	(20)
Nomura Toindo Shokusan K.K. (Nomura E. Indies Colonization Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)	(1)	(4)			(1)		(8)
Taiwan Takushoku K.K. (Formosan Dev. Co.)		(2)	(2)			(9)		(5)		(18)
Tokendo Kaihatsu K.K. (Tokendo Dev. Co. Ltd.)	(2)	(2)			(2)	(2)		(2)		(10)
Tohoku Kogyo K.K. (Tohoku Dev. Co., Ltd.)			1					1		2
Toyo Takushoku K.K. (Oriental Dev. Co.)		(2)	(1)			4 (16)	(3)		(6)	4 (28)
Total	(3)	(21)	1 (16)	(2)	(15)	4 (93)	(6)	1 (37)	(20)	6 (213)

Zaibatsu Holding Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Asano Honsha (Asano Central Co.)		1								1
K.K. Nissan (Nissan Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1 (2)			(2)	(2)		(2)		1 (9)
Mitsubishi Honsha (Mitsubishi Cent. Co.)			(1)	(2)	(2)			(2)		(7)
Mitsui Gomei K.K. (Mitsui Partnership Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(4)					(5)
Mitsui Honsha (Mitsui Central Co.)		(1)				(6)		(1)		(8)
Nomura Gomei K.K. (Nomura Partnership Co.)	(1)		(1)	(1)	(3)		(1)	(1)		(8)
Shibusewa Dozoku K.K. (Shibusewa Family Co., Ltd.)		(1)		(1)						(2)
Sumitomo Honsha (Sumitomo Central Co.)		(1)				(2)		(2)		(5)
Yasuda Hosen-Sha (Yasuda Central Co.)		(1)				(2)				(3)
Okura Jigyo K.K. (Okura Enterprise Co., Ltd.)	(1)				(3)					(4)
Total	(3)	2 (7)	(2)	(4)	(14)	(13)	(1)	(8)	(1)	2 (52)

Banks	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Ginko (Bank of Chosen)		(2)	(3)			(6)		(5)		(16)
Chosen Kinyu Kumiai Rengokai (Korean Co-operative Union of Credit)		(3)				(24)		(7)		(34)
Chosen Shokusan Ginko (Chosen Colonization Bank)		(1)	(2)			(11)		(5)	(1)	(20)
Chugoku Rengo Junbi Ginko (Federal Reserve Bank of China)								(3)		(3)

Banks	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chuo Chobi Ginko (Central Reserve Bank of China)								(2)		(2)
Gaishi Kinko (Overseas Funds Bank)	(3)					(7)		(2)		(12)
Kako Shogyo Ginko (Kako Commercial Bank)		(1)	(1)		(4)					(6)
Kanan Ginko (South China Bank)		(1)	(1)		(2)			(3)		(7)
Kobe Ginko (Kobe Bank)	1		1			4 (1)				6 (1)
Kokumin Kosei Kinko (National Rehabilitation Bank)		2								2
Kono Kinko (Agriculture Development Bank)		(1)			(1)					(2)
Manahu Chuo Ginko (Central Bank of Manchuko)		(2)	(1)			(5)		(1)		(9)
Manshu Kogo Ginko (Manchurian Development Bank)			(1)			(9)		(3)		(13)
Mitsubishi Ginko (Mitsubishi Bank)	(1)	(1)			2 (5)		2 (2)			4 (9)
Mitsui Ginko (Mitsui Bank)	(1)				(5)		(2)			(8)
Mokyo Ginko (Bank of Mongolia)		(2)	(3)			(3)		(1)		(9)
Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko (Southern Development Bank)	(1)		(1)			(6)		(2)		(10)
Nippon Chochiku Ginko (Japan Saving Bank)	(1)	1	(2)		3		1			5 (3)
Nippon Ginko (Bank of Japan)	1	1				6				8
Nippon Kangyo Ginko (Hypothec Bank of Japan)			1							1
Nippon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan)	1									1
Nomura Ginko (Nomura Bank)		1 (2)			1 (8)			(1)		2 (11)

Banks	Positiona from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Norin Chuo Kinko (Central Bank for Agri. & Forestry)			1							1
Onkyu Kinko (Pension Bank)								1		1
Senji Kinyu Kinko (Wartime Finance Bank)		(2)	(1)			(9)		(2)		(14)
Shoke Kumiai Chuo Kinko (Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Association)	(1)									(1)
Shomin Kinko (Peoples' Bank)		1								1
Sumitomo Ginko (Sumitomo Bank)	(2)	(1)	(1)		(7)		(7)			(18)
Taiwan Ginko (Bank of Taiwan)		(3)	(2)			(8)		(6)		(19)
Teikoku Ginko (Teikoku Bank)	1 (1)	1	1	(1)	2 (2)		2 (1)			7 (5)
Yasuda Ginko (Yasuda Bank)	(1)	(1)	(2)		(9)		(2)			(15)
Yokohama Shokin Ginko (Yokohama Special Bank)		(3)	(4)			(20)		(10)		(37)
Total	4 (12)	7 (26)	4 (25)	(1)	8 (43)	10 (109)	5 (14)	1 (53)	(1)	39 (284)

Trust	Positiona from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Shintaku K.K. (Chosen Trust Co., Ltd.)		(2)		(1)		(8)		(1)		(12)
Mitsubishi Shintaku K.K. (Mitsubishi Trust Co.)		(1)			(1)			(2)		(4)
Mitsui Shintaku K.K. (Mitsui Trust Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1				(3)	(2)			1 (6)
Nomura Shintaku K.K. (Nomura Trust Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(2)		(1)	(1)		(6)

Trust	Positiona from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Prea.	Vice- Prea.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
Sumitomo Shintaku K.K. (Sumitomo Trust Co., Ltd.)	(3)	(1)			(6)		(1)			(11)
Yasuda Shintaku K.K. (Yasuda Trust Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(2)			(5)		(2)	(1)		(11)
Total	(6)	1 (7)	0	(1)	(14)	(11)	(6)	(5)	0	1 (50)

Securities and Investment Companies	Positiona from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice- Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
Manshu Toshishoken K.K. (Manchurian Investment and Securities Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)	(5)		(2)		(9)
Nitchitsu Shoken K.K. (Nitchitsu Securities Co., Ltd.)		1			1			(1)		2 (1)
Nomura Shoken K.K. (Nomura Securities Co. Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(5)		(1)			(8)
Total	(1)	1 (2)	0	0	1 (6)	(5)	(1)	(3)	0	2 (18)

Insurance	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice- Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
Meiji Seimei Hoken K.K. (Meiji Life Insurance Co., Ltd.)		1			3 (2)			(1)		4 (3)
Nippon Seimei Hoken K.K. (Nippon Life In- surance Co. Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(5)			(1)		(8)
Osaka Amiotomo Kaijo Kasai K.K. (Osaka Sumitomo Fire and Marine Insurance Co.)	(1)	(1)	(1)		(3)		(2)			(8)

Insurance	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Taisho Kasai Kaijo Hoken K.K. (Taisha Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.)	(2)				(5)		(2)			(9)
Teikoku Simei Hoken K.K. (Teikoku Life Insurance Co., Ltd.)		1 (2)			2 (2)					3 (4)
Tokyo Kaijo Hoken K.K. (Tokyo Maritime Insurance Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(5)		(1)			(8)
Yasuda Kasai Kaijo Hoken K.K. (Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(5)		(2)			(8)
Chiyoda Seimei Hoken K.K. (Chiyoda Life Insurance Co., Ltd.)						1				1
Daiichi Seimei Hoken K.K. (Daiichi Life Insurance Co., Ltd.)										0
Total	(5)	2 (6)	(1)	0	5 (27)	1	(7)	(2)	0	8 (48)

Mining Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
<u>Coal</u>										
Daido Tanko K.K. (Daido Coal Mining Co., Ltd.)			(1)			(2)		(3)		(6)
Fushin Tanko K.K. (Fushin Coal Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)			(1)	(2)			(1)		(5)
Hokkaido Tanko Kisen K.K. (Hokkaido Mining & Steamship Co., Ltd.)	1				1 (4)			(1)		2 (5)
Hokukyo Tanko K.K. (Hokukyo Coal and Iron Co., Ltd.)	(1)			(1)				(1)		(3)
Honkeiko Baitetsu K.K. (Honkeiko Coal and Iron Co., Ltd.)		(2)			(2)	(2)		(1)		(7)

Mining Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
<u>Coal (Continued)</u>										
Kakuko Tanko K.K. (Kakuko Coal Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)			(1)	(3)			(1)		(6)
Karafuto Kogyo K.K. (Karafuto Mining Co., Ltd.)		(3)		(1)	(4)			(1)		(9)
Manahu Kozan K.K. (Manchurian Mines Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(4)				(2)		(1)		(9)
Manshu Tanko, K.K. (Manchurian Coal Mine Co., Ltd.)		(3)			(5)			(2)		(10)
Mitsubishi Kogyo K.K. (Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1			4 (5)			(1)		5 (7)
Mitsui Kozan K.K. (Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			2 (7)		(3)			2 (12)
Mitsuzan Tanko K.K. (Mitsuzan Coal Mine Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)			(5)			(2)		(10)
Nitchitsu Kogyo Kaihatsu K.K. (Nitchitsu Mining Development Co., Ltd.)		(2)			(3)			(2)		(7)
Okura Kogyo K.K. (Okura Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)				(3)			(1)		(5)
Seian Tanko K.K. (Seian Coal Mine Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)				(1)				(3)
Seika Kogyo K.K. (Seika Mining Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)		(3)	4 (3)			(2)		4 (11)
Total	1 (13)	1 (18)	(1)	(7)	11 (46)	(7)	(3)	(20)	0	13 (115)

Iron

Manshu Tokushu Tekko K.K. (Manchurian Special Iron-Ore Co., Ltd.)		(3)			(1)	(1)		(2)		(7)
Mosan Tekko Kaihatsu K.K. (Mosan Iron Mine Development Co., Ltd.)	(1)			(2)		(1)		(3)		(7)
Nittetsu Kogyo K.K. (Nittetsu Mining Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)	1		1 (2)		1		(2)	4 (5)

Mining	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
<u>Iron (continued)</u>										
Nitchitsu Kainan Kogyo K.K. (Nitchitsu Kainan Dev. Co., Ltd.)		1	1 (1)		1 (1)			(1)		3 (3)
Ryuen Tekko K.K. (Ryuen Iron Mine Co., Ltd.)		(1)				(3)		(2)		(6)
Total	(1)	2 (5)	2 (1)	(4)	2 (2)	(5)	1	(10)	0	7 (28)

Others

Furukawa Kogyo K.K. (Furukawa Mining Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)		(2)			(1)		(5)
Ishihara Sangyo K.K. (Ishihara Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(4)					(10)
Chosen Kogyo Shinko K.K. (Chosen Mining Development Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(1)			(1)				(4)
Kobayashi Kogyo K.K. (Kobayashi Mining Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		(1)	(1)		(1)	(1)		(6)
Manahu Enko K.K. (Manchurian Lead Mine Co., Ltd.)		(3)		(1)	(5)			(3)		(12)
Manahu Kogyo Kaihatsu K.K. (Manchurian Mining Dev. Co., Ltd.)		(1)				(1)				(2)
Nippon Kogyo K.K. (Japan Mining Co., Ltd.)	1 (1)	(3)	(1)	1 (5)	1 (6)			1 (1)		4 (17)
Total	1 (3)	(14)	(4)	1 (8)	1 (18)	(2)	(1)	1 (5)	0	4 (56)
Grand Total	2 (17)	3 (37)	2 (6)	1 (19)	14 (66)	(14)	1 (4)	1 (36)	0	24 (199)

Oil	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Jinzo Sekiyu K.K. (Chosen Synthetic Oil Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(2)			(6)			(1)		(10)

Oil	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Sekiyu K.K. (Chosen Oil Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)			(2)		(7)
Kitsurin Jinzo Sekiyu K.K. (Kitsurin Synthetic Oil Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(2)	(1)		(2)		(6)
Manshu Jinzo Sekiyu K.K. (Manchurian Synthetic Oil Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(2)			(2)		(5)
Manshu Gosei Nenryo K.K. (Manchurian Synthetic Fuel Co., Ltd.)		(3)			(4)					(7)
Manshu Sekitan Ekika Kenkyusho (Manchurian Coal Liquefaction Research Institute)		(1)				(2)		(1)		(4)
Manshu Sekiyu K.K. (Manchurian Oil Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(3)	(1)		(4)		(9)
Mitsubishi Sekiyu K.K. (Mitsubishi Oil Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)			(1)			(2)		1 (4)
Nippon Sekiyu K.K. (Japan Petroleum Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1 (1)		1 (1)	2		(1)			4 (4)
Nitchitsu Nenryo Kogyo K.K. (Nitchitsu Fuel Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1	(1)		1			(1)		2 (2)
Teikoku Nenryo Kogyo K.K. (Imperial Fuel Co., Ltd.)		1				2		1		4
Teikoku Sekiyu K.K. (Imperial Oil Co., Ltd.)			1			1				2
Total	(3)	4 (12)	1 (2)	1 (2)	3 (19)	3 (4)	(1)	1 (15)	0	13 (58)

Communication	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kachu Denki Taushin K.K. (Central China Telegram Co., Ltd.)		(2)			(3)			(2)		(7)

Communication	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kahoku Denshin Denwa K.K. (North China Telegraph and Telephone Co., Ltd.)						(1)		(1)		(2)
Manchu Denshin Denwa K.K. (Manchurian Telephone and Telegram Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(1)			(2)				(5)
Total	0	(4)	(1)	0	(3)	(3)	0	(3)	0	(14)

Communications-Construction	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kokusai Denki Tsushin K.K. (International Electric and Communication)		(1)	(1)	1 (1)	5 (5)		1 (1)	1		8 (9)
Mokyo Denki Tshushin Setsubi K.K. (Mongolian Electric Communication Equipment Co., Ltd.)			(1)		(2)			(2)		(5)
Nippon Denshin Denwa Koji K.K. (Japan Cable and Telephone Construction Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1		(1)	(3)	1		(1)		2 (7)
Total	(2)	1 (1)	(2)	1 (2)	5 (10)	1	1 (1)	1 (3)	0	10 (21)

Air Transportation	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chuka Koku K.K. (Central China Aviation Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(2)			(1)	(1)			(6)
Manshu Koku K.K. (Manchurian Aviation Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(1)		(4)			(1)		(8)
Total	0	(4)	(3)	0	(4)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	(14)

Railways	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kachu Tetsudo K.K. (Central China Railway Co., Ltd.)			(2)			(1)		(3)		(6)
Kahoku Kotsu K.K. (North China Railway Co., Ltd.)			(2)			(1)		(2)		(5)
Keihanshin Kyuko Dentetsu K.K. (Keihanshin Express Tramway Co., Ltd.)		1	2	1	1			(1)		5 (1)
Kinki Nippon Tetsudo K.K. (Kinki Japan Railway Co., Ltd.)	1	1	2	2			1	1		8
Teito Kosokudo Kotsu Eidan (Metropolis High Speed Transportation Co.)						3				3
Tokyo Kyuko Dentetsu K.K. (Tokyo Express Tramway Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)		(1)			(10)
Total	1 (1)	2 (3)	4 (5)	3 (3)	1 (1)	3 (2)	1 (1)	1 (6)	0	16 (22)

Steamship Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chuka Rinsen K.K. (Chinese Ship Co., Ltd.)			(2)		(3)			(3)		(8)
Kawasaki Kisen K.K. (Kawasaki Steamship Co., Ltd.)			1		1	1		(1)		3 (1)
Mitsubishi Kisen K.K. (Mitsubishi Steamship Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1 (1)			(3)			(1)		1 (6)
Mitsui Senpaku K.K. (Mitsui Shipping Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		(1)	(3)					(6)
Nippon Yusen K.K. (N.Y.K.)		1 (1)	(3)	(1)	1 (6)			(1)		2 (12)
Osaka Shosen K.K. (O.S.K.)		1 (1)	1 (2)	3 (5)				(2)		5 (10)
Toa Kaiun K.K. (Toa Navigation Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (2)				(1)		3 (5)

Steamship Companies	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Yamashita Kisen K.K. (Yamashita Steamship Co., Ltd.)		1		1 (1)	4 (2)			(1)	(1)	6 (5)
Total	(2)	(5)	3 (8)	(5) (10)	6 (17)	1		(10)	(1)	20 (53)

Land Transportation	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kokussai Unyu K.K. (International Transportation Co., Ltd.)		(3)	(1)	(1)	(7)		(3)			(15)
Nippon Tsuun K.K. (Japan Trans. Co., Ltd.)						2				2
Total	0	(3)	(1)	(1)	(7)	2	(3)	0	0	2 (15)

Warehouse	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Mitsubishi Soko K.K. (Mitsubishi Warehouse Co., Ltd.)	(1)				1 (3)		(1)	(3)		1 (8)
Mitsui Soko K.K. (Mitsui Warehouse Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1		1	(4)			(1)		2 (7)
Sumitomo Soko K.K. (Sumitomo Warehouse Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)			2 (3)			(3)		2 (9)
Total	(5)	1 (1)	0	1	3 (10)	0	(1)	(7)	0	5 (24)

Electricity	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Dengyo K.K. (Chosen Electrical Enterprise Co.)		(1)	(1)			(1)		(1)		(4)

Electricity	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chosen Oryokko Suiden K.K. (Chosen Oryokko Hydroelectric Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(2)			(2)		(5)
Chubu Haiden K.K. (Chubu District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		1	1			(1)	1			3 (1)
Chugoku Haiden K.K. (Chugoku District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		1	(2)			(2)	1			2 (4)
Hokuriku Haiden K.K. (Hokuriku District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		1	(1)			(2)	1			2 (3)
Kacho Suiden K.K. (Central China Water Works and Electricity Co., Ltd.)			(1)		(2)			(2)		(5)
Kahoku Dengyo K.K. (North China Electricity Co., Ltd.)			(2)			(2)		(1)		(5)
Kensai Haiden K.K. (Kensai District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		1				(1)	(2)			1 (3)
Kanto Haiden K.K. (Kanto District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(3)			(2)	(2)			(9)
Kyushu Haiden K.K. (Kyushu District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)	1 (1)			(1)	(2)			2 (5)
Manchu Dengyo K.K. (Manchurian Electrical Works Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(2)		(4)	(2)	(1)	(1)		(11)
Manchu Oryokko Suiden K.K. (Manchurian Oryokko Hydroelectric Co., Ltd.)					(3)			(2)		(5)
Mokyo Dengyo K.K. (Mongolian Electricity Co., Ltd.)			(2)		(2)	(1)		(3)		(8)
Nippon Hassoden K.K. (Japan Electric Supply Co., Ltd.)		1	2			1		1		5

Electricity	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Taiwan Denryoku K.K. (Taiwan Electric Power Co., Ltd.)		(4)	(3)			(1)		(1)		(9)
Tohoku Haiden K.K. (Tohoku District Electricity Distribution Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(2)			(1)	(2)	(1)		(7)
Total	0	6 (11)	4 (20)	0	(13)	1 (17)	3 (9)	1 (14)	0	15 (84)

Gas	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Tokyo Gasu K.K. (Tokyo Gas. Co., Ltd.)	1	1 (1)	(1)		3		(1)			5 (3)

Chemical Industries	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Asahi Denka Kogyo K.K. (Asahi Electrical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		1	2 (1)			(1)		3 (4)
Asahi Kasei K.K. (Asahi Chemical Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1		2	4 (1)			(1)		7 (2)
Chosen Chiso Kayaky K.K. (Chosen Nitrate Powder Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)			(1)		(3)
Kahoku Chisao Hiryo K.K. (North China Nitrate Fertiliser Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(2)			(1)		(4)
Manahu Denki Kagaku Kogyo K.K. (Manchuria Elec. Chem. Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(5)			(1)					(6)
Manshu Magneashumu K.K. (Manchurian Magnesium Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)			(1)		(3)

Chemical Industries	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Mitsubishi Kasei Kogyo K.K. (Mitsubishi Chemical Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)			1 (3)			(1)		1 (5)
Mitsui Kagaku Kogyo K.K. (Mitsui Chemical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)				(5)		(1)			(8)
Mitsui Yushi K.K. (Mitsui Grease & Fat Co., Ltd.)		1		(2)	(1)		(1)			1 (4)
Nippon Chiasso Hiryo K.K. (Japan Nitrate Fertilizer Co., Ltd.)		1	1	2			(1)			4 (1)
Nippon Denko K.K. (Japan Electricity Co., Ltd.)		1	1		(1)	(2)		(1)		2 (4)
Nippon Hiryo K.K. (Japan Fertilizer Co., Ltd.)						2				2
Nippon Soda K.K. (Japan Soda Co., Ltd.)		(2)		(2)	(8)			(2)		(14)
Nissan Kagaku Kogyo K.K. (Nissan Chemical Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)				(2)	(1)			(4)
Nisshin Kagaku K.K. (Nisshin Chemical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(2)	(1)		1 (5)			(3)		1 (13)
Riken Kogyo K.K. (Riken Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(4)		(1)	(1)		(10)
Showa Denko K.K. (Showa Electrical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1 (1)		2 (2)	3 (1)			1		7 (5)
Toyo Katsuo Kogyo K.K. (Toyo High Pressure Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(3)	(1)			(6)			(2)		(12)
Total	(10)	5 (18)	2 (2)	7 (7)	11 (41)	2 (4)	(5)	1 (15)	0	28 (102)

Heavy Industries	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Amagasaki Seitetsu K.K. (Amagasaki Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)			1 (2)			(1)		2 (4)

Heavy Industries	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chintao Seitetsu K.K. (Chintao Steel Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		(1)		(1)	(1)			(1)		(4)
Chosen Shinko Kinsoku K.K. (Chosen Shinko Metal Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(2)	(1)		(1)		(6)
Chuka Seitetsu K.K. (Central China Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd.)					(1)	(2)	(1)			(4)
Dai Nippon Heiki K.K. (Great Japan Arms Production Co., Ltd.)		(2)			(2)			(1)		(5)
Daido Seiko K.K. (Daido Steel Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)		1 (4)			(1)		1 (7)
Furukawa Denki Kogyo K.K. (Furukawa Electric Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)		(2)	(3)	(1)	(1)			(8)
Fuso Kinsoku Kogyo K.K. (Fuso Metal Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1 (1)	(2)	(1)	(9)			(4)		1 (19)
Hitachi Heiki Seisakusho (Hitachi Arms Mfg. Works, Ltd.)	1			1	1			(2)		3 (2)
Hitachi Seisaku-Sho (Hitachi Engineering Works, Ltd.)	1 (1)		1	1	3 (2)			(1)		6 (4)
Hitachi Zohsei K.K. (Hitachi Arms Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	1				1			1		3
Hitachi Zosen-Sho (Hitachi Shipbuilding Yard Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1			(3)			(2)		1 (6)
Ishikawajima Jukogyo K.K. (Ishikawajima Heavy Ind. Co., Ltd.)			(1)		2 (4)			(2)		2 (7)
Kawanami Kogyo K.K. (Kawanami Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1				2 (2)		(1)		3 (3)
Kitashina Seitetsu K.K. (North China Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		(2)		(1)	(2)			(1)		(6)
Kawasaki Jukogyo K.K. (Kawasaki Heavy Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1		2 (1)	(2)			(1)		3 (4)
Kobe Seiko-Sho (Kobe Steel Mfg. Works Ltd.)		(1)			1 (4)	(1)	1 (1)	(1)		2 (8)

Heavy Industries	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Manshu Jukogyo K.K. (Manchurian Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.)	(2)		(1)	(4)	(1)	(9)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(20)
Manshu Hitachi Seisaku Sho (Manchurian Hitachi Mfg. Works, Ltd.)	(1)			(1)	(1)	(1)		(3)		(7)
Manshu Kosho K.K. (Manchurian Arsenal Co., Ltd.)		(3)		(2)	(1)			(1)		(7)
Manshu Seitetsu K.K. (Manchurian Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd.)					(6)			(1)		(7)
Minsei Sangyo K.K. (Minsei Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1	(1)	1	2 (2)					4 (3)
Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K. (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.)	(2)				2 (7)			(2)		2 (11)
Mitsubishi Seiko K.K. (Mitsubishi Steel Mfg. Co., Ltd.)					(2)			1		1 (2)
Mitsui Zosen K.K. (Mitsui Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.)	(3)	1		(1)	2 (2)		(1)	(1)		3 (8)
Nippon Kokan K.K. (Nippon Steel Pipe Co., Ltd.)		1			1 (6)			(1)		2 (7)
Nippon Koshu Jukogyo K.K. (Japan High Frequency Heavy Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		(2)	2 (3)		(1)			2 (8)
Nippon Seiko-Sha (Japan Steel Mfg. Works, Ltd.)	(2)	(1)			1 (1)			(1)		1 (5)
Nippon Seitetsu K.K. (Japan Iron Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		1 (3)	1 (2)		(3)	(2)	(1)			2 (11)
Showa Seiko-Sha (Showa Steel Mfg. Works, Ltd.)	(2)	(1)			(4)			(3)		(10)
Tokyo Shibaura Seisaku Sho (Tokyo Shibaura Mfg. Works, Ltd.)	(2)	1			1 (1)					2 (3)
Total	3 (20)	10 (20)	2 (8)	5 (16)	21 (81)	2 (19)	1 (7)	2 (34)	(1)	46 (206)

Light Metal	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Anto Keikinzoku K.K. (Anto Light Metal Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		(3)	(4)			(1)		(10)
Asahi Keikinzoku K.K. (Asahi Light Metal Co., Ltd.)		1		1				1		3
Chitan Kogyo K.K. (Chitan Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1 (2)			(3)					1 (5)
Chosen Sumitomo Keikinzoku K.K. (Chosen Sumitomo Light Metal Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1		1	(3)			(1)		2 (5)
Kahoku Keikinzoku K.K. (North China Light Metal Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(3)			(1)		(5)
Manshu Keikinzoku K.K. (Manchurian Light Metal Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(2)		(1)	(2)	(1)		(2)		(9)
Mitsui Keikinzoku K.K. (Mitsui Light Metal Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		1 (3)				(1)		1 (6)
Nippon Arumi K.K. (Nippon Aluminum Co., Ltd.)		1 (2)		2 (1)		(1)		(1)		3 (5)
Nippon Keikinzoku K.K. (Japan Light Metal Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)	1		4			(1)		6 (2)
Sumitomo Arumi Seiren K.K. (Sumitomo Aluminum Refinery Co., Ltd.)	(3)			1 (1)	(1)			(2)		1 (7)
Tohoku Shinko Arumi K.K. (Tohoku Dev. Aluminum Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(3)		(3)			(12)
Total	(8)	5 (13)	1 (1)	6 (10)	4 (10)	(2)	(3)	1 (10)	0	17 (66)

Airplane Manufactures	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Hitachi Kokuki K.K. (Hitachi Aeroplane Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1		(2)	2 (2)		1			4 (5)

Airplane Manufacturers	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Fuji Sangyo K.K. (Fuji Indus. Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)				(4)		(1)		1 (6)
Kawanishi Kokuki K.K. (Kawanishi Aeroplane Co., Ltd.)						1				1
Manahu Hikoki Seizo K.K. (Manchurian Aeroplane Mfg. Co., Ltd.)		(5)	(2)		(3)	(1)		(2)		(13)
Showa Hikoki K.K. (Showa Aeroplane Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1			1 (7)		1	(1)		3 (9)
Tachikawa Kogyo K.K. (Tachikawa Aeroplane Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	1	(1)		1	(2)			(1)		2 (4)
Total	1 (2)	3 (7)	(2)	1 (2)	3 (14)	1 (5)	2	(5)	0	11 (37)

Cement	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Asano Semento K.K. (Asano Cement Co., Ltd.)	1	1 (1)	1	(2)	(2)			(1)		3 (6)
Onoda Semento K.K. (Onoda Cement Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)		1 (1)	2			(2)		4 (4)
Total	1	2 (2)	1	1 (3)	2 (2)	0	0	(3)	0	7 (10)

Automobiles and Rolling Stock	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kahoku Jidosha K.K. (North China Automobiles Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)				(1)	(3)
Kawasaki Sharyo K.K. (Kawasaki Rolling Stock Co., Ltd.)		1		1	1			(1)		3 (1)

Automobiles and Rolling Stock	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice- Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
Manshu Jidosha Seizo K.K. (Manchurian Auto- mobiles Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(2)			(3)			(2)		(9)
Nissan Jukogyo K.K. (Nissan Heavy Indus- tries Co.)	(1)	(4)			(7)			(2)		(14)
Tokyo Shibaura Sharyo K.K. (Tokyo Shibaura Rolling Stock Co., Ltd.)	(1)									(1)
Total	(4)	1 (7)	0	1	1 (11)	0	0	(5)	(1)	3 (28)

Other Manufacturers	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice- Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Con- sult- ant	
Chosen Denko K.K. (Chosen Electric & En- gineering Co., Ltd.)		(2)	(1)	(1)	(2)					(6)
Daiken Sangyo K.K. (Daiken Ind. Co., Ltd.)	1	1	2	2				1		7
Kawasaki Sangyo K.K. (Kawasaki Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1		1 (1)			1			3 (1)
Hitachi Seiki K.K. (Hitachi Machine Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	1	1			(3)			(3)		2 (6)
Manshu Sumitomo Kinzoku K.K. (Manchu- rian Sumitomo Metals Co., Ltd.)	1	(1)			1 (2)			(3)		2 (6)
Mitsubishi Denki Kikai K.K. (Mitsubishi Elec- trical Machinery Co., Ltd.)		1			(2)			(2)		1 (4)
Mitsui Seiki K.K. (Mitsui Precise In- struments Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			1 (3)		(1)	(1)		1 (7)
Mizuho Sangyo K.K. (Mizuho Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(1)			(1)		(3)
Nichiden Kogyo K.K. (Nichiden Ind. Co., Ltd.)		1	1	1 (1)			(1)			3 (2)

Other Manufacturers	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Nikkoku Kogyo K.K. (Nikkoku Industries Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)	(1)	(4)			(1)		(8)
Nippon Denki K.K. (Japan Electricity Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)		(1)	(3)			(1)		(8)
Nippon Kentetsu Kogyo K.K. (Japan Kentetsu Ind. Co., Ltd.)				(2)	2 (1)		(2)			2 (5)
Nippon Kogaku K.K. (Japan Optical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			1 (2)		1	(1)		2 (5)
Nippon Musen K.K. (Japan Wireless Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)			1 (2)		(1)			1 (6)
Nippon Seiko K.K. (Japan Precision Bearing Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1			2			(1)		3 (2)
Oki Denki K.K. (Oki Electricity Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			(6)					(8)
Sanki Kogyo K.K. (Sanki Engineering Co., Ltd.)	(1)				(5)			1		1 (6)
Shikoku Kikai Kogyo K.K. (Shikoku Machine Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(3)	1 (1)			(1)			(2)		1 (7)
Sumitomo Denki Kogyo K.K. (Sumitomo Electrical Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1		(2)	1 (2)			(2)		2 (8)
Tokyo Shibaura Denki K.K. (Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co., Ltd.)	1	1	(4)		(1)			(1)		2 (6)
Tokyo Shibaura Koki K.K. (Tokyo Shibaura Instrument Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)		1	2			(2)		3 (4)
Toyo Bearings Seizo K.K. (Toyo Bearing Co., Ltd.)		(1)		(1)	1 (1)		1			2 (2)
Total	4 (15)	9 (13)	3 (6)	5 (10)	12 (41)	0	3 (5)	2 (21)	0	38 (111)

Tobacco	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Chuka Tabako K.K. (Central China Tobacco Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(3)					(4)
Kahoku Katabako K.K. (North China Tobacco Leaf Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(4)					(10)
Kahoku Toa Tabako K.K. (North China East Asia Tobacco Co., Ltd.)		(3)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)		(2)		(13)
Total	(1)	(5)	(4)	(4)	(9)	(2)	0	(2)	0	(27)

Spinning	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Dai Nippon Boseki K.K. (Great Japan Spinning Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)			3 (8)		1			5 (9)
Daiwa Boseki K.K. (Daiwa Spinning Co., Ltd.)				1						1
Gunze Kogyo K.K. (Gunze Ind. Co., Ltd.)					2			1		3
Kahoku Seni K.K. (North China Fiber Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(5)			(1)		(7)
Kanegafuchi Boseki K.K. (Kanegafuchi Spinning Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)		4			1		5 (2)
Kanegafuchi Kodai Jitsugyo K.K. (Kanegafuchi Kodai Ind. Co., Ltd.)		(1)	(1)					(1)		(3)
Katakura Kogyo K.K. (Katakura Ind. Co., Ltd.)			(1)		(1)		(1)	(1)		(4)
Manshu Toyo Boseki K.K. (Manchurian Toyo Spinning Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1						1		2 (1)
Nippon Sanshi Tosei K.K. (Japan Silk Control Co., Ltd.)						6		1		7

Spinning	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Teikoku Seni K.K. (Teikoku Fiber Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1 (4)		(1)	(1)		1 (10)
Toyo Boseki K.K. (Toyo Spinning Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)	(1)		1 (6)			(1)		1 (10)
Toyo Menka K.K. (Toyo Cotton Co., Ltd.)	(2)				(4)			(3)		(9)
Toyo Reiyon K.K. (Toyo Rayon Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1			1 (2)			(1)		2 (5)
Total	(7)	3 (6)	(5)	1 (1)	12 (30)	6	1 (2)	4 (9)	0	27 (60)

Real Estate	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Mitsui Fudosan K.K. (Mitsui Real Estate Co., Ltd.)	(1)	1			(2)		(1)			1 (4)

Timber	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Mitsui Mokuzai K.K. (Mitsui Lumber Co., Ltd.)		(2)		(1)	(2)		(1)			(6)

Paper Pulp	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Kinshu Parupu K.K. (Kinshu Pulp Co., Ltd.)		(3)			(1)			(2)		(6)
Oji Seichi K.K. (Oji Paper Mfg. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	1 (1)	(1)	(1)	(4)			(1)		1 (10)
Tohoku Shinko Parupu K.K. (Tohoku Development Pulp Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(2)	1 (2)		2 (1)		1 (1)			4 (7)
Total	(3)	1 (6)	1 (3)	(1)	2 (6)	0	1 (1)	(3)	0	5 (23)

Food	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Godo Shusei K.K. (United Alcohol Co., Ltd.)						1				1
Shokuryo Eidan (Food Corporation)						3				3
Total						4				4

Fishing	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
K.K. Hayaashi-Kane Shoten (Hayaashi-Kane Co., Ltd.)			(1)	(2)	(5)			(1)		(9)
Nichiro Gyogyo K.K. (Nichiro Fishing Co., Ltd.)		(1)	1 (1)	2 (1)	(3)		1			4 (6)
Nippon Suisan K.K. (Japan Marine Products Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)			(3)		(10)
Taiyo Gyogyo K.K. (Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd.)			(1)	(2)	(1)			(1)		(5)
Total	(1)	(2)	1 (4)	1 (4)	(11)	0	1	(5)		4 (30)

Construction	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Jutaku Eidan (Housing Corporation)		1				1				2
Okura Doboku K.K. (Okura Engineering Co., Ltd.)	1 (1)	1			1 (2)				(2)	3 (5)
Sangyo Setaubi Eidan (Industrial Equipment Corporation)						3		1		4
Total	1 (1)	2	0	0	1 (2)	4	0	1 (2)	0	9 (5)

Trading	Positions from which Purged									Total
	Chair.	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Man. Dir.	Sta. Dir.	Dir.	Sta. Aud.	Aud.	Consultant	
Asano Bussan K.K. (Asano Trading Co., Ltd.)		1 (1)	(1)	1	1 (2)		(2)	(1)		3 (7)
Banwa Yoko (Banwa Trading Co.)		(2)			(1)					(3)
Koeki Eidan (Trading Corporation)			1							1
Mitsubishi Shoji K.K. (Mitsubishi Trading Co., Ltd.)	(1)	(1)			1 (5)		1 (1)	(1)		2 (9)
Mitsui Bussan K.K. (Mitsui Trading Co., Ltd.)	(3)	1 (11)			1 (2)		1 (7)			3 (23)
Nakashina Gunpyo Kokanyo Bussai Haikyuu Kumiai (Central China Distributing Ass'n. of Materials for Exchange with Military Notes)	(3)									(3)
Nichinan Shoji K.K. (Japan Manchurian Trading Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(5)	(1)		(1)		(8)
Nippon Kensetsu Sangyo K.K. (Japan Construction Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)	(1)		(2)	(3)			(1)		(9)
Nippon Yushutsu Nisankutsu K.K. (Japan Export Agricultural Products Co., Ltd.)						2				2
Okura Sangyo K.K. (Okura Ind. Co., Ltd.)	(2)				1 (3)			(1)		1 (6)
Sansei Sangyo K.K. (Sansei Ind. Co., Ltd.)					(6)			(1)		(7)
Showa Tsusho K.K. (Showa Trading Co., Ltd.)		(1)			(3)			(1)		(5)
Total	(11)	2 (18)	1 (1)	1 (2)	4 (30)	2 (1)	2 (10)	(7)	0	12 (80)

**INDEX OF PURGED COMPANIES SUBSEQUENTLY REORGANIZED OR
DISSOLVED, WITH SUCCESSORS (1945-1952)**

<u>Former Names of Companies</u>	<u>New Names or Affiliated Companies</u>
Aichi Tokai Denki K.K. Amagasaki Seitetsu K.K.	Shin Aichi Tokai Denki K.K. Amagasaki Seitetsu K.K. Nippon Raimu Kogyo K.K. Konan Shokusan K.K. Nippon Cement K.K. Chubu Denryoku K.K. Chugoku Denryoku K.K. Shigoku Denryoku K.K. Shin Daido Seiko K.K. Daido Kohan K.K. Kureha Boseki K.K. Itochu Shoki K.K. Marubeni K.K. Amagasaki Seitei K.K. Nippei Sangyo K.K. Daiwa Boseki K.K. Daiwa Kikai K.K. Fuji Sangyo K.K. Fuji Kogyo K.K. Fuji Jidosha K.K. Utsunomiya Sharyo K.K. Aichi Fuji Sangyo K.K. Fuji Kiki K.K. Iwate Fuji Sangyo K.K. Fuji Seimitsu Kogyo K.K. Omiya Kogyo K.K. Numazu Sangyo K.K. Tanuma Mokuzai Kogyo K.K. K.K. Tomita Kiki Seisakusho Shin Fuso Kinzoku Kogyo K.K. Hitachi Koki K.K. Nikko Kogyo K.K. Nippon Kiki K.K. Tokyo Gas Denki Kogyo K.K. joint to Hitachi Seisakusho Hokuriku Denryoku K.K. Ishihara Sangyo K.K. joint to Taiyo Gyogyo K.K. Kanegafuchi Boseki K.K. Kanegafuchi Kagaku Kogyo K.K. Kansai Denryoku K.K. Tokyo Denryoku K.K. Kawanami Kogyo K.K. Nippon Kasei Kogyo K.K. Meiwa Jidosha K.K. Shin Showa Kogyo K.K. Kawasaki Jukogyo K.K. Kawasaki Seitetsu K.K. Kawasaki Kikai Kogyo K.K. Kawasaki Gifu Seisakusho Kawasaki Miyakonojo Seisakusho
Asano Cement K.K. Chubu Haiden K.K. Chugoku Haiden K.K.	
Daido Seiko K.K.	
Daiwa Sangyo K.K.	
Dainippon Heiki K.K. Daiwa Boseki K.K.	
Fuji Sangyo K.K.	
Fuso Kinzoku Kogyo K.K. Hitachi Heiki Seisakusho Hitachi Kokuki K.K.	
Hitachi Zohsei K.K. Hokuriku Haiden K.K. Ishihara Sangyo K.K. K.K. Hayashikane Shoten Kanegafuchi Goseki K.K.	
Kansai Haiden K.K. Kanto Haiden K.K. Kawanami Kogyo K.K.	
Kawanishi Kokuki K.K.	
Kawasaki Jukogyo K.K.	
Kawasaki Sangyo K.K.	

Former Names of Companies

K.K. Kobe Seikoshō

Kokusai Denki Tsushin K.K.
Kurashiki Boseki K.K.

Kyushu Haiden K.K.
Meiji Seimei Hoken K.K.
Minsei Sangyo K.K.

Mitsubishi Kogyo K.K.

Mitsubishi Ginko
Mitsubishi Honsha

Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K.

Mitsubishi Kasei Kogyo K.K.

Mitsubishi Kisen K.K.
Mitsubishi Seiko K.K.

Mitsubishi Shintaku K.K.
Mitsui Kozan K.K.

Mitsui Seiki K.K.
Mitsui Shintaku K.K.
Mizuho Sangyo K.K.
Naigai Cotton K.K.

Nanyo Kaiun K.K.
Nikkoku Kogyo K.K.
Nippon Chochiku Ginko
Nippon Musen K.K.

Nippon Kentetsu Kogyo K.K.
K.K. Nippon Seikoshō

Nippon Chisso Hiryo K.K.
Nippon Seimei Hoken K.K.
Nippon Seitetsu K.K.

Nippon Soda K.K.

Nissan Kagaku Kogyo K.K.

New Names or Affiliated Companies

K.K. Kobe Seikoshō
Shinko Kinzoku Kogyo K.K.
Shinko Denki K.K.
Denki Kogyo K.K.
Kurashi Boseki K.K.
Kurashiki Kikai K.K.
Kyushu Denryoku K.K.
Meiji Seimei Hoken Sogo K.K.
Kanegafuchi Diezel K.K.
Sumida Diezel K.K.
Mitsubishi Kogyo K.K.
Taihei Kogyo K.K.
Chiyoda Ginko
Yowa Fudosan K.K.
Kanto Fudosan K.K.
Higashi Nippon Jukogyo K.K.
Naka Nippon Jukogyo K.K.
Nishi Nippon Jukogyo K.K.
Asahi Glass K.K.
Shinko Rayon K.K.
Nippon Kasei Kogyo K.K.
Mitsubishi Kaiun K.K.
Tokyo Kozai K.K.
Nagasaki Seiko K.K.
Asahi Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Mitsui Tanko K.K.
Kamiooka Kozan K.K.
Toyo Seiki K.K.
Tokyo Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Mizuho Kinzoku Kogyo K.K.
Shin Naigai Cotton K.K.
Nippon Suiryoku Kogyo K.K.
Tokyo Senpaku K.K.
Shin Nikkoku Kogyo K.K.
Kyowa Ginko
Nippon Musen K.K.
Nagano Nippon Musen K.K.
Suwa Nippon Musen K.K.
Ueda Nippon Musen K.K.
Nippon Kentetsu K.K.
K.K. Nippon Seikoshō
Pine Machine K.K.
Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo K.K.
Nippon Seimei Hoken Sogo K.K.
Yahata Seitetsu K.K.
Fuji Seitetsu K.K.
Kita Nippon Seitetsu K.K.
Nittetsu Kisen K.K.
Harima Taika Renga K.K.
Nippon Soda K.K.
Nisso Kagaku Kogyo K.K.
Nisso Seiko K.K.
Nisso Tanko K.K.
Nissan Kagaku Kogyo K.K.

Former Names of Companies

Nissan Kagaku Kogyo K.K.
Nissan Jukogyo K.K.
Nomura Ginko
Nomura Shintaku K.K.
Oji Seishi K.K.

Oki Denki K.K.
Okura Doboku K.K.
Okura Sangyo K.K.
Okura Kogyo K.K.
Otani Jukodyo K.K.
Rikagaku Kenkyusho
Riken Kogyo K.K.

Sanki Kogyo K.K.
Seika Kogyo K.K.

Showa Hikoki K.K.

Showa Nosan Kako K.K.
Sumitomo Aluminium K.K.
Sumitomo Ginko
Sumitomo Honsha

Sumitomo Shintaku K.K.
Tachikawa Kokuki K.K.
Teikoku Seimei Hoken K.K.

Tohoku Haiden K.K.

Tohoku Shinko Pulp K.K.
Tokyo Shibaura Denki K.K.

New Names of Affiliated Companies

Nippon Ushi K.K.
Nissan Jidosha K.K.
Daiwa Ginko
joined to Daiwa Ginko
Honshu Seishi K.K.
Tomakomai Seishi K.K.
Jujo Seishi K.K.
Oki Denki Kogyo K.K.
Daisei Kensetsu K.K.
Naigai Tsusho K.K.
Chuo Tatemono K.K.
Otani Kogyo K.K.
Kagaku Kenkyusho
Shin Riken Kogyo K.K.
Niigata Kogyo K.K.
Riken Kozai K.K.
Rikagaku Kogyo K.K.
Riken Seiko K.K.
Riken Kashiwazaki Piston Ring K.K.
Riken Maebashi Piston Ring K.K.
Kumagaya Chutetsu K.K.
Sanwa Kogyo K.K.
Riko Kinzoku Kogyo K.K.
Daiken Kogyo K.K.
Sanki Kogyo K.K.
Seika Kogyo K.K.
Besshi Kogyo K.K.
Besshi Hyakkaten
Besshi Kensetsu K.K.
Showa Seisakusho
Showa Mokuzai Kigyo K.K.
Showa Kogyo K.K.
Sanraku Shuzo K.K.
Toya Aluminum K.K.
Osaka Ginko
Hokkai Norin K.K.
Shikoku Ringyo K.K.
Kyushu Norin K.K.
Fuso Norin K.K.
Fuji Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Tachihi Kogyo K.K.
Asahi Seimei Hoken Sogo K.
Toyo Rayon K.K.
Chuo Sen-i K.K.
Hokkaido Denryoku K.K.
Tohoku Denryoku K.K.
Tohoku Pulp K.K.
Tokyo Denki K.K.
Kitashiba Denki K.K.
Showa Kasei Kogyo K.K.
Seibutsu Rikagaku Kenkyusho
Tokyo Dento Kigu K.K.
Seiken Seiyaku K.K.
Adachi Seikosho

Former Names of Companies**New Names of Affiliated Companies**

Tokyo Shibaura Denki K.K.

Tangaroi Kogyo K.K.
Tokyo Denki Glass K.K.
Tokyo Denki Kigu K.K.
Teikoku Kasei K.K.
Tokyo Rozai K.K.

Tokyo Shibaura Koki K.K.

Tokyo Denki Musen K.K.
Nishishiba Denki K.K.
Shibaura Koki K.K.
Shibaura Kikai Seisakusho
Shibaura Seiki Kogyo K.K.
Shibaura Kiki K.K.

Tokyo Shibaura Kyodo Kogyo K.K.

Shibaura Kyodo Kogyo K.K.

Tokyo Shoken K.K.

Nippon Shoken Kinyu K.K.

Toyota Jidosha K.K.

Toyota Jidosha K.K.

Aichi Horo K.K.

Nippon Denso K.K.

Minsei Boseki K.K.

LEADING CORPORATIONS CREATED BY DISSOLUTION OF MAJOR ZAIBATSU TRADERS

The dissolution of the zaibatsu trading companies was followed by the fragmentation of their activities into 290 separate corporations. These were created largely to enable the staff of the Mitsui Bussan (later 170 companies) and Mitsubishi Shoji (later 120 companies) to continue conducting operations they had formerly performed in the original parent companies (see Chap. 5, Case I).

In August 1952, the major companies formed by the dissolution were as follows:

1. The Mitsui Bussan:

<u>Company Name</u>	<u>Capital, thousands of yen</u>	<u>President</u>	<u>Former Post with Mitsui</u>
Daiichi Bussan	400,000	Yatsutaro Niizeki	Representative
Daiichi Tsusho	150,000	Tadashi Okamoto	Manager, Nagoya Branch; liquidator, main office
Muromachi Bussan	150,000	Toshio Hirajima	Chief, Hardware Dept.
Nippon Kikai Boeki	250,000	Kyo Hironaka	Chief, Machinery Dept.
Goyo Boeki	60,000	Shoji Hashimoto	Chief, Business Dept.
Taiyo Shosha	60,000	Takeo Munakata	Chief, Transportation Dept.
Zeneraru Bussan	150,000	Seizo Imai	Chief, Personnel Dept.
Tokyo Shokuhin	70,000	Hisatake Rikishi	Deputy-chief, Food Dept.
Sanshin Sen'i	50,000	Yonekei Nakamura	Auditor
Toho Bussan	50,000	Yoshio Terao	Director, Subway
Kyokuto Bussan	70,000	Shinji Okada	Manager, Tientsin Branch

2. The Mitsubishi Shoji:

<u>Company Name</u>	<u>Capital, thousands of yen</u>	<u>President</u>	<u>Former post, with Mitsubishi</u>
Tozai Koeki	150,000	Kanzo Tanaka	President
Tokyo Boeki	170,000	Ichiro Hattori	President

<u>Company Name</u>	<u>Capital, thousands of yen</u>	<u>President</u>	<u>Former post, with Mitsubishi</u>
Fuji Shoji	170,000	Katsujiro Takagaki	President
Shoko Shoji	100,000	Ken Kobayashi	Chief, 2nd Sect., Metal Dept.

It is interesting to note that these new companies were striving to reunite again as the Occupation ended. Already amalgamation had been effected among companies of the Mitsubishi Shoji origin. The Tozai Koeki, Tokyo Boeki and Fuji Shoji, which started business in March 1952, are actually combinations of four smaller companies:

Tozai Koeki	Kyowa Koeki*	(general merchandise)
	Shin-Nippon Tsusho	(machinery, metal)
	Toko Shoji	(lumber; farm and marine fertilizer)
	Zenrin Boeki	(wool)
Tokyo Boeki (newly created by merger)	Taihei Shoko	(general merchandise)
	Santo Shoji	(metal; machinery)
	Seiwa Shoji	(machinery)
	Asahi Koeki	(sugar refining)
Fuji Shoji (newly created by merger)	Marunouchi Shoji	(steel; metals)
	Kyokuto Shoji	(textiles)
	Meiko Shoji	(machinery; farm and marine products; nonferrous metals; oils and fats)
	Miyako Shoji	(general merchandise; transportation; warehouse)

Among companies of the Mitsui Bussan origin, too, moves for amalgamation were undertaken. There was first a move to amalgamate Daiichi Tsusho, Tokyo Shokuhin, Sanshin Seni, and Kyokuto Bussan, and negotiations were then made among these four companies to establish definite conditions of amalgamation. Another move for merger was made by Daiichi Bussan, Nippon Kikai Boeki, Muromachi Bussan, and others, but the latter group has taken less definite shape than the former.

In connection with the moves for amalgamation, the titles of the now-defunct, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, have come into question. As soon as the use of these titles was permitted, the Nitto Soko Tatemono (Nitto Warehouse and Building Company, capital, 90 million yen), the secondary company of the Mitsui Bussan which took over the real estate branch of that concern, changed its name to Mitsui Bussan. Thus, this company, though small and insignificant, can go by the name "Mitsui Bussan."

*This company changed its name after the other three companies were merged into it.

The same applies to the title Mitsubishi Shoji, which was to be adopted by the Kowa Jitsugyo, a secondary company of the Mitsubishi Shoji. In any case, it is expected that these moves for amalgamation will create problems because of the reappearance of these world-famous company titles in misleading forms.

RETURN OF PURGEES IN KEY INDUSTRIES

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

<u>Name of Company and Officers</u>	<u>Post from which Purged</u>	<u>Position, April 1952</u>
Toyo Boseki		
Keizo Seki	Vice-Pres.	Chman., Bd. of Dir.
Toyosaburo Taniguchi	Pres.	Vice-Pres.
Tamezo Yabuta	Man. Dir.	Vice-Pres.
Takejiro Shindo	Man. Dir.	Vice-Pres.
Kanegafuchi Boseki		
Tsunejiro Hiraga	Man. Dir.	Man. Dir.
Dai Nippon Boseki		
Gengo Koderu	Chman., Bd. of Dir.	Adv.
Kuzuyoshi Mimura	Pres.	Adv.
Juzo Tashiro	Dir.	Aud. (subsequently died)
Kureha Boseki		
Tomizo Inoue	Pres.	Pres.
Tetsuzo Ueba	Man. Dir.	Man. Dir.
Shikishima Boseki		
Mitsugu Yamauchi	Pres.	Adv.
Asahi Kasei		
Tomochika Hori	Pres.	Chman., Bd. of Dir.
Toyo Reigon		
Shigeiki Tashiro	Pres.	Chman., Bd. of Dir.

THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

<u>Name of Company and Officers</u>	<u>Post from which Purged</u>	<u>Position, April 1952</u>
Nitto Kagaku		
Aiichiro Fujiyama	Pres.	Pres.
Mitsubishi Kasei		
Kamesabura Ikeda	Pres.	Vice-pres., Kagaku Kogyokai (Chemical Industry Assoc.)
Shin-Nippon Chisso		
Naosaburo Enami	Pres.	Adv
Eitaro Kaneda	Vice-pres.	Chman., Bd. of Dir.
Muneki Shiraiishi	Man. Dir.	Pres.
Takeo Oishi	Man. Dir.	Vice-pres.

<u>Name of Company and Officers</u>	<u>Post from which Purged</u>	<u>Position, April 1952</u>
Showa Denko Satoru Mori	Pres.	Pres., Nihon Yakin Kogyo (Japan Metallurgical Industries)
Masao Anzai	Man. Dir.	Vice-pres., Chugai Sei Yaku expected to return to Showa Denko
Nippon Soda Teiji Owada	Pres.	Chman., Bd. of Dir.

THE MACHINE TOOLS INDUSTRY

<u>Name</u>	<u>Post from which Purged</u>	<u>Position, April 1952</u>
Yoshinari Kawai	Minister of Welfare	Pres., Komatsu Seisaku (Engineering Works)
Soji Yamamoto	Pres., Nissan Motors Co.	Pres., Nippei Sangyo; Pres., Fuji Jidosha (Motor Car Co.)
Takeshi Kajii	Pres., Nippon Denki (Elec. Co.)	Pres., Tokyo Gas & Elec. Co.
Daigoro Yasukawa	Pres., Yasukawa Denki	Chman., Bd. of Dir., Nippon Denki
Kaheita Okazaki	Secy, Bank of Japan	Chman., Bd. of Dir., Yasukawa Denki
Tsutomu Ishihara	Exec. Dir., Nippei Sangyo	Pres., Ikegai Tokko (Iron Works)
Ryojiro Kawabata	Man. Dir., Nissan Motors	Exec. Dir., Nippei Sangyo
Kiyoshi Goko	Pres., Mitsubishi Juko (Heavy Ind.)	Dir., Nippei Sangyo
Kamejiro Takeuchi	Exec. Dir., Manshuran Hitachi Engineering Works	Pres., Heiki Seisan Kyoryokukai (Munitions Assn.)
Seiichi Akita	Man. Dir., Hitachi Works	Dir., Hitachi Eng. Works
Kunio Baba	Exec. Dir., Hitachi Works	Dir., Hitachi Works
Naosaburo Tukao	Vice-pres., Hitachi Works	Adv., Hitachi Works
Toyoharu Tsumori	Pres., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co.	Adv., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co.
Immei Kawamura	Exec. Dir., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co.	Pres., Tokyo Seuki Kigu Kai (Elec. Appliance Assn.)
Kenjiro Kaneko	Vice-Pres., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co.	Pres., Nippon Toreidingu (Trading Co.)
Kazuo Aoki	Min. of Greater East Asiatic Affairs	Dir., Sagami Seisaku (Precision Mach.)
Shinsuke Kishi	Min. of Munitions	Dir., Sagami Seisaku (Precision Mach.)
Arata Ninomiya	Pres., Asano Bussan	Dir., Sagami Seisaku (Precision Mach.)
Keizo Shibuzawa	Min. of Finance	Dir., Nippon Denki
Chosai Saeki	Pres., Nippon Denki	Adv., Nippon Denki
Yasujiro Niwa	Man. Dir., Nippon Denki	Dir., Nippon Denki
Kametaro Fujishima	Dir., Tokyo Shibaura Denki	Pres., Shibaura Kitai

<u>Name</u>	<u>Post from which Purged</u>	<u>Position, April 1952</u>
Kiichiro Tanabe	Man. Dir., Numazu Helki (Munitions)	Dir., Shibaura Kitai
Masakichi Kubo	Vice-Pres., Tokyo Shibaura Denki	Pres., Shibaura Kyodo Kogyokai (Coop. Ind. Assn.)
Suekichi Nakagawa	Pres., Furukawa Denko	Adv., Furukawa Denko
Manjiro Yoshimura	Pres., Fuji Denki	Adv., Fuji Denki
Shoji Arai	Pres., Nippon Hassoden (Elec. Prod. Generating Co.)	Chman., Bd. of Dir., Tokyo Denki
Ichizo Kohayashi	Pres., Toho Motion Picture Co.	Adv., Toko Denki
Genshichi Asahara	Pres., Nissan Motor Co.	Pres., Nissan Motor Co.
Ryozo Asano	Pres., Nippon Kokan (Steel Pipe)	Pres., Kayaha Kogyo
Noboru Niwa	Pres., Toyo Bearing Co.	Pres., Toyo Unpanki (Con- veyor Mfg. Co.)
Genshiro Kubota	Pres., Kubota Tekko	Adv., Kubota Tekko
Shungo Kawabata	Man. Dir., Kubota Tekko	Man. Dir., Kubota Tekko
Eikichi Terada	Man. Dir., Dai-Nippon Boseki (Spinning)	Dir., Osaka Setsa Zoki

Appendix H
POST-PURGE ACTIVITIES OF PURGEES
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INVESTIGATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF PURGEES IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS *

General Election of Members of the House of Representatives, February 1949

Since there was every reason to believe that the purgees, who were formerly influential figures in the bureaucratic and political circles, would carry out active or behind-the-scenes maneuverings to develop the election to the advantage of their own faction or party by taking advantage of various opportunities, the authorities, as a preliminary measure to prevent violations, cautioned the purgees and the people in general in each prefecture against violation of the Purge Directive, through the medium of local newspapers, radio, etc. and, at the same time, kept the purgees under surveillance.

The number of cases investigated by the authorities in each prefecture before the election on the basis of information, anonymous communications or the findings of the investigation is as follows: Tokyo, 119 cases; Aomori, 72; Fukuoka, 46; Kagoshima, 45; Yamaguchi, 44; Wakayama, 40; Niigata, 30; and Nagano, 21 cases.

The number of cases investigated in other prefectures was less than twenty and Kanagawa, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Hokkaido had one case each. The prefectures with no cases for investigation numbered seven, including Aichi and Saitama. The prefectures whose cases were relatively small in number despite the existence of large cities were Osaka with five, Kyoto with two, and Kanagawa with one, respectively. It is worthy of note that there were no cases in Aichi. The total number of cases was 606.

The over-all result of the investigation, as revealed after the general election, was as follows:

1. Cases in which accusations were filed with the public procurator's office for alleged violations—10
2. Cases of alleged violations acquitted with admonitions in consideration of extenuating circumstances—2
3. Cases not constituting violations—24

It is believed that the comparatively small number of serious violations is attributable to the preventive measures taken by the authorities before the election.

General Election of Members of the House of Councilors, June 1950.

In view of the result of the investigation in the above-mentioned election of members of the House of Representatives, the authorities placed emphasis on preventive measures prior to this election.

To assure maximum results, the investigation was enforced in two phases: first period—from 20 April to election day; second period—from the day following the election to 30 June.

The over-all result of the investigation in this election was:

1. Cases in which accusations were filed with the public procurator's Office for alleged violations—10
2. Cases of alleged violations acquitted with admonitions in consideration of extenuating circumstances—4
3. Cases not constituting violations—49

Election of Assemblymen and Chiefs of Local Public Entities, April 1951.

This was an unprecedented large-scale election as a result of enforcement of local autonomy in Japan, the number of candidates was 247,491 and those elected totaled 178,285.

At that time, there was a debate on the peace issue and widespread rumors relative to easing of the purge directive which appeared to have substantial psychological effects

*Prepared by Tsugunao Kubo and Haruo Hasegawa of SIB.

upon the purges. In view of this, the authorities conceived even more thorough measures to prevent violations than in the previous elections and, in conjunction with the special investigation, emphasized the policy of preliminary guidance.

The investigation was carried out during these three periods: first period, from mid-February through the time of the election notice; second period, from the election notice through the election; and the third period, from the election to one month after.

Efforts were exerted to guide and enlighten the people and to disseminate information.

The over-all result of the investigation in this election was:

1. Cases in which accusations were filed with the public procurator's office for alleged violations—18
2. Cases of alleged violations acquitted with admonitions in consideration of extenuating circumstances—44
3. Cases not constituting violations—16

INVESTIGATION OF MOVEMENTS OF PURGED FORMER MILITARY POLICE, ARMY AND NAVY CAREER OFFICERS*

With the recent changes in the domestic and international situation, a special investigation of the major activities of former military police and army and navy career officers, subject to the purge memorandum, was conducted in April and May, 1952. Results of this investigation are summarized below:

General Tendency

In facing squarely the reality of a democratic Japan, where peace has been restored 4 years after termination of the war, the question arises as to whether former military police and army and navy career officers are inactive only for the present or whether they are changing from a militaristic to a revolutionary coloring. The evidence suggests a negative answer. Some of them are procommunist and leftists, while others are anticommunists and rightists; the general tendency is that with the change in the political and economic situation at home and abroad, their old way of thinking is gradually being eliminated and they are leading the normal lives of citizens who conform to their surroundings.

These men (with the exception of those in the younger age group who are more than capable of earning a livelihood and others with special financial resources) are generally leading miserable lives and they are concerned with self-preservation; they are not in any position to think about the maintenance of a militaristic country or the re-establishment of an ultranationalistic state. An investigation of the economic positions of these men indicates that some of them are low-paid employees, such as clerical workers in companies and factories, factory hands, coal miners, and day laborers and that some are engaged in small businesses, such as teashops, restaurants, or food stores.

A nation-wide survey reveals that the majority of them have returned to farming, but that most of them are small or pioneer farmers. Some of the former officers, NCOs and enlisted men, who have returned to farming, have organized pioneer groups and are now engaged in the cultivation of former military grounds in various parts of the country. Instances of their establishing firms by getting together old army friends, by cooperating with those formerly connected with civilian organizations attached to the army, or former munition makers, or instances of ex-soldiers working in groups in the same organization can also be found (for example, salesmen of the Asahi Life Insurance Company's branch office in Kochi Ken).

*Prepared by Tsugunao Kubo and Haruo Hasegawa of SIB.

However, no ideological movement of special importance is to be seen. Many former senior officers have been tried as war-crimes suspects, and even those who have not been tried are the cynosure of all classes of society; very few of them are attempting to launch activities in close cooperation with each other. However, among former young officers, who have lost their spiritual foothold because of despondency and the sudden environmental changes created by the defeat, there are those who devote themselves to leftist movements. Although this is believed to be limited to a very small minority, its significance is potentially great, and the outcome of its development along with changes in the international political situation is difficult to forecast.

Cases of Violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 Exposed by the Investigation

The total number of cases of violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 exposed by this investigation exceeded forty. Of the above cases, five were forwarded to the attorney-general for prosecution, twelve constituted criminal offenses, but were disposed of with reprimands, and approximately thirty are now under further investigation or surveillance.

The important cases are as follows:

A. Cases referred to the attorney-general for prosecution:

1. Sakujiro Kojima (aged 41, former military police warrant officer), Niigata Ken. He is suspected of engaging in political activities. He attended the general meeting for exposure of the scandal of the agricultural cooperative association in Shibata Shi which was sponsored by the Shibata cell of the Japan Communist party at the Gomen (the primary school) in the same city and expressed opinions in order to break up the general meeting; he attended the round-table conference of people of the same city which was held at the above-mentioned school and denounced the municipal assembly and demanded the presence of the city assembly chairman at the people's rally which was scheduled to be held at a later date.

2. Mamoru Tanaka (aged 37, former army career officer), Kagawa Ken. He is suspected of engaging in political activities. Representing the Society for the Protection of Livelihood (Seikatsu O Mamoru Kai) organized by more than 300 people of Zentsuji Machi, in the same prefecture, he demanded that the mayor of the town and others revise the residence tax, advised the resignation of the assembly chairman, and moreover, petitioned the Marugame Taxation Office.

3. Sadao Ando (aged 49, former military police), Miyagi Ken. He is suspected of conducting an election campaign in support of Tamisaburo Sato who ran in the by-election of 25 February 1949 for assembly member of the same prefecture.

4. Masayoshi Yoneda (aged 30, former military police sergeant), Shiga Ken. He is suspected of engaging in political activities. He attended the people's rally of Nagahama Shi, sponsored by the Association for the Improvement of Nagahama Shi (Nagahama Shi Meiro Kisei Domei), held at the Daitsuji Temple in the same city, became vice-chairman and introduced the resolution denouncing corruption in the municipal police, demanding democratization of the tax office, and opposing the vicious taxes. Moreover, he attended the public hearing, held under the auspices of the same city at the Nagahama Primary School, and accused several city assembly members of failing to attend the aforementioned city people's rally.

5. Akira Endo (aged 29, former army captain), Kanagawa Ken. He is suspected of engaging in the political activities described below. He became a member of the Japan Communist party and was despatched to the Shohoku District in Kanagawa Ken to become permanent secretary. During his activity in this capacity he attended the town people's rally for dismissal of the problem of management of the police, which was held at the Aiya (or Soya) public hall in Hatano Machi, and criticized police administration. Moreover, he attended and presided over the meeting for delivery of political views by Communist party Diet member Takeo Imano, held at the Dairymen's

hall, (Nyugyo Kokai), and the town people's rally for democratization of Hatano Machi. On another occasion, he demanded that the mayor and deputy mayor of the town place public pawnbrokers under town control.

B. Cases wherein criminal offenses were committed but only reprimands issued:

1. Former military policeman (aged 26), Gifu Ken. The person in question is suspected of delivering election speeches in support of Yuzo Watanabe, who stood from the second electoral district of the same prefecture for the general election for the House of Representatives held in January 1949. However, there were mistakes in the charges that the subject came within the purview of the memorandum.

2. Former army career officer (aged 42), Iwate Ken. The subject, together with the deputy mayor of Kanegasaki Machi of the same prefecture and the staff of the Flood Control Countermeasure Research Committee, visited the Construction Ministry agency in charge of conservation of the upper reaches Kitakami River to petition for restoration of flood-damaged areas. However, no aggressive actions were noticed.

3. Former military policeman (aged 26), Aomori Ken. Even after the subject was designated as coming within the purview of the memorandum during his employment with the Farmland Development Section of the Aomori Prefectural Office, he did not resign and continued to hold his position. This, however, was due to his ignorance of the pertinent laws and regulations.

4. Former army career officer (aged 64), Hokkaido. His previous service as secretary of the Development and Production Increase Headquarters Office, and auxiliary organ of the Hokkaido Prefectural Office, was disclosed, but he has already resigned.

5. Former army career officer (aged 37), Hokkaido. His previous service with the Asahikawa Municipal Hospital in his official capacity as engineer of the city office became known, but he had already resigned.

6. Former career officer (aged 28), Tokyo To. The previous employment of the subject and 23 others in some news agency became known, but this was due to their ignorance of the pertinent laws and regulations. They have resigned.

7. Former military policeman (aged 30), Hokkaido. He and another employee were working in a news agency, but this was due to their ignorance of the pertinent laws and regulations. They have resigned.

8. Former career officer, Hokkaido. His previous position as a reporter of the Abashiri Newspaper office was disclosed, but the above employment was due to ignorance of the pertinent laws and regulations. He has already resigned.

9. Former naval career officer, Shizuoka Ken. He is suspected of engaging in political activities. Together with members of the fishery association, he launched a movement for the dissolution of the fishery association in connection with the problem of the right to crop *Gelidium anansii* in Imura. However, no political motive is evident.

10. Former naval career officer and military policeman, respectively. Yamaguchi Ken. They were forced to resign as officers of the labor union.

11. Former army career officer, Nara Ken. He was forced to resign as inspector and chairman of the agricultural cooperation association.

12. Former second lieutenant (aged 28), Tochigi Ken. The subject engaged in political activities. He became a member of the Japan Communist party, held responsible positions in the district committee and cell, led antitax demonstration, attended and presided over the villagers' rallies held under the sponsorship of the above-mentioned cell in various parts of the country, and attacked and criticized the village administration. Moreover, he posted a number of bills stating that delivery of hemp must be stopped. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the subject had been charged as falling within the purview of the memorandum as a result of his failure to go through the necessary formalities due to a misunderstanding.

C. Cases under investigation or surveillance.

1. Former army career lieutenant general (aged 59), Kagawa Ken. He is suspected of engaging in political activities because he has accepted invitations to lecture at round-table and lecture meetings and frequently has attended such meetings.

2. Former naval career officer (aged 56), Nagano Ken. As chief secretary of the farmers' association in Itogawa, Ta-mura of the Japan Farmers' Union he is suspected of calling on the Susaka Tax Office to appeal for a reduction of taxes, together with members of the association.

3. Former lieutenant commander (aged 53), Kochi Ken. Together with more than 300 members of the society for the Realization of Reconstruction of Kochi Shi in the same prefecture, he is believed to have called on the mayor of Kochi Shi to voice opposition to the city planning and took charge of guiding 50 representatives of the society.

4. Former military police officer, Kyoto Fu. He is suspected of conducting an election campaign in support of Sueo Kobayashi, who stood from the second electoral district of Kyoto Fu for the general election of the House of Representatives held in January 1949.

5. Former naval career officer (aged 26), Yamaguchi Prefecture. He is presently Secretary of the Bofu Chapter of the Japan Socialist party and is under surveillance.

6. Former military career officer, Mie Prefecture. Suspicion is attached to his participation in political activities in connection with the land reform problem.

7. Former naval career officer, Miyazaki Prefecture. He is alleged to have participated in the election campaigns for members of the Prefectural School Board in October 1948 and the House of Representatives in January 1949, respectively.

8. Former military police private (aged 43), Niigata Prefecture. Suspicion is attached to his connection with the editorial work of the Shibata Times, a weekly newspaper.

9. Former army career officer (aged 34), Niigata Prefecture. He is alleged to have participated in a labor dispute as a union officer.

10. Three former army career officers of Niigata Prefecture. They are suspected of holding positions as officers of organizations.

Ideological Trends.

Since this investigation was carried out extensively and covered diverse investigation items, partly with a view to collecting data for future investigations, the probe into ideological trends is not entirely free of superficialities.

Results of the investigation show that ideological trends can be classified as follows:

A. There are some among former young, company grade or junior officers who are active in the left-wing movement.

B. Field grade (senior) officers who constituted the backbone of military life generally abstain from leftist movements.

C. Those advanced in age are moderates. In contrast with leftists, extreme rightists may appear among those referred to under "A," and from this may be obtained many helpful suggestions for future investigation.

A. Those connected with left-wing movements:

1. Former career lieutenant commander of Yamaguchi Prefecture. He is a leader in charge of the cultural activities of the Kuka cell of the Japan Communist party and engaged in the publication of the cell's newspaper and posters. Also, he is guiding students by placing his home at the disposal of the Students' Cultural Group. In addition, he is suspected of participating in the election campaign for a certain Communist candidate during the general election for the House of Representatives held in January 1949.

2. Former career army second lieutenant of Okayama Prefecture, former career captain (army) of Nara Prefecture. It is rumored in the neighborhood that they are members of the Communist party.

3. Former career lieutenant commander of Kagoshima Prefecture. He is alleged to have joined the Chikaku Chiran cell of the Japan Communist party.

4. Former captain (military police) of Kagoshima Prefecture. It is rumored that he joined the Japan Communist party.

5. Former leading private (military police) (aged 27) of Osaka Prefecture. He is accused of being an organizer and a member of the Japan Communist party by leading factory workers.

6. Former second lieutenant (aged 25) of Fukuoka Prefecture. He became an officer of the Toyo Chinaware Company Workers' Union (Toyo Toki K. K. Jugyoin Kumiai) and published an article charging the Yoshida Cabinet in the Tokon, the union organ. He is alleged to be a sympathizer of the Communist party.

B. Those connected with right-wing movements:

1. Former career officer first lieutenant (aged 27) of Yamaguchi Prefecture. He is attempting to check the Communist party's union activities by organizing the League for Protecting Enterprise in the Tokuyama Iron Plate Co., Ltd. (Tokuyama Teppan K. K.) but, at present the League is only a research organization.

2. Former career officer first lieutenant (aged 26) of Yamaguchi Prefecture. He was formerly an executive member of the Youth Department of the above-mentioned company and also a member of the Japan Communist party. He left the party and broke with the union movement.

3. Former career first lieutenant (aged 29) of Yamaguchi Prefecture. By organizing an association called The Taiyo Kai of the Miyata coal mine workers, he is attempting to check the activities of the Communist party.

4. Former career lieutenant (navy) of Hiroshima Prefecture. He joined the Kure Youth Renovation party.

5. Former career major of Okayama Prefecture. He joined the Comrades Association of the Eastern District of Asakuchi County (Asakuchi-Gun Tobu Doshikai) which is alleged to be a rightist organization.

6. Former career ensign of Saga Prefecture. Formerly a member of the national Salvation and Restoration Comrades Society (Kyukoku Ishin Doshikai). After dissolution of the above organization, he still maintains contact with former colleagues and his aggressive actions can be observed.

7. Former career lieutenant (navy) (aged 26) of Osaka Prefecture. He organized the Haryu Society, a rightist organization, by approaching former naval officers, both seniors and classmates, in Kyoto, Maizuru and Kobe. He collected large sums of money from merchants on the pretext of soliciting funds for the purchase of war materials. He was arrested and sentenced for fraud.

8. Former members of the Loyalist True-hearted Solidarity Society (Kinno Makoto Musubi, dissolved) and a certain ex-lieutenant general, a member of the former Special Service Agency, are approaching ex-soldiers, including three former regular officers and many NCOs, and men who belong to the Japan Land Development Corps in Okayama Prefecture and are attempting to persuade them to join the rightist movements. On the other hand, there is an indication that leftists are also approaching these ex-soldiers.

C. Those connected with other organizations:

1. Former career army officer (aged 25) of Hokkaido. He is engaging in missionary work as a member of the Matsusakae Branch of the Japan Kannonkyo Association (a Buddhist faith).

2. Former career naval officer of Miyazaki Prefecture. He is engaged in propagation as a missionary of the above faith.

3. Former career naval captain of Akita Prefecture. He is attached to the Akita Chapter of the Buddhist League for the Salvation of the World (Bukkyo Gensei Kyugo Remmei) engaging in the dissemination of the Terumi Treatment (Electrotherapeutics).

4. Former career colonel of Kagoshima Prefecture. He started the INPA movement (establishing an antiwar, new, cultural country) and is planning to collect signatures, distribute badges, and publish pamphlets containing questions and answers exchanged through correspondence.

5. Former career colonel (aged 64) of Tokyo. He was a member of the Jupiter Society (Mokusei Kai) which was organized by graduates of the 18th term of the Military Academy, but was voluntarily dissolved on 18 July 1949.

6. Former career major (aged 61) of Tokyo. He organized a society in 1933 with the objective of establishing a bright and peaceful organization through an understanding of the true meaning of the Japanese language and through an understanding of the universal truth. He is now engaged in propaganda activity.

INVESTIGATION OF ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR OFFICERS OF TERRORISTIC ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNATED BY PURGE MEMORANDUM*

A special investigation was carried out simultaneously throughout the nation in November 1949, in accord with the Special Investigation Bureau's 2d Section Directive No. 870, dated 20 October 1949, which was addressed to all prefectural governors. Based on the reports of the results from the various prefectures, the movements of those individuals falling within the scope of the memorandum will be studied as outlined below and may be used as reference for future surveys.

Purpose of the Survey

The greatest obstacle preventing the speedy democratization of Japan is the existence of extreme political elements — both left and right. In addition to left-wing elements, those right-wing organizations and individuals that advocated imperialism during World War II and led the Japanese people into committing the fatal mistake of attempting to conquer the world, should be eliminated from the sphere of the democratic political reorganization of Japan.

In accord with the 4 January 1946 SCAP Memorandum, more than 180 ultranationalistic and racketeer organizations were dissolved, and more than 3000 leaders of these organizations were designated as subject to the provisions of the memorandum.

Among the persons designated under the memorandum are: Akira Inoue, alias Nissho; Kosaburo Tachibana; Tatsuo Amano; and others who played leading roles in such incidents as the God-sent Troops (Shimpei Tai), the Blood Brotherhood Alliance (Ketsumeitai), and the subversive revolutionary incidents. There is a danger that these persons will attempt to achieve their long-cherished political ambitions by taking advantage of changes in the international political situation or by preserving their strength by collaborating with their former comrades.

Recent newspaper accounts report several incidents such as travel of former soldiers to Formosa and Go Kairetsu's smuggling which allegedly involved individuals falling under Category C. It was considered necessary, therefore, to expose individual political movements of those within the sphere of the memorandum and, at the same time, to become familiar with other purgee activities as well. For this reason, the survey was carried out simultaneously throughout the country.

Method of Survey

The Special Investigation Bureau selected more than 3000 persons who were categorized under Category C from the roster of those within the purview of the memorandum compiled by the Inspection Section of the Prime Minister's Office. A roster of these names was prepared and copies distributed to the prefectures. Using the roster for basic data, the prefectures surveyed the organizations within the area of their jurisdiction and conducted thorough investigations of the individuals listed. The investigations covered these points:

1. Name, date of birth, permanent domicile, and present address.
2. Why individuals are subject to investigation under the memorandum.
3. Present occupation and income status.
4. Relatives and friends.
5. Past and present organization affiliation and position in these organizations.
6. Recent ideological trends.
7. Recent movements.

*This section prepared by Tsugunao Kubo and Haruo Hasegawa of SIB.

8. Person or organization giving behind-the-scene support and the source of any funds received.

9. Other pertinent matters.

Results of the Survey: Summary

The majority of Category C organizations have headquarters in Tokyo, while a few also have headquarters in local districts. Lower echelon organizations are located throughout the nation, their number depending on the birthplaces of the key men and their political strength in that locality.

Examples are: organizations affiliated with the former East Asia League (Toa Renmei), which center around Yamagata Ken; the Association for the Opening of the Tenkan (Tenkan Dakai Kiseikai), centering around Yamaguchi Ken; and the Dark Ocean Society (Genyosha), centering around Fukuoka Ken. Their subordinate and sister organizations are scattered throughout the country. Branches of the East Asia League are to be found in large numbers in the Yamagata, Iwate, and Aomori Districts, centering around the Shonai Region, Yamagata Ken. Organizations having nation-wide branch offices are the Great Japan True-hearted Society (Dai-Nihon Sekisei Kai), Great Japan Renovation Society (Dai-Nihon Isshin Kai), Ultrationalist Party (Kokusui Taishuto), Far Eastern Comrades Association (Toho Doshi Kai), Loyalist True-hearted Solidarity Society (Kinno Majoto Musubi), Great Japan Production Party (Dai-Nihon Seisan To), Higher Ethics Society (Meirin Kai) and Yamato Solidarity Society (Yamato Musubi).

Former officers of Category C organizations may be roughly classified into the following: (a) those who have joined the rightist movements in accord with their policy and doctrine and (b) those who joined from a whimsical desire for fame and worship of the powerful, or those who exploited the organizations to achieve their own political ambitions.

The former still adhere to their old ideas and, moreover, there is a movement to preserve the power of the "old days" or rather an attempt to promote its development in a different form. For example, there is an indication that some organizations affiliated with the former East Asia League (Toa Renmei) are conducting a nationwide movement on behalf of the Enzyme Fertilizer Diffusion Association (Koso-Hiryo Fukyu Kai) which is associated with a religious organization called the National Glory Society (Seika Kai).

The latter group (the politically ambitious), on the other hand, have generally lost interest in political affairs due to the sudden changes in postwar conditions and are totally engrossed in their own occupations. In reviewing the occupations of these two groups it is noted that the majority of the rightists who were the so-called campaigners for their political groups were barred from political circles since they came under the scope of the memorandum. They were thus forced to sink to the lower classes and spend their full time earning their livelihood as farmers, small traders, or manufacturers. Former doctors, landowners, and local bosses are now leading a comparatively secure life, enjoying the confidence of the local people, and even, in some cases, exerting political influence. Most of them assume a negative stand, however, since they are fully aware that the general public does not think highly of this. The general tendency of the group can be summarized in this way:

a. They are still incapable of shaking off their ultranationalistic ideas and are taking every opportunity to contact former comrades or rightist leaders.

b. They are anticommunist. Some apparently are approaching anticommunist organizations in an effort to establish coalitions (for example, Renovation League (Kakushin Domei) of Hiroshima Prefecture).

c. They have strong aspirations to restore traditional emperor system, which has not, however, come to the fore as an open movement. A glimpse of their ideas can be seen from the thoughts expressed by some in their poetry, a traditional Japanese medium for expressing ideas.

In general, the activities of those individuals classified under Item C follow this trend: although they played an active part in past political movements, they are now assuming a wait-and-see attitude in keeping with the times. Also, since their ideas have exerted little influence on postwar rightist organizations, they are inclined to be nihilistic and indifferent to realities following the defeat of Japan. It may be said that this is an inevitable result of the situation as they see it, and that they are watching for an opportunity to make the most of the experiences and political ethics gained from past movements.

Other Movements

Members of the Former East Asia League. This organization has members scattered throughout the country with a comparatively strong bond of unity existing between former comrades. Most individuals affiliated with the organization have some interest in political issues while others are almost fanatical in their beliefs. There are also some who, in pursuance of the last will of Kanji Ishihara, a deceased leader, are assuming leadership among the young people in the local communities (for example, Asakichi Kamagata in Yamagata). Successor organizations to the League are the Enzyme Fertilizer Diffusion Association and the National Glory Society. Former colleagues are seemingly maintaining close contact with each other as evidenced by the large attendance at the funeral rites for Kanji Ishihara.

League Members in Yamagata Prefecture. Members of this branch of the League are divided into two factions. One is termed the idealistic group, and follows the ideas of the late Kanji Ishihara. Asakichi Kamagata, Makoto Kiriya, Yoshimichi Komatsu, and Tatsuo Fuchigami are members of this faction which has many supporters in the Honjo district. The National Glory Society forms the nucleus of the organization which is not however, engaged in political activities. The other faction, called the realists, are under the leadership of Takeo Kimura, and are opposed to the idealists. Members are individually connected with Kimura through the medium of the three teachings bequeathed by Ishihara (Ishi Sambu), but apparently no bond ties the individuals together as comrades.

Members of the Former Loyalist True-hearted Solidarity Society (Kinno Makoto Musubi Kai), Kagawa Prefecture. Chikamasa who was a central figure among the members of the Society, is abstaining from openly participating in activities, but behind the scenes he is exchanging views with former members, through Waka poems, using the Shiratama Waka Poem Research Group (Shiratama Tanka Kai) as the center of his organization; moreover, he seems to be establishing close relationships with members of the Youth League for National Salvation (Kyukoku Seinen Remmei), an anti-communist organization.

Members of the Former Great Japan Loyalist Comrades Society (Dai-Nippon Kinno Doshi Kai), Hiroshima Prefecture. Shozo Kadota, who was a member of the central committee of this Society, is the true leader of the Renovation Youth party (Kakushin Seinen To) located at Naka Yamate Cho. Kadota and Shi Kure are planning to launch a cultural movement among the students by organizing the Fuyo Cultural Circle (Fuyo Bunka Sakuru). It is reported that he is associated with an organization called the Society of Eccentrics (Kijin Kai).

Masaharu Kageyama. Mr. Kageyama is head of the former Daito Juku (a private school) and has as the nucleus of his following the Fuji Kakai (Fuji Japanese Poem Society). He has ultranationalistic ideas based on Shintoism and seems to be in close contact with members of local poetry groups affiliated with the Society in various parts of the country. By expressing his intentions through poems, he is attempting to establish connections with his former colleagues. He travels throughout the country accompanied by a former pupil, Yukio Hasegawa, and others.

Members of the Former Loyalist Comrades Society (Kinno Doshikai), Yamaguchi Prefecture. An ex-member of this society has joined the Yamaguchi Prefectural Committee of the Japan Revolution Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades Society (Nihon Kakumei

TABLE H1
ACTIVITIES OF LEADING OFFICERS

Name (Reason for designation)	Address	Occupation	Activities
Tomo Sagoya Member, Patriots Society (Aikokuha)	Tokyo-to, Minato-ku, Shiba, Shirogane Dai-machi, 1-8 (Sagoya himself lives in Osaka, while his family is in Tokyo)	Chairman, Board of Directors, Japan Natural Resources Development Co., Ltd. (Nippon Shigen Kogyo K. K., Osaka) Public Opinion Survey Institute (c/o Sanwa Bldg Osaka-shi, Higashi-ku, Kawara-machi, 3-chome)	Collecting information on right- and left-wing movements. Visited by members of the Yamato Party (Yamato To).
Kenichiro Honma President, Great East Asia Association (Daitoa Kyokai)	Ibaraki Ken, Tsuchura-shi, Manabe-cho 2-131	Unknown	Unknown
Kozaburo Tachibana Head of the Aikyojuku (A private school, literally Love-thy-Birthplace School)	Ibaraki-ken, Mito-shi Shinhara-machi, 3-039	Director of an association	Running a dairy-farm with 10 former colleagues.
Joe Hanawa Permanent secretary, Aikyo Juku (see above)	Ibaraki-ken, Nishi Ibaraki-gun Kasama-cho, Kasama 1-362-4	Unknown	Same as Tachibana
Tadaaki Konuma Leader, Blood Brotherhood Alliance (Ketsuwei Dan)	Ibaraki-ken, Mito-shi Matsumoto-cho, 2-413	President, Konuma Co. Director of the Akabono Industrial Co.	Seemingly associated with former colleagues.
Goro Obata (former name, Mishinuma) Leader, Blood Brotherhood Alliance (see above)	Ibaraki-ken, Higashi Ibaraki-gun, Ishihama-cho, 6-944-60	President, Nakaminato Shipbuilding Co.	Seemingly associated with Nissho Inoue, Taku Mikami, and others.
Akira Inoue Undesignated activities in Gamma Prefecture	Appears to be changing his quarters frequently in Gamma and Shirooka Prefectures	Unknown	Constantly traveling in various districts.
Fuji Furuuchi Leader, Blood Brotherhood Alliance (see above)	Tchigi-ken, Hage-gun Nakagawa-mura, Kawai, 405	Agricultural work	Skill maintaining teacher-pupil relation with Akira Inoue.

Kikuhata Doshi Kai) and, while assisting the chairman, he is carrying on considerably active movements, mainly in Toyoura County where right-wing influence is strong.

Alleged Violations of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 - Revealed by Special Investigation

The special investigation obtained clues to the alleged violations described below. Each case will be disposed of after a further investigation.

1. Tokyo: Chief Councilor of the former Nationalist League (Kodusui Domei). Suspected of holding a position with a press agency as President of the Japan Correspondents Association (Nippon Tsushin Kai).
2. Saitama Prefecture: Chief of the Chichibu Chapter of the former Great Japan Production party (Dai Nippon Seisan To). Suspected of holding a position in a press agency as Chief of the Kumagaya Branch office in Saitama Prefecture.
3. Gumma Prefecture: Chief of the Tochigi Chapter of the former Eastern Society (Tohokai). Suspected of political activities in connection with the agricultural land reform of the village in which he resides.
4. Hiroshima Prefecture: Person in charge of the Kure Branch School of Keiko Juku, a private school, literally Light-of-Mercy School attached to the Great Japan True-hearted Society (Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai). Suspected of political activities through affiliation with a local political party.
5. Hiroshima Prefecture: Member of Central Committee of the former Great Japan Loyalist Comrades Society (Dai Nippon Kinno Doshikai). Suspected of political activities through affiliation with a local political party.
6. Tottori Prefecture: Secretary-General of the former Great Japan Production Party (Dai Nippon Sei Santo) and head of the former Seisei Juku, a private school, literally Creation School. Suspected of political activities in connection with school affairs as a director of the Parent Teachers Association.
7. Nara Prefecture: General Director of the Nara Chapter of the Higher Ethics Society (Meirin Kai). Suspected of political activities as a director of the Nara Buddhist Association.
8. Akita Prefecture: Chief of the Hiraga Chapter of the former Far Eastern Comrades Association (Toho Doshi Kai). Suspected of joining a local leftist party and engaging in political activities.
9. Iwate Prefecture: Preparation Committee of the Iwate Chapter of the former Jimmu Society. Suspected of holding a position in a press agency in connection with the Daily Iwate.
10. Aomori Prefecture: Chief of the former Southern District Shinto Youth Group attached to the Eastern Society (Toho Kai Nambu Shinto Seinentai). Suspected of holding a position as chief of an agricultural cooperative association.
11. Fukuoka Prefecture: Assistant Chief of the Kyoto Gun Chapter of the former Great Japan True-hearted Society (Dai Nippon Seikisei Kai). Suspected of political activities in connection with the secret recruitment of soldiers for the Chinese nationalist Army in Formosa.
12. Fukuoka Prefecture: Member of the Central Committee of the former Great Japan Renovation Society (Dai Nippon Isshin Kai). Suspected of political activities as a member of the New Japan Youth Party (Shin Nippon Seinen To).
13. Akita Prefecture: Chief of a chapter of the East Asia League Comrades Association (Toa Renmei Doshi kai). Suspected of publishing the Rural News (Denen Tsushin).

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS - US TERMS

CCD - Civil Censorship Detachment
CIC - Counterintelligence Corps
CI&E - Civil Information and Education
CIS - Civil Intelligence Corps
CLO - Central Liaison Office
ESS - Economic and Scientific Section
FEC - Far Eastern Command
GHQ - General Headquarters
GS - Government Section
Nisei - US citizens, 2d generation Japanese
SIB - Special Investigation Bureau (Attorney General's Office)
Stars and Stripes - Occupation newspaper published by the Army
SCAP - Supreme Commander Allied Powers

JAPANESE TERMS

Aigo Juku - Native Place Loving Academy
Aikoku Seiji Domei - Patriotic Political Alliance of Yokohama
Aikoku Seinen Yushi Inkai - Ardent Patriotic Youth Committee
Aishi - Love of City League
Akahata - Red Flag
Aomori-ken Kaitaku Kyokai - Aomori Prefectural Land Development Commission

Buraku - Local government subdivision, roughly a hamlet
Butokukai - Military Virtue Association

Cho - 2.45 acres
Chonai - Street or district
Chokunin - Imperial appointments: 2d civil service rank
Chosenjin Domei - League of Korean Residents in Japan

Dai Nippon Butokukai - Great Japan Military Virtue Association
Dai Nippon Seiji Kai - Great Japan Political Association
Dai Nippon Koa Domei - Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance
Daito Juku - Greater East Asia Academy
Dokokai - Political faction
Dokuritsu Juyu Remmei - Independence and Liberty League

Eta - "Untouchable" class

Genyosha - Dark Ocean Society

Gyochisha - Secret society

Hanba - Lodging house

Himorogi Juku - Solidarity or Fence Academy

IRAA - Imperial Rule Assistance Association

IRA - Imperial Reserve Association

IRAPS - Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society

Imate-ken Kochi Kyokai - Iitate Prefectural Arable Land Association

Jichicho - Bureau of Self Government

Jimmu Kai - Emperor Jimmu Society

Kabuki - A form of classic Japanese drama

Kaishinto - Present Progressive Party

Kawasuji Katagi - Riverside men's spirit

Keiaido jun Remmei - Secret society

Kempei Tai - Secret police

Ketsumei Dan - Blood Brotherhood Alliance

Kinomaru Domei Kai - Rising Sun Alliance

Kippu - Tickets

Koa Seinun Undo Hombu - Asian Development Youth Movement

Kodoku - Imperial Way Society

Kodo - Journal

Kokka Shakaito - National Society Party

Kokka Shakaihuge Bakumei - National Socialistic Science League

Kokusui Taishuto - Secret society, later joined to Kokusui Domei

Kokumin Tokkotai - People's Special Attack Corps

Kokusui Domei - Secret society, later Zenroku Kenrossha Domei

Kotokan Shiken - Higher civil service examination

Kurikomiryo - Brokerage fee

Kyokucho - Bureau chief

Meiro Kai - Serenity Society

Minseito - Prewar Japanese party

Nayagashima - Shed bosses

Nippon Shinpo To - Japan Progressive party

Nishi Nippon Kensetsu Kokumin Domei - Western Japan Reconstruction National Alliance

Oyabun-kobun - Boss-follower, a relationship of "feudalistic" origins and loyalties, literally "parent-role-child-role."

Rikkin Yogo Doshi Kai - Constitutional Protection Comrade Society

Romin Kesshitai - Peasant Suicide Corps

Sainihonsha - New Japan Society

Sampo - Rightist Labor movement

Seiyukai Party - Prewar right-wing party

Sekai Nokao - Face of the World

Shimbun - Newspaper

Shimpo To or Shimpoto - Original Progressive party
Shijo-kai - Standing Committee for City Administration
Shinnin - Imperial appointments of highest rank
Sekine Gumi - Secret society
Seiji Shikin Kisei Ho - Political Funds Control Law
Shoki Ippa - Secret society
Shinjuku - Suburb of Tokyo where Communist party has a branch
Shadanhoin Rodokaei Kenkyujo - Labor Scientific Management Research Society
Showa - Present Emperor's reign, lit., "enlightenment."
Sonjo Dishikai - Loyalist Comrades Society
Suiheisha - Equality Society
Suiyokai - Wednesday Society

Tsubo - Small plot equal in size to two rice floor mats. One tsubo equals 6 X 6 ft.

Tan - 300 tsubo

Toyo Keizai Shimpo - Oriental Economic News

Taisei Yokusankei - Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA)

Toa Remmei - East Asia League

Tojigaku Kenkyujo - Institute for the Study of the Science of Government

Taisei Yokusan Seijikai - Political Association of Great Japan

Takako Kosaku Kumiai Chuokai - Tobacco Manufacturer's organization

Toho Kaiga - Easter conference

Wakayama-ken Shoba Kyokai - Wakayama Prefectural Fire Preservation Association

Yamato Society - Japan Society

Yamato Hokokukai - Yamato Patriotic Society

Yokusan Seiji Kai - Government wartime political coalition

Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogikai - National Service Political Council

Zenno - All Japan Farmer's Union

Zenrokukenrosha Domei - All Japan Worker's Alliance

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